Combating Export Violations to Iran

By Matthew Levitt

Last month a senior U.S. delegation visited key world capitals to stress the risks incurred by foreign banks as they continue to do business with Iran. Indeed, Tehran -- mirroring the Iranian banking sector's deceptive financial practices -- has successfully evaded sanctions by setting up a network of front companies, procurement agents, businesses, and transporters as a means of procuring controlled military and dual-use technologies. Of equal concern are the re-export loopholes through which Iran has successfully evaded sanctions in the past.

Yesterday, the Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence hosted Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security and Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) John T. Morton to discuss "Combating Export Violations to Iran: The Role of ICE Homeland Security Investigations." This event was part of the Institute's ongoing lecture series with senior U.S. counterterrorism officials.

Mr. Morton's prepared remarks are available here. An audio link is available here.

Updates on Abu Bakar Bashir

By Zachary Abuza

Despite an online petition drive and pressure campaign to release militant cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, both the evidence against him and the Indonesian authorities' confidence in prosecuting him are greater than the two other times he was arrested. For an analysis of the case against Bashir and what the recent investigations tell us about the state of Jemaah Islamiyah, please see my recent article "Fall of the Teflon Terrorist?" in the Australia/Israel Review.

WaPo: "Bitter religious fighting over mosque plays right into al-Qaeda's hands"

By Evan Kohlmann

The Washington Post kindly invited me to contribute a column to their "On Faith" blog regarding the latest controversy over the proposed Cordoba House Muslim community center in New York near the site of "Ground Zero." See below:

http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2010/08/by_evan_f_kohlmann_the.html

Bitter religious fighting over mosque plays right into al-Qaeda's hands

By Evan F. Kohlmann

The way that renowned Christian preacher Franklin Graham portrayed Muslims on a nationally-televised news broadcast last week, one would imagine that Islam is some sort of insidious cancer devouring the civilized world. Between his nauseating description of Islam as a "devilish" faith and his nonsensical discussion about the "Muslim seed" of President Obama, Graham managed to shame not only himself, but also the very democratic, pluralist ideals that we as Americans aspire to. I watched in disgust as his uninterrupted tirade continued, and it suddenly occurred to me that some viewers might not recognize that Graham speaks only for a prejudiced minority, whose numbers have been artificially inflated by the cynical recent tactics of various political candidates. To that segment of viewers, Graham instead represents the larger, ugly face of American xenophobia and prejudice--and in doing so, this self-described "man of God" has merely provided extra ammunition for al-Qaeda to use in its battle against us, our constitutional ideals, and our ethos of personal freedom...

Arming Hizballah?: The debate about US Military Assistance to Lebanon

By David Schenker

The fatal cross-border shooting of an Israeli soldier by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in early August has sparked a debate in Washington as to the utility of providing Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to the Lebanese military. Since 2005, the US has obligated over $700 million to the army, which has less than 50,000 troops.

The robust program was started in the immediate aftermath of the Cedar Revolution. But much has changed since then, and Congress is asking whether the policy is still appropriate. Of particular concern is the relationship of the Shiite militia Hizballah to the standing army. There is a history of collusion and cooperation, which, although not surprising, remains problematic.

Over the past week, I’ve written two articles discussing in detail US funding for the LAF. The first piece provides the history and context of US military assistance to the LAF. The second addresses the policy issues and asks what, if anything, should cause the US to downgrade its FMF program with Lebanon.

The Real Truth About Al Qaeda in Afghanistan

By James Gordon Meek

Ever since senior Obama administration advisers such as CIA Director Leon Panetta and Vice President Biden admitted that Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan was minimal, with fewer than 100 operatives believed to be on the ground there, war critics have complained the President has little justification for escalating the U.S. commitment there.

But the inside-the-Beltway political debate underscores a fundamental misunderstanding of what Al Qaeda’s role in Afghanistan — which Osama Bin Laden’s minions call “Khorasan” — truly has been, according to Special Operations commanders and troops on the ground.

Today’s Washington Post makes hay of the fact that Al Qaeda is barely mentioned in the 76,000 pages of war files released last month by WikiLeaks. The story overlooks two key facts: (1) The voluminous files are mostly “sigact” - “significant action” - combat reports dispatched as incidents happened; and (2) troops who faced Arabs in battle fighting alongside Afghan “Taliban” rarely knew, even after they had killed them, that they were up against non-Afghan opponents.

Critics also fail to realize that a single Al Qaeda operative’s knowledge and experience in guerrilla and terror tactics is of incalculable value as a force multiplier to the Taliban.

Al Qaeda’s Arab operatives are considered a fearless elite. They have knowledge of Islam that makes them seem like religious scholars to many Pashtun tribesmen, who they have led into battle in the past. After Al Qaeda fled Afghanistan’s cities with their Taliban government allies in 2001-02, they reorganized and reconstituted their ranks in Pakistan. Al Qaeda returned to the fight in 2004, training, equipping and often leading or joining Haqqani fighters in battle along the eastern border.

Their presence was often suggested by the tactics used by Haqqani fighters, the cells’ skill at accurately firing AK-47s and RPGs, and gear such as armor-piercing ammo, body armor and night-vision devices.

Today, as they withstand CIA’s withering drone onslaught in Pakistan’s tribal belt, the Arabs are more low-key in their Afghan ops than they were in the past. The CIA’s targeted killing of Skeik Mustafa Abu al-Yazid after he left Mir Ali may also have impacted their activities on the other side of the AfPak.

Arabs from Al Qaeda still fund and train the Taliban, but no longer lead operations from the front, Army Col. Donald C. Bolduc, who leads the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, told me in his office at Bagram Airfield this month.

“They’re considered much too valuable to risk that,” said another U.S. official in the war zone.

During the winter, Taliban leaders ensconced in Pakistan send in Al Qaeda operatives to train their fighters in bombmaking tradecraft during the lull in fighting, sources said.

“The Pakistani madrassahs are still the big recruiting and training place. The Afghans go to a madrassah in Pakistan, where an Arab is typically like the dean, or headmaster, and learn how to fight,” the official told me. “Then the Afghan goes back home and teaches others to build bombs or fight — and gets paid handsomely for it.”

Meanwhile, as we reported in today's New York Daily News, Taliban leaders in key Afghanistan districts have been "shwacking" each other (Special Forces term) to jockey for "permanent" leadership positions after the U.S. begins to draw down forces next year.

The Militant Myth

By Farhana Qazi

On Saturday morning, I appeared on Fox News to discuss whether militants in Pakistan could recruit among the millions of flood victims. The story began with a statement made by US Senator John Kerry, the first American official to visit the flood-hit areas, “We don’t want additional jihadists (and) extremists coming out of a crisis.” The idea that the human tragedy in Pakistan is a “frightening opening for the Taliban” is not yet substantiated but certainly makes for sensational news. We should remember that the Taliban is and has never been a charitable organization. The Taliban does not have a social services institute, and instead, boasts of enforcing and providing justice and order in the form of Qazi courts (i.e., harsh interpretation of Shariah law).

While American security may be linked to Pakistan’s future, the militant myth serves Pakistan’s political elite all too well. The message of militants moving into grief-stricken areas is largely being propagated by the Pakistani Government. This past week, at a United Nations donor meeting, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureishi stated “The massive upheaval caused by the floods and the economic losses suffered by the millions of Pakistanis must be addressed urgently. We cannot allow this catastrophe to become an opportunity for the terrorists." Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari makes a similar argument. In his visit to flood-hit areas with Kerry, Zardari said at a joint press conference, “The children could be put in camps to be trained as the terrorists of tomorrow.”

There is little truth to these arguments. So why make them? In reality, Pakistan needs increased aid to rise above its latest crisis of crises. By invoking the rise of the militant mafia, Pakistan can woo America into donating millions more. Pakistan can convince the international aid community that it cannot survive without its support. But more aid to the Pakistani government is met with great skepticism and suspicion.

Keeping Tabs on Terrorists: Aaron Mannes & V.S. Subrahmanian in the "Wall Street Journal"

By Aaron Mannes

The Wall Street Journal Asia just posted an article my colleague V.S. Subrahmanian and I wrote on the ongoing game of catch-up intelligence agencies are forced to play as terrorists quickly adopt and adapt the latest communications technologies.

Keeping Tabs on Terrorists
India's spat with the maker of the Blackberry underlines a broader technological challenge for intelligence agencies.

By V.S. SUBRAHMANIAN AND AARON MANNES

The war on terror came closer to home this month, when the Indian government pressured Canadian company Research in Motion to hand over encryption keys for its popular Blackberry device. New Delhi claims terrorists are using the company's secure networks for covert communications. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia—all of which face significant terror threats—have also expressed concern. But such moves may do more harm than good.

India's concern is clearly justified: Terrorists are using new media sources to facilitate covert communications that—directly or indirectly—have led to numerous deaths. According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incident Tracking System, Pakistan-based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), perpetrator of the deadly 2008 Mumbai attacks, is responsible for over 700 fatalities in India during the last five years.

But publicly browbeating RIM into providing its encryption keys is a Pyrrhic victory. Terrorist organizations can only survive if they study the capabilities of their adversaries and adapt. Terrorist organizations backed by intelligence agencies tend to be even more sophisticated. If terrorists know that Blackberries are monitored, terrorists will not employ them—or will do so only in combination with other channels of communication in order to evade intelligence agencies. The much-publicized nature of India's threat to Blackberry thus may well have compromised potential operational gains.

LeT's Mumbai attack shows how quickly terrorists adapt to new technology.

Read the full article here.

Viktor Bout, the Merchant of Death, to Stand Trial in the United States

By Douglas Farah

Well, it is a day I had long predicted would never occur, but I have never been happier to be wrong. A Thai appeals court today ruled the Russian weapons merchant Viktor Bout could be extradited to stand trial in the United States.

Bout not only supplied the Taliban and the FARC in Colombia, both designated terrorist organizations. He also helped arm some of the most murderous regimes and groups in Africa (Charles Taylor, Mubut Sese Seko the RUF, UNITA etc.) and the genocidal regime in Sudan. These actions are detailed in my book, with Stephen Braun, Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes and the Man Who Makes War Possible (Wiley 2007).

Bout should be extradited in about a week, although the Russian government has already made clear it will do what it can to slow the process even further. There is, under Thai law, no further appeal allowed of this ruling.

Bout's extradition request is based on an elaborate and successful operation by the DEA's Special Operations Division, where informants posed as representatives of the FARC seeking to buy weapons to fight in Colombia, and specifically to kill Americans. Bout took the bait and arrived in Bangkok March 2008 with a laptop full of pictures of the toys he could deliver to them, including unmanned drones, RPGs and the promise of surface-to-air missiles.

When he finished his presentation he was arrested by Thai police, having said more than sufficient to build a case. He then spent the next 2.5 years fighting extradition to the United States, where similar cases, using similar tactics, have led to quick convictions.
My full blog is here.

The End of Pakistan?

By Aaron Mannes

Although it is wracked by floods, violence, and other tragedies, this small story from rural Pakistan caught my eye recently:

SHIKARPUR: Ten people were killed in an armed clash between Magsi and Qambrani tribes in the jurisdiction of Golodaro police station on Thursday evening.

According to sources, the gunbattle followed a brawl over irrigation of paddy crops near Kuddan village.

The sources said the Qambrani tribe lost seven men while the Magsi tribe lost three.

Sanaullah Abbasi, a senior police official, told Dawn five bodies had been recovered.

A big police contingent stormed the village late in the evening and brought the situation under control.

This story encapsulates several important realities about Pakistan: declining resources, the increasing violence over the declining resources and the inability of the government to control this violence.

This is a miniature of the violence that has recently wracked Karachi – also fundamentally a conflict over land and resources. These riots are unfortunately endemic to Pakistan’s commercial capital. Just two years ago, on the weekend that the world watched as Mumbai suffered from an overflow of Pakistan’s internal disorder, Karachi was suffering its own outbreak of violence in which at least 40 people were killed, not unlike the recent fighting.

The great fear of the West is Pakistan falling under the control of radical Islamists. The great fear of Pakistan’s leadership is the state fracturing (this is probably #2 for the West – a nuclear Yugoslavia.) But the endemic low level violence suggests another possibility, the state dissolving – a nuclear Somalia.

Medium and Long-Term Dangers
Meanwhile the terrible flooding is testing the capabilities of Pakistan’s institutions and they are failing. Their record at providing immediate relief is mediocre. But the floods have destroyed Pakistan’s crops, so that the country (which is already broke) will be forced to buy or beg food abroad. It will be several years before Pakistan’s agricultural production will return to their previous levels – so food shortages will be an ongoing problem. Even without the crisis food security was a problem in Pakistan. In addition, cotton crops, essential to Pakistan’s major export industry – textiles – have also been devastated. All of this can only further weaken an already precarious economy.

Assuming the floods and their aftermath do not lead to state dissolution it certainly weakens Pakistan for facing its longer-term crises.

Read the full post here.

Latest Developments with Hizballah

By David Schenker

Last night, Hizballah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah gave a press conference (via satellite) in which he claimed that Israel was responsible for the 2005 murder of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri. The conference was held amidst rising speculation that Hizballahis will be indicted by the Special Tribunal on Lebanon for the Hariri assassination.

Nearly all of what Nasrallah laid out as “proof” that Israel was involved in the killing was circumstantial, but he did make an interesting comment suggesting that Hizballah had been able to intercept transmissions from Israeli UAVs operating over Lebanon.

Nasrallah’s gambit to implicate Israel comes amidst increasing tensions on the Lebanese-Israeli border following an incident last week in which an Israeli Lt. Colonel was killed by a Lebanese sniper—whether from the Lebanese Armed Forces or Hizballah. The attack prompted an Israeli retaliation against an LAF outpost. More details on the operation can be found here.

Yesterday, an article of mine ran in The New Republic, discussing Hizballah’s latest campaign in Dahyia to convince women to wear the veil. The campaign suggests that Hizballah’s long-ago articulated goal of transforming Lebanon into a Shiite Islamic State ala Iran is alive and well.

Status Check on the Struggle against Global Terrorism

By Matthew Levitt

The State Department's recently released Country Reports on Terrorism 2010 (CRT 2010) reveals several important trends in the evolution of global terrorism. The good news is that al-Qaeda is facing significant pressure, even as the organization and its affiliates and followers retain the intent and capability to carry out attacks. What remains to be seen is if the dispersion of the global jihadist threat from the heart of the Middle East to South Asia and Africa foreshadows organizational decline or revival for al-Qaeda itself and the radical jihadist ideology it espouses. How governments and civil society alike organize to contend with the changing threat will be central to this determination. The bad news is that governments and civil society remain woefully ineffective at reducing the spread and appeal of radical Islamist extremism.

For all the tactical counterterrorism successes documented in CRT 2010, the most significant finding of the report is the one that is missing: strategic counterterrorism success remains elusive. Al-Qaeda senior leadership has been in hiding and on the run for several years now, but despite losing safe havens and facing hard financial times, the organization and its affiliates and like-minded followers remain capable of recruiting new foot soldiers and executing attacks. Unfortunately, despite the sharp rise in terrorist plots and cases of homegrown radicalization, specific policies and programs aimed squarely at countering the radical narrative remain few and far between. It is axiomatic that the United States cannot simply capture and kill its way out of the problem; it must find a way to take on the extremist ideology directly. As concluded by the recent Washington Institute strategic report Fighting the Ideological Battle, failure to recognize the impact of radical Islamism -- an extremist political ideology separate and apart from Islam as a religion -- as a key driver framing, motivating, and justifying violent extremism hampers efforts to intervene early enough in the radicalization process to prevent individuals from becoming violent.

The full article is available here.

Militant Cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir Detained, Again

By Kenneth Conboy

With the Islamic fasting month set to start at mid-week, and the country's independence day to be celebrated next week, there has been a flurry of terrorism-related arrests in Indonesia during recent days. On Saturday, five suspects were arrested at three locations across West Java province and accused of plotting a car bomb attack; one explosive device, and chemicals for further bombs, were found at one of the sites.

Although Indonesian terrorists have not succeeded at car bombing since 2004, this has not been for want of trying. Last August, the police disrupted a plot to ram a car bomb into the president's motorcade. And two months ago, further arrests halted plans to use a car bomb against the Danish embassy (located in an office tower that houses other embassies and many Western firms) as belated payback for the cartoon controversy.

The target of the latest car bomb plot has not yet been revealed, though the current crop of Indonesian terrorists appears to be splitting its wrath between both Western interests (especially those of the U.S., U.K., and Australia) and the Indonesian government.

Tied to all this, the police this morning announced that they had detained militant cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Ba'aysir had been convicted in 2005 on terrorism-related charges, but was freed a year later after his case was overturned. There have been frequent reports in the press that members of his radical Islamic organization, which goes by the initials JAT, were involved in paramilitary training in Aceh earlier this year, and were among the five arrested this past weekend.

Islamic Radicalism Rising in India’s Southern State!

By Animesh Roul

The prevalence of anti India ideology, especially in northeastern states and J&K is not uncommon. But in States like Kerala, it is certainly worrisome for India’s internal security and integrity. Though there are such activities by the SIMI since long, recent evidence shows the organization like the Popular Front of India (PFI) calls India its enemy openly and asks for 'total Muslim empowerment' in the state.

Late last month, reports indicated that PFI is holding Taliban style (Kangaroo) courts in the state. To recollect, this same Popular Front of India activists recently attacked a college teacher for setting question paper that had some references to Prophet Mohammed that allegedly hurt Muslim sentiments. On July 04, suspected PFI activists chopped off teacher’s right hand for this. It is also established that the PFI organized Freedom Parade on every Independence Day (August 15), and the radical group has backing of some political organization as well. Police investiagtions shows that there are other like minded groups also operating in the state.

The state chief minister recently said that PFI is aiming to convert Kerala into a Muslim majority state in the next 20 years and for achieving that goal, the outfit is pumping money to attract youth and give them weapons. They also try to convert youth from other communities and persuade them to marry Muslim girls (understandably part of the so called Love Jihad campaign).”

Following the July 04 attack on the teacher, police seized maps of at least three temples and CDs of Al-Qaida and Taliban training, along with country-made bombs, swords, knives during raids on some hideouts of PFI activists.

Terrorist group is one thing, but over ground radical originations like the Popular Front of India (PFI) which has been nurturing and spreading anti national ideals is really disturbing.

Indonesia Establishes New Counter-Terrorism Agency

By Kenneth Conboy

The Indonesian president on 16 July signed a decree establishing a new National Counter-Terrorism Agency that answers only to him. It is tasked with “preventing terrorism, protecting civilians, de-radicalizing terrorists, and building national preparedness.” It will be launched later this year, though no specific date has been set. Ansyad Mbai, who heads a counter-terrorism desk under the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, will likely initially serve as its caretaker chief. The agency will have its own budget and staff, including members seconded from the police, State Intelligence Agency, and military.

The new body has been established after the Indonesian government came under criticism following the July 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta. During this incident, several terrorist suspects were found to be repeat offenders—that is, they had been arrested once before and already underwent rehabilitation classes. Then this past February, more than a dozen terrorists released from detention joined a militant training camp in the jungles of Aceh. The new agency, therefore, will focus on ways of more effectively de-radicalizing captured terrorists. Meantime, Special Detachment 88, part of the Indonesian National Police, will continue to be the country’s primary counter-terrorism strike force.

Some rights groups have criticized the new body because of what they see as vague provisions in the presidential decree, and because they oppose the idea of military officers serving on the board.

Flashpoint Exclusive: Captive Pakistani Intel Officer Threatens to Reveal "Secret Game" Behind Afghan Conflict

By Evan Kohlmann

In the wake of the latest embarrassing disclosures about Pakistan's unhelpful role in the Afghan conflict, Flashpoint Global Partners has obtained an unpublished video of retired Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officer Colonel Imam Sultan Amir Tarar, who has been held hostage by militants in Pakistan’s tribal region since March 2010, when he arrived in the area alongside another former ISI officer Khalid Khwaja.

Tarar, a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war and a reputed expert on guerilla warfare, has acknowledged a long relationship with the Afghan Taliban and its leader Mullah Mohammed Omar—but has been far more critical of the Pakistani Taliban movement. During a recent New York Times interview, Tarar admonished the TTP and its leadership as “troublemakers” who should be “neutralized.”

In his latest video-recorded message, Colonel Imam Tarar claims that he has been kidnapped by “Lashkar Jhangvi al-Alami, Abdullah Mansour” faction and insists that the Pakistani government has done nothing to facilitate his release. If the government continues to refuse negotiations for his freedom, Tarar further threatens to disclose highly sensitive information about “the weaknesses of our nation” and the secret “game being played with Afghanistan, India, Russia, and America.”

Still images and an English transcript of the video of Colonel Sultan Amir Tarar are now available via the website of Flashpoint Global Partners - http://www.flashpoint-intel.com.

The Boston Cluster and Extended Connections: Case Study on Homegrown Radicalization

By Madeleine Gruen

The NEFA Foundation has released the 26th report in the “Target: America” series; a PowerPoint presentation on a cluster of men originally from the Boston area and their associates. Members of this cluster sought to join al-Qaida forces overseas to kill Americans and also contemplated an attack in a shopping center in the United States. Several participated in jihad by circulating jihadist propaganda to other Americans.

This case study provides insight into how U.S. citizens who sympathize with terrorists make connections with like-minded people on the internet, and through school and community activities. This case also provides insight into how American citizens arrange to access terrorist training camps overseas.

The PowerPoint can be viewed here.

Hezbollah Spies via Facebook

By Aaron Mannes

In an excellent article in The Washington Times, UPI’s Shaun Waterman described a “red team” activity in which a security consultant created a false persona on Facebook that appeared to be attractive young woman who was working in cyber defense. She quickly garnered hundreds of friends in the national security community, as well as job offers and invites to conferences. In the process she gathered a great deal of sensitive materials such as inadvertently exposed passwords.

This is not a hypothetical concern – Hezbollah (long a terrorism pioneer) has already employed this strategy. According to the Israeli news site MySay:

The Hizbullah agent pretended she was an Israeli girl named “Reut Zukerman”, “Reut” succeeded during several weeks to engage more then 200 reserve and active personnel.

The Hizbullah agent gained the trust of soldiers and officers that didn’t hesitate to confirm him as a “friend” once they saw he/she is friends with several of their friends from the same unit. Most of them assumed that “Reut” was just another person who served in that elite intelligence unit.

In this way, Hizbullah collected information about the unit’s activity, names and personal details of its personnel, the unit’s slang, and visual information on its bases. This user / agent using Facebook is an example of a trend called fakebook.

Implications

The first concern regarding incidents of this nature is the raw intelligence collected. But more than the data, it creates opportunities to gather even more data.

Read the full post here.

Flashpoint Partners Exclusive: Video of Times Square Bomber with Pakistani Taliban Commander

By Evan Kohlmann

Flashpoint Global Partners has released a previously unpublished video excerpt of a meeting between confessed Times Square bomb plotter Faisal Shahzad and the leader of the Pakistani Taliban Hakimullah Mehsud. During the undated video clip, Hakimullah and Shahzad are shown shaking hands and hugging, as Shahzad speaks in an overlaid audio track: "Today, along with the leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Hakimullah Mehsud and under the command of Amir al-Mumineen Mullah Mohammed Omar Mujahid (may Allah protect him), we are planning to wage an attack on your side, inshallah."

The video excerpt can be accessed via Flashpoint’s website: http://www.flashpoint-intel.com.

The Ghazi Brigade: Lal Masjid Episode Conitinues to Haunt Pakistan

By Animesh Roul

Last week I published one report on the Lal Masjid offshoot ‘Ghazi Brigade’, a relatively new comer and named after the slain radical Abdul Rashid Ghazi. The Ghazi Brigade has stepped up its Jihadi actvties recently in Pakistan primarily to enforce Islamic Shari’a in the country through the use of force and to punish those who stormed the mosque in July 2007.

"Little-Known Ghazi Brigade Now a Major Player in the Punjabi Jihad?", Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8 (28), July 16, 2010.

Abstract of the article:

A recent spurt in sectarian attacks in Pakistan has been blamed on a lethal but lesser known group affiliated with Taliban and al-Qaeda elements: the Ghazi Abdul Rashid Shaheed Brigade, also known as the Ghazi Brigade or Ghazi Force (Daily Times [Lahore], July 2). What was formed as an Islamic vigilante group has now emerged as a radical jihadi organization in response to the July 2007 Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) siege in Islamabad. Over one hundred religious students were killed by Pakistani security forces during the siege, including the mosque’s deputy leader, Abdul Rashid Ghazi. Thousands of mourners pledging their commitment to jihad thronged the funeral of Abdul Ghazi, held in his native village of Basti Abdullah in Punjab (PakTribune, July 12, 2007). Indeed, his death heralded the start of a neo-Taliban movement in Pakistan, with radical students calling for jihad against Pakistan and its allies.

The events at Lal Masjid prompted al-Qaeda's Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri to call for revenge attacks in Pakistan. Maulana Abdul Aziz, the brother of Rashid Ghazi, also issued a threat of “bloody revolution” in the country (Dawn, July 10, 2009). Addressing an Islamic gathering to commemorate the Lal Masjid standoff, an unidentified cleric said, “You killed one Ghazi. Here are thousands of Ghazis ready to sacrifice in the way of Allah.” In effect, the events at the mosque have unleashed a wave of suicide attacks across Pakistan.

According to intelligence sources, the organization is led by Maulana Niaz Raheem (a.k.a. Bilal), a former student at the Red Mosque’s Jamia Faridia seminary. Pakistani agencies have arrested a Ghazi Brigade terrorist identified as Fidaullah (a.k.a. Junaid) who was allegedly involved in the attacks on the Police Special Branch and the FC checkpoint in Islamabad. Fidaullah has been identified as one of the top strategists for the Ghazi Brigade, operating from the Galjo area in Hangu, part of the North-West Frontier Province (Geo TV, June 1, 2009). Two of his accomplices also involved in the FC checkpoint attack, Khairullah and Khurram Shahzad, were arrested on earlier occasions. Ghazi Brigade terrorists adopted decapitation as a tactic to instill fear among those civilians supporting security forces in the battle zones. Fidaullah himself beheaded three people publicly in Sultanwas and Pir Baba in Swat (The News [Islamabad], June 2, 2009).

Read Full Text Here

Arab Bank Case Ruling: A Victory for Victims of Terrorism

By Victor Comras

It looks like the 6 year old Linde v Arab Bank case may finally move into its trial on the merits phase following a ruling July 12th by US District Court Judge Nina Gershon that:

"The factual allegations of the complaints sufficiently support an inference that Arab Bank and the terrorist organizations were participants in a common plan under which Arab Bank would supply necessary financial services to the organizations which would themselves perform the violent acts. Administering the death and dismemberment benefit plan further supports not only the existence of an agreement but Arab Bank's knowing and intentional participation in the agreement's illegal goals. No more is required."

The case had been locked in its discovery phase for some time pending rulings on Arab Bank’s refusal to provide documentation concerning such financial transfers. Plaintiffs maintained that such documents, if provided, would establish that Arab Bank participated knowingly in this money raising and transferring scheme. Arab Bank’s attorneys maintained that they were precluded from providing such documents because of Jordanian and other country bank secrecy laws. The ruling reflects Judge Gershon’s determination that the refusal to comply with the court's order that such documents be made available to the plaintiffs pursuant to discovery requests merits legal sanctions against Arab Bank. And, the judge's instruction to the jury that they can draw the above inference from this lack of production of such documents is the appropriate remedy. This ruling is fully in line with legal precedent in such cases of non production of court ordered documents.

The Linde case was brought before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in July 2004 by six American families, victims of Palestinian terrorism in Israel during the Al Aqsa Intifada. They sued Jordan's Arab Bank under section 2333 of the Anti Terrorism Act of 1996 alleging that Arab Bank had encouraged such terrorism by disbursing millions of dollars in support payment for families of suicide bombers, which served as a further incentive for attacks.

Section 2333 provides that “Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue {in Federal Court} … and … recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.” The District Court also permitted foreign nationals to join the lawsuit via the Alien Torts Claims Act. Currently, more than 100 families and 700 individuals in the Linde case and related cases are seeking more than $1 billion in damages based on Arab Bank’s role in financially supporting terrorist activities. The foreign nationals consist mostly of Israeli citizens but also include Afghani, Argentinian, Australian, Belarusian, Canadian, French, Iranian, Iraqi, Peruvian, South African, Turkmenian, Ukranian, and Uzbeki citizens.

The payments were transferred by Arab Bank to and through several charities that allegedly serve as fronts for Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These funds were originally collected by two special committees established in Saudi Arabia with the stated intention of raising funds for the families of those carrying out suicide missions at the behest of the named terrorist organizations. Some of these funds were routed through Arab Bank’s New York office in order to convert the funds into U.S. dollars. The Palestinian charities named in the suit include, inter alia, the Popular Committee for Support of the Intifada (the “Popular Committee”), the Coalition of Benevolence (the “Coalition”), the Humanitarian Relief Association (the “HRA”), the Al-Ansar Society, and the Tulkarem Charitable Committee.

The Arab Bank case will likely move forward before a jury at the same time as Canada’s Parliament takes up new legislation that would also grant victims of terrorism the right to hold those that finance terrorism liable for damages. Final Parliamentary committee hearings on this legislation were held earlier this month, and passage of the act is expected when Parliament reconvenes in October. This is due in large part to the unceasing efforts of C-CAT, the Canadian Coalition Against Terrorism, which has become the leading voice for victims of terrorism in Canada. I had an opportunity to testify in the course of these hearings. A webcast of the hearings can be found here.

Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in U.S. Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism

By Matthew Levitt

As nonaffiliate terrorist actors begin to take center stage and al-Qaeda's core strength diminishes, it has become clear that America is at war with a larger enemy: the extremist ideology that fuels and supports Islamist violence. Unfortunately, the United States is not well equipped to fight on this ideological battleground, and U.S. efforts to confront the ideology worldwide have not kept pace with more successful military targeting of high-level al-Qaeda leaders.

In a new Washington Institute Strategic Report my co-authors and I argue that rather than avoid any mention of the religious motivation behind the terrorism of al-Qaeda and other like-minded organizations, the Obama administration should sharpen the distinction between the religion of Islam and the political ideology of radical Islamism to successfully defeat Islamist terrorism at its most fundamental source.

Engagement and counterterrorism are key elements of this comprehensive strategy, we argue, but the wide space between them must be addressed. Missing are the policies and programs that should suffuse the space between these two poles on the counterradicalization spectrum, including efforts to contest the extremist narrative of radicalizers, empower and network mainstream voices countering extremism, promote diversity of ideas and means of expression, and challenge extremist voices and ideas in
the public domain. Contesting the radical Islamist narrative does not mean arresting or banning despicable but protected speech; rather, it means openly contesting
extremist views by offering alternatives and fostering deeper ideological debate. The objective in either case is to strengthen the moderate center against the extremist pole and help Muslim communities become more resilient in confronting the challenge.

This report, Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in U.S. Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, follows on the Institute's 2009 bipartisan Presidential Task Force report Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization. It is a joint project of The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Project Fikra: Defeating Extremism through the Power of Ideas.

This new report recognizes the important steps the Obama administration has taken to address violent extremism and suggests ways to address remaining gaps in U.S. homeland security and foreign policy. The report has benefited from a series of interviews with administration officials at numerous cabinet level agencies and the White House and is the product of a small study group including myself, my Washington Institute colleague J Scott Carpenter, and former White House counterterrorism officials Steven Simon and Juan Zarate.

The complete report is available here.

Iran's Global Terrorist Reach

By Walid Phares

The United States became painfully aware of the threat posed by global jihadism after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Until that day, Iranian-backed terrorist networks, such as Hezbollah, were responsible for killing more American citizens than al-Qaeda. In the years since, the balance has been gradually tilting back towards Iran. In the words of former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, al-Qaeda may be the 'B' team of international terrorism, but Hezbollah is the 'A' team. Indeed, Iran's Khomeinists began their war on the U.S. and other democracies years before Osama bin Laden began his jihad.

The takeover of Iran's government in 1979 by radical Islamist forces faithful to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the breakthrough after which the so-called Islamic Revolution spread throughout the Middle East and beyond. The Khomeinist revolution is ideologically rooted in a radical Islamist doctrine that stands in opposition to the more traditional "Quietist" school of thought among Shia clerics. In a sense, the Khomeinists are the Shia world's equivalent of the Salafists within the Sunni world. The Islamist Shias are also jihadists, in the sense that they call for the establishment of a future Imamate, a Shia form of Islamic Caliphate, by any means necessarily, including what they coin as "Jihad," which practically means war.

Because it cannot project much conventional military power, Iran threatens the United States, Israel and other democracies by unconventional means. Through the use of its terrorist surrogates—such as Hezbollah—Tehran's reach extends around the world.

Iran

Syria

Update on the Insurgency in Southern Thailand

By Zachary Abuza

Last week, four bombs went off in southern Thailand, killing 10, including four soldiers and four paramilitaries. An additional four people were gunned down. Pundits decry the 88 killed in the Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok in May, yet more than 4,100 people have been killed, and nearly 7,000 wounded since the insurgency in southern Thailand began in January 2004; 160 have been killed and over 400 wounded in 2010 alone. Yet the conflict gets little attention in this Bangkok-centric nation, obsessed with the elite’s political machinations, despite the Bt 3 billion ($91 million) a year spent on curbing it.

The administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva pledged to resolve the crisis in the south when it came to power in December 2008. The south has long been the Democrat Party’s heartland, and they believed they had a softer and more nuanced approach. But the government soon became embroiled in a popular uprising over how it came to power and the south became a low priority.

Nonetheless, in the 18 months since the Abhisit administration has been in office, violence has come down. An average of 32 people a month are being killed, while 66 are wounded. In 2007, the peak of the violence, 4 people a day were being killed and 8 were being wounded. In the first half of 2010, the ratio was down to just under 24.3 people a month being killed and 67 wounded.

For the full report, please click here.

Terrorists: Nitwits or Masterminds?

By Aaron Mannes

Recently, in the Atlantic Monthly Daniel Byman and Christine Fair (two first-rate analysts) argue that the reality is that the terrorist enemies of the United States are not highly disciplined religious fanatics – but in fact are a bunch of nitwits. The article is interesting, provocative, and makes some important points. But we cannot dismiss the terrorists as nitwits quite yet – they’ve had failings in attacking the U.S. homeland directly, but they have also had some important successes.

Byman and Fair point out the many cases of terrorist incompetence such as the Times Square bomber, the UK doctors, and the Miami jihadis. In many regards, I agree with them. Terrorist groups are extremely constrained in their efforts to hit “far targets.” I’ve argued that this is a logistical issue. With intelligence agencies worldwide on high alert it is increasingly difficult to move operatives long distances. This complicates long-range terror strikes. Self-starters do not have the necessary skills and groups do not want to risk well-trained operatives on operations that will probably not succeed. The failed attacks on the West aren’t because the terrorists are stupid. What’s more they are adaptable. My argument continued that the danger was now in the realm of geopolitics – terrorists destabilizing and important country rather than carrying out direct attacks in the U.S. or the West.

Fair and Byman also state that the Taliban are similarly stupid. They frequently blow themselves up and also become intimate with livestock (this has been caught on tape by drones and other battlefield cameras). Maybe, but they are also giving the U.S. military a run for its money so discounting their capabilities seems unwise.

Read the full post here.

Two Major Middle East Terrorist Figures Die in their Safe Havens

By Michael B. Kraft

The deaths within days this weekend of two major figures behind major Middle East terrorist attacks and the possible death of a third last month should serve as a reminder of how long the terrorist threat has been with us -- and the difficulty in taking action against terrorists when they enjoy safe havens.

In Damascus, Mohammed Oudeh, better known as Abu Daoud -- the mastermind of the 1972 massacre of Israel athletes at the Munich Olympics, died Friday of kidney failure at the age of 73.

In Beirut Lebanon on Sunday morning, a liver hemorrhage claimed the life of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the Shiite spiritual leader of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah terrorist organization which conducted the 1983 bombings of the barracks of the U.S. and French peacekeeping forces and the U.S. embassy. The group was also involved in the kidnappings of dozens of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon in the 1980’s. He was 75.

Both deaths were announced separately by the families or associates.

In an unconfirmed report last month, the German press agency DPA reported that a drone missile strike in Pakistan on June 19 killed Mohammad Ali Hamadeh, a Lebanese Hezbollah member who was accused of killing of an American Navy diver, Robert Stethem during the hijacking of TWA 847 flight to Beirut 25 years ago in June, 1985. However State Department officials said they could not confirm the report when it came out and DOD did not respond to a query.

Both the Munich Olympics attacks and the Beirut bombings had wide ranging consequences although not necessarily those intended by the perpetrators.

Failed States and Terrorism: Interesting Reading

By Douglas Farah

My favorite magazine edition of the year just came out: Foreign Policy's Failed State Index.. As always it is full of interesting data points that help one understand how and why state's fail. But this year there is also a ranking of the worst leaders in the world.

What is striking, from my perspective, is that only two Latin American leaders are named: Hugo Chávez, weighing at number 17 of the 23 worst listed, and Raúl Castro at number 21. What is also striking is that their three primary allies outside of Latin America are also among the world's worst: Mahmoud Ajmadinejad of Iran at number 8; Basher al-Assad of Syria (recently jointly bashing Israel and calling for an end to the empire, meaning the United States) at number 12; and China's Hu Jintao, busying buying up all the natural resources he can, at number 10.

Sub-Saharan Africa, of course, has the most of the worst, including my personal favorite, Equatorial Guinea's Teodoro Obiang (number 14), who has hired Lanny Davis and other prominent and once respectable people as lobbyists. Obiang deposed and killed his uncle before assuming power in 1979, and was well-loved for continuing his uncle's heart-warming custom of having his political enemies beaten to death with metal bars in the main stadium while the band played "Happy Days are Here Again."

But back to Latin America: One can tell a great deal about leaders by the company they keep and the alliances they build. Chávez, rather than embracing any government with a liberal democratic form of government, has gone for the most repressive. Not coincidentally, both Syria and Iran are among the world's foremost sponsors of terrorism. Cuba, toying with modest internal reforms, remains a formidably repressive state, and has been busy helping the Bolivarian states implant state of the art internal security apparatuses that are sure to improve their respective repressive capacities.
My "a href="http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/540/failing-states-and-despots-interesting-reading.com">full blog is here.

Giving Teeth to the Iran Sanctions: Targeting Re-Export Loopholes

By Matthew Levitt

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week, Undersecretary of State William Burns and Undersecretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey laid out the administration's game plan for leveraging the sanctions mandate created by UN Security Council Resolution 1929, adopted earlier this month. Central to this strategy is "vigorous" implementation, in part through a monitoring committee. The resolution, Burns noted, includes "new platforms" and "new tools," including a tough cargo inspection regime to detect and prevent Iranian smuggling efforts aimed at circumventing the sanctions. Now that these measures have been passed, he emphasized, we "need to make the maximum use of them." One key area that would benefit from greater attention and enforcement is closing the re-export loopholes through which Iran has successfully evaded sanctions in the past.

Deceptive Trade Practices

Mirroring the Iranian banking sector's deceptive financial practices -- which the Treasury Department has studiously exposed over the past few years -- procurement agents, businesses, and transporters in Iran have developed a network of front companies and willing partners as a means of procuring controlled military and dual-use technologies. Some of these fronts are aware of the deception, while others are not.

Resolution 1929 highlighted such conduct by both Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and IranAir's cargo division. For example, since Treasury designated IRISL in 2008, the company has sought to evade sanctions by not only establishing new front companies, but also renaming and repainting its vessels.

The just-released annual report of the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) offers similar findings. In 2009, Iran used "mediating firms" in the Czech Republic to procure items that could facilitate the production of weapons of mass destruction. According to the report, Iran orchestrates "complex business channels in which companies from various countries fulfill only partial tasks without knowing the whole chain of suppliers and customers." Iranian procurement agents have been active within the United States as well.

The complete article is available here.

Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in America's Effort to Counter Violent Extremism

By Matthew Levitt

Although the United States continues to successfully target high-level al-Qaeda leaders along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, efforts to contest the Islamist ideology that fuels and supports violence have not kept pace. At home, incidents of domestic radicalization have increased dramatically in 2010, while abroad, the myriad, complex security challenges inspired by various violent strands of Islamist ideology have multiplied from Yemen to Pakistan. Indeed, just today several Muslim-American youth from Northern Virginia were convicted in a Pakistani court of plotting terrorist acts with militants in Pakistan they had met via the internet and sentenced to 10 years in jail each.

In the context of the recent release of the Obama administration's National Security Strategy and the one-year anniversary of the president's Cairo speech, the Washington Institute convened a special Policy Forum marking the release of recommendations from the Institute's forthcoming report on Obama administration efforts to address violent extremism -- a follow-up to the Institute's 2009 bipartisan task force report Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization This new report, soon to be released in full, was the product of a study group comprising J. Scott Carpenter, Matthew Levitt, Steven Simon and Juan Zarate.

A rapporteur's summary of the event, which featured Mr. Carpenter, Dr. Levitt and Mr. Zarate (Coauthor Steve Simon was unable to attend due to travel conflicts), is available here. Audio of the event, which also appeared on C-SPAN, is available here.

Police Raid in Central Java

By Kenneth Conboy

The Indonesian police counter-terrorist unit, Special Detachment 88, conducted a raid in North Klaten sub-district, Central Java province, late on Wednesday afternoon (local time). One suspect, Juli Hartono (alias Yuli Sartono) was shot dead, and three others were captured. Unconfirmed reports indicate that one of the three is Abdulah Sunata, Indonesia's most-wanted terrorist fugitive who reportedly helped organize the paramilitary camp uncovered in Aceh last February. Sunata is a repeat offender, having served an earlier prison sentence for terrorist offenses before being released ahead of schedule for good behavior.

The police reportedly found a bomb and an unspecified firearm at the Klaten terrorist safehouse.

If it turns out Sunata was captured alive, this would be a major coup for Special Detachment 88, which has come under criticism in recent months for being too fast to kill senior terrorist suspects.

Terrorist Motivations –Shooting to be Big Shots?

By Michael B. Kraft

Some quotes and comments buried in recent press articles, including an article this week by Jessica Stern, should give pause to the theories fashionable in some circles that terrorism is prompted primarily by “root causes.”

Usually cited are poverty and despair and/or U.S foreign policy (especially support for Israel) and or support for Arab governments such as Egypt and Saudi that are often called repressive regimes. Another alleged cause is the U.S. invasion of Iraq that overthrew an oppressive regime, headed by Saddam Hussein. And of course there is the narrative promoted by some radical Muslims that the west is out to destroy Islam (never mind the U.S. and NATO support for the Muslims in the Bosnia conflict or the emergency aid that the U.S. has rushed to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other Muslim countries in the wake of major natural disasters). Hundreds of thousands of words have been written on these theories.

The vexing question of “what makes terrorists tick” is an important one, especially as governments are paying more attention to the need to counter radicalization. Some countries such as Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have programs, with limited success, to try to deradicalize captured terrorist suspects. They and western governments, especially Britain, the Netherlands and more recently the United States have been trying to develop and strengthen programs to counter terrorism radicalization, including public diplomacy efforts.

This is important and necessary. It is essential that we try to counter the ideology, spread so easily on the internet that justifies mass murders for the sake of some “sacred cause” or restoring an idealized 15th century world of purity and/or the Muslim Caliph that stretched from the Middle East into Spain.

Ideology, however, is not the only factor in why some people, especially young men, embrace violence and terrorism and done suicide belts.

Although some writers have discussed the psychological aspects of terrorists, this aspect is often overlooked in the pontification about policies and “root causes.”

I am by no means an expert on the motivation of terrorism but I want to call attention to several recent articles that deserve a closer look.

They include the article by Ms. Stern, a respected counterterrorism expert, in Sunday’s Washington Post Outlook section describing her experiences in researching terrorism and her theories on the role of trauma in the outlook of some terrorists. An earlier June 15 Reuters article reported that Somali Islamists killed two persons and arresting dozens of others for the transgression of watching the World Cup soccer matches on television.

A June 11 New York Times in-depth article described the motives of two young New Jersey men who were arrested June 5 as they were about to fly to Egypt and then to Somalia to link up with a terrorist group and kill Americans.

And a June 22 New York Times front page article describing the path to radicalizcation taken by Faiesal Shahzad, who pleaded guilty to trying to set off a car bomb in Times Square.

Material Support Court Ruling: More background and Free Speech Issue

By Michael B. Kraft

The Supreme Court’s 6-3 decision today upholding the 1996 law that makes it illegal for American citizens and residents to knowingly provide material support to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations helps maintain a major tool to curb terrorist fund raising.

Here is some additional background on the case and the free speech issues raised in the court case. This piece supplements and emphasizes different aspects of the ruling than the excellent and more comprehensive blog item just filed by the Investigative Project on Terrorism, written by Stephen Landman.

The material support statute, signed into law in April 1996 by President Clinton and also used by the Bush and Obama administrations, is one of the U.S. Government most important tools against terrorism fundraising. Justice Department officials say it has been used more than 150 times since Sept. 11, resulting in 75 convictions. Additionally, there also have been plea bargaining and confessions by persons charged with violating the provision that makes it illegal for persons to knowingly provide funds, services, training, weapons or other forms of material support to groups designated by the Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO.)

I won’t repeat the full legal text of the material definition contained in the 4th paragraph of Landman’s article, but note that most of those cases, especially relating to Al Qaeda and Hamas, involved money and other tangible support for terrorist groups.

Supreme Court Upholds Material Support Law

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

The Department of Justice won a major victory Monday when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the "material support" statute. In a 6-3 opinion announced by Chief Justice John Roberts, the court held that the Constitution does not preclude the government from criminalizing speech and other forms of advocacy in support of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), even if the intent is to support the group's "peaceful or humanitarian" efforts.

Under U.S. law, it is a crime for any person to provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO. Known as the "material support" law, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B has become a cornerstone in U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. Since 2001, the U.S. has charged approximately 150 defendants with violations of the statute, and to date approximately 75 people have been convicted.

The statute defines "material support or resources" as:

"any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instrument or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials" (emphasis added).

The Court began by rejecting the argument that the statute was violated the Fifth Amendment because it was unclear to an ordinary person what type of activity was actually prohibited. Explaining that "perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required," the majority found the statute was sufficiently clear in what conduct was proscribed:

"Of course the scope of the material-support statute may not be clear in every application. But the dispositive point here is that the statutory terms are clear in their application to plaintiffs' proposed conduct, which means that plaintiffs' vagueness challenge must fail."

Next, the Court rejected the claims that the law violated free speech and free association guarantees in the First Amendment. Those challenging the statute sought to provide non-violent resources to support the humanitarian and peaceful efforts of terrorist organizations. The Court found that not only was there no distinction between the violent and non-violent wings of terrorist groups, but that terrorist groups benefit from any support given to them.

The case on appeal involved groups and individuals who wanted to support the humanitarian and political activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)—groups that were designated as FTOs in 1997.

Hoping to continue supporting the PKK and LTTE, the petitioners challenged the law, aiming to have it struck down as unconstitutional. As they explained in their opening brief to the court, "plaintiffs here seek only to safeguard their right to promote lawful, nonviolent activities through pure speech," and the statute violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights by preventing them from doing so.

Rejecting each of the challenges, the Court conceded that the PKK and the LTTE may engage in political and humanitarian activities. But overwhelming evidence also showed that both groups have committed numerous acts of terrorism, some of which have harmed Americans. In light of the dual-use qualities of terrorist organizations, the Court went on:

"Whether foreign terrorist organizations meaningfully segregate support of their legitimate activities from support of terrorism is an empirical question. When it enacted section 2339B in 1996, Congress made specific findings regarding the serious threat posed by international terrorism. One of those findings explicitly rejects plaintiffs' contention that their support would not further the terrorist activities of the PKK and LTTE: 'Foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.'"

Read our full report by Stephen I. Landman here.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE – An Open Discussion

By Michael B. Kraft

A group of U.S. experts on open source intelligence today said that the U.S. intelligence efforts are negatively affected by the cutbacks in the number of newspaper correspondents overseas and the terrorists’ own use of the internet to gather information on the United States.

They made their comments at a crowded forum at the National Press Club today, June 17, titled “The Future of Open Source Intelligence,” sponsored by LexisNexis.

Mr. Daniel Butler, Assistant Deputy Director for Open Source in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) said that open source intelligence gathering is basically good research and analysis and that the internet has been a “game changer” in gathering material. This raises new challenges in organizing and prioritizing the material to be analyzed, he said

Butler, a former Defense Department official and military intelligence officer, and other panelists noted that open sources include a wide variety of information, not only from the media but from academia and other sources. They also predicted that open source intelligence will be increasingly integrated into traditional intelligence analysis that heavily relied on classified sources.

In response to a question, Butler said that the open source program had been impacted negatively by the reduction in the number of foreign correspondents. He said the quantity, breadth and quality of overseas reporting has declined because of the decisions by many news organizations to cut back the number of their correspondents overseas. During the past several years several major newspapers and television networks have eliminated or minimized their foreign correspondents posts, mainly for financial reasons. Butler quipped that one only has to pick up the Washington Post every morning to see how much lighter it is.

Kevin O’Connell, who has served in the CIA, and in Defense Department and State Department analyst positions, said that reporting from foreign correspondents often provides a context and depth of understanding a country that is not always available to analysts who have not been there. * O’Connell, who also served in the Vice President’s office and at Rand, is now an adjunct professor at Georgetown University said that is important that our education system emphasis the development of critical analytical training. He is also President/CEO of Innovative Analytics & Training.

The terrorists are also exploiting open sources, said Kenneth Rapuano, a former White House Homeland Security Advisor in the Bush Administration, who resigned from his civilian post in 2006 to serve in Afghanistan as a Marine Corps officer on a special joint operations task force. He said that, although the popular image of the Afghan Taliban was that of guys in ragged clothes toting AK-47’s, U.S. forces found they had computer hard drives with information on the U.S. infrastructure, GAO reports and even Congressional testimony. Rapuano is now Director of Advanced Systems and Policy at the MITRE Corporation.

Dr. Mark Gabriele, trained as a computer science specialist, said the technology was changing quickly. Even though the cell phones and equipment in Africa lagged 10 years behind the United States, they were adequate for most purposes. Dr. Gabriele, previously with Rand and now with Booze Allen and Hamilton, noted that even the GPS is now an open source device.

Other panel participants were Mr. Doug Magoffin, Chief of the Defense Department Open Source Program, who spoke of the need to develop and recruit people with good language skills, and Mr. Alexander Joel, Civil Liberties Protection Officer, ODNI, who emphasized the efforts to develop guidelines to protect civil liberties.

* A personal observation: as a consumer of intelligence while in the State Department Office of Counterterrorism, I and many of my fellow officers closely read press articles for information and context that often was not contained in the official message traffic from embassies or the intelligence community. In an earlier career as a news agency correspondent overseas, it was apparent that correspondents often would have a wider range of local contacts and more freedom to move about than intelligence or embassy political officers.

More on Hezbollah in Latin America

By Douglas Farah

There is still significant debate within the U.S. government and among members of the national security establishment over the level of threat posed by Iran's growing presence and the increasing presence of Hezbollah that this presence brings.

So the arrest of a suspected Hezbollah fundraiser with an outstanding US arrest warrant in the Tri-border area is another important indicator of just how deep this relationship has now become.

Moussa Hamdan is the latest in a long line of suspected Hezbollah financiers who have been arrested in and around Ciudad del Este, the main hub of the Tri-border (where the borders of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay meet near Iguazu Falls) region. U.S., European and Latin American investigations have traced tens of millions of dollars from the region back to Hezbollah in Lebanon, using the formal and informal money remittance systems. Hezbollah operatives in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires have been documented as having used Ciudad del Este as their base while planning their attack on a Jewish target, operating under orders from Iran.

The Tri-border has historically been a smuggling and black market center for the Southern Cone of Latin America, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in illicit profits. That is not new. What changed over the past 15 years is the importance of the region as a financial hub for terrorist groups, from Hezbollah to the FARC in Colombia to Hamas.

So Hezbollah and other terrorist groups have an expanded playing field. Venezuela is friendly territory, Ecuador is hospitable and the Tri-Border network gives them access to Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, none of which want to acknowledge there is a problem.

The key factor in looking at this expanding territory is the expanding networks that develop among groups operating there, and their ability to cross pollinate and help each other logistically and financially. It also creates new areas in which to move illicit goods, and those goods are likely not to simply be cocaine and knock off watches.

There is another little tidbit pointed out by a blog reader that goes to the network aspects. It turns out that Dror Feiler, an outspoken Swedish-Israeli musician who was a main organizer of the flotilla to Gaza, is also on the editorial board of ANNCOL (Agencia de Noticias Nueva Colombia or New Colombia News Agency), a key part of the FARC's external propaganda machine.
My full blog is here.

Hunting Bin Laden in Chitral? Maybe Not Anymore

By James Gordon Meek

A year ago, I reported in the New York Daily News that the hunt for Al Qaeda kingpin Osama Bin Laden had focused on a vast swath of mega mountains in Northwest Pakistan called Chitral. Not only did dozens of sources pinpoint Chitral as his most likely hideout, many said it's where the CIA had been hunting him using contractors disguised as adventure tourists in a region renowned as a trekkers' paradise. The drone fly-bys were also a hint.

On Sunday, Gary Brooks Faulkner, 50, was arrested in the woods of Chitral near Afghanistan's Nuristan province, reportedly armed with a 40-inch blade, a loaded pistol and night-vision goggles -- and looking for Bin Laden. Faulkner is a construction worker and a devout Christian, his family told The News.

Reports in Chitral's two English-language news services today say Faulkner was apprehended by Chitrali police or scouts in the Bumburet Valley after he went missing from a nearby hotel. Bumburet is inhabited by the Kalash, ethnic caucasians tracing their lineage to Alexander the Great, who are not practicing Muslims in the largely Islamic nation. Their women are known for colorful outfits and often draw attention because they do not cover their faces.

Here's how close the Kalash village is to the neighboring war across the border: Earlier this month, 15 Afghan National Army soldiers were arrested there by Pakistani forces after fleeing fighting in Nuristan, the Chitral News reported.

Could the top terror leader with a $25 million bounty still be in Chitral? Probably not. After thousands of years as a hideout for brigands, something has changed in the past year that makes Chitral's valleys and soaring peaks (ranging from 5-25,000 feet) much less secure as a hideout. A travel route was created that established, in effect, an I-95 superhighway into the once isolated landscape.

The Pakistani government has all but completed a vehicle tunnel through the Lowari mountain pass, which has made Chitral accessible to the rest of Pakistan during the long winter months for the first time in history. Typically snowfall atop the 10,000-foot overland Lowari Pass cuts off the district from the rest of the country for half the year -- making Chitral virtually impenetrable.

Despite putting out several dozen audio and videotapes since Sept. 11, 2001, an exhaustive review by The News had found relatively few that appeared to have been recorded by Bin Laden during winter months, suggesting to experts that he had been unable to dispatch couriers carrying thumb drives during the heavy snow season. Though unable to communicate to the outside world, conceivably Bin Laden was also safe during winter by being snowed in. The same high-altitude snow drifts that prevented his couriers from moving also would have kept out potential assassins.

But the Lowari Tunnel may have changed all that by opening up a travel artery that would make Chitral open year 'round. The completion of the Lowari Tunnel was conveniently delayed by fighting that spilled over from the Swat Valley southeast of Chitral last year. Foreign construction firms refused to work on the tunnel project while Taliban extremists were roaming the Dir Valley due south of Chitral (where three U.S. Special Forces troops were recently killed in a suicide bombing). But once the fighting in Dir subsided, Chitral was not as isolated during the past winter.

And Bin Laden? He's produced only two tapes so far this year. But he'd be a fool to stick around Chitral.

Read more @meekwire

Hizb ut-Tahrir Uses Social Media to Promote Its "Emerging World Order" Conference

By Madeleine Gruen

The radical Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir America (HTA) will host a conference in Chicago on July 11 to hype the virtues of an Islamic state ruled according to the strictest interpretation of Islamic law. The group launched an online social media campaign to promote the event; one that serves as a prime example of how extremists are able to expose the mainstream to their ideology.

HTA hosted a similar conference outside of Chicago last year, which drew about 500 participants. This year, the campaign to promote the conference is more comprehensive, and the group expects many more participants as a result; it has booked an 11,000-square-foot ballroom at the Chicago Marriott Oak Brook that can accommodate more than one thousand.

HTA is part of a worldwide organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), which works towards the establishment of an Islamic state (Khalifah) in a Muslim country. Once a government and a military have been installed, it intends to spread Islam to the rest of the world. HT condones violence against Western troops in Muslim countries and advocates the eradication of Israel, but has so far maintained a non-violent approach to its objectives.
9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is a former HT adherent. He, like others, joined a militant organization after becoming impatient with HT’s softer methods, which is why some observers have labeled HT “a conveyor belt to terrorism.”

A component of HTA’s strategy is to instill a sense of alienation among American Muslims so that they will turn away from their country and instead identify themselves as members of the Ummah (worldwide Muslim community). HTA tells Muslims not to vote or to embrace the culture of the “unbelievers.” However, HTA will indulge in socializing online in order to generate support.

2010 Propaganda Campaign

Social media is more popular than ever. The web is no longer simply a series of static billboards for celebrities and corporations that do not allow for two-way interaction. Social media lets users generate content, creating a sense of propriety. Facebook and Twitter provide instant satisfaction derived from the approval of peers in response to the sharing of ideas and experiences. Peer endorsements are an effective element of political propaganda and marketing campaigns.

You may continue reading this article at the Huffington Post.

Turkish Jihadists in Waziristan Respond to Charges Against Gaza Flotilla Charity IHH

By Evan Kohlmann

In the wake of the controversy over the Turkish charity Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH), a principle sponsor of the Gaza aid flotilla, Turkish jihadists fighting alongside the Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan have now weighed in with their own perspective. On June 7, the "Taifatul Mansura" Turkish-speaking foreign fighter contingent issued a communique acknowledging that IHH has promoted itself as a channel to provide financing and recruits to frontline mujahideen fighters in Chechnya and Afghanistan. However, the group thereupon accused IHH of misappropriating those resources and instead serving as a tool of Turkish intelligence agencies. According to "Taifatul Mansura", the IHH "was sincere at the beginning [but] was later used by the MIT (National Intelligence Organization) and the Psychological Warfare Department of Turkish General Staff in order to prevent the emergence of a mujahideen movement that could pose a threat to Turkish government. Both Chechen mujahideen and Turkish mujahideen who have taken part in operations in the Afghanistan Emirate are fully aware of the activities and scheming of this organization. None of the donations collected by this organization and advertised as if they had been delivered to the mujahideen were actually received by the mujahideen... We, the Taifatul Mansura Organization in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, argue that this organization is only a burden to the mujahideen.” Taifatul Mansura also accused IHH of sparking quarrels and infighting amongst various mujahideen commanders.

A translation of the statement from Taifatul Mansura can be accessed via Flashpoint Global Partners.

Why the Iran Sanctions Matter

By Matthew Levitt

Wednesday's U.N. Security Council resolution sanctioning Iran marks a critical turning point in the U.S.-led efforts to target Iran's illicit activities. The resolution focuses on Iran's nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is responsible for these programs as well as the regime's support for terrorism; and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which has been directly involved in proliferation shipments. The sanctions included in this resolution are, as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice put it, "as tough as they are smart and precise." If anything, this new resolution is both too precise and purposefully vague. And therein lies its strength.
The list of 40 entities and one individual listed in the resolution's three annexes is extremely targeted. Employing such "smart sanctions" -- pinpointing the specific entities and persons involved in Iran's illicit conduct and holding them accountable while shielding the general Iranian public from old-fashioned, shotgun, regime-wide sanctions -- has been very effective. This tactic denies Iran's revolutionary regime the chance to deflect blame for the country's economic woes, while disrupting its ability to finance and transport material necessary for its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. But the number of entities excluded from the resolution is even more telling than the list of those that made the final cut. Most entities designated this week, for example, had already been designated by the U.S. Treasury Department and/or the European Union. They have therefore already been subject to most of the impacts a U.N. resolution would hope to achieve, such as economic isolation by major financial institutions.

The full article, published by ForeignPolicy.com, is available here.

Banning Terrorist Groups: India’s Counterterrorism Priorities

By Animesh Roul

I have contributed an article in the latest issue of Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation). The article titled "100 More Terrorist Groups Banned in India: What are India’s Counterterrorism Priorities?," Vol 8 (22) June 4, 2010).

Here is the abstract of the article:

India, one of the most terrorism-troubled countries in the world, is finally pursuing the idea of proscribing nearly 100 terrorist entities, both regional and international. The proscription will exist in tandem with the United Nations’ consolidated list of al-Qaeda and Taliban linked groups. Many of these outlawed entities have staged numerous attacks either in India or abroad and threaten to continue their transnational terrorist activities in order to further their violent jihadi ideology.

Facing a Range of Threats: India has already outlawed 36 terrorist organizations which have carried out operations and have a physical presence across the country. The prominent terrorist groups currently outlawed reflect diverse ideologies and objectives.
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Quoting Home Ministry sources, the Indian media indicated that the terror organizations soon to be added to the revised and expanded list include Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the International Islamic Relief Organization of the Philippines (IIRO PHL) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
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The Ministry of Home Affairs listing often receives criticism at home for excluding homegrown groups posing a threat to India’s national security and territorial integrity. In actuality, besides the 35 terror entities currently under proscription, there are more than 100 separatist and extremist armed groups, both active and dormant, that remain a threat to the state (Times of India, June 24, 2009, Hindustan Times, April 13, 2008). However, the official listing overlooks many of these clandestine networks and fails to put any curb on their activities. India’s northernmost state of Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states of Manipur and Assam share between them more than 100 terrorist organizations operating from their soil. The Ministry’s list also fails to take note of the activities of pan-Islamic terrorist groups based in Bangladesh that operate both internally and externally across the Indian border.

Access the full text of this article here:Terrorism Monitor

More Documentation on Gaza Flotilla Charity IHH

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has released two new documents relating to the Turkish Muslim charitable group Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH), sponsor of the Gaza freedom flotilla.

1.) During court proceedings involving U.S. national Abdurahman Alamoudi, who was later sentenced to 23 years in prison after pleading guilty to 3 federal offenses including violating the IEPPA Act, ICE Special Agent Brent Gentrup provided information pertaining to links between IHH and the Alamoudi-linked Success Foundation. According to Gentrup, "I have reviewed several pieces of correspondence on the letterhead of Insan Hak ve Hurrhyetleri Insani Yardim Vakfi, aka The Foundation for Human Rights & Humanitarian Relief and commonly referred to by the initials on it logo 'I.H.H.' This correspondence was seized from the offices of Success Foundation at 3606B Forest Drive, Alexandria, VA in March 2002. The first letter, on IHH letterhead is dated August 1999 and states that IHH accounts have been closed by the Turkish government. It states that 'we are only accepting cash/in-kind donations.' For more, see the affidavit on the NEFA Foundation website.

2.) The NEFA Foundation has also released a photo of representatives of the Turkish Islamic charity Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH) speaking at an IHH-sponsored event celebrating the “martyrdom” of senior Hamas leader Mohammad Said Seyam. U.S. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley previously told reporters that "we know that IHH representatives have met with senior Hamas officials in Turkey, Syria, and Gaza over the past three years. That is obviously of great concern to us." IHH sponsored the flotilla of vessels that attempted to break the ongoing blockade on Gaza. The photo is available on the NEFA Foundation website.