National Lab Security Failure - We Get What We Pay For

By Bill West

Today, the Washington Times reported the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, that conducts research on America’s nuclear weapons and houses special nuclear material for that research, failed a crucial counter-terror security exercise (also reported in today’s CTB Newslinks section). The exercise was a “force-on-force” operation where mock commandos infiltrated and took over key parts of the facility, managing to gain access to what would have been quantities of that special nuclear material.

The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees the Lab. The National Nuclear Security Administration is the division of DOE responsible for security at the Nation’s nuclear sites, including the National Laboratory. At many of the country’s nuclear facilities, both private and Government, the front line security forces are private contract security officers. On the surface, at least per the Government-required contract specifications, these contract security officers are supposed to be a notable cut above what the public usually associates with private security guards. They are generally better paid and are supposed to be better trained.

That said, too frequently private security forces protecting nuclear facilities fail these force-on-force exercises. This happens at private nuclear power plants as well as Government compounds such as the National Lab and the Y-12 facility in Tennessee. Critics argue that private security contractors, at least as they are currently configured, are simply not up to the task of protecting facilities as sensitive as the country’s nuclear sites. Interestingly, a NNSA spokesman, when commenting on the security failures at the National Lab resulting from the most recent exercise stated, "The nuclear material at the site is secure, and we have the best security in the government." He is probably one of those senior Government officials who would also not dare call a jihadist a jihadist.


There has been some little noticed Congressional interest in requiring the DOE to establish a Federal security force for nuclear facilities. DOE has resisted this, claiming it would be unnecessary and too expensive. That is perhaps a curious position, given the performance record of the private security forces.

With security, generally we get what we pay for. Some Federal agencies seem to understand that axiom. Visit CIA or NSA headquarters and one immediately realizes those agencies do not skimp on their physical security. Contract private security guards do not protect those facilities. Those agencies have their own uniformed Security Police Officers that are sworn Federal law enforcement officers, who undergo rigorous pre-employment screening and background checks, are highly trained at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, are reasonably well paid with good benefits and they have a decent chance at career advancement. The same applies at the Pentagon and other Defense Department facilities and many military bases.

Force-on-force exercises at facilities secured by Federal officers can occur far more frequently than at facilities where private contractors are located and where such actions require “negotiated” notifications. The real Feds conduct such operations as routine training. They are far more proficient and professional at what they do. Establishing and maintaining an in-house Federal security force might cost somewhat more than contracting to private security firms, but at least for those nuclear facilities under the direct control of the US Government, especially those facilities directly involved with nuclear weapons, it would appear it may be a better way to go.

INTERPOL Finds FARC Computers Material Authentic and Extensive

By Jonathan Winer

We don't yet know what else is in the contents of the FARC computers that INTERPOL has now verified to be exactly as represented by the Colombian government -- the true and untampered contents of FARC computers seized by Colombia following its March 1 cross-border attack on a FARC camp in Ecuador.

But we know that the sheer volume of what is contained in those computers, which included three Toshiba laptops, one external hard drive, one external hard disk, and three USB "thumbnail drives" is remarkably extensive.

As set forth by the INTERPOL team,

"Without revealing the content of the data, INTERPOL can state the following with regard to the user files contained in the eight seized FARC computer exhibits:
􀁸 109 document files were found on more than one of the exhibits
􀁸 452 spreadsheets
􀁸 7,989 e-mail addresses
􀁸 10,537 multimedia files (sound and video)
􀁸 22,481 web pages
􀁸 37,872 written documents (such as Word documents, PDF files, text format documents)
􀁸 210,888 images
Of the above, 983 files were found to be encrypted."

The report then includes images from the computer of FARC leader Raul Reyes that show him studiously working at what appears to be the very same computer, in the jungle, clothed in camouflage and authentic jungle hat.

The nearly 8000 e-mail addresses could be interesting window into FARC's political as well as operational contacts, at least of the terrorist group's contacts that are online. We have yet to see the bulk of the text documents, but presumably, there are now more than one government that has them. It is of substantial, international public importance that whatever documentation of support for FARC they may contain undertaken by officials of any country be disclosed as soon as possible, now that INTERPOL has confirmed their authenticity.

Hugo Chavez continues to state that the documents are fake and that Colombia is using them as a pretext for war. He also has recently compared German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Hitler. Eventually, he and the region are going to have deal with their reality, and the implications of it.

Addressing Asymmetric Threats: Shifts at the Pentagon And Strategic Communications Strategy

By Andrew Cochran

Last Thursday, I was honored to chair one of four panels at a special seminar, "Dealing with Today's Asymmetric Threat," co-sponsored by the National Defense University and CACI International, with assistance from the Counterterrorism Foundation. The purpose of the seminar was to establish a framework for the development of an integrated and synchronized strategy, by the end of the calendar year, to address the asymmetrical threats to United States and global security. My panel, titled, "Global Strategy to Counter Terrorism and Extremism," included Contributing Expert Douglas Farah; VADM Bert Calland, USN (Ret.), former CIA Deputy Director; Jose Rodriguez, former Director of the CIA's National Clandestine Center and the Counterterrorism Center; and Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (Ret.), FOX News Channel analyst and President of WVC3. My comments included recommendations for the need for continued deployment of joint DOD-Treasury "Threat Finance Cells" (about which I posted here and here) and the need to promote the continued work of the non-governmental CT community of nonprofits, journalists, and independent media (including this site). I participated with senior officials at NDU and CACI in planning the seminar and look forward to working with them and the broader community towards the development of the strategy for the next Administration and Congress.

An article in today's Washington Post is further proof of the need for such a strategy and indicates the degree to which the Defense Department is recognizing a permanent paradigm shift in the threat from state-based to asymmetric actors:

"An Army board headed by Gen. David H. Petraeus has selected several combat-tested counterinsurgency experts for promotion to the rank of brigadier general, sifting through more than 1,000 colonels to identify a handful of innovative leaders who will shape the future Army, according to current and former senior Army officers... Several of the colonels widely expected to appear on the resulting promotion list, which has not yet been released, are considered unconventional thinkers who were effective in the Iraq campaign, in many cases because they embraced a counterinsurgency doctrine that Petraeus helped craft, the officials said... They include Special Forces Col. Ken Tovo, a veteran of multiple Iraq tours who recently led a Special Operations task force there; Col. H.R. McMaster, a senior Petraeus adviser known for leading a successful counterinsurgency effort in the Iraqi city of Tall Afar, and Col. Sean MacFarland, who created a network of patrol bases in Ramadi that helped curb violence in the capital of Anbar Province, according to the officers."

Contributing Expert Walid Phares participated in another panel at the seminar titled, "Strategic Communications," which explored how to protect security through an effective communication strategy. Another panelist was Steven Monblatt, former senior CT official at the State Department and OAS who participated in our March 19 panel on FARC and Hugo Chavez, presented his views with some excellent and provocative recommendations. With his permission, I am posting his presentation here as a Word file for your review.

Euro 2008 and Terrorism

By Lorenzo Vidino

In 23 days the 2008 European soccer Cup (Euro 2008), this year hosted jointly by Austria and Switzerland, will kickoff. As for any event attracting large crowds and global attention in today’s age, authorities are worried about potential terrorist threats. The Euro Cup, in a way, presents the same security features of a Super Bowl, but it is held in 8 different cities over 3 weeks and with the participation of 16 national teams, making security planning significantly more complicated. Just yesterday Swiss newspaper La Liberté reported an interview with Jürg Bühler, a security official with the Swiss Federal Police, in which Mr. Bühler revealed that his agency has been monitoring threats against the event made by several users of various Islamist websites. While there seems to be no specific threat so far, Mr. Bühler correctly pointed out that vigilance should be kept high, as soccer competitions have attracted the attention of jihadist networks in Europe in the past.

Weeks before the 1998 World Cup held in France police across Europe conducted raids against a network of Algerian militants, apprehending more than 100 individuals. According to French authorities the men were planning a string of attacks against stadiums during the World Cup, even though some believed French authorities used the World Cup as an excuse to crack down on Algerian networks (coincidentally, Farid Benyettou, a militant with close links to the 1998 network, was convicted just yesterday in Paris for recruiting young French Muslims to fight against U.S. forces in Iraq). Allegedly, a similar plot was uncovered by French authorities against Paris’ Stade de France in October 2001, when police arrested a handful of North African men reportedly planning to carry out an attack during the France-Algeria soccer match.

Authorities suspected a terrorist attack was planned also during the 2004 Euro Cup held in Portugal. Days before the beginning of the tournament Portuguese authorities, acting on a tip from Dutch intelligence, arrested three members of the Hofstad group in the city of Oporto. The men were deported and never charged with any crime, but authorities suspected the three wanted to target former Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Barroso (the plot was never fully confirmed). Authorities believe that the 2006 World Cup held in Germany was also targeted by jihadists. Various Islamist websites issued threats against it, but, more concretely, authorities found out, months after the event, that Ayman Hawa and Jihad Hamad, the two Lebanese men that placed suitcases filled with explosives (which, luckily, failed to detonate) on two German commuter trains in July 2006, had initially thought of targeting the World Cup.

On one hand major mediatic attention, the possibility of targeting large crowds (in and out of stadiums) and striking at Europe’s most cherished pastime make Euro 2008 a potential target for terrorists. Austria and Switzerland have a small presence of militants and sympathizers (even though in borderless Europe this has only limited relevance, as the threat could easily come from militants based in other European countries). Austria has recently dismantled its first homegrown network, which was running the German-language branch of the Global Islamic Media Front. The 2007 security report recently released by Swiss federal authorities clearly points to homegrown jihadist networks as “the most serious threat” to the country’s security. On the other hand, there is no reason to be alarmists. Not only is there no specific threat, but terrorists like surprises and easy targets and events such as Euro 2008 offer neither. Most of the plots described above, aside from the one targeting the 1998 World Cup in France, seem to have been either very abstract or very amateurish, often little more than just wishes.

While the terrorist threat clearly worries Swiss and Austrian authorities, who are working closely with their counterparts throughout Europe, a more concrete fear is that of hooliganism, given the precedents of urban guerrilla that took place before and/or after some games (particularly England’s) of the 1998 France World Cup, 2000 Euro Cup (held in Belgium and Holland) and the 2006 Germany World Cup (and just last night there were riots during and after the UEFA Cup final between Glasgow Rangers and Zenit of Saint Petersburg and a Russian fan was stabbed).

Daily Kos and Others on Jihad

By Jeffrey Imm

What do the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), and the Daily Kos all have in common? They are all seeking to define the enemy as other than "jihadists".

A. Daily Kos: Jihad Not Terrorism

Three weeks after AP's report of the NCTC/DHS recommendations to eliminate the term "jihadist" (among others) from the lexicon describing Jihadist terrorism, the latest salvo in this "war of ideas" was published on the popular Daily Kos web site by "Amad" on May 12: "Who Speaks for Islam? Part 3b: Jihad, Religion & Politics". The Daily Kos author states that to "most Muslims, jihad implies honor and sacrifice for others", and "[u]sing jihad and terrorism as synonyms is wrong and counterproductive" -- seeking to define the threat as "extremism". The article also expands on the real cause of "extremism" as "disrespect for Islam", "aggressive" U.S. foreign policy, and "double-standards exhibited by the US on democracy and human-rights". It quotes a student at the American University of Cairo as condemning U.S. foreign policy: "Bush has given Israel carte blanch to attack Palestinians and Lebanese. The war on terror is an open-ended war on Muslims."

Daily Kos provides a biography on "Amad" stating: "Amad runs MuslimMatters.org... [and]... was one of the founders of Texas Dawah." Amad's blogroll on Daily Kos promotes MuslimMatters.org and CAIR. What Daily Kos does not mention is who some of the participants at Texas Dawah meetings and at the MuslimMatters.org website are, as they include supporters of jihadist groups, unindicted co-conspirators in U.S. terror trials, and supporters of the Taliban.

Handover of Terrorist Paramilitaries Could be Turning Point in Colombia

By Douglas Farah

Colombian president Alvaro Uribe's decision to extradite 13 leaders of the paramilitary, terrorist-designated United Self Defense Forces (AUC) to the United States could be a milestone in Colombia's efforts to erradicate terrorism from all sides of the political spectrum.

Uribe's own past ties to paramilitary organizations, the political influence wielded by the groups and the alleged direct participation in the groups by his cousin and close adviser Mario Uribe, now jailed, have seriously undermined his government's credibility in the international arena, even as his administration successfully tackled the Marxist FARC forces.

Perhaps this is a sign that the AUC leaders, despite their political and military patrons, will finally face justice in the same way the FARC is pursued.

The AUC, along with the FARC, was designated a terrorist entity by the US in 2001, a designation shared by the EU and other groups.

"Among those extradited were Salvatore Mancuso, Rodrigo Tovar, Diego Fernando Murillo, Hernán Giraldo and Ramiro Vanoy. Along with others, they have been accused of ordering the slayings of thousands of people over a generation, from poor peasants to leftist politicians, journalists to union activists."

That encapsulates one of the great tragedies of Colombia-the political violence has been endemic for generations. This group of paramilitary leaders, responsible for the deaths of thousands of people, as well as the export of tons of cocaine, reaches back decades in its criminal activity.

While I have spent much time on the FARC and its alliance with Venezuela (Hugo Chavez) and potential alliance because of that tie, to Iran, the AUC has been an equally destructive force inside Colombia.

While not posing the national security threat to the United States nor possessing the same explicitly anti-American agenda the FARC does, the AUC has been a larger drug trafficking force and wreaked havoc for years on the civilian population. My full blog is here.

U.S. House Makes It Tougher to Remove North Korea From "State Sponsors" List

By Andrew Cochran

The U.S. House of Representatives will approve a bill with a special section that reinforces the conditions governing North Korea’s potential removal from the list of "State Sponsors of Terrorism." Sponsored by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, Section 306 of the Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Reform Act of 2008 requires that before removal, the President must first certify that North Korea has ceased to provide nuclear assistance to Syria, Iran, and other "state sponsors"; has provided a verifiable list of all of its nuclear programs; and allowed the IAEA to monitor and verify the monitoring and verification of the shutdown and sealing of the Yongbyon nuclear facility.

As I write this, I do not know the Administration's position on this section, but as a matter of principle it usually opposes any Congresional action designed to mandate or limit Executive Branch discretion in foreign policy. The section is already reduced in scope from its original version, which added more conditions. In light of the discovery of North Korean personnel working at the Syrians' nuclear sites, the Administration wil be hard-pressed to publicly justify opposition to this provision. I assume that the Administration will work quietly to remove the section from the Senate version, its usual M.O. in these situations, but I predict that the Senate will include this section. Then we'll see if the President vetoes this bill over this or any other section (and whether Congress moves to pass it separately).

The full text of Section 306, as of today, is below.

India: Multiple Terror Blasts in Jaipur City, SIMI-HuJI-LeT Alliance Suspected!

By Animesh Roul

After brief period of quiescence, mass fatality terror has returned to India. And this time, as usual, it caught the security force, intelligence agencies napping. On May 13, around nine high to low intensity blasts took place at six places within a span of 15 minutes in the pink city of Jaipur, state capital of Rajasthan. All blasts occurred within a radius of one kilometer, hitting crowded markets, places of worships and one eatery. The explosions have killed more than 60 people (as of now) and nearly 200 sustained severe to minor injuries, presently languishing in crammed city hospitals. The epicenters are Tripolia market, Manek Chowk, Chandpol Gate, Lakshmi Mishthan Bhandar, Johri Bazaar, Sanganeri Gate in the walled part of the state capital. At least four more live bombs found in these areas and later diffused safely.

The government though not ruled out the use of military explosives in these blasts (e.g.RDX), enough evidence of cocktail bombs emerged during initial mopping of the blast sites. Mobile phones, Iron pipes, wires and plastic substances, splinters and timer devices found with mangled bicycles and bikes. Looking at these findings, fingers of suspicion pointed at the Islamic terror alliance: Harkat-ul-Jehadi Islami (HuJI)- Lashkar e Toiba- Student Islamic Movements of India (SIMI). HujI has revolutionized use of mobile phones, commercial explosives and chemicals (Neogel-90) in most of terror strikes recently, e.g. in Mecca mosque blasts in Hyderabad last year.

Last October (2007) for the first time, terror struck Rajasthan when an explosion at the famous Ajmer Sheriff (Dargah of Sufi saint Moinuddin Chishti ) in Ajmer that left two persons dead and over 15 others injured.

Pictures

Blasts rocks the Pink City

Serial blasts leave trail of destruction

Next Public Event: "The Future of Turkey-U.S. Strategic Partnership"

By Andrew Cochran

On Monday, May 19, at 2 pm, I will co-chair, with Professor Yonah Alexander, a special seminar titled, "The Future of Turkey-U.S. Strategic Partnership" (corrected title) in room 2255 of the Rayburn House Office Building on Capitol Hill in Washington. Our featured speaker will be Ambassador Nabi Sensoy, who has served as Ambassador of Turkey to the United States since January 2006. Ambassador Sensoy previously held several positions in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has also served as Ambassador to Russia and Spain. Ambassador Sensoy is a graduate of the University of Ankara.

CTB Contributing Expert Frank Hyland, a former CIA and NSA official who also writes for the Jamestown Foundation, and Zeyno Baran, Director of the Center for Eurasian Policy at the Hudson Institute and a former CTB Contributing Expert, will serve as Commentators for the seminar after the Ambassador speaks. Closing comments will be made by Professor Edgar H. Brenner, Co-Director of the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies and co-editor of Turkey: Terrorism, Civil Rights and the European Union (2008).

My co-chair, Professor Yonah Alexander, is Director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and co-editor of Turkey: Terrorism, Civil Rights and the European Union. Professor Alexander was a panelist in our February 12 panel, "The Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy" and in our April 15 panel, "Iran and the United States: Outlook for the Next Decade?"

The event is co-sponsored by the Counterterrorism Foundation; the Hudson Institute; the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute.

To RSVP, contact Jenn Zewin by e-mail or call 703-562-4522 with your name and affiliation. Acceptances only, please.

More trouble for Tehran at home

By Olivier Guitta

Further to my last week's article in the Middle East Times regarding Iran's internal rebellion, the newsletter The Croissant (available for a small fee) reported that Khameini’s representative in Eastern Iran was murdered. Indeed after the trouble in Baluchistan, the following story seems to confirm a trend of minorities rebelling against Tehran.

Indeed The Croissant reported that Sheikh Abbassian Abbas, the Supreme Leader’s representative in Taybad (a city located near the Afghan border) responsible for the mobilization and recruitment within the Bassij (a militia at the service of the regime of the mullahs) was killed in an ambush in the city of Khafajia (in the province of Ahvaz, home to a mostly ethnic Arab population). Iranian authorities confirmed this information on 5/6/08.

Assessing the Risks of Turkish Raids in Northern Iraq

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Turkey has just launched a fresh set of air raids against PKK targets in northern Iraq, continuing from last weekend into this week, following a series of PKK attacks in Turkey that killed four civilians and six soldiers. The New Anatolian reported yesterday that after the PKK's attacks, "The Turkish military retaliated with artillery strikes against the PKK hideouts in northern Iraq while the terrorists who attacked the military outpost were cornered as they fled back into northern Iraq and were destroyed by repeated air raids that continued into Monday. Turkish fighters also destroyed the PKK propaganda center in northern Iraq which also served as the main broadcasting unit for Roj TV, the mouthpiece of the militant organization based in Denmark."

Such incursions by Turkey worry many analysts who are concerned about the risks of accidental skirmishes and civilian casualties. Today my associate Samantha Rollinger and I have an article in the Middle East Times that assesses the risks posed by such Turkish raids. An excerpt:

We spoke with several analysts who felt that a miscalculated conflict between Turkish and American forces was simply not a realistic concern due to coordination between the two countries' militaries. Svante Cornell, research director for the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, told us that Turkey's ground offensive in February never could have occurred without coordination with the United States. "An accidental conflict between U.S. forces and Turkish forces is not even worth talking about," he said. "The Turkish military has a direct relationship with the U.S. military. The U.S. was informed, and was brought to a point of approving of it." Cornell emphasized that while the U.S. was likely displeased with Turkey's incursion, it understood that the intervention was inevitable due to PKK attacks against Turkey....

The PKK's location has also helped to keep civilian casualties from spiraling out of control during Turkish interventions. A senior American military intelligence officer told us that the PKK does not follow Mao Zedong's famous adage that "the guerilla is the fish and the people are the sea." Moreover, he noted that the PKK does not have a great deal of support in northern Iraq's large urban areas - thus inhibiting the group's ability to mix into the civilian population to the same extent as, for example, al-Qaida in Iraq.

You can read the whole article here.

NEFA TerrorWatch: New Insight into the 7/7 Bombings, Pakistan Terror Connections

By Evan Kohlmann

This week's edition of the NEFA Foundation's TerrorWatch cybercast takes an inside look at "Operation Theseus": a series of ongoing criminal investigations and trials in the United Kingdom involving a network of alleged accomplices in the July 7, 2005 suicide bombings in London. In the Spring of 2007, British police arrested four men: Waheed Ali, Mohammed Shakil, Sadeer Saleem, and Khalid Khaliq—accusing them of complicity in the bombings and possession of terrorist propaganda materials. Two of the men were arrested at Manchester Airport while attempting to board a flight to Pakistan. At locations in central England, U.K. counterterrorism police recovered a variety of terrorist propaganda documents. During the subsequent trial, prosecutors have released several eye-opening pieces of evidence, including police surveillance footage of the two 7/7 bombers Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer along with several of the Operation Theseus defendants during a suspected reconnaissance trip to London in March 2004 in anticipation of their planned suicide attack.

The entire TerrorWatch episode can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website.

Docs Suggest Chavez, FARC Agreed to Blame Paramilitaries for FARC's Murders

By Jonathan Winer

On May 10, the Colombian magazine Semana reported that FARC guerrillas developed a strategy in the fall of 2004 to blame Colombian paramilitaries for the Apure massacre in which FARC killed five soldiers and a woman engineer in a raid on Venezuelan oil company assets there. At the time, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his defense minister told the public that Colombian paramilitaries had carried out the raid, murdering the six civilians in cold blood.

Privately, FARC's leaders discussed in e-mails the reality that Chavez knew FARC was responsible. As FARC leader Raul Reyes concluded, "President Chavez is annoyed, but wants to treat this politically and with prudence." According to the e-mails, Venezuelan military leaders were increasingly upset at FARC's kidnapping, extortion and murder of Venezuelan cattle ranchers, but President Chavez wanted to keep things quiet in order to maintain a relationship with FARC despite the provocations due to FARC's ability to contribute regionally to extending the reach of Chavez's "Bolivarian revolution."

Deportation Hearings of Hamas-linked Imam Wind Down

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

Deportation proceedings against Imam Mohammad Qatanani of the Islamic Center of Passaic in New Jersey, charged with failing to disclose an earlier arrest and conviction in Israel, wrapped up today. News reports have alternately described Qatanani as "revered," "influential," and "respected." Likewise, all media reports have outlined both the charges against Qatanani and his excuses, bolstered by a coterie of quotes from supporters about how revered, influential and respected Qatanani is.

What those stories do not detail is Qatanani's history of attending radical conferences in the United States, nor his frequent use of incendiary rhetoric in speeches and sermons.

For the entire story, click here to go to the IPT's website.

UPDATE: News reports indicate that the trial, which had originally been scheduled to last just three days, has been extended. Testimony will resume on Monday, June 1. Please check the CT Blog and the IPT website for updates on the proceedings.