Indonesia Establishes New Counter-Terrorism Agency

By Kenneth Conboy

The Indonesian president on 16 July signed a decree establishing a new National Counter-Terrorism Agency that answers only to him. It is tasked with “preventing terrorism, protecting civilians, de-radicalizing terrorists, and building national preparedness.” It will be launched later this year, though no specific date has been set. Ansyad Mbai, who heads a counter-terrorism desk under the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, will likely initially serve as its caretaker chief. The agency will have its own budget and staff, including members seconded from the police, State Intelligence Agency, and military.

The new body has been established after the Indonesian government came under criticism following the July 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta. During this incident, several terrorist suspects were found to be repeat offenders—that is, they had been arrested once before and already underwent rehabilitation classes. Then this past February, more than a dozen terrorists released from detention joined a militant training camp in the jungles of Aceh. The new agency, therefore, will focus on ways of more effectively de-radicalizing captured terrorists. Meantime, Special Detachment 88, part of the Indonesian National Police, will continue to be the country’s primary counter-terrorism strike force.

Some rights groups have criticized the new body because of what they see as vague provisions in the presidential decree, and because they oppose the idea of military officers serving on the board.

Flashpoint Exclusive: Captive Pakistani Intel Officer Threatens to Reveal "Secret Game" Behind Afghan Conflict

By Evan Kohlmann

In the wake of the latest embarrassing disclosures about Pakistan's unhelpful role in the Afghan conflict, Flashpoint Global Partners has obtained an unpublished video of retired Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officer Colonel Imam Sultan Amir Tarar, who has been held hostage by militants in Pakistan’s tribal region since March 2010, when he arrived in the area alongside another former ISI officer Khalid Khwaja.

Tarar, a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war and a reputed expert on guerilla warfare, has acknowledged a long relationship with the Afghan Taliban and its leader Mullah Mohammed Omar—but has been far more critical of the Pakistani Taliban movement. During a recent New York Times interview, Tarar admonished the TTP and its leadership as “troublemakers” who should be “neutralized.”

In his latest video-recorded message, Colonel Imam Tarar claims that he has been kidnapped by “Lashkar Jhangvi al-Alami, Abdullah Mansour” faction and insists that the Pakistani government has done nothing to facilitate his release. If the government continues to refuse negotiations for his freedom, Tarar further threatens to disclose highly sensitive information about “the weaknesses of our nation” and the secret “game being played with Afghanistan, India, Russia, and America.”

Still images and an English transcript of the video of Colonel Sultan Amir Tarar are now available via the website of Flashpoint Global Partners - http://www.flashpoint-intel.com.

The Boston Cluster and Extended Connections: Case Study on Homegrown Radicalization

By Madeleine Gruen

The NEFA Foundation has released the 26th report in the “Target: America” series; a PowerPoint presentation on a cluster of men originally from the Boston area and their associates. Members of this cluster sought to join al-Qaida forces overseas to kill Americans and also contemplated an attack in a shopping center in the United States. Several participated in jihad by circulating jihadist propaganda to other Americans.

This case study provides insight into how U.S. citizens who sympathize with terrorists make connections with like-minded people on the internet, and through school and community activities. This case also provides insight into how American citizens arrange to access terrorist training camps overseas.

The PowerPoint can be viewed here.

Hezbollah Spies via Facebook

By Aaron Mannes

In an excellent article in The Washington Times, UPI’s Shaun Waterman described a “red team” activity in which a security consultant created a false persona on Facebook that appeared to be attractive young woman who was working in cyber defense. She quickly garnered hundreds of friends in the national security community, as well as job offers and invites to conferences. In the process she gathered a great deal of sensitive materials such as inadvertently exposed passwords.

This is not a hypothetical concern – Hezbollah (long a terrorism pioneer) has already employed this strategy. According to the Israeli news site MySay:

The Hizbullah agent pretended she was an Israeli girl named “Reut Zukerman”, “Reut” succeeded during several weeks to engage more then 200 reserve and active personnel.

The Hizbullah agent gained the trust of soldiers and officers that didn’t hesitate to confirm him as a “friend” once they saw he/she is friends with several of their friends from the same unit. Most of them assumed that “Reut” was just another person who served in that elite intelligence unit.

In this way, Hizbullah collected information about the unit’s activity, names and personal details of its personnel, the unit’s slang, and visual information on its bases. This user / agent using Facebook is an example of a trend called fakebook.

Implications

The first concern regarding incidents of this nature is the raw intelligence collected. But more than the data, it creates opportunities to gather even more data.

Read the full post here.

Flashpoint Partners Exclusive: Video of Times Square Bomber with Pakistani Taliban Commander

By Evan Kohlmann

Flashpoint Global Partners has released a previously unpublished video excerpt of a meeting between confessed Times Square bomb plotter Faisal Shahzad and the leader of the Pakistani Taliban Hakimullah Mehsud. During the undated video clip, Hakimullah and Shahzad are shown shaking hands and hugging, as Shahzad speaks in an overlaid audio track: "Today, along with the leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Hakimullah Mehsud and under the command of Amir al-Mumineen Mullah Mohammed Omar Mujahid (may Allah protect him), we are planning to wage an attack on your side, inshallah."

The video excerpt can be accessed via Flashpoint’s website: http://www.flashpoint-intel.com.

The Ghazi Brigade: Lal Masjid Episode Conitinues to Haunt Pakistan

By Animesh Roul

Last week I published one report on the Lal Masjid offshoot ‘Ghazi Brigade’, a relatively new comer and named after the slain radical Abdul Rashid Ghazi. The Ghazi Brigade has stepped up its Jihadi actvties recently in Pakistan primarily to enforce Islamic Shari’a in the country through the use of force and to punish those who stormed the mosque in July 2007.

"Little-Known Ghazi Brigade Now a Major Player in the Punjabi Jihad?", Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8 (28), July 16, 2010.

Abstract of the article:

A recent spurt in sectarian attacks in Pakistan has been blamed on a lethal but lesser known group affiliated with Taliban and al-Qaeda elements: the Ghazi Abdul Rashid Shaheed Brigade, also known as the Ghazi Brigade or Ghazi Force (Daily Times [Lahore], July 2). What was formed as an Islamic vigilante group has now emerged as a radical jihadi organization in response to the July 2007 Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) siege in Islamabad. Over one hundred religious students were killed by Pakistani security forces during the siege, including the mosque’s deputy leader, Abdul Rashid Ghazi. Thousands of mourners pledging their commitment to jihad thronged the funeral of Abdul Ghazi, held in his native village of Basti Abdullah in Punjab (PakTribune, July 12, 2007). Indeed, his death heralded the start of a neo-Taliban movement in Pakistan, with radical students calling for jihad against Pakistan and its allies.

The events at Lal Masjid prompted al-Qaeda's Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri to call for revenge attacks in Pakistan. Maulana Abdul Aziz, the brother of Rashid Ghazi, also issued a threat of “bloody revolution” in the country (Dawn, July 10, 2009). Addressing an Islamic gathering to commemorate the Lal Masjid standoff, an unidentified cleric said, “You killed one Ghazi. Here are thousands of Ghazis ready to sacrifice in the way of Allah.” In effect, the events at the mosque have unleashed a wave of suicide attacks across Pakistan.

According to intelligence sources, the organization is led by Maulana Niaz Raheem (a.k.a. Bilal), a former student at the Red Mosque’s Jamia Faridia seminary. Pakistani agencies have arrested a Ghazi Brigade terrorist identified as Fidaullah (a.k.a. Junaid) who was allegedly involved in the attacks on the Police Special Branch and the FC checkpoint in Islamabad. Fidaullah has been identified as one of the top strategists for the Ghazi Brigade, operating from the Galjo area in Hangu, part of the North-West Frontier Province (Geo TV, June 1, 2009). Two of his accomplices also involved in the FC checkpoint attack, Khairullah and Khurram Shahzad, were arrested on earlier occasions. Ghazi Brigade terrorists adopted decapitation as a tactic to instill fear among those civilians supporting security forces in the battle zones. Fidaullah himself beheaded three people publicly in Sultanwas and Pir Baba in Swat (The News [Islamabad], June 2, 2009).

Read Full Text Here

Arab Bank Case Ruling: A Victory for Victims of Terrorism

By Victor Comras

It looks like the 6 year old Linde v Arab Bank case may finally move into its trial on the merits phase following a ruling July 12th by US District Court Judge Nina Gershon that:

"The factual allegations of the complaints sufficiently support an inference that Arab Bank and the terrorist organizations were participants in a common plan under which Arab Bank would supply necessary financial services to the organizations which would themselves perform the violent acts. Administering the death and dismemberment benefit plan further supports not only the existence of an agreement but Arab Bank's knowing and intentional participation in the agreement's illegal goals. No more is required."

The case had been locked in its discovery phase for some time pending rulings on Arab Bank’s refusal to provide documentation concerning such financial transfers. Plaintiffs maintained that such documents, if provided, would establish that Arab Bank participated knowingly in this money raising and transferring scheme. Arab Bank’s attorneys maintained that they were precluded from providing such documents because of Jordanian and other country bank secrecy laws. The ruling reflects Judge Gershon’s determination that the refusal to comply with the court's order that such documents be made available to the plaintiffs pursuant to discovery requests merits legal sanctions against Arab Bank. And, the judge's instruction to the jury that they can draw the above inference from this lack of production of such documents is the appropriate remedy. This ruling is fully in line with legal precedent in such cases of non production of court ordered documents.

The Linde case was brought before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in July 2004 by six American families, victims of Palestinian terrorism in Israel during the Al Aqsa Intifada. They sued Jordan's Arab Bank under section 2333 of the Anti Terrorism Act of 1996 alleging that Arab Bank had encouraged such terrorism by disbursing millions of dollars in support payment for families of suicide bombers, which served as a further incentive for attacks.

Section 2333 provides that “Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue {in Federal Court} … and … recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.” The District Court also permitted foreign nationals to join the lawsuit via the Alien Torts Claims Act. Currently, more than 100 families and 700 individuals in the Linde case and related cases are seeking more than $1 billion in damages based on Arab Bank’s role in financially supporting terrorist activities. The foreign nationals consist mostly of Israeli citizens but also include Afghani, Argentinian, Australian, Belarusian, Canadian, French, Iranian, Iraqi, Peruvian, South African, Turkmenian, Ukranian, and Uzbeki citizens.

The payments were transferred by Arab Bank to and through several charities that allegedly serve as fronts for Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These funds were originally collected by two special committees established in Saudi Arabia with the stated intention of raising funds for the families of those carrying out suicide missions at the behest of the named terrorist organizations. Some of these funds were routed through Arab Bank’s New York office in order to convert the funds into U.S. dollars. The Palestinian charities named in the suit include, inter alia, the Popular Committee for Support of the Intifada (the “Popular Committee”), the Coalition of Benevolence (the “Coalition”), the Humanitarian Relief Association (the “HRA”), the Al-Ansar Society, and the Tulkarem Charitable Committee.

The Arab Bank case will likely move forward before a jury at the same time as Canada’s Parliament takes up new legislation that would also grant victims of terrorism the right to hold those that finance terrorism liable for damages. Final Parliamentary committee hearings on this legislation were held earlier this month, and passage of the act is expected when Parliament reconvenes in October. This is due in large part to the unceasing efforts of C-CAT, the Canadian Coalition Against Terrorism, which has become the leading voice for victims of terrorism in Canada. I had an opportunity to testify in the course of these hearings. A webcast of the hearings can be found here.

Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in U.S. Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism

By Matthew Levitt

As nonaffiliate terrorist actors begin to take center stage and al-Qaeda's core strength diminishes, it has become clear that America is at war with a larger enemy: the extremist ideology that fuels and supports Islamist violence. Unfortunately, the United States is not well equipped to fight on this ideological battleground, and U.S. efforts to confront the ideology worldwide have not kept pace with more successful military targeting of high-level al-Qaeda leaders.

In a new Washington Institute Strategic Report my co-authors and I argue that rather than avoid any mention of the religious motivation behind the terrorism of al-Qaeda and other like-minded organizations, the Obama administration should sharpen the distinction between the religion of Islam and the political ideology of radical Islamism to successfully defeat Islamist terrorism at its most fundamental source.

Engagement and counterterrorism are key elements of this comprehensive strategy, we argue, but the wide space between them must be addressed. Missing are the policies and programs that should suffuse the space between these two poles on the counterradicalization spectrum, including efforts to contest the extremist narrative of radicalizers, empower and network mainstream voices countering extremism, promote diversity of ideas and means of expression, and challenge extremist voices and ideas in
the public domain. Contesting the radical Islamist narrative does not mean arresting or banning despicable but protected speech; rather, it means openly contesting
extremist views by offering alternatives and fostering deeper ideological debate. The objective in either case is to strengthen the moderate center against the extremist pole and help Muslim communities become more resilient in confronting the challenge.

This report, Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in U.S. Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, follows on the Institute's 2009 bipartisan Presidential Task Force report Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization. It is a joint project of The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Project Fikra: Defeating Extremism through the Power of Ideas.

This new report recognizes the important steps the Obama administration has taken to address violent extremism and suggests ways to address remaining gaps in U.S. homeland security and foreign policy. The report has benefited from a series of interviews with administration officials at numerous cabinet level agencies and the White House and is the product of a small study group including myself, my Washington Institute colleague J Scott Carpenter, and former White House counterterrorism officials Steven Simon and Juan Zarate.

The complete report is available here.

Iran's Global Terrorist Reach

By Walid Phares

The United States became painfully aware of the threat posed by global jihadism after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Until that day, Iranian-backed terrorist networks, such as Hezbollah, were responsible for killing more American citizens than al-Qaeda. In the years since, the balance has been gradually tilting back towards Iran. In the words of former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, al-Qaeda may be the 'B' team of international terrorism, but Hezbollah is the 'A' team. Indeed, Iran's Khomeinists began their war on the U.S. and other democracies years before Osama bin Laden began his jihad.

The takeover of Iran's government in 1979 by radical Islamist forces faithful to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the breakthrough after which the so-called Islamic Revolution spread throughout the Middle East and beyond. The Khomeinist revolution is ideologically rooted in a radical Islamist doctrine that stands in opposition to the more traditional "Quietist" school of thought among Shia clerics. In a sense, the Khomeinists are the Shia world's equivalent of the Salafists within the Sunni world. The Islamist Shias are also jihadists, in the sense that they call for the establishment of a future Imamate, a Shia form of Islamic Caliphate, by any means necessarily, including what they coin as "Jihad," which practically means war.

Because it cannot project much conventional military power, Iran threatens the United States, Israel and other democracies by unconventional means. Through the use of its terrorist surrogates—such as Hezbollah—Tehran's reach extends around the world.

Iran

Syria

Update on the Insurgency in Southern Thailand

By Zachary Abuza

Last week, four bombs went off in southern Thailand, killing 10, including four soldiers and four paramilitaries. An additional four people were gunned down. Pundits decry the 88 killed in the Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok in May, yet more than 4,100 people have been killed, and nearly 7,000 wounded since the insurgency in southern Thailand began in January 2004; 160 have been killed and over 400 wounded in 2010 alone. Yet the conflict gets little attention in this Bangkok-centric nation, obsessed with the elite’s political machinations, despite the Bt 3 billion ($91 million) a year spent on curbing it.

The administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva pledged to resolve the crisis in the south when it came to power in December 2008. The south has long been the Democrat Party’s heartland, and they believed they had a softer and more nuanced approach. But the government soon became embroiled in a popular uprising over how it came to power and the south became a low priority.

Nonetheless, in the 18 months since the Abhisit administration has been in office, violence has come down. An average of 32 people a month are being killed, while 66 are wounded. In 2007, the peak of the violence, 4 people a day were being killed and 8 were being wounded. In the first half of 2010, the ratio was down to just under 24.3 people a month being killed and 67 wounded.

For the full report, please click here.

Terrorists: Nitwits or Masterminds?

By Aaron Mannes

Recently, in the Atlantic Monthly Daniel Byman and Christine Fair (two first-rate analysts) argue that the reality is that the terrorist enemies of the United States are not highly disciplined religious fanatics – but in fact are a bunch of nitwits. The article is interesting, provocative, and makes some important points. But we cannot dismiss the terrorists as nitwits quite yet – they’ve had failings in attacking the U.S. homeland directly, but they have also had some important successes.

Byman and Fair point out the many cases of terrorist incompetence such as the Times Square bomber, the UK doctors, and the Miami jihadis. In many regards, I agree with them. Terrorist groups are extremely constrained in their efforts to hit “far targets.” I’ve argued that this is a logistical issue. With intelligence agencies worldwide on high alert it is increasingly difficult to move operatives long distances. This complicates long-range terror strikes. Self-starters do not have the necessary skills and groups do not want to risk well-trained operatives on operations that will probably not succeed. The failed attacks on the West aren’t because the terrorists are stupid. What’s more they are adaptable. My argument continued that the danger was now in the realm of geopolitics – terrorists destabilizing and important country rather than carrying out direct attacks in the U.S. or the West.

Fair and Byman also state that the Taliban are similarly stupid. They frequently blow themselves up and also become intimate with livestock (this has been caught on tape by drones and other battlefield cameras). Maybe, but they are also giving the U.S. military a run for its money so discounting their capabilities seems unwise.

Read the full post here.

Two Major Middle East Terrorist Figures Die in their Safe Havens

By Michael B. Kraft

The deaths within days this weekend of two major figures behind major Middle East terrorist attacks and the possible death of a third last month should serve as a reminder of how long the terrorist threat has been with us -- and the difficulty in taking action against terrorists when they enjoy safe havens.

In Damascus, Mohammed Oudeh, better known as Abu Daoud -- the mastermind of the 1972 massacre of Israel athletes at the Munich Olympics, died Friday of kidney failure at the age of 73.

In Beirut Lebanon on Sunday morning, a liver hemorrhage claimed the life of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the Shiite spiritual leader of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah terrorist organization which conducted the 1983 bombings of the barracks of the U.S. and French peacekeeping forces and the U.S. embassy. The group was also involved in the kidnappings of dozens of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon in the 1980’s. He was 75.

Both deaths were announced separately by the families or associates.

In an unconfirmed report last month, the German press agency DPA reported that a drone missile strike in Pakistan on June 19 killed Mohammad Ali Hamadeh, a Lebanese Hezbollah member who was accused of killing of an American Navy diver, Robert Stethem during the hijacking of TWA 847 flight to Beirut 25 years ago in June, 1985. However State Department officials said they could not confirm the report when it came out and DOD did not respond to a query.

Both the Munich Olympics attacks and the Beirut bombings had wide ranging consequences although not necessarily those intended by the perpetrators.

Failed States and Terrorism: Interesting Reading

By Douglas Farah

My favorite magazine edition of the year just came out: Foreign Policy's Failed State Index.. As always it is full of interesting data points that help one understand how and why state's fail. But this year there is also a ranking of the worst leaders in the world.

What is striking, from my perspective, is that only two Latin American leaders are named: Hugo Chávez, weighing at number 17 of the 23 worst listed, and Raúl Castro at number 21. What is also striking is that their three primary allies outside of Latin America are also among the world's worst: Mahmoud Ajmadinejad of Iran at number 8; Basher al-Assad of Syria (recently jointly bashing Israel and calling for an end to the empire, meaning the United States) at number 12; and China's Hu Jintao, busying buying up all the natural resources he can, at number 10.

Sub-Saharan Africa, of course, has the most of the worst, including my personal favorite, Equatorial Guinea's Teodoro Obiang (number 14), who has hired Lanny Davis and other prominent and once respectable people as lobbyists. Obiang deposed and killed his uncle before assuming power in 1979, and was well-loved for continuing his uncle's heart-warming custom of having his political enemies beaten to death with metal bars in the main stadium while the band played "Happy Days are Here Again."

But back to Latin America: One can tell a great deal about leaders by the company they keep and the alliances they build. Chávez, rather than embracing any government with a liberal democratic form of government, has gone for the most repressive. Not coincidentally, both Syria and Iran are among the world's foremost sponsors of terrorism. Cuba, toying with modest internal reforms, remains a formidably repressive state, and has been busy helping the Bolivarian states implant state of the art internal security apparatuses that are sure to improve their respective repressive capacities.
My "a href="http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/540/failing-states-and-despots-interesting-reading.com">full blog is here.

Giving Teeth to the Iran Sanctions: Targeting Re-Export Loopholes

By Matthew Levitt

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week, Undersecretary of State William Burns and Undersecretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey laid out the administration's game plan for leveraging the sanctions mandate created by UN Security Council Resolution 1929, adopted earlier this month. Central to this strategy is "vigorous" implementation, in part through a monitoring committee. The resolution, Burns noted, includes "new platforms" and "new tools," including a tough cargo inspection regime to detect and prevent Iranian smuggling efforts aimed at circumventing the sanctions. Now that these measures have been passed, he emphasized, we "need to make the maximum use of them." One key area that would benefit from greater attention and enforcement is closing the re-export loopholes through which Iran has successfully evaded sanctions in the past.

Deceptive Trade Practices

Mirroring the Iranian banking sector's deceptive financial practices -- which the Treasury Department has studiously exposed over the past few years -- procurement agents, businesses, and transporters in Iran have developed a network of front companies and willing partners as a means of procuring controlled military and dual-use technologies. Some of these fronts are aware of the deception, while others are not.

Resolution 1929 highlighted such conduct by both Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and IranAir's cargo division. For example, since Treasury designated IRISL in 2008, the company has sought to evade sanctions by not only establishing new front companies, but also renaming and repainting its vessels.

The just-released annual report of the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) offers similar findings. In 2009, Iran used "mediating firms" in the Czech Republic to procure items that could facilitate the production of weapons of mass destruction. According to the report, Iran orchestrates "complex business channels in which companies from various countries fulfill only partial tasks without knowing the whole chain of suppliers and customers." Iranian procurement agents have been active within the United States as well.

The complete article is available here.

Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in America's Effort to Counter Violent Extremism

By Matthew Levitt

Although the United States continues to successfully target high-level al-Qaeda leaders along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, efforts to contest the Islamist ideology that fuels and supports violence have not kept pace. At home, incidents of domestic radicalization have increased dramatically in 2010, while abroad, the myriad, complex security challenges inspired by various violent strands of Islamist ideology have multiplied from Yemen to Pakistan. Indeed, just today several Muslim-American youth from Northern Virginia were convicted in a Pakistani court of plotting terrorist acts with militants in Pakistan they had met via the internet and sentenced to 10 years in jail each.

In the context of the recent release of the Obama administration's National Security Strategy and the one-year anniversary of the president's Cairo speech, the Washington Institute convened a special Policy Forum marking the release of recommendations from the Institute's forthcoming report on Obama administration efforts to address violent extremism -- a follow-up to the Institute's 2009 bipartisan task force report Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization This new report, soon to be released in full, was the product of a study group comprising J. Scott Carpenter, Matthew Levitt, Steven Simon and Juan Zarate.

A rapporteur's summary of the event, which featured Mr. Carpenter, Dr. Levitt and Mr. Zarate (Coauthor Steve Simon was unable to attend due to travel conflicts), is available here. Audio of the event, which also appeared on C-SPAN, is available here.

Police Raid in Central Java

By Kenneth Conboy

The Indonesian police counter-terrorist unit, Special Detachment 88, conducted a raid in North Klaten sub-district, Central Java province, late on Wednesday afternoon (local time). One suspect, Juli Hartono (alias Yuli Sartono) was shot dead, and three others were captured. Unconfirmed reports indicate that one of the three is Abdulah Sunata, Indonesia's most-wanted terrorist fugitive who reportedly helped organize the paramilitary camp uncovered in Aceh last February. Sunata is a repeat offender, having served an earlier prison sentence for terrorist offenses before being released ahead of schedule for good behavior.

The police reportedly found a bomb and an unspecified firearm at the Klaten terrorist safehouse.

If it turns out Sunata was captured alive, this would be a major coup for Special Detachment 88, which has come under criticism in recent months for being too fast to kill senior terrorist suspects.

Terrorist Motivations –Shooting to be Big Shots?

By Michael B. Kraft

Some quotes and comments buried in recent press articles, including an article this week by Jessica Stern, should give pause to the theories fashionable in some circles that terrorism is prompted primarily by “root causes.”

Usually cited are poverty and despair and/or U.S foreign policy (especially support for Israel) and or support for Arab governments such as Egypt and Saudi that are often called repressive regimes. Another alleged cause is the U.S. invasion of Iraq that overthrew an oppressive regime, headed by Saddam Hussein. And of course there is the narrative promoted by some radical Muslims that the west is out to destroy Islam (never mind the U.S. and NATO support for the Muslims in the Bosnia conflict or the emergency aid that the U.S. has rushed to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other Muslim countries in the wake of major natural disasters). Hundreds of thousands of words have been written on these theories.

The vexing question of “what makes terrorists tick” is an important one, especially as governments are paying more attention to the need to counter radicalization. Some countries such as Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have programs, with limited success, to try to deradicalize captured terrorist suspects. They and western governments, especially Britain, the Netherlands and more recently the United States have been trying to develop and strengthen programs to counter terrorism radicalization, including public diplomacy efforts.

This is important and necessary. It is essential that we try to counter the ideology, spread so easily on the internet that justifies mass murders for the sake of some “sacred cause” or restoring an idealized 15th century world of purity and/or the Muslim Caliph that stretched from the Middle East into Spain.

Ideology, however, is not the only factor in why some people, especially young men, embrace violence and terrorism and done suicide belts.

Although some writers have discussed the psychological aspects of terrorists, this aspect is often overlooked in the pontification about policies and “root causes.”

I am by no means an expert on the motivation of terrorism but I want to call attention to several recent articles that deserve a closer look.

They include the article by Ms. Stern, a respected counterterrorism expert, in Sunday’s Washington Post Outlook section describing her experiences in researching terrorism and her theories on the role of trauma in the outlook of some terrorists. An earlier June 15 Reuters article reported that Somali Islamists killed two persons and arresting dozens of others for the transgression of watching the World Cup soccer matches on television.

A June 11 New York Times in-depth article described the motives of two young New Jersey men who were arrested June 5 as they were about to fly to Egypt and then to Somalia to link up with a terrorist group and kill Americans.

And a June 22 New York Times front page article describing the path to radicalizcation taken by Faiesal Shahzad, who pleaded guilty to trying to set off a car bomb in Times Square.

Material Support Court Ruling: More background and Free Speech Issue

By Michael B. Kraft

The Supreme Court’s 6-3 decision today upholding the 1996 law that makes it illegal for American citizens and residents to knowingly provide material support to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations helps maintain a major tool to curb terrorist fund raising.

Here is some additional background on the case and the free speech issues raised in the court case. This piece supplements and emphasizes different aspects of the ruling than the excellent and more comprehensive blog item just filed by the Investigative Project on Terrorism, written by Stephen Landman.

The material support statute, signed into law in April 1996 by President Clinton and also used by the Bush and Obama administrations, is one of the U.S. Government most important tools against terrorism fundraising. Justice Department officials say it has been used more than 150 times since Sept. 11, resulting in 75 convictions. Additionally, there also have been plea bargaining and confessions by persons charged with violating the provision that makes it illegal for persons to knowingly provide funds, services, training, weapons or other forms of material support to groups designated by the Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO.)

I won’t repeat the full legal text of the material definition contained in the 4th paragraph of Landman’s article, but note that most of those cases, especially relating to Al Qaeda and Hamas, involved money and other tangible support for terrorist groups.

Supreme Court Upholds Material Support Law

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

The Department of Justice won a major victory Monday when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the "material support" statute. In a 6-3 opinion announced by Chief Justice John Roberts, the court held that the Constitution does not preclude the government from criminalizing speech and other forms of advocacy in support of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), even if the intent is to support the group's "peaceful or humanitarian" efforts.

Under U.S. law, it is a crime for any person to provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO. Known as the "material support" law, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B has become a cornerstone in U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. Since 2001, the U.S. has charged approximately 150 defendants with violations of the statute, and to date approximately 75 people have been convicted.

The statute defines "material support or resources" as:

"any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instrument or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials" (emphasis added).

The Court began by rejecting the argument that the statute was violated the Fifth Amendment because it was unclear to an ordinary person what type of activity was actually prohibited. Explaining that "perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required," the majority found the statute was sufficiently clear in what conduct was proscribed:

"Of course the scope of the material-support statute may not be clear in every application. But the dispositive point here is that the statutory terms are clear in their application to plaintiffs' proposed conduct, which means that plaintiffs' vagueness challenge must fail."

Next, the Court rejected the claims that the law violated free speech and free association guarantees in the First Amendment. Those challenging the statute sought to provide non-violent resources to support the humanitarian and peaceful efforts of terrorist organizations. The Court found that not only was there no distinction between the violent and non-violent wings of terrorist groups, but that terrorist groups benefit from any support given to them.

The case on appeal involved groups and individuals who wanted to support the humanitarian and political activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)—groups that were designated as FTOs in 1997.

Hoping to continue supporting the PKK and LTTE, the petitioners challenged the law, aiming to have it struck down as unconstitutional. As they explained in their opening brief to the court, "plaintiffs here seek only to safeguard their right to promote lawful, nonviolent activities through pure speech," and the statute violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights by preventing them from doing so.

Rejecting each of the challenges, the Court conceded that the PKK and the LTTE may engage in political and humanitarian activities. But overwhelming evidence also showed that both groups have committed numerous acts of terrorism, some of which have harmed Americans. In light of the dual-use qualities of terrorist organizations, the Court went on:

"Whether foreign terrorist organizations meaningfully segregate support of their legitimate activities from support of terrorism is an empirical question. When it enacted section 2339B in 1996, Congress made specific findings regarding the serious threat posed by international terrorism. One of those findings explicitly rejects plaintiffs' contention that their support would not further the terrorist activities of the PKK and LTTE: 'Foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.'"

Read our full report by Stephen I. Landman here.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE – An Open Discussion

By Michael B. Kraft

A group of U.S. experts on open source intelligence today said that the U.S. intelligence efforts are negatively affected by the cutbacks in the number of newspaper correspondents overseas and the terrorists’ own use of the internet to gather information on the United States.

They made their comments at a crowded forum at the National Press Club today, June 17, titled “The Future of Open Source Intelligence,” sponsored by LexisNexis.

Mr. Daniel Butler, Assistant Deputy Director for Open Source in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) said that open source intelligence gathering is basically good research and analysis and that the internet has been a “game changer” in gathering material. This raises new challenges in organizing and prioritizing the material to be analyzed, he said

Butler, a former Defense Department official and military intelligence officer, and other panelists noted that open sources include a wide variety of information, not only from the media but from academia and other sources. They also predicted that open source intelligence will be increasingly integrated into traditional intelligence analysis that heavily relied on classified sources.

In response to a question, Butler said that the open source program had been impacted negatively by the reduction in the number of foreign correspondents. He said the quantity, breadth and quality of overseas reporting has declined because of the decisions by many news organizations to cut back the number of their correspondents overseas. During the past several years several major newspapers and television networks have eliminated or minimized their foreign correspondents posts, mainly for financial reasons. Butler quipped that one only has to pick up the Washington Post every morning to see how much lighter it is.

Kevin O’Connell, who has served in the CIA, and in Defense Department and State Department analyst positions, said that reporting from foreign correspondents often provides a context and depth of understanding a country that is not always available to analysts who have not been there. * O’Connell, who also served in the Vice President’s office and at Rand, is now an adjunct professor at Georgetown University said that is important that our education system emphasis the development of critical analytical training. He is also President/CEO of Innovative Analytics & Training.

The terrorists are also exploiting open sources, said Kenneth Rapuano, a former White House Homeland Security Advisor in the Bush Administration, who resigned from his civilian post in 2006 to serve in Afghanistan as a Marine Corps officer on a special joint operations task force. He said that, although the popular image of the Afghan Taliban was that of guys in ragged clothes toting AK-47’s, U.S. forces found they had computer hard drives with information on the U.S. infrastructure, GAO reports and even Congressional testimony. Rapuano is now Director of Advanced Systems and Policy at the MITRE Corporation.

Dr. Mark Gabriele, trained as a computer science specialist, said the technology was changing quickly. Even though the cell phones and equipment in Africa lagged 10 years behind the United States, they were adequate for most purposes. Dr. Gabriele, previously with Rand and now with Booze Allen and Hamilton, noted that even the GPS is now an open source device.

Other panel participants were Mr. Doug Magoffin, Chief of the Defense Department Open Source Program, who spoke of the need to develop and recruit people with good language skills, and Mr. Alexander Joel, Civil Liberties Protection Officer, ODNI, who emphasized the efforts to develop guidelines to protect civil liberties.

* A personal observation: as a consumer of intelligence while in the State Department Office of Counterterrorism, I and many of my fellow officers closely read press articles for information and context that often was not contained in the official message traffic from embassies or the intelligence community. In an earlier career as a news agency correspondent overseas, it was apparent that correspondents often would have a wider range of local contacts and more freedom to move about than intelligence or embassy political officers.

More on Hezbollah in Latin America

By Douglas Farah

There is still significant debate within the U.S. government and among members of the national security establishment over the level of threat posed by Iran's growing presence and the increasing presence of Hezbollah that this presence brings.

So the arrest of a suspected Hezbollah fundraiser with an outstanding US arrest warrant in the Tri-border area is another important indicator of just how deep this relationship has now become.

Moussa Hamdan is the latest in a long line of suspected Hezbollah financiers who have been arrested in and around Ciudad del Este, the main hub of the Tri-border (where the borders of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay meet near Iguazu Falls) region. U.S., European and Latin American investigations have traced tens of millions of dollars from the region back to Hezbollah in Lebanon, using the formal and informal money remittance systems. Hezbollah operatives in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires have been documented as having used Ciudad del Este as their base while planning their attack on a Jewish target, operating under orders from Iran.

The Tri-border has historically been a smuggling and black market center for the Southern Cone of Latin America, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in illicit profits. That is not new. What changed over the past 15 years is the importance of the region as a financial hub for terrorist groups, from Hezbollah to the FARC in Colombia to Hamas.

So Hezbollah and other terrorist groups have an expanded playing field. Venezuela is friendly territory, Ecuador is hospitable and the Tri-Border network gives them access to Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, none of which want to acknowledge there is a problem.

The key factor in looking at this expanding territory is the expanding networks that develop among groups operating there, and their ability to cross pollinate and help each other logistically and financially. It also creates new areas in which to move illicit goods, and those goods are likely not to simply be cocaine and knock off watches.

There is another little tidbit pointed out by a blog reader that goes to the network aspects. It turns out that Dror Feiler, an outspoken Swedish-Israeli musician who was a main organizer of the flotilla to Gaza, is also on the editorial board of ANNCOL (Agencia de Noticias Nueva Colombia or New Colombia News Agency), a key part of the FARC's external propaganda machine.
My full blog is here.

Hunting Bin Laden in Chitral? Maybe Not Anymore

By James Gordon Meek

A year ago, I reported in the New York Daily News that the hunt for Al Qaeda kingpin Osama Bin Laden had focused on a vast swath of mega mountains in Northwest Pakistan called Chitral. Not only did dozens of sources pinpoint Chitral as his most likely hideout, many said it's where the CIA had been hunting him using contractors disguised as adventure tourists in a region renowned as a trekkers' paradise. The drone fly-bys were also a hint.

On Sunday, Gary Brooks Faulkner, 50, was arrested in the woods of Chitral near Afghanistan's Nuristan province, reportedly armed with a 40-inch blade, a loaded pistol and night-vision goggles -- and looking for Bin Laden. Faulkner is a construction worker and a devout Christian, his family told The News.

Reports in Chitral's two English-language news services today say Faulkner was apprehended by Chitrali police or scouts in the Bumburet Valley after he went missing from a nearby hotel. Bumburet is inhabited by the Kalash, ethnic caucasians tracing their lineage to Alexander the Great, who are not practicing Muslims in the largely Islamic nation. Their women are known for colorful outfits and often draw attention because they do not cover their faces.

Here's how close the Kalash village is to the neighboring war across the border: Earlier this month, 15 Afghan National Army soldiers were arrested there by Pakistani forces after fleeing fighting in Nuristan, the Chitral News reported.

Could the top terror leader with a $25 million bounty still be in Chitral? Probably not. After thousands of years as a hideout for brigands, something has changed in the past year that makes Chitral's valleys and soaring peaks (ranging from 5-25,000 feet) much less secure as a hideout. A travel route was created that established, in effect, an I-95 superhighway into the once isolated landscape.

The Pakistani government has all but completed a vehicle tunnel through the Lowari mountain pass, which has made Chitral accessible to the rest of Pakistan during the long winter months for the first time in history. Typically snowfall atop the 10,000-foot overland Lowari Pass cuts off the district from the rest of the country for half the year -- making Chitral virtually impenetrable.

Despite putting out several dozen audio and videotapes since Sept. 11, 2001, an exhaustive review by The News had found relatively few that appeared to have been recorded by Bin Laden during winter months, suggesting to experts that he had been unable to dispatch couriers carrying thumb drives during the heavy snow season. Though unable to communicate to the outside world, conceivably Bin Laden was also safe during winter by being snowed in. The same high-altitude snow drifts that prevented his couriers from moving also would have kept out potential assassins.

But the Lowari Tunnel may have changed all that by opening up a travel artery that would make Chitral open year 'round. The completion of the Lowari Tunnel was conveniently delayed by fighting that spilled over from the Swat Valley southeast of Chitral last year. Foreign construction firms refused to work on the tunnel project while Taliban extremists were roaming the Dir Valley due south of Chitral (where three U.S. Special Forces troops were recently killed in a suicide bombing). But once the fighting in Dir subsided, Chitral was not as isolated during the past winter.

And Bin Laden? He's produced only two tapes so far this year. But he'd be a fool to stick around Chitral.

Read more @meekwire

Hizb ut-Tahrir Uses Social Media to Promote Its "Emerging World Order" Conference

By Madeleine Gruen

The radical Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir America (HTA) will host a conference in Chicago on July 11 to hype the virtues of an Islamic state ruled according to the strictest interpretation of Islamic law. The group launched an online social media campaign to promote the event; one that serves as a prime example of how extremists are able to expose the mainstream to their ideology.

HTA hosted a similar conference outside of Chicago last year, which drew about 500 participants. This year, the campaign to promote the conference is more comprehensive, and the group expects many more participants as a result; it has booked an 11,000-square-foot ballroom at the Chicago Marriott Oak Brook that can accommodate more than one thousand.

HTA is part of a worldwide organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), which works towards the establishment of an Islamic state (Khalifah) in a Muslim country. Once a government and a military have been installed, it intends to spread Islam to the rest of the world. HT condones violence against Western troops in Muslim countries and advocates the eradication of Israel, but has so far maintained a non-violent approach to its objectives.
9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is a former HT adherent. He, like others, joined a militant organization after becoming impatient with HT’s softer methods, which is why some observers have labeled HT “a conveyor belt to terrorism.”

A component of HTA’s strategy is to instill a sense of alienation among American Muslims so that they will turn away from their country and instead identify themselves as members of the Ummah (worldwide Muslim community). HTA tells Muslims not to vote or to embrace the culture of the “unbelievers.” However, HTA will indulge in socializing online in order to generate support.

2010 Propaganda Campaign

Social media is more popular than ever. The web is no longer simply a series of static billboards for celebrities and corporations that do not allow for two-way interaction. Social media lets users generate content, creating a sense of propriety. Facebook and Twitter provide instant satisfaction derived from the approval of peers in response to the sharing of ideas and experiences. Peer endorsements are an effective element of political propaganda and marketing campaigns.

You may continue reading this article at the Huffington Post.

Turkish Jihadists in Waziristan Respond to Charges Against Gaza Flotilla Charity IHH

By Evan Kohlmann

In the wake of the controversy over the Turkish charity Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH), a principle sponsor of the Gaza aid flotilla, Turkish jihadists fighting alongside the Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan have now weighed in with their own perspective. On June 7, the "Taifatul Mansura" Turkish-speaking foreign fighter contingent issued a communique acknowledging that IHH has promoted itself as a channel to provide financing and recruits to frontline mujahideen fighters in Chechnya and Afghanistan. However, the group thereupon accused IHH of misappropriating those resources and instead serving as a tool of Turkish intelligence agencies. According to "Taifatul Mansura", the IHH "was sincere at the beginning [but] was later used by the MIT (National Intelligence Organization) and the Psychological Warfare Department of Turkish General Staff in order to prevent the emergence of a mujahideen movement that could pose a threat to Turkish government. Both Chechen mujahideen and Turkish mujahideen who have taken part in operations in the Afghanistan Emirate are fully aware of the activities and scheming of this organization. None of the donations collected by this organization and advertised as if they had been delivered to the mujahideen were actually received by the mujahideen... We, the Taifatul Mansura Organization in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, argue that this organization is only a burden to the mujahideen.” Taifatul Mansura also accused IHH of sparking quarrels and infighting amongst various mujahideen commanders.

A translation of the statement from Taifatul Mansura can be accessed via Flashpoint Global Partners.

Why the Iran Sanctions Matter

By Matthew Levitt

Wednesday's U.N. Security Council resolution sanctioning Iran marks a critical turning point in the U.S.-led efforts to target Iran's illicit activities. The resolution focuses on Iran's nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is responsible for these programs as well as the regime's support for terrorism; and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which has been directly involved in proliferation shipments. The sanctions included in this resolution are, as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice put it, "as tough as they are smart and precise." If anything, this new resolution is both too precise and purposefully vague. And therein lies its strength.
The list of 40 entities and one individual listed in the resolution's three annexes is extremely targeted. Employing such "smart sanctions" -- pinpointing the specific entities and persons involved in Iran's illicit conduct and holding them accountable while shielding the general Iranian public from old-fashioned, shotgun, regime-wide sanctions -- has been very effective. This tactic denies Iran's revolutionary regime the chance to deflect blame for the country's economic woes, while disrupting its ability to finance and transport material necessary for its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. But the number of entities excluded from the resolution is even more telling than the list of those that made the final cut. Most entities designated this week, for example, had already been designated by the U.S. Treasury Department and/or the European Union. They have therefore already been subject to most of the impacts a U.N. resolution would hope to achieve, such as economic isolation by major financial institutions.

The full article, published by ForeignPolicy.com, is available here.

Banning Terrorist Groups: India’s Counterterrorism Priorities

By Animesh Roul

I have contributed an article in the latest issue of Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation). The article titled "100 More Terrorist Groups Banned in India: What are India’s Counterterrorism Priorities?," Vol 8 (22) June 4, 2010).

Here is the abstract of the article:

India, one of the most terrorism-troubled countries in the world, is finally pursuing the idea of proscribing nearly 100 terrorist entities, both regional and international. The proscription will exist in tandem with the United Nations’ consolidated list of al-Qaeda and Taliban linked groups. Many of these outlawed entities have staged numerous attacks either in India or abroad and threaten to continue their transnational terrorist activities in order to further their violent jihadi ideology.

Facing a Range of Threats: India has already outlawed 36 terrorist organizations which have carried out operations and have a physical presence across the country. The prominent terrorist groups currently outlawed reflect diverse ideologies and objectives.
......
Quoting Home Ministry sources, the Indian media indicated that the terror organizations soon to be added to the revised and expanded list include Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the International Islamic Relief Organization of the Philippines (IIRO PHL) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
.....
The Ministry of Home Affairs listing often receives criticism at home for excluding homegrown groups posing a threat to India’s national security and territorial integrity. In actuality, besides the 35 terror entities currently under proscription, there are more than 100 separatist and extremist armed groups, both active and dormant, that remain a threat to the state (Times of India, June 24, 2009, Hindustan Times, April 13, 2008). However, the official listing overlooks many of these clandestine networks and fails to put any curb on their activities. India’s northernmost state of Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states of Manipur and Assam share between them more than 100 terrorist organizations operating from their soil. The Ministry’s list also fails to take note of the activities of pan-Islamic terrorist groups based in Bangladesh that operate both internally and externally across the Indian border.

Access the full text of this article here:Terrorism Monitor

More Documentation on Gaza Flotilla Charity IHH

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has released two new documents relating to the Turkish Muslim charitable group Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH), sponsor of the Gaza freedom flotilla.

1.) During court proceedings involving U.S. national Abdurahman Alamoudi, who was later sentenced to 23 years in prison after pleading guilty to 3 federal offenses including violating the IEPPA Act, ICE Special Agent Brent Gentrup provided information pertaining to links between IHH and the Alamoudi-linked Success Foundation. According to Gentrup, "I have reviewed several pieces of correspondence on the letterhead of Insan Hak ve Hurrhyetleri Insani Yardim Vakfi, aka The Foundation for Human Rights & Humanitarian Relief and commonly referred to by the initials on it logo 'I.H.H.' This correspondence was seized from the offices of Success Foundation at 3606B Forest Drive, Alexandria, VA in March 2002. The first letter, on IHH letterhead is dated August 1999 and states that IHH accounts have been closed by the Turkish government. It states that 'we are only accepting cash/in-kind donations.' For more, see the affidavit on the NEFA Foundation website.

2.) The NEFA Foundation has also released a photo of representatives of the Turkish Islamic charity Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH) speaking at an IHH-sponsored event celebrating the “martyrdom” of senior Hamas leader Mohammad Said Seyam. U.S. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley previously told reporters that "we know that IHH representatives have met with senior Hamas officials in Turkey, Syria, and Gaza over the past three years. That is obviously of great concern to us." IHH sponsored the flotilla of vessels that attempted to break the ongoing blockade on Gaza. The photo is available on the NEFA Foundation website.

Hizb ut-Tahrir America Announces Annual Conference

By Madeleine Gruen

Hizb ut-Tahrir America (HTA) released a video announcement for its 2010 "Khilafah Conference," to be held on July 11 at the Chicago Marriott, Oak Brook. The conference is titled, "Emerging World Order: How the Khilafah Will Shape the World."

Last year, HTA announced its presence in the United States by hosting a conference at the Hilton in Oak Lawn, Illinois. The conference drew approximately 500 supporters, but did not appear to generate lasting momentum for HTA beyond the flurry of press reporting surrounding the event.

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) has a presence in more than 45 countries around the world and seeks to establish an Islamic state. Once its government has been established, HT intends to spread Islam to the rest of the world.

To read about HTA's history, please click here.

Defining Homeland Security Intelligence

By Matthew Levitt

Earlier today The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence hosted DHS Deputy Undersecretary for intelligence and analysis Todd Rosenblum. In his remarks, Mr. Rosenblum noted that one "particularly disturbing" phenomenon "is the significant increase in al-Qaida and its affiliate’s ability to use operatives that have access and familiarity with the United States." The need to fully integrate homeland security intelligence -- which is in many ways very different from traditional foreign intelligence -- into our overall national security strategy is critical, something stressed in the new National Security Strategy.

The audio and text of Mr. Rosenblum's full comments are available here.

Hammering the West Africa-FARC Criminal-Terror Pipeline

By Douglas Farah

It has been an unprecedented week of drug busts and designations designed to slow the criminal-terrorist nexus in Africa, mostly through cocaine supplied by the FARC in Colombia through air shipments originating in Venezuela.

We have, in the past day, seen a major cocaine ring linked to the FARC in Liberia dismantled, the son of (now dead) dictator Lansana Conte designated a drug kingpin in Guinea (Conakry), and the designation of a major drug kingpin in Mozambique.

As noted by Main Justice, linked above and including a link to the indictment, the son of Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf wore a wire for the DEA while pretending to accept bribes for a shipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Fombah Tea Sirleaf, the son or step son of the president, is the head of Liberia's National Security Agency, and participated in "Operation Relentless."

According to the indictment unsealed yesterday, a Nigerian was coordinating two shipments (one of 4,000 kilos and one of 1,500 kilos) on two different aircraft departing from Venezuela. A Colombian, a Ghanaian and a Russian all played roles. The shipment originated with the FARC in Colombia.

That is about as good as summary as one could want of the current state of alliances in the Latin American-West African drug nexus. The FARC to its state sponsor in Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, to the long-standing Nigerian network in West Africa, through a weak and highly corruptible state (Liberia). The traffickers must have been shocked to find an official in Liberia who actually did not take a bribe. Heroes are few and far between in the war on drug corruption, but there were some in this battle.
My full blog is here.

The Gaza Flotilla Decoy for Iranian Missiles to Hezbollah?

By Walid Phares

"De-Blockading" Hamas?

At first glance, the takeover by the Israeli Navy of the "humanitarian flotilla" heading towards Gaza is just one more of the disputed crises between Israel and its foes. As in all previous incidents, the spiral of accusations will eventually reach bottom. While media attention will highlight the tactical events—seizure of the ships, rules of engagement, who fired first, the legal location of the incident and the other dramatic details—the rapidly expanding debate will soon reach the strategic intent of the "flotilla." After all the governments involved issue their condemnations and warnings in all directions, after the UN issues a statement and international forums mobilize to indict their predictably targeted foe—in this case Israel—the question unavoidably will be: why is there a flotilla heading towards a military zone, and what is the ultimate goal of the operation?

WILL EU PRIVACY RIGHT CONCERNS IMPEDE CRITICAL COUNTER-TERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING?

By Victor Comras

Four years ago I had the opportunity to write a blog here concerning a controversial story in the New York Times which revealed the ongoing sifting of SWIFT intra bank transfer information by US intelligence agencies. The NYT report incensed US government officials who viewed the revelation as a serious setback in their ability to use "follow the money" strategies for tracing and finding terrorist cells. They were deeply concerned that the article had alerted those funding terrorism to the practice and that they would now avoid such transfers. But, the real damage to the program came from a different source – the European-wide outcry concerning what Europeans perceived as violations of their privacy rights. The NYT story provoked an arduous European reconsideration of its data sharing practices and a debate over the correct balance between preserving privacy rights and effectively combating terrorism and terrorism financing. This debate continues today.

Last month members of the European Parliament took up two important resolutions related to data sharing with the United States. They expressed strong concerns over the way the EU Council and Commission were handling these issues with the United States, particularly in the areas of banking data and traveler-related information. And, they warned the EU leadership that they would continue to stand in the way of any agreement which unduly sacrificed privacy rights or subjected private data to potential abuse. They also provided their own advice and guidance to the EU Council and Commission on what safeguards information sharing agreements with the United States must contain.

Bank data transfers

International bank account transfers are now channeled, for the most part, through correspondent banking relationships and large-value message and payment clearance systems. The Belgium based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication ("SWIFT") is one of the largest of these clearing centers, handling some 3.76 billion transaction messages and linking some 8,740 financial institutions in 209 countries. It seemed quite evident and logical that the US would target these critical banking transfer nodes to obtain vital information concerning the financing of terrorism and to trace and locate terrorist cells. And that is precisely what the US Treasury Department did under its Terrorism Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). It developed its own criteria for identifying and subpoenaing specific records and data from Swift.

Following publication on June 23, 2006 of the New York Times story about this practice, and the resulting European uproar, the EU and US agreed to put in place a more formal accord which called for procedures to protect against unauthorized use of the data gleaned from the TFTP SWIFT program. But, European Parliamentarians balked at the arrangement. They insisted that more specific safeguards be put in place that would comply fully with EU privacy legislation. On February 11, 2010, the EU Parliament formally rejected (378 to 196 with 31 abstentions) the US-EU interim data sharing agreement, causing considerable consternation in both European and US counter-terrorism circles.

With the data sharing agreement now supposedly in abeyance, MEP’s have moved forward on providing specific guidance to the EU Council on the protections they want. A new resolution, passed by a raised hands vote, foreclosed inclusion of so-called bulk data sharing and transfers. They also insisted that any new agreement include "strict implementation and supervision safeguards, monitored by an appropriate EU-appointed authority." This authority would be charged with filtering the day-to-day extraction of and use by the US authorities of all such data. The maximum storage period, they indicate, must not exceed five years and the data may not be disclosed to third countries. They also insist on reciprocity that would require the United States to permit EU authorities access to data stored in servers in the US. Finally, they insist that Europeans be given the same rights and access to US courts to challenge errors, and unauthorized use and abuse of the shared data. At present the privacy rights guaranteed under the US Privacy Act can only be invoked by US citizens and permanent residents of the United States.

Passenger name records (PNRs)

While deferring official Parliamentary action on the sharing of information gathered on potential travelers, the MEPs nevertheless reflected grave concerns on the current arrangements in place. The US now requires all airlines flying to the United States to provide the Department of Homeland Security with full electronic access to detailed personal information on all passengers, in the form of Passenger Name Records (PNRs). The MEP’s are aware that interrupting this process might seriously impede international travel. Therefore, they agreed to postpone taking any action. Rather, they indicated in committee discussions with the EC Commission that they wanted the Commission to move ahead on drafting a model PNR and procedures for safeguarding the information against potential abusive release or use.

PNR's contain data collected by airline reservation systems on individuals who make reservations whether or not they actually travel. Each entry is logged in a PNR "history" which is retained by the various reservation systems now in operation. Over time they put together a more complete profile of the potential traveler including the places he has gone, when, with whom, for how long, and at whose expense. This information can be very useful, and is often essential, in identifying potentially dangerous travelers and subjecting them to closer inspection or “no fly” restrictions.

The appropriate balance between protecting privacy rights and counter-terrorism concerns entails many subjective determinations. The essential element in preserving privacy and combating terrorism must be the confidence that has hopefully already developed between US and counter-part EU agencies which have already long handled and processed such data. Few, if any, cases of abuse have arisen so far. Perhaps it is time to rely on this close cooperation and confidence, rather than on new detailed legislated rules, and to make sure that vital counter-terrorism information is available and appropriately assessed in a timely fashion.

Fallout from the Gaza Flotilla Tragedy

By Matthew Levitt

The Gaza flotilla tragedy has given Hamas at least a short-term political boost while undercutting the sea blockade of Gaza, fitting well with the agenda of the flotilla's organizers, Turkey's Humanitarian Relief Fund. At the same time, the incident -- to the extent that the details are known -- has shown that U.S.-Israel relations have proven resilient in the face of the first major international incident since the two parties worked to mend relations following the Jerusalem building-permit crisis in March.

In the short term, Hamas will benefit politically from its role as a supporter of the flotilla, its public calls for Israel to not interfere with the effort to break the blockade, and the burnishing of its fading "resistance" credentials. Ismail Haniyah set up the situation as a win-win for Hamas in his May 29 speech declaring that it was a victory if the flotilla got through or if Israel stopped it. The bloody outcome only increased the size of the victory for Hamas. Previously, Hamas had launched a broad media campaign to focus attention on the flotilla and warn of the possibility of an Israeli action against it. Since the incident, Hamas media organs have given extensive coverage to it, prominently depicting the role and actions of Hamas officials. Hamas's public role in the events makes the Palestinian Authority (PA) look bad by comparison. For the most part, Hamas has considerably trailed the PA in support among Palestinians, so Hamas is hoping the incident will give it at least a temporary boost. It should be pointed out that even the sympathy boost that Hamas garnered after the 2008-2009 Gaza war evaporated in just two months.

The Gaza flotilla interdiction incident cannot be seen as other than a major victory for Hamas. The outcome, the images, and the reflexive condemnation of the action by much of the world are all of direct benefit to Hamas and to the detriment of its opponents -- especially Israel, but the PA as well. Hamas will see immediate political gains as well as potential long-term practical benefits for its rule in Gaza.

The complete article, co-authored by myself, David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, is available here.

Shooting the Messenger: A Look at the Facts on the Turkish Aid Group IHH

By Evan Kohlmann

When I first published a research paper four years ago with the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) on the Turkish Muslim charitable group Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH), I didn't imagine it would get much of a response outside the academic conference in which it was presented in Copenhagen. However, as a result of this weekend's tragic Israeli raid on an IHH-sponsored flotilla of vessels attempting to break the ongoing blockade on Gaza, the group has suddenly jumped into the headlines, and has become a focus of intense debate over the intentions of the flotilla organizers and the controversial killing of at least 9 would-be participants by Israeli commandos.

Though my DIIS paper made no mention of IHH's activities in Gaza or in support of suffering Palestinian refugees, some of those angered by the Israeli flotilla raid have instead turned their emotional animus on past critics of IHH, such as myself. While I certainly can't speak with any authority on what took place on the Gaza flotilla boats, I'm rather mystified why the flotilla killings--whether right or wrong--would have any bearing on the factual question of whether the IHH has engaged in illicit financing and episodic support to extremist groups. The evidence in this regard is fairly weighty, and much of it comes directly from the Turkish government -- not the United States, nor the Israelis.

On December 5, 1997, Turkish police raided the IHH headquarters office in Istanbul and arrested its principal leaders. Following their preliminary inquiry, on April 27, 1998, Turkish investigators launched a formal legal case against the IHH. According to a report produced by French counterterrorism magistrates, the inquiry was spurred by the sale of an AK-47 assault rifle to an IHH leader by "a member of the illegal organization VASAT." Turkish police reported seizing a series of disturbing items from the IHH in Turkey, including an explosive device, two sticks of dynamite, bomb making instructions, and a "jihad flag." The French magistrates report noted that:

"It appears that the detained members of IHH were going to fight in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya... The essential goal of this Association was to illegally arm its membership for overthrowing democratic, secular, and constitutional order present in Turkey and replacing it with an Islamic state founded on the Shariah. Under the cover of this organization known under the name of IHH, [IHH leaders] acted to recruit veteran soldiers in anticipation of the coming holy war. In particular, some men were sent into war zones in Muslim countries in order to acquire combat experience. On the spot, the formation of a military unit was assured. In addition, towards the purpose of obtaining political support from these countries, financial aid was transferred [from IHH], as well as caches of firearms, knives, and pre-fabricated explosives."

The IHH's connections to international terrorism have even surfaced in sworn witness testimony in the U.S. federal court system. During the trial of attempted Millenium bomber Ahmed Ressam, noted French counterterrorism magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere took the stand and testified that IHH had played “[a]n important role” in Ressam's bomb plot targeting LAX. Under repeated questioning, Bruguiere insisted that “[t]here’s a rather close relation”: "The IHH is an NGO, but it was kind of a type of cover-up… in order to obtain forged documents and also to obtain different forms of infiltration for Mujahideen in combat. And also to go and gather[recruit] these Mujahideens. And finally, one of the last responsibilities that they had was also to be implicated or involved in weapons trafficking."

None of this information is considered sensitive or secret, nor is it particularly difficult to come by. Turkish government officials have openly acknowledged as much in major Western media outlets. In August 1999, the governor of Istanbul was interviewed in the Washington Post after he personally ordered local IHH bank accounts frozen because of suspected criminal activity. He explained at the time, "All legal institutions may have some illegal connections. This might be the case here. If they don't like it, they can appeal in court."

To his credit, the former Istanbul governor here underscores another critical point. Contemporary terror finance networks are most effectively curtailed using accepted legal sanctions and transnational cooperation between regional allies. Incidents such as the deadly Gaza flotilla raid ultimately undermine the battle against illicit financing, and weaken shared international resolve to punish those who manipulate humanitarian relief as a cover to fund terrorism. The Israeli government must be more mindful in the future of the wider political repercussions its attempts at punitive actions can have, whether technically justified or not. Those repercussions impact not only the state of Israel, but also carry implicit costs for the United States and its European allies.

PAKISTAN: Another Terror Friday, Ahmadi Sect Targeted in Lahore

By Animesh Roul

If we scan past terror events in Pakistan, we will find most of the sectarian religious attacks targeting worshippers in and around mosques or their processions, occurred on Fridays.

On May 28, twin fidayeen style attacks in Lahore left nearly 80 people dead, all worshippers from minority Ahmadi sect (also known as Quadianis or Lahoris). Sunni terrorists (suspected Talban and the affiliated Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) stormed two mosques in Garhi Shahu and Model Town taking hundreds of worshippers hostage who congregated for prayer. The terrorists have unleashed coordinated attacks: opening fire indiscriminately at the crowd, simultaneously lobbing hand grenades around, taking hostage and blowing themselves up. Initial reports suggested that at last five terrorists, two at the Model Town mosque and three in Garhi Shahu have perpetrated mayhem for more than three hours. Local media reported late in the day that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)’s Punjab wing has claimed responsibility for the twin attacks. Another unknown group al Qaeda Al-Jihad Punjab also claimed responsibility.

On January 5 this year, one Ahmadi leader Muhammad Yousaf was killed by bike borne terrorists in Ferozewala area of Karachi which threatened to aggravate sectarian situation that time. The Tehreek-e-Tahafuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat (TTKN) was blamed for the assassination.

Ahmadis, considered non-Muslims and heretics by the mainstream Muslim populace in Pakistan, are vulnerable religious minorities like Sikhs and Christians. Unlike Shia sect which often faces the wrath of Sunni terrorists with frequent attacks in Pakistan, Ahmadi sect has experienced social discrimination, targeted assassination, but not large scale massacre like May 28 attacks. This could be a begining of a dangerous sectarian trend in Pakistan.

Ignoring al Qaeda’s ideology is a threat to US national security

By Walid Phares

In preparation for the publicizing for the new National Security Strategy by the Obama Administration, Mr John Brennan, White House Advisor on Counter Terrorism said the President’s strategy "is absolutely clear about the threat we face." From such an announcement one would project that the new narrative would be as precise as it should be. That is to define the ideology and the goals of the forces we're facing, namely the Jihadists, either Salafists or Khomeinists. Unfortunately, it was just the opposite. M. Brennan said the Obama Administration doesn’t "describe our enemy as 'Jihadists' or Islamists," because (as he argued) Jihad is a holy struggle, a legitimate tenant of Islam, meaning to purify oneself or one's community." He added that "the use of these religious terms would "play into the false perception" that al-Qaeda and its affiliates are "religious leaders and defending a holy cause, when in fact, they are nothing more than murderers." In reality, abandoning the use of terms such as “Jihadists” or even “Islamists” in defining the threat is a strategic set back in the war of ideas fought against al Qaeda, the Taliban, Shabab al Jihad, Hezbollah, the Pasdaran and all other adherents to Global Jihadism. It is the equivalent in a classical war, of banning the use of radars, AWACs and broadcast. In short, this is a shortcut to utter self defeat.

The premise of the new national security doctrine regarding the identification of the threat and the appropriate names to use is flawed in its root. Linguistically Jihad doesn’t translate into “Holy Struggle,” for the latter in Arabic is “al Nidal al muqaddass.” In its substance Jihad doesn’t mean a purification of oneself in abstract, like Yoga. Theologically it is a call for efforts on behalf of Allah (Jihad fi sabeel Allah) which could take different forms, some of which could be in the battlefield. It is originally a theological notion that US Government officials have no business in defining or redefining as M. Brennan and the national security doctrine of President Obama are attempting to. The United States secular Government shouldn’t enter the fray of stating that Jihad is legitimate or illegitimate from a theological standpoint. Instead they should identify if a particular ideology self described as "Jihadist" is or isn't a source of threat and radicalization.

Anti-Money Laundering: Blocking Terrorist Financing and Its Impact on Lawful Charities

By Matthew Levitt

This morning I had the opportunity to testify before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on the topic of "Anti-Money Laundering: Blocking Terrorist Financing and Its Impact on Lawful Charities."

Non-profit organizations are especially susceptible to abuse by terrorists and their supporters for whom charitable or humanitarian organizations are particularly attractive fronts. Here is a selection from my testimony:

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – the multilateral body that aims to set global standards for anti-money laundering and counter-terror financing – has found that “Terror networks often use compromised or complicit charities and businesses to support their objectives.” In fact, FATF warned that “the misuse of non-profit organizations for the financing of terrorism is coming to be recognized as a crucial weak point in the global struggle to stop such funding at its source.”

According to the Justice Department, intelligence indicates that terrorists continue to use charities as sources of both financial and logistical support. British officials concur. According to a joint UK Treasury/Home Office report, a “significant proportion” of terror finance investigations in the UK over 2006 included analysis of links to charities. The report found that “the risk of exploitation of charities is a significant aspect of the terrorist finance threat.”

Most charities are completely law-abiding, praiseworthy organizations. But among the minority of charities engaged in supporting terrorism, some are founded with the express purpose of financing terror, while others are infiltrated by terrorist operatives and supporters and co-opted from within. Treasury designations of entire charity tend to focus on the former. Never has the government targeted unwitting donors.

Getting the Moro House in Order?

By Zachary Abuza

On 20 May 2010, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) penned a coordination agreement under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Tajikistan. This agreement, which was signed by MILF Chairman Ebrahim el-Haj Murad and the MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari, is at the same time, symbolic, legally important, and problematic.

Symbolically, it is important because the two groups loathe each other. They split in 1978, though the MILF was not formally formed until 1984. The MILF sees the MNLF as a bunch of debauched apostates who sold out for a failed peace agreement with the government in 1996. The MNLF have failed to come to terms that the MILF is a separate entity that is larger, more powerful and could potentially win more at the negotiating table. The MNLF has – in essence – become a Tausig organization with limited presence in the Maranao and Maguindanao heartland, while the MILF’s presence in the Sulu archipelago is spotty and on the Island of Basilan especially troubling as they are oftentimes indistinguishable from the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

But the agreement is problematic because not all regard Nur Misuari, the MNLF’s founder, as the legitimate MNLF chairman. After his failed governance from 1996-2001, he was ousted by the MNLF’s Executive Council, and replaced by Muslimin Semma. Misuari led a failed rebellion, fled to Malaysia, which quickly rendered him to the Philippines, where he languished in house arrest until a few years ago. Semma, though less charismatic than Misuari, is a competent administrator and deserves plaudits for running and growing Cotabato City so effectively. Misuari once told me that Semma “is a traitor who should be hung.” Then again, Misuari also talks about himself in the third person and includes himself in the great pantheon of revolutionary leaders (Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh, you get the picture).

Semma’s faction of the MNLF, which is removed from the Tausig stronghold, has worked well with the MILF over the years. Misuari’s wing tends to embody Tausig chauvinism. But the MNLF has two distinct factions, which still needs to be addressed.

Nonetheless, the agreement has important ramifications for the government’s peace process with the MILF:

The government’s 1996 peace accord with the MNLF created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, which now include Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Tawi Tawi and most of Basilan. The MILF continued fighting for an independent state over a territory that included but was not limited to the ARMM. From 2003-2007, the government and MILF were in peace talks to establish an expanded autonomous region, known as the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE).

The sticking point was the size and the scope of the BJE. The MILF’s map included 3,978 barangays (villages) in addition to the ARMM, while the government said the Moro ancestral domain only included 613 barangays in addition to the ARMM. Finally in November 2007 the two sides reached a compromise and a draft agreement was signed.

Nonetheless, the security cluster in the President Arroyo’s cabinet, hardliners in the Congress, as well as many Christian leaders in Mindanao rejected the agreement. Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled the agreement unconstitutional, which led the MILF to take up arms once again. Low-level violence has continued since.

But here’s the rub: the MNLF has been vehemently against this agreement, which in effect would nullify their own 1996 autonomy accord. The MNLF insists upon talks with the government to redress what the government has failed to implement since 1996. The MNLF saw the creation of the BJE as patently illegal; and many Filipino leaders agreed with them. The MNLF called for Tripartite Talks, between themselves, the government and OIC to revisit the 1996 Tripoli Accord.

The 2007 draft accord with the MILF, called for ARMM officials to finish their terms, upon which the ARMM would be dissolved. The BJE’s government would be established over an enlarged territory. The draft accord did not outline how the BJE would establish its government. It left that decision – or indecision - to the bickering Moros. The MNLF assumed that the MILF would never relinquish control, and their concerns are founded.

In sum, for the government’s peace accord with the MILF to go forward, there has to be a strong working relationship between the two Moro groups and a shared acceptance of the BJE’s scope and governance. As the agreement said, coordination between the MILF and MNLF was “geared toward achieving the aspirations of the Bangsamoro people for genuine self-governance.”

This is not the first time that the two sides have tried to establish working relationship. Mutual suspicion, differing goals and egos always undermined attempts at coordination. But with a new administration, there is window of opportunity, at least in the eyes of the international community. As the MILF’s chief negotiation Mohagher Iqbal put it, the accord signals “that we are now in the right direction.”

We don’t know where the peace process is heading. Appalling little was said about the peace process by all candidates in this past May’s presidential election, least of all by the apparent winner, Benigno Aquino. We don’t know what policies his administration will put in place, nor the vigor in which he will pursue the peace process. A student of his mother’s presidency, Aquino will unlikely push for policies that antagonize the country’s politicized security forces. But he is an economic pragmatist who understands that the economy can ill-afford more war and further under-development in resource rich Mindanao.

While the Moros have plenty of grievances and mistrust towards government intentions is palpable, their inability to work together has played into the Philippine government’s traditional policy of divide and conquer. The Moros have to get their own house in order, before a durable political settlement can be reached. If properly implemented, and that’s a big if, the two sides can begin to forge a common negotiating framework. The reality is, without a holistic approach, Moro region will continue to be mired in conflict and poverty.

Radical Cleric Freewheeling in Jamaica

By Madeleine Gruen

Faisal Shahzad, the man accused of placing a car bomb in Times Square on May 1, reportedly claimed to authorities that he was inspired by Jamaican cleric Abdullah al-Faisal and the American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.

Anwar al-Awlaki's ability to circulate messages has been significantly diminished in the wake of revelations of his connections to the Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan and the would-be Christmas Day airline bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. However, Abdullah al-Faisal's ability to communicate remains relatively unhindered.

Despite serving a prison sentence in the U.K. for inciting violence, having been recognized as a spiritual mentor to 7/7 bomber Germaine Lindsay and to American James Ujaama, who attempted to establish a terrorist training camp in Bly, Oregon, and getting bounced out of Kenya in January 2010 due to concern over his detrimental influence in the Muslim community, Faisal is still able to communicate freely with followers through his online broadcasts from Jamaica.

A group calling itself The Call2Islam Movement (which is likely a cover for the U.K. extremist group Al Muhajiroun) broadcast a May 2010 Paltalk lecture by Faisal on its Youtube home page. In the lecture, Faisal implied that he is building a following in Jamaica, and praised the Jamaican media for giving him a platform to deliver his message openly:

"I'm having a good time in Jamaica. I can't go into details, but lot of people are taking their Shahada here [converting to Islam] in Jamaica, especially women and this is quite shocking because in the 1980s women did not gravitate towards Islam but now we're in the 2000s and the women are gravitating towards Islam here in Jamaica. The Jamaican media has been extremely good for Islam. They do not give Islam bad press in this country. It's not like the USA and the UK in which they target Islam in order to give it bad press. They allow you to come on the TV and explain [Islam] to the people. They allow you to come on the TV and debate with bishops and priests and expose the falsehood they are preaching to the people. So, the Jamaican media is excellent from that angle."

The NPR report that disclosed Faisal Shahzad's statement to interrogators about drawing spiritual inspiration from Awlaki and al Faisal did not specify whether there was any direct communication between Shahzad and either cleric. Faisal denied to the NPR reporter that he corresponded with Shahzad. Nevertheless, direct communication is not a requirement for incitement. Shahad, like many others, likely found inspiration by downloading lectures and reading statements that are easily accessed on the Internet.

A background report on Abdullah al-Faisal can be read here.

Chávez and Hezollah - The Relationship Revealed

By Douglas Farah

I have not had time to write much recently, but two recent events point to the increasingly overt ties between the Chávez government and international terrorist organizations.

The first, Chávez's help bring the FARC in Colombia and the Spanish ETA together,, I already discussed at some length here.

New revelations are now being published about Chávez's direct (although repeatedly denied) ties to Hezbollah and other radical Islamist groups. A new book, "El Palestino," by Spanish journalist Antonio Salas documents armed camps in Venezuela where the FARC, Hezbollah, ETA and others all train together.

In the book, which comes out later this week, the author says he posed as a Venezuelan Palestinian interested in jihad and ended up traveling around the world after fabricating a new identity. His employer, Antena 3 of Spain, has released some of the hidden camera video he shot to verify his experience.

According to the book's publicity, "It was in Venezuela that he received his baptism of fire. He found that just around the city of Caracas there are six terrorist training camps. There he learned to shoot every kind of weapon. His time there coincided with the training of members of the FARC, ETA and other groups."

There have long been reports of these camps from credible sources, but video and direct, publicly available documentation and first hand experience has not been. This is in keeping with Chávez's broader goals of creating an alliance of state and non-state actors to wage asymmetrical warfare against the United States. It is, quite likely, the worst of all worlds for the rest of Latin America, and beginnings of the solidifying joint venture that will eventually pose and existential threat to the United States.
My full blog is here.