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July 3, 2009Honduras and the Bolivarian RevolutionBy Douglas Farah
Once again an outside power is meddling in the internal affairs of a small, poor Central American country and threatening military action if its preferred candidate is not restored to office. The irony is that it is not Uncle Sam interfering in Honduras-which has happened often enough-but Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, who has made a career of railing against foreign intervention. Chávez's belligerent threats of military action to restore his ally, ousted president Manuel Zelaya, to power are supported by Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega, Bolivia's Evo Morales and the Castro brothers in Cuba. The leaders, as part of Chávez's oil-fueled regional "Bolivarian revolution," have twisted their constitutions like pretzels, run roughshod over due process, worked to silence the press, concentrated power in their own hands, and fomented violence against the legal political opposition. In addition to their current autocratic and anti-democratic governing styles, Ortega led a violent, successful revolution and Chávez led an unsuccessful military coup attempt, making their outrage over a constitutional maneuver, no matter how questionable, ring hollow. What is more disturbing is the growing ties between the Bolivarian revolutionary states and armed groups in Latin America and across the world, their open embrace of Iran, and the teaching of terrorist methodologies pioneered by radical Islamists as official military doctrine. The sole point of convergence between the Iranian theocracy and the secular Bolivarian populists is a deep hatred for the United States and liberal democracy. Zelaya, hooked on subsidized Venezuelan oil, was following the same autocratic and anti-democratic path pioneered by Chávez and joining an alliance that has strangled democratic development wherever the Bolivarian revolution has taken root. Zelaya's ouster is the first clear sign that there will be a reaction against the abuses and excesses of the Bolivarian model of radical populism, megalomania and violence, often called "popular democracy" and described as 21st Century socialism. The concern of Chávez and his allies have for Zelaya has much more to do with a fear that the reaction against them will grow than it does with any commitment to democracy. A successful removal of Zelaya could be a model for their own demise. Make no mistake. Giving the military a leading role in a political drama in Honduras may be akin to giving a pyromaniac matches and can of kerosene. It can end badly. I covered Honduras for 20 years and reported extensively both on the military's egregious human rights abuses and voracious economic appetite that sucked the national coffers dry, although the troops have stayed in the barracks for more than two decades. But look at the alternatives. Zelaya was illegally attempting the same political move successfully executed by Chávez and Morales-a constitutional change that would allow him to stay in power indefinitely-always among the first actions of the Bolivarian leaders. The nation's supreme court ruled that his attempted referendum was unconstitutional. His party broke with him, his attorney general said it was illegal and the army refused to cooperate in light of the court ruling. Yet Zelaya proceeded, after leading a crowd to burn an army installation in protest of the institution's failure to defy the supreme court decision. He was flown into exile at gunpoint and replaced by Roberto Micheletti, of his own party and head of the National Assembly. Micheletti promises to hold scheduled presidential elections this year and not be a candidate. Time will tell. The Honduras situation leaves the United States with difficult options. How the Obama administration handles this challenge against a government that was in the process of breaching the constitutional order will have powerful repercussions across Latin America. Similar challenges could appear in Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Ecuador as the Bolivarian governments move to consolidate their hold on power and meet resistance. It is tempting to see the restoration of Zelaya as the democratic imperative, and most of the international community is pressing for this outcome, while not endorsing Chávez's threats of violence. The Organization of American States is set to impose a series of crippling economic sanctions if Zelaya is not allowed to return in some form. But it is worth looking further at the implications of the Boliviarian revolution writ large. It has been almost two decades since the democratic processes began in Central America, and a few years more since South America moved from military dictatorships and coups to liberal democracies with imperfect but improving institutional processes, transparency and freedoms. I lived in Latin America during civil wars and the difficult transition from decades of brutal authoritarian regimes to the fragile democratic structures, built through sweat and blood. These still-fragile democracies are now in danger of being choked by the new radical populism, fueled by oil money, deep disillusionment with the corruption and mismanagement of the traditional political classes and exclusion based on race and class. The need for deep reform certainly exists. But Chávez's model is not the solution. Reasons for deep concern about the spread of the Bolivarian revolution are far deeper than simple ideological disputes, and Zelaya's actions are only one piece of a wider pattern. The threat of Chávez and his allies goes to the heart of the region's democratic processes and institutionality. While the moves against civil society and institutions have been amply documented, the contours of the broader threat of the Bolivarian alliance and its ties to radical Islamist regimes, particularly Iran, are now clearer. Venezuela has adopted an official military doctrine that is based on strategies Hezbollah and other radical Islamist groups are already practicing, and one embraced to a significant degree by Iran, the primary state sponsor of those groups. The embrace of this doctrine provides an important link in understanding the ties of Venezuela and its allies to Iran. Since 2005 Chávez has rewritten Venezuela's security doctrine, replacing "imperialist" influences with a doctrine centered on asymmetrical warfare, in the belief that the primary threat to Venezuelan and Latin American security is a U.S. invasion. This doctrine is being taught by Venezuelan instructors to the militaries of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Honduras. One of the main books Chávez has adopted is Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare by the Spanish politician Jorge Verstrynge. Although he is not a Muslim Verstrynge's book lauds radical Islam (as well as past terrorists like Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, better known as Carlos the Jackal) for expanding the parameters of what irregular warfare can encompass, including the use of biological and nuclear weapons. He is particularly taken with suicide bombers, whom he praises for their willingness to die for the cause. Verstrynge has lauded Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda for creating a new type of warfare that is "de-territorialized, de-stateized and de-nationalized," a war where suicide bombers act as "atomic bombs for the poor." Chávez invited Verstrynge to give keynote address to military leaders in a 2005 conference and ordered a special pocket size edition of the book to be printed up and distributed throughout the officer corps, to be studied cover to cover. The fascination with asymmetrical warfare may explain why Chávez and other members of the Bolivarian axis maintain close ties to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated terrorist and drug trafficking organization by both the United States and the European Union. Chávez personally requested that the FARC train Venezuelan military and militias in guerrilla warfare in case of a U.S. invasion. These actions are part of why many who viewed the Bolivarian revolutions in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Honduras with hope are now turning away in disillusionment. With more and more avenues of legitimate protest, dissent and political change cut off, there few options to return to the values so many fought for in decades past-freedom of speech, the rule of law, unfettered media, a separation of powers and chance to replace poor governments with better ones in regularly scheduled elections. Zelaya's removal was evokes old school methods and appears to be ill-considered. But the Obama administration needs to weigh the bigger picture before handing Chávez and his allies an easy victory by backing Zelaya under the illusion that such a move will bring advance democracy in Honduras or Latin America.
Lashkar-e-Taiba's Terror Tentacles in the GulfBy Animesh Roul
I just published one article on the Lashkar-e-Taiba's gulf based cells and operatives who have masterminded series of recent attacks against India. The article titled,"Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network Targets India from the Gulf States" in Jamestwon Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7 (19), July 2, 2009. Here is an excerpt: An impending threat from the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist group has prompted security establishments to raise an alert along India’s western sea-coast. According to intelligence sources, the LeT’s marine wing is planning a Mumbai-type incursion to target vital installations in the three coastal states of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Goa. The group is also reported to have funneled huge amounts of money from its Gulf-based networks to fund jihad activities in India (Times of India, June 30). This is not an isolated intelligence alert. The threat emanating from the LeT was partially revealed following the recent arrest of Muhammad Omar Madni, a close associate of LeT/Jamaat-ud- Dawa chief Hafeez Muhammad Saeed. The arrest and interrogation of Madni revealed several startling details, including new routes used by terrorists, the location of bases inside and outside India, terrorist finances, and the recruitment strategy of Lashkar-e-Taiba. For Complete Issue, Read Here. July 2, 2009NEFA Foundation: AQIM Threatens Attacks on France over Veil ControversyBy Evan Kohlmann
An English translation of the AQIM communique can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website. July 1, 2009Hizb ut-Tahrir America Conference Update: HTA Books Grand Ballroom at Chicago Area HiltonBy Madeleine Gruen
Hizb ut-Tahrir America (HTA) has booked the Hilton in Oak Lawn, IL for the "Fall of Capitalism & Rise of Islam" conference, according to an update on their Khilafah Conference web site. HTA was forced to find another venue at which to hold their conference after the original venue, the Aqsa School in Bridgeview, Illinois canceled. The Aqsa School's business manager told a CBS News reporter that the representatives of HTA had "misrepresented themselves and the event" and the school did not "want to be in the middle of something like that." According to the announcement on the HTA conference web site, the conference will still be held on July 19th, from 11 am to 5 pm, as originally planned. The Hilton Oak Lawn reservations department does not have any record of guest rooms held under the name "Hizb ut-Tahrir," or "Khilafah Conference," or "Fall of Capitalism & Rise of Islam." The Hilton's catering department, which keeps a record of the organizations that have booked event spaces at the hotel, was not open at the time of the publication of this article; therefore, it cannot be determined at this time whether HTA booked under its own name or if it has used a cover name to reserve the Grand Ballroom. *** UPDATE: 7/2/09 - Hizb ut-Tahrir reserved the banquet space at the hotel under its own name and apparently did not find it necessary to use a cover name. *** For more information on HTA and the Khilafah Conference, please see my recent posts on the Counterterrorism Blog. How the FBI Broke Saddam - Part 4 (Epilogue)By James Gordon Meek
Three months into interrogating Saddam Hussein, the FBI had heard no bombshells. There had been no startling boasts by Iraq’s ousted president of ordering the Kurds in northern Iraq to be gassed, nor had he bragged of sending his thugs to slaughter Shi’a in the south to quash the uprising that followed the first Gulf war. But the more the FBI confronted him with its painstakingly-gathered evidence - documents, videos, witnesses and interrogations of other regime detainees - the harder it had been for Saddam to lie, spin or obfuscate. By May 2004, he was still defiant - but the chinks in his armor were noticeable. He admitted as a point of pride that he was “responsible” for everything his regime did, good or bad. FBI Agent George Piro had mostly kept Saddam in the dark about current events, forcing him to reckon with the hell he brought on his own people. Now it was time to show the ex-dictator he was no longer in charge of anything more than his own thoughts. Now it was time to humiliate him over his failures. Only then would he come clean about what propelled the U.S. and Iraq into war, agents reasoned. In the FBI’s 21st interrogation session, Saddam asked what was making headlines. He was told Iraq had signed a new constitution, was about to regain its sovereignty, had a new all-Iraqi Governing Council and that elections were on the way. None of that made him happy, according to the Bureau’s files. Next came intense discussions about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. “Iraq does not have any WMD and has not for some time,” the FBI reported back to Washington, summing up Saddam’s responses. (Charles Duelfer - who had taken over the WMD hunt from the CIA’s David Kay in January - was coming up just as empty as his predecessor.) Why had he rejected UN weapons inspections and defied President Bush? Saddam’s answer - one never seriously considered inside the Beltway before the 2003 invasion - was shockingly credible. “Even though Hussein claimed Iraq did not have WMD, the threat from Iran was the major factor as to why he did not allow the return of the UN inspectors,” the FBI reported. Read my full post - with FBI source documents - on Saddam's WMD and Al Qaeda explanations at the New York Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog. The Bolivarian-Islamist Narrative in Latin America and its DangersBy Douglas Farah
Yesterday I participated in a Hudson Institute event on Populism, Islamism and "Indigenism" versus Democracy in Latin America. What came into focus there was the joint narrative of the Bolivarian populist governments (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua) and radical Islamists, led by Iran. It is hard, on the surface, to imagine what a secular revolution that allows women on the beach in bikinis, salsa music, racy soap operas and rum has in common with a theocracy that tolerates none of those things and believes that divine law should rule the world. One of the primary unifying threads in the joint narrative is the utopian vision that a human system can be devised that will bring justice and peace. Hence, from this vision, both groups construct a narrative of heroic battling against the earthly forces of evil and corruption, and both have chosen the United States as its primary enemy, followed closely by other liberal democracies that, in their view, have failed to live up to the utopian ideals. This is where, as I have written about before, the joint fascination with asymmetrical warfare and its desirability meshes with the larger story line. Both sides view themselves as small powers taking on vast world powers, a David and Goliath narrative that imbues a sense of inevitable ultimate victory with the need to find the weapons that will lead to the defeat of enemy. The keynote speaker at the Hudson event, Spanish parliamentarian Gustavo de Arístegui, has written that those in this alliance, whether secular or religious, view themselves as "legitimate soldiers in an heroic battle within the context of an asymmetrical war of liberation. It is a theory that justifies any kind of violence, including terrorism, if it is used against the most powerful countries, the repressive forces of the West." This view of the heroism of the actions is in part what gives such a dangerously romantic view of suicide bombings, as espoused in the book Chavez has adopted as official military doctrine: Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra Periferica y el Islam There is little doubt that this tactical alliance would shatter if either side were to gain significant ground. The Islamists have shown, particularly in the Iranian revolution that was viewed initially by many as triumph of secular, reformist forces, that it will eat the young revolutionaries for lunch. But for now, the common view of the struggle against the West, bound by a narrative both can offer as an explanation for their actions, is sufficient. The common enemy is there, and the weapons for the struggle can be obtained. One of the dangers of this narrative is not just the seduction it holds for messianic leaders like Chavez in Venezuela and Ahmadinejad in Iran, but the lure it holds for non-state armed groups like the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), who increasingly find themselves isolated and without a coherent reason to continue the revolution. Chavez's willingness to embrace and help write this narrative means that he has shared with his allies in the FARC, and why his pro forma protestations of not supporting the revolutionary cause are meaningless, and will remain so. The FARC needs to articulate a reason for its continuation in the armed struggle. The narrative not only offers that, but well-trained allies (Hezbollah particularly) who can help them advance once a common agenda is established. And that is truly alarming. June 29, 2009How the FBI Broke Saddam - Part 3By James Gordon Meek
Saddam Hussein loved to talk - and to b.s. his sole interrogator, FBI Supervisory Special Agent George Piro. But, as we first reported in the New York Daily News in 2007, Piro - backed up by a team of FBI agents and crack CIA analysts - knew Saddam’s history too well. Where there were gaps, Piro was able to parry with the imprisoned leader to get credible answers. “High Value Detainee-1” was soon blabbing so freely it was hard for him to keep his lies intact. Once secret FBI files on the Saddam interrogations, which I have been reporting the past week, show that as the weeks wore on Saddam opened up more and more. The FBI-CIA team leveraged its strategy to “overwhelm” - and break - Saddam by confronting the deposed dictator with evidence of his crimes against humanity. He was soon boasting of terrible misdeeds against his own people - in order to set the historical record straight, which Piro had encouraged. On Mar. 21, 2004, the FBI team in Baghdad reported they had conducted 16 interviews of Saddam and a dozen with his former henchmen, including ex-foreign minister Tariq Aziz and a death-dealing thug nicknamed “Chemical Ali.” Noting Saddam’s willingness to engage in “dialogue, not an interrogation,” the FBI’s Baghdad agents told Washington that Piro spent several sessions “discussing non-threatening topics,” and that Saddam felt relaxed enough “to talk freely and to boast of past accomplishments.” But Saddam also quit eating in some unexplained protest, the FBI memo said - though he had grown so dependant on the G-man providing for all his needs that “Hussein announced he was ending his hunger strike for the benefit of SSA Piro.” “As the rapport and dependency between Hussein and SSA Piro continues to grow, more complex topics are being introduced into the interviews,” such as detailed questions about gassing Kurds in northern Iraq and suppressing the 1991 Shi’a uprising, the once-secret memo reported. “In the past, Hussein would have refused to discuss these topics. However, he has increasingly allowed himself to be drawn into discussions… [due] to the non-threatening manner in which they are being posed,” the FBI file said. More on how the FBI needled Saddam into confessing his crimes in my full post at the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog. June 28, 2009Swat Analysis: Focus Shifts to Waziristan, Taliban Reaches MuzaffarabadBy Animesh Roul
'Swat Analysis’ is a Daily brief on the resurgent Taliban and their safe sanctuaries in Pakistan. The brief focuses on the developments in Swat province, NWPF and other Taliban hotspots. This is the concluding brief. The Pakistani army has initiated military offensive code named “Rah-e- Nijat” in Waziristan to quell terrorist movement there, after flushing out Taliban/TNSM militants from Swat and Malakand region. The government claimed that military operation in Swat is nearing end. However, on the ground, the operation “ Rah-e-Rast” is far from over in Malakand region as security forces are still holding search and sweep operations in Swat and Dir areas. In Upper Dir’s Ghazi Gai area, Taliban and local militias are still confronting each other. It is believed that most of the senior Taliban leaders operating in Swat have either fled to Waziristan or crossed the border to Afghanistan. Started since Mid June, the ongoing Waziristan operation targets Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan chief Baitullah Mehsud and his band of terrorists, including suspected al Qaeda leaderships hiding in the area. In the latest wave of operations in Ladha and Wana in South Waziristan, Taliban hideouts were targeted. In North Waziristan also security forces are engaged with Taliban militants who have been resorting to ambush tactics on security convoys and IED attacks recently. While the military engaged in shelling Taliban/al Qaeda hideouts there, the government has offered millions of rupees as head money for any information on Mehsud and his accomplices from South Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand, and Darra Adamkhel. The other Taliban leaders with head money were identified as Molvi Faqir, Abdul Wali, Qari Shakeel, Hakimullah Mehsud and Qari Hussain. Taliban’s 'Ustad-e-Fidayeen' Qari Hussain, a close aide of Baitullah Mehsud and chief trainer for suicide bombers, was reportedly among many killed in US drone attacks in South Waziristan recently. However, there is no confirmation as such about his death till now. The intra-fighting within Taliban leaderships emerged when Turkistan Bhittani, a dissident Taliban militant commander has spoken out against TTP’s Baitullah Meshud. Much before Bhittani’s resentment, another dissident Taliban commander Qari Zainuddin raised the standard of revolt. He was later killed by Baitullah’s followers in Dera Ismail Khan. Taliban’s tentacles reached Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) last week when a suicide bomber blew himself up targeting an army vehicle in Muzaffarabad, in an apparent retaliation of June 23 drone (U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles) attacks in South Waziristan. For the first time Taliban forces marked their presence in PAK region which traditionally dominated by ‘Kashmir-India- Centric’ terrorist outfits like HIzbul Mujahidin, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish- e- Muhammad. Pakistan’s Interior Minister Rehman Malik in an interview indicated that Swat like situation might arise in south Punjab where a fleeing Taliban could take shelter. Meanwhile, in the latest search operations around Punjab province, Pakistan security forces have arrested nearly 40 suspected terrorists from various parts of the Punjab province as part of a countrywide crackdown. From the capital Islamabad, at least 25 pro-Taliban militants were arrested who were plotting attacks against vital installations and Embassies and security establishments. In Karachi, city police managed to bust a Taliban hideout and neutralized five close associates of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Chief Baitullah Mehsud in a shootout near Gadap town. It seems the war against Taliban forces in Pakistan will be long and winding one. The war in Swat province may be over soon, but for now, Islamabad administration is more concerned about the spill-over Taliban forces who might take shelters in or trying to regroup in volatile Waziristan, or Punjab and exterminating the top Taliban leadership there. Previous Briefs on Swat Operation and Anti-Taliban offensive in Pakistan: 1."Taliban Retaliation, Tribal Backlash and 'Greater Pakhtunistan' Buzz" (June 7, 2009) June 27, 2009How the FBI Broke Saddam - Part 2By James Gordon Meek
Saddam Hussein was defiant in his first meetings with his American captors. But soon it was time to begin whittling down his ego, bloated by decades of absolute power in Iraq. Brute force, however, was not in the gameplan. By mid-February 2004, FBI Supervisory Special Agent George Piro had sat down with Saddam Hussein three times - as I reported exclusively for the New York Daily News on Friday - and listened to the toppled tyrant yap away about his great accomplishments leading ragtag Iraq out of the Stone Age. The FBI prides itself on “rapport-based” interrogations that have a high success rate for yielding confessions from the likes of 1993 World trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and CIA headquarters killer Mir Aimal Kasi. There was no “ticking bomb” scenario with Saddam - just inherent political pressure - so the interrogation proceeded carefully and cautiously over months. The strategy involved executing a subtle emotional attack, digging out Saddam’s soft spots and exploiting them. Prick his ego. Saddam had revealed little, so far - and neither had Piro - other than stating he remained in Baghdad until the day before his capital fell to American-led forces in April 2003. He said he instructed his henchmen in a final meeting, “We will struggle in secret.” After fleeing Baghdad, he gradually dispersed his bodyguards one by one to avoid drawing Coalition forces’ attention. Saddam had evaded capture for nine months, until U.S. viceroy Paul Bremer made his famous exultation in December 2003: “Ladies and gentleman, we got him!” Piro asked if Saddam ever used body doubles, as was widely believed. “No, of course not,” he scoffed. “This is movie magic, not reality.” But as the fourth interrogation began on Feb. 13, Saddam wanted answers from Piro. “Let me ask a direct question. I want to ask where … has the information been going? For our relationship to remain clear, I want to know,” he demanded. Piro replied that he was a “representative of the U.S. Government” and told Saddam many U.S. officials saw his reports, and that readership “may include the President of the United States.” Saddam seemed pleased, commenting that he did “not mind” if the interviews were published. Piro turned to Saddam’s WMD stockpiles but his quarry brushed it off, saying, “We destroyed them. We told you… By God, if I had such weapons, I would have used them in the fight against the U.S.” Hadn’t Saddam’s own decision to defy the UN on WMD inspections led to crippling sanctions and then a war that ousted him from power? “This is your opinion. I answered,” the stonewaller said. “We (Iraqis) are among the few remaining cavaliers.” Read my full post on how the FBI began to whittle away at Saddam’s ego - as well as the FBI source documents - at the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog. Hizb ut-Tahrir America Conference Venue CancelsBy Madeleine Gruen
The Aqsa School, an Islamic school located in Bridgeview, Illinois, was announced as the conference venue in the promotional video that was released by HTA earlier this month. The HTA conference web site provides no further explanation for the cancellation. The Aqsa School web site does not mention the Khilfafah Conference-- officially titled "Fall of Capitalism and Rise of Islam"-- or the subsequent cancellation. It is possible that the school did not welcome the association with HTA, which adheres to extremist Islamist ideology. It is also possible that the board and administrators of the school anticipated unwelcome attention from the public and government officials as a result of hosting the conference. HTA intends to find a new venue in which to hold the conference, according to the conference web site. Now that HTA has come out publicly, and is thus openly linked to the Khilafah Conference concept, it may be difficult for it to find a venue willing to host the event. To read more about HTA's history, and its transition from covert to public operating status, please see my recent post on the Counterterrorism Blog. June 26, 2009Iran Sanctions: Still A Viable Option?By Victor Comras
Earlier this month I had the opportunity to address a Canadian House of Commons Foreign Relations Subcommittee concerning the potential use and impact of sanctions on Iran and its quest for nuclear weapons. This oral testimony can be found here. At that time we were all awaiting the outcome of the Iranian Presidential elections and there was much speculation that a significant change might be in the offing. The outcome of those elections did effect change, but few could have predicted the context or direction those changes took. We are now faced with an even more dangerous Iran – An Iran in the throes of a domestic upheaval that has illegitimized the government as representative of the Iranian people, hardened its position vis a vis the outside world, and made productive dialogue with Iran’s current leaders a virtual impossibility. What Western government leader would, in the present context, now be willing to engage with, and thereby strengthen and re-legitimize the Ahmadinejad administration and his Mullah regime overseers? Yet, through all the turmoil in Iran there is no indication that those now ruling Iran have indicated any willingness to change course, or slow down their unmonitored uranium enrichment and their daily advances toward nuclear weapons capability. Each day brings Iran closer to that irreversible point after which Iran’s neighbors, and the rest of the world, must consider Iran to be nuclear weapons capable. It is that point that risks setting off an unstoppable proliferation of nuclear weapons programs in the Middle East, and beyond. If dialogue with the current Iranian regime is not now possible, other options must be pursued. And the one option that stands out is for the West to apply significant sanctions pressure against the Ahmadinejad regime, and the mullahs, IRGC and other quasi military forces that are upholding it. We don’t need a UN Security Council resolution to accomplish this. But, we do need our European allies and friends, and other countries opposed to what is going on in Iran to join us in apply such measures. Europe remains the key. Western Europe alone accounts for Iran’s largest slice of trade and largest sources of revenues. Together we must impress also on the UAE, and especially Dubai, that it can no longer do business as usual with Iran with regard to circumventing sanctions Iran, or providing Iran’s corrupt leaders a safe place to deposit their money. Let’s be clear. The low-impact sanctions now on the table simply will not work. We need to move forward now on putting in place sanctions that really target Iran’s political and economic vulnerabilities – the elements that can truly heighten the stress on its leaders. These vulnerabilities include Iran’s fragile financial system, Iran’s energy sector, Iran’s transportation and communication sector, and Iran’s elite investment entities.. Iran’s leaders will only change course if and when they are convinced that the international community will, in fact, take the steps necessary to deprive them of the resources they depend on to retain their positions of power and authority, or that they have squirreled away. Iran’s Mullahs and favored business leaders must be made to feel the pinch of sanctions. So far they have enjoyed a free ride, and with corruption running high throughout Iran’s ruling circles, there is quite a bit of their money outside Iran that could and should be frozen. Europe, Japan and Canada should be convinced to join with us now also in cutting off Iran’s access to high tech items, including potentially dual-use, equipment and expertise. Together, we must put Dubai and the freeport of Jebel Ali on notice that we will no longer countenance their acting as intermediaries for transshipments of such goods to Iran. With a daily consumption of more than 18 million gallons of gasoline Iran must now import some 180 to 200 million gallons of gasoline per month. The availability of gasoline exports to Iran should be curtailed. Rising petroleum prices have already been the cause of civil unrest, and gasoline shortages could have a significant impact on local business activity and put increased pressure on Iranian leaders to alter course. Travel restrictions on Iran’s leaders should also be broadened, and cultural, sporting and scientific exchanges with Iran curtailed. These are examples of measure that can be taken now to convince Iran we mean business. These are the kind of measures that give us our last best chance of heading off a graver crisis just a few years down the road. Can Hezbollah Launch Long-Range Terror Attacks?By Aaron Mannes
In his new book Homeland Security, Assessing the First Five Years, former DHS secretary Michael Chertoff argues: Al-Qaeda and its network are our most serious immediate threat, they may not be our most serious long-term threat….[Hezbollah] has developed capabilities that Al-Qaeda can only dream of, including large quantities of missiles and highly sophisticated explosives.Chertoff’s statement is conventional wisdom among many terrorism experts. Shortly after 9/11 then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated: Hezbollah may be the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the 'B' team.But Hezbollah has not carried out a successful out-of-area attack since the 1996 Khobar strike. Is Hezbollah still capable of carrying out long-range terror attacks? In 1992, exactly one month after Israel assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi, the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed. Two years later, on July 18, 1994 Hezbollah bombed the Jewish communal offices in Buenos Aires, at least partially in response to Israel’s capture of Hezbollah leader Mustafa Dirani on May 21 and a bombing of a Hezbollah training camp on June 2. In contrast, it has been almost a year and a half since Hezbollah terror master-mind Imad Mughniyeh was assassinated. Hezbollah has threatened revenge against Israel for the assassination of Mughniyeh. But attempts to kidnap Israeli tourists and bomb the Israeli embassy in Baku have been foiled. Azerbaijan borders Iran and Iran has a very large Azerbaijani population, so Hezbollah and its IRGC allies should have had a relatively easy time carrying out an attack. Has Hezbollah’s ability to launch an attack deteriorated, or is it merely biding its time? In and of itself, this is an important question – but it achieves even greater significance in light of the unstable situation in Iran. One constraint on Western action is the concern of long-range terror by Hezbollah and its allies in the IRGC. If that threat is not be as significant as previously assessed, then one barrier to action is lowered. Read the full post here. How the FBI Broke Saddam - Part 1By James Gordon Meek
Where were Iraq’s WMD? How close was Saddam Hussein to Al Qaeda, really? These were vital - but still unanswered - questions when the Iraqi despot was yanked out of a spider hole in December 2003 and placed in U.S. military detention. Lives were at stake - along with the entire political rationale for the U.S.-led coalition invading Iraq. Only one man could say for sure, and now that the U.S. finally had him in custody, they had to find out. There was only one way: Break Saddam. The FBI’s newly-declassified interrogation files on Saddam Hussein, reported exclusively in yesterday’s New York Daily News, stand in contrast to the dark view espoused by Team Bush: extreme interrogation techniques extract confessions from “high-value” detainees who resist questioning. The CIA and FBI were intent on getting Saddam to explain what happened to the missing weapons of mass destruction, his operational ties - if any - to Al Qaeda and admit his own crimes against humanity by gassing and slaughtering his own people. CIA WMD hunter David Kay had resigned in frustration in late January 2004, and the missing arsenal was vexing Team Bush just as special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald was beginning his probe of the White House over leaks in retaliation against Iraq war critic Joe Wilson. The pressure was intense. A young, Arabic-speaking, Lebanese-American FBI agent named George Piro was picked to get Saddam to confess. Detailed interrogation plans were drawn up, and Piro sat down with one of the most brutally ruthless world leaders of the late 20th century, prepared to play mental chess with a master of manipulation, whose intelligence ranged from cunning street smarts to quirky political intuition. The first FBI interrogation of Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti - in a program codenamed “Desert Spider” - took place Feb. 7, 2004, in a dingy cell at Baghdad International Airport. Memos obtained by The News through a 2006 Freedom of Information Act request for Saddam’s file show that top FBI and Justice Department officials had decided Feb. 6 not to read high-value detainees Miranda rights or to identify interrogators to detainees in any way other than as “representatives of the United States Government” or “U.S. Government agents.” Saddam assumed Piro was a top Bush aide - not a low-ranking street agent. Sizing up the G-man, Saddam observed that Piro (an FBI supervisory special agent) was “smart,” and predicted, “Perhaps a conversation between two such educated people will not be useful or successful.” He decreed that it was only important to him what people say or think about him “in the future, 500 or 1,000 years from now.” The ex-leader ranted about all he had done for Iraq, which “barely had anything” when he came to power in a bloodbath 40 years ago. Piro asked if he had ever failed in his decades as Iraq’s leader, but Saddam countered, “Do you think I would tell my enemy if I made a mistake?” His ego as yet undiminished by captivity, Saddam gloated that “the only political parties existing in Iraq are the ones with the weapons” - a reference to the growing lethality of the Sunni insurgency - and said it made no difference what anybody thought about him. “Hussein believes people will love him more after he passes away than they do now,” Piro wrote in his first FBI “302” report back to Washington. Read my complete post on how the FBI broke Saddam Hussein and the original FBI interrogation reports at the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog. Palestinian Militants in Gaza Split with the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)By Evan Kohlmann
The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a new statement from the Army of Islam (a.k.a. Jaish al-Islam) in the Gaza Strip -- a Palestinian Islamic militant faction opposed to Hamas -- announcing that it is withdrawing from a mutual agreement with the online jihadi logistical support group known as the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF). The Palestinian faction refused to explain the reasons for its decision, citing its desire to avoid controversy and quarreling between Muslims. NEFA Foundation: Transcript of Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid's Al-Jazeera InterviewBy Evan Kohlmann
State of Play VI: Malevolent MashupsBy Roderick Jones
I had the pleasure of hosting the Security and Surveillance panel discussion at the State of Play VI conference at New York Law School last week. The panel was designed to try and explore ideas around security and surveillance in virtual worlds. While the overall title of the conference was 'plateau' the feeling on the panel was that constant innovation within and outside of virtual worlds would continue to create new security challenges. Michael Schrage coined the phrase 'Malevolent Mashups', which seemed to describe the future challenge. June 25, 2009Have the Islamists won in Algeria?By Olivier Guitta
For the past month, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has perpetrated numerous terror acts including two major attacks against Algerian policemen: one that killed 24 on June 18 and another one that killed 6 on June 22. FBI Replaces Brotherhood Tainted Liaison with Brotherhood Tainted LiaisonBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
A top FBI official met Wednesday with the vice president of the Islamic Society of North America, a move which followed the Bureau's decision "to use ISNA as their official point of contact with the American Muslim community," an email from an intelligence community veteran that was widely distributed Wednesday said. The FBI has not yet commented on the claim. But the IPT has confirmed that the meeting did take place at FBI headquarters. The decision to make ISNA the FBI's contact point came over the objections of case agents and supervisors investigating Muslim Brotherhood activity in the U.S. Last year, the FBI cut off outreach communication with the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), after evidence in the Hamas-support trial against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) raised questions "whether there continues to be a connection between CAIR or its executives and HAMAS." The FBI's case agent testified that CAIR was a Hamas front. Like CAIR, ISNA was an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF trial. It is listed among "who are and/or were members of the US Muslim Brotherhood." Jamal Badawi, an ISNA board member, also was named as an unindicted co-conspirator, listed among people who raised money for HLF. The evidence involving ISNA, however, was not as deep as it was with CAIR. In CAIR's case, its founders are included on a telephone list for members of a secret Hamas support network in the U.S. created by the Muslim Brotherhood. And they participated in a 1993 meeting of Hamas members and supporters called to discuss ways to thwart U.S.-led peace efforts between Israel and the Palestinians. In that weekend-long meeting, CAIR co-founder Omar Ahmad discussed ways to mislead Americans about their goals and ideology. Executive Director Nihad Awad discussed media strategies to help the cause. In the evidence admitted by the court, ISNA officials were not named among members of the Hamas support network, called the Palestine Committee. But FBI investigative records show it held a significant role in the Brotherhood's U.S. activities. According to an FBI memorandum from the 1980s obtained via the Freedom of Information Act, past "ISNA conferences provided opportunities for the extreme fundamentalist Muslims to meet with their supporters ... The annual conferences are used for both religious and political purposes. The political purpose is to further the Islamic Revolution, which includes providing anti-U.S. and Israel publications and publications that support the war effort of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war." The Brotherhood is an 80-year-old Egyptian movement which seeks to spread the rule of Shariah, or Islamic law, throughout the world. But some top FBI officials are not convinced the Brotherhood is a problem, a law enforcement source said Thursday. This, despite the fact that FBI investigation has uncovered documents showing the U.S. Brotherhood's goal is "a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions." The problem, the source said, is too many FBI officials have developed friendly individual relationships with the leadership of groups like ISNA. "As an FBI agent, we use facts and evidence and truth to base our decisions and not because we went to dinner with someone." ISNA's roots in the Brotherhood are clearly established. Internal Muslim Brotherhood records in evidence the HLF trial show ISNA was created by Muslim Brotherhood members in the U.S. who had been leaders of the Muslim Students Association. In addition, the Chicago Tribune and federal prosecutors in Dallas have documented the link. Read our full post on the ISNA-FBI developments here. Terrorist Financing on the InternetBy Michael Jacobson
Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, al-Qaeda has come under growing international pressure. In response, the terrorist organization has increasingly relied on the internet to spread its message and gain support throughout the world. While its use of the internet for propaganda and recruiting purposes has received wide publicity, al-Qaeda has also utilized the internet for a variety of other purposes, including terrorist financing. Al-Qaeda is far from alone among terrorist organizations in exploiting the internet for financing. A wide range of other terrorist groups -- including Hamas, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Hizballah -- have also used the internet to raise and transfer needed funds to support their activities. The internet offers broad reach, timely efficiency, as well as a certain degree of anonymity and security for both donors and recipients. Although governments throughout the world now recognize that the internet is an increasingly valuable tool for terrorist organizations, the response has been inconsistent. For the United States and its allies to effectively counter this dangerous trend, they will have to prioritize their efforts in this area in the years to come. Click here to rest the rest of this article, which was published in the June issue of "The Sentinel," the West Point Counterterrorism Center's monthly journal. June 24, 2009More Terrorists Arrests in IndonesiaBy Kenneth Conboy
With a presidential election slated for 8 July, the Indonesian security forces have recently gone into overdrive while making a series of arrests of terrorist suspects. Over the past couple of days, the police counter-terrorist unit, Special Detachment 88, has detained two radicals believed to be Singaporean nationals. The first, Syamsul Anwar alias Somad bin Soba, was arrested in Bandar Lampung, Lampung province. The second, Husaini, who had been living in Malang, East Java province, was picked up while en route to Central Java. Both were thought to have infiltrated into Indonesia in 2002 along with Slamat Kasteri, a Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist who escaped from a Singaporean prison last year and was re-captured in Malaysia on 1 April. Along with Kasteri, the two men arrested in Indonesia this past week were thought to have been tied to an aborted plot to bomb Changi International Airport in Singapore. Residents near Syamsul Anwar’s house in Bandar Lampung expressed shock over his reported ties to terrorism. He was said to spend his time driving a pedicab and attending prayer sessions at a local mosque. Also arrested in Indonesia this past week was Syaifudin Zuhry in Cilacap, Central Java. Zuhry was reported tailed for months and is thought to be closely tied to JI fugitive Noordin Top. West Africa in the New Cocaine PipelineBy Douglas Farah
Yesterday the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Africa held what Chairman Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin) called a wake up call on the growing threat of cocaine trafficking through West Africa. I testified there on the ties of the emerging groups in West Africa to the FARC and my fellow CTB contributor Michael Braun testified as well. I think it is a tremendously important development because, in the end, there are two major consequences for the United States: the money from that trade will strengthen the criminal pipelines in our hemisphere because most of the money comes back here and; the human cost of putting that much new money into the existing criminal pipelines in a region where there has already been horrendous violence surrounding far less valuable commodities. The amount of money in play here is enormous, particularly given the weak state of governments, civil society, law enforcement, the judiciary etc. There is little that can be done to avert the wholesale implosion of the region. One of the reasons for this is the dismal state of governance in West Africa is that since the early 1990s the region has suffered a series of conflicts centered on natural resources, particularly diamonds, timber, oil, and gold. Profits from these "honey pot" wars fueled the rise of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone with its child soldiers and unspeakable atrocities; fed the wars sustained by Liberia's Charles Taylor; and contributed to the rampant corruption and weak or failed institutions in almost every country. These natural resources, while valuable, pale in comparison to the money the cocaine trade generates. For example, at the height of the "blood diamond" trade in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the total value of the diamonds being smuggled out was less than $200 million. The potential to fuel conflicts over the cocaine pipeline, the most lucrative commodity so far and one whose profits are several orders of magnitude larger than diamonds, is truly frightening. Given Hezbollah's long-established presence on the ground in the region and the closeness of its operatives to that community, it is also reasonable to assume that Hezbollah and the drug traffickers, operating in the same permissive environment, will cross paths. It is precisely this type of environment that allows for the otherwise unthinkable alliances to emerge. Most are short-lived, centering on specific opportunities and operations that can benefit both groups, but others are longer lasting and more dangerous. June 23, 2009Defending the City: NYPD's Counterterrorism OperationsBy Michael Jacobson
This afternoon, the Washington Institute hosted Richard Falkenrath, the NYPD Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, as part of a lecture series the Institute has been running since late 2007 with senior US counterterrorism officials. Here is an excerpt of his remarks: The threat is both external and internal. The external threat, I think, is best understood by the federal government and by the Beltway experts. I think the internal threat – the homegrown threat – is far less well understood by counterterrorism experts in Washington. And there’s a reason for that, which is our entire counterterrorism intelligence collection process in the United States requires predication. It requires various conditions to be met in order for the FBI or the other agencies involved to proceed with their investigations. To read the entire transcript of the event, click here. June 21, 2009Hizb ut-Tahrir America Launches Web Site to Promote July ConferenceBy Madeleine Gruen
Hizb ut-Tahrir America (HTA) has a launched a Web Site to promote its July 19th, 2009 Khilafah Conference in Bridgeview, Illinois. http://www.khilafahconference2009.com/ The site provides an agenda for the conference, but does not provide a list of invited speakers or any contact information for the organizers. The well-designed site indicates that HTA is taking steps to create an impression with the public and with its target audience that it is a solidly established institution. Most likely, HTA's membership and support base in the United States numbers only in the hundreds. Due to the fact that HTA's operations have been largely clandestine until now, it has been difficult to determine the size of its ranks. However, several known members have status and influence in universities and in their communities. For more information about HTA's activities in the United States, and their recent transition to the public phase of operations, please see my recent post on the CTB. June 19, 2009Kids Martyrdom Videos Get New Sophistication, Huge AudienceBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
The little girl's dark brown eyes look heavenward as she sings, When we seek martyrdom, we go to heaven. This is not a song from Hamas television in Gaza, nor is it a Hizballah anthem. "When We Seek Martyrdom" is the latest hit from a production house called Birds of Paradise. It is racking up millions of hits on Arabic and worldwide websites. Birds of Paradise, which appears to be based in Jordan, is quickly becoming one of the most popular children's groups in the Arab world. My country and my blood are like its sands Youtube, has dozens of editions and edits of the video, ranging from Arab parents having their children parrot the lyrics to Jihadists using it as background music in terrorist videos. "[Birds of Paradise] is one of the most widely distributed children's songs group in the Arab world, and it seems to have crossed the ocean to Canada and Britain," wrote journalist Fawzia Nasir al-Naeem in the Saudi Arabian newspaper, Al-Jazirah. "Birds of Paradise" represents a new wave in Jihadist youth indoctrination. It is far more professional, better edited, and presented in a much more kid-friendly style than previous Jihadist children's programming. The themes are easily digestible even for toddlers. Child actors portray Israeli soldiers, all wearing yarmulkes, who ruthlessly gun down other children shown playing and dancing. Minutes later, the kids exact revenge and kill the soldiers. See our report, and the video, here. June 18, 2009Hizb ut-Tahrir America Enters Public StageBy Madeleine Gruen
Bridgeview is a suburb of Chicago. Chicago has been a major hub of HTA's activities for the past ten years, approximately. According to information available on the internet, the Aqsa School is a private Islamic primary and secondary school. Although HTA's Khilafah conference will be held at the school, there is no public indication that the school, its staff, or its board members are directly involved with HTA. Last fall, after HTA issued a leaflet in its own name calling for Muslims not to participate in the U.S. elections, I wrote a brief post on CTB about the possible transition of HTA to the second stage of its development. According to party doctrine, Hizb ut Tahrir (HT) implements its strategy in three stages--The first stage is the covert level of development in which members are recruited and trained. In the second stage, members promote the party's methods and objectives publicly in order to win the support of the Muslim population. The final stage is the establishment of an Islamic government and military, in order to carry HT's "message to the world." Indeed, HTA's announcement that it will host the Khilafah conference in July indicates that the U.S.-based branch now perceives itself as solidly prepared to emerge from its covert status into the second stage. HTA has held Khilafah conferences, and other major conferences, in the past, but has only done so from behind fronts and covers. Other international branches of HT that have advanced from the developmental stage to the public phase have done so after achieving a level of internal fortitude that would enable the branch to withstand opposition. The transition may indicate that HTA perceives a level of comfort in an operating environment in which aggressive challenge from the government or the public is not anticipated. In order to sustain operations publicly, the branch leaders must be confident that members are loyal and committed to HT's objectives. The conference promotional video does not provide a list of speakers or an agenda for the conference. However, Khilafah conferences hosted by branches of HT in other countries most often include prominent HT members invited from overseas. It is likely members of HT will travel from abroad to the conference in Bridgeview, Illinois, to enhance the credibility of HTA and to solidify the commitment of its members. The promotional video for the July conference appears to have been created by an Australian member of HT, which indicates some degree of coordination between the organization's branches. This particular member has created promotional videos for HT conferences in Indonesia and in Australia. Although HTA appears to have transitioned to the second stage of development, it is important to note that aspects of HTA's activities will continue to be conducted covertly, such as recruitment and ideological training. HT is not designated as a terrorist organization in the United States, however many consider it to be a stepping stone to more militant organizations. For more information on Hizb ut-Tahrir, please see Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam's Political Insurgency, by Zeyno Baran. For more information on the background of Hizb ut-Tahrir America, please see my article in the Jamestown Terrorism Monitor. New Bolivia Paper: Into the AbyssBy Douglas Farah
The International Assessment and Strategy Center has just published a paper I wrote on the rapidly-deteriorating situation in Bolivia: Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Morales and the MAS. The study outlines several of the more dangerous elements of the Morales government and his ties to Venezuela and Iran. Among them are: o The systematic de-institutionalization of the nation's fragile democratic structures, including the judiciary and independent auditing agencies; Of greatest concern is the little-discussed endorsement of Chavez of the a doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States based on the principles pioneered by radical Islamist groups. Since 2005 Chávez has rewritten Venezuela's security doctrine to scrub it of all outside, "imperialist" influences. To replace the old doctrine, Chávez and the Venezuelan military leadership have focused on developing a doctrine centered on asymmetrical warfare, in the belief that the primary threat to Venezuelan security is a U.S. invasion. One of the main books he has adopted is Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra Periferica y el Islam Captured Terrorist Bombs Explode in IndonesiaBy Kenneth Conboy
The late Jemaah Islamiyah bomber, Azhari Husein, who was killed when his house in East Java was raided in 2005, appears to have struck from beyond the grave. On 17 June, several of his bombs, which were being kept as training aids, blew apart a warehouse of the Indonesian police Mobile Brigade just south of the capital Jakarta. The explosions took place at around 0215 on 17 June and are believed to have been caused when torrential rains prompted a short circuit in the warehouse. The explosions were heard for 5 kilometers and broke windows in several adjacent houses. Sources in the Indonesian media said the warehouse stored several home-made bombs seized from Azhari's hideout in 2005, as well as several other bombs seized during the capture of JI suspects in 2007. They were being used by counter-terrorist units to study how terrorists put together their devices. June 17, 2009Defeating al-Qaeda and Neutralizing Its Support NetworksBy Michael Jacobson
This afternoon, the Washington Institute published a piece by Ali Soufan, a former FBI agent, who was one of the Bureau's lead investigators and interrogators in a number of key international terrorism investigations, including the 1998 embassy bombings and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. Mr. Soufan has received considerable attention in recent months for his op-eds for the New York Times and testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the issue of interrogations. In the piece for the Institute, Mr. Soufan discusses interrogations and provides recommendations on the division of labor between the FBI and CIA, but he also offers his broader thoughts on US counterterrorism strategy. Here is an excerpt: In mid-June, a group of tourists visiting Yemen's tribal areas were brutally murdered by terrorists most likely connected to al-Qaeda. This tragic event underscores a particularly difficult challenge for the United States and its allies: as al-Qaeda's activities are undermined in one part of the world, it adapts and moves its operations elsewhere. Yemen and Somalia -- where the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabab movement is now a major force -- are the latest examples of this phenomenon. To thwart al-Qaeda's versatility, our counterterrorism strategy must adapt to the terrorist organization's changing modus operandi and theaters of battle. We also need to improve our ability to counter asymmetrical threats, which require more than just a military response. Against a foe like al Qaeda which operates in the shadows, it's intelligence that is crucial to defeating them. It is therefore crucial that we use the best and most effective intelligence-collection methods, and that our key counterterrorism agencies work seamlessly together. To read the rest of the piece, click here. NEFA Foundation: "Target: America": The Conspiracy to Establish a Terrorist Training Camp In Bly, Oregon"By Madeleine Gruen
The NEFA Foundation has released the 19th report in the “Target: America” series, which focuses on the conspiracy to establish a jihad training camp in Bly, Oregon in late 1999 through early 2000. In October1999, Seattle native, James Ujaama came up with the idea of opening a jihad training camp outside of the tiny town of Bly, Oregon, where his acquaintance from the Dar-us-Salaam mosque in Seattle, Semi Osman, had moved with his family to a 160-acre abandoned sheep ranch. Ujaama proposed the training camp idea to his spiritual mentor, London cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri. Al-Masri, who had a track record of facilitating and funding jihad training for his followers, saw potential in Ujaama’s idea, and sent two of his closest followers, Oussama Kassir and Haroon Rashid Aswat, from London to the United States to investigate further. The men found the conditions on the Bly ranch to be unsatisfactory for the purpose of establishing a jihad training camp and abandoned the plan. However, the evidence presented in the indictments and the recent trial of Oussama Kassir revealed useful information about terrorist training methods. The case also sheds further light on how radicalization and recruitment may occur in the United States. In May 2009, Oussama Kassir, was found guilty in Manhattan federal court of charges related to his participation in the effort to establish a jihad training camp in Bly. Al Masri and Aswat are both awaiting extradition to the United States to stand trial for their role in the Bly training camp conspiracy, pending their appeals in the European Court of Human Rights. The entire report can be read at the NEFA Foundation web site by clicking on this link. June 16, 2009Ramifications of a Possibly Armed Muslim BrotherhoodBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
An Egyptian newspaper claims the Muslim Brotherhood may have constituted a large, well-armed wing, with perhaps thousands of operatives, and its purpose is to engage in terrorist operations. The report, published May 27 in Egypt's Al-Masry Al-Youm, carried the headline, "Why is Security Silent About the Secret Armed Organization of the Brotherhood?" A potential mission for this Muslim Brotherhood armed division would be to send 10,000 trained fighters to south Lebanon (Hezbollah territory) and to Gaza to attack Israel. Author Hussaneyn Kuroum notes there are some Muslim Brotherhood leaders who refute the existence of an armed wing, but the current Secretary General (Guide) Mahdi Akef, has made statements clearly indicating that the organization has such an armed element. The article questions what the Egyptian security services may or may not know about this unit. Kuroum cites an interview in a separate Egyptian publication with Brotherhood opponent Wahid Hamid, who argues Akef's brash talk has meaning: "He said that he is prepared to send to South Lebanon tens of thousands of fighters. Will he send them with clubs and swords? Or will they be armed in a modern fashion, besides there being trained to fight? Mahdi Akef also said, 'I am prepared to send fighters to Gaza.' Good. He'll send them with what and how? Sure, armed and trained. The matter is clear. It can be easily concluded." The public suggestion in a respected, privately-owned Egyptian media source that the Muslim Brotherhood has a significant armed branch should be of keen interest to U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies. If this is true, it should put to rest any consideration by U.S. officialdom to engage the Muslim Brotherhood in substantial dialogue. It would seemingly weigh in favor of designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Read our entire article here. June 15, 2009NEFA Foundation Report - "Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir"By Evan Kohlmann
The NEFA Foundation has released a new report by NEFA Director of Analysis and Research Ronald Sandee titled, "Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir." Nasir was arrested in June 2007 in Pakistan on suspicion of involvement in a bomb plot. Following his return to Germany, Western authorities gained significant insights into Nasir's activities and identified him as a kingpin in the radical Muslim scene in Germany. He recruited young men for the Jihad and sent them to training camps in Pakistan's Tribal Areas. Nasir also went to Pakistan more than once to deliver cash and supplies to al-Qaida's top commanders, including Mustafa Abu Yazid and the late Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi, Abu Zubair al-Masri and Khalid Habib. This paper, which draws heavily on Pakistani intelligence reports and confidential documents to which Sandee gained access, also highlights the close links between al-Qaida and the Lashkar-e-Taiba. The report can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website. Rep. Wolf Takes on CAIR, and A US-MB Tie to HamasBy Douglas Farah
Two interesting notes regarding the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups in the United States over the weekend. First, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va), took the unusual and courageous step of directly tackling CAIR on the floor of the House last Friday. In his speech, also available on Youtube, Wolf laid out CAIR's history in some detail and asked the FBI and the main Justice Department to clarify the status of their relationships with CAIR. After reviewing the group's history, Wolf identified one of their most effective tactics and why it is so dangerous: Given CAIR’s genesis, its associations with known terrorist entities and individuals, and its tactics—namely attempting to discredit anyone who dares to speak out against its organization—their cries of victimization and accusations of religious bigotry appear disingenuous. Wolf further noted that: In a federal court filing from December 2007, federal prosecutors described CAIR as "having conspired with other affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood to support terrorists." The government also stated that "proof that the conspirators used deception to conceal from the American public their connections to terrorists was introduced" in the Holy Land Foundation trial. In a footnote government prosecutors points out: “(F)rom its founding by Muslim Brotherhood leaders, CAIR conspired with other affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood to support terrorists…” Other elected officials, including Democrats like Charles Schumer and Dick Durbin and Republicans like Jon Kyle and Tom Coburn, have taken on CAIR, but Wolf's call to the FBI and other U.S. government agencies to keep a healthy distance from the organization is both timely and important, as CAIR and other MB-linked organizations seek to influence the Obama administration. The ties of some of these groups to Hamas is shown by this note in the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required) The posting notes that: In a response to the recent President Obama speech to the Muslim world, Islamic convert Robert Crane makes the interesting admission that he is a “principal adviser” to Hamas leader Ahmed Yousef. In an article in the American Muslim, Dr Crane writes: "The best approach was taken by Dr. Ahmed Yousef, for whom I served in the 1990s as Managing Editor of his scholarly Middle East Affairs Journal and for whom I have long been a principal adviser. As the Deputy Foreign Minister in Palestine’s legally elected government, and as one of the two intellectual founders in 1983 of the Palestinian Hamas, Dr. Yousef has authority as perhaps the world’s leading Islamist in the search for peace, prosperity, and freedom through compassionate justice". Youssef serves as Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the dissolved government in Gaza but is usually described by the western media as a political adviser to Ismail Haniya, senior political leader of Hamas and one of two disputed Prime Ministers of the Palestinian National Authority. His Middle East Affairs Journal is published by the United Association for Studies and Research (USAR), part of the Palestine Committee of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood and generally thought to be part of the Hamas infrastructure in the U.S. Dr. Crane, who was very briefly U.S. ambassador to the UAE in 1981 and who converted to Islam in Bahrain during that year, has been a board member of the USAR as well as holding positions with the American Muslim Council and the International Institute of Islamic Thought, both also part of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood. In 1998, Dr. Crane wrote that he had a “structure for Islamizing America.” Shortly after 911, Dr. Crane published an article blaming the terrorist attacks solely on the U.S, and specifically on “active U.S. support of secularized and xenophobic Zionism” In 2007 wrote that he looked forward to the collapse of the “American Empire” which he said would come about “only with the help of Muslims”: The American Empire must eventually collapse, as John Whitehead predicts, and as all empires have. The challenge is to transform America so that it is no longer an empire and therefore can serve the intent of its founders to be a moral model for the world based on the universal wisdom of all the world religions. This transformation can come only with the help of Muslims who are pursuing the mission of educating their fellow Muslims for the good of America. Crane's public acknowledgement of being a principal advisor to a leader of Hamas, as the GMBDR notes, may be a violation of U.S. law regarding the provision of material support for designated terrorist organizations, which is what Hamas is. At the least, it shows the ties between the legacy MB groups in the US and Hamas remain strong. June 13, 2009Dear As-Sahab: Please Take Away Adam Gadahn's MicrophoneBy Evan Kohlmann
Late yesterday, Al-Qaida's official media wing--the As-Sahab Media Foundation--released yet another meandering, half-baked video message from American Al-Qaida member Adam Gadahn, formerly of Los Angeles, California. Gadahn--who perhaps at best can be described as an arrogant, pasty-faced computer nerd--has nonetheless become a key spokesman for Al-Qaida over the past five years. Making his initial debut in October 2004, a masked and angry Gadahn cut a much more fearsome figure. Aside from the relatively silent "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh, most people had never seen a U.S.-born jihadi in the flesh before--and his words left little to the imagination. Awkwardly jabbing into the air with his chubby pale fingers, he insisted, “what took place on September 11 was but the opening salvo of the war against America and … Allah willing, the magnitude and ferocity of what is coming your way will make you forget all about September 11. … Allah willing, the streets of America will run red with blood … casualties will be too many to count, and the next wave of attacks may come at any moment.” We next saw Gadahn in September 2005, this time wearing something suspiciously reminiscent of a woman's veil. Ratcheting things up a notch, he swore revenge on his own hometown: “Yesterday, London and Madrid. Tomorrow, Los Angeles and Melbourne (Australia, God willing.” With words like that, big things were obviously expected from Mr. Gadahn and a hoped-for wave of likeminded souls from within the U.S. who would rise up and follow his call. Yet, the scattered groups of fanatics who have been detained in Europe and North America in possession of Gadahn's videos seem to largely suffer from the same fatal flaws as Mr. Gadahn himself: they have an overdeveloped sense of grandeur, they lack any sense of humility, and they are often emotionally infantile. Meanwhile, Gadahn has turned into a bloated and bizarre media caricature of himself--the undisputed Rush Limbaugh of Al-Qaida. He now appears regularly on "Bin Laden TV", dispensing bits of personal wisdom about everything from the 9/11 attacks to the affairs of the Palestinians. His persistent threats against America no longer seem so prescient, and his eyebrow-raising ideological tangents into controversial Muslim issues would appear to be strongly inadvisable for Al-Qaida. With each new consecutive video he appears in, he only adds to the punchline and further dilutes the underlying seriousness of Al-Qaida's intentions. Were Al-Qaida's leadership to read this, they could perhaps dismiss these criticisms by explaining it away as merely a "crusader" attempt to rain on Al-Qaida's parade, no matter who the messenger. Yet, for those who would defend Gadahn on this basis, there is a clear, recent example of an effective American mujahid who has appeared on video and who admittedly does have a certain distinct "Che Guevara"-style appeal. I speak here of "Abu Mansour al-Amriki", the erstwhile star of a recent propaganda video produced by the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia. While Abu Mansour certainly displayed his own set of eccentricities--including rapping freestyle about Al-Qaida and terrorism--he fits much more closely into the mold of an Ibn-ul-Khattab or an Usama Bin Laden. Abu Mansour speaks softly, carefully, and deliberately. He offers deference to others, and in a tone that suggests coolness and confidence, not frothy rage. He is shown fighting in the field, hiding from the enemy, and without any sense of script or pretension. In a word, in contrast to the constantly posturing Gadahn, Abu Mansour appears genuine. Not the least of all, his incredible pronunciation of Arabic makes Adam Gadahn's Quranic recitation sound by comparison like someone banging trash cans together. Thus, on behalf of all of us, this is an open appeal to As-Sahab to please take away Adam Gadahn's microphone. There has got to be someone more influential--or at least somewhat more interesting--to constantly parade around on camera. NEFA Foundation: New Video From American Al-Qaida Spokesman Adam GadahnBy Evan Kohlmann
An English transcript of Gadahn's remarks can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website. June 12, 2009NEFA Foundation "Target America" Report: "The Little Rock, Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting"By Evan Kohlmann
Punitive Power: Combating Proliferation with SanctionsBy Matthew Levitt
On April 5, despite repeated warnings from the US and others, North Korea launched a rocket the regime claimed was sending a satellite into space, but which Washington viewed as another test of the regime’s ballistic missile systems. On April 6, the UN Security Council issued a non-binding statement condemning the launch as a violation of Security Council Resolution 1718, a 2006 resolution which prohibits North Korea from engaging in any missile-related activity. More recently, North Korea’s recent nuclear and missiles tests leave the international community in a difficult position, where military options are limited at best, and where tough diplomacy is unlikely to achieve the desired results. The likely response will once again center around sanctions and financial pressure, including blacklisting numerous North Korean entities, including banks and trading houses, and imposing a trade embargo on dual use goods and technologies, and empowering navies to stop and search North Korean vessels suspected of carrying illicit cargo. As the cases of North Korea and Iran highlight, sanctions are a frequent yet controversial tool used by the international community in dealing with proliferant states and nuclear non-compliance. But how successful can we expect these tools to be? What are their limitations? These are questions my colleague Michael Jacobson and I explore in an article published by Jane's Intelligence Review. In other related news, The Washington Institute's work on the issue of combating the finances of transnational threats has not only been published recently by the Emirati Center for Strategic Studies and Research, it is now being cited by Jihadists themselves. An Arabic summary of our report "The Money Trail" is is circulating on jihadi Internet forums such as As-Ansar. We are pleased to see our scholarship receiving attention in such a broad range of outlets. Strategic Importance of a Peshawar HotelBy Aaron Mannes
The attack on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar was a major attack that will have important implications for the counter-insurgency in Pakistan. This is an issue that could have a ripple effect felt worldwide. Strategic Guests The attack on the Pearl Continental had fewer casualties then the Marriott bombing, but may have been more sophisticated - employing gunmen to pin down the guards allowing the truck bomb to get closer to the hotel. The Peshawar bombing may also prove more significant historically then the Marriott bombing. June 11, 2009How Non-State Actors Learn and TeachBy Douglas Farah
One of the fascinating things about a spate of recent articles is that they point to how non-state armed actors acquire information and new, ever-more sophisticated techniques. Two examples are the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the more sophisticated of the Somali pirates. This shows that these groups talk and learn from other groups, have networks to transfer technologies and "lessons learned" and greatly accelerate the speed of their learning curves. Unconstrained by laws, acquisition regulations and budgetary considerations, these groups can rapidly acquire whatever they can afford. Thanks to the fact that dozens of shipping companies have paid tens of millions of dollars to the different Somali clans and sub-clans that carry out the piracy, they are cash flush. The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) says the pirates, until recently, had attacked during the day and were relatively unsophisticated in their tactics. Now, however, "pirates have attacked vessels at night and have conducted attacks far off the eastern coast of Somalia," the CMF said. Using "mother ships" as staging platforms and night vision technology, they are able to operate much further from the Somali coast than before. This means that extra territorial actors are providing the pirate groups with what they need, in a space that has had virtually no functional government for more than a decade. Just as the RUF, deep in the bush in Sierra Leone, could be found by U.S. European and African diamond merchants and weapons purveyors, the pirates can find the market or the market can find them. The Taliban is also showing increasing sophistication in their attacks. Two commando-style assaults in Pakistan in the past two weeks show militants can now pierce the iron-fortified gates, concrete barricades and cordons of armed guards that are meant to secure hotels, housing compounds and even police stations across the country. The level of organization and sophistication of the attacks has been rarely seen in Pakistan. They are designed to send a message that if the military launches an offensive against the Taliban's stronghold near the Afghan border it will face a highly determined and well-prepared enemy, analysts say. "It is an improvement in their tactics; they are trying to enter the target through use of force," Mahmood Shah told The Associated Press. "It appears that they are in a hurry and they are becoming more aggressive." One can trace the evolution of these tactics to the cross training, both on the ground and in cyberspace, that the Taliban has shared with other militant groups, including al Qaeda and Hezbollah. The terrorist organizations have the express intent of sharing tactics, strategies and lessons with each other, and spend a great deal of time in doing that. They have money from poppies and private donors that allows them to dedicate time and resources studying, sharing and acquiring the best off the shelf products, with no need for competitive bid contracts and the like. But, as David Ignatius writes in today's Washington Post, our side seems to be somewhat fixated on internal wars and turf fights in a system that has not grown more streamlined since 9-11. While there are some efforts put into transmitting lessons learned on the U.S. side, those efforts are sporadic and almost never cross over to those of lessons we could learn from our allies. One of the most interesting things in watching Latin America is how little the Colombian efforts against the FARC have been studied and taught. Non-state actors have a built in advantage because they are not accountable to anyone, have no use for transparency and are not slowed by the niceties of democratic debate. And, as Ignatius notes, "There's a world of scary people out there, and the country can't afford this turf war any longer." June 10, 2009Combating the Financing of Transnational ThreatsBy Michael Jacobson
As the NEFA Foundation reported, Shaykh Mustafa abu al-Yazid (aka Shaykh Saeed), the former Al Qaeda finance chief and current head of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, recently released a statement again lamenting the poor state of his organization's finances. He explained how the lack of financing is affecting their ability to carry out operations and to run the organization, and proclaimed that contributing money to the jihad is a religious obligation. Shaykh Saeed's statement highlights what has been one of the more effective aspects of the international counterterrorism efforts over the past eight years -- combating terrorist financing. In fact, targeting the finances of illicit actors has proven effective in other contexts as well, particularly Iran. While ultimately no one tool will deter, disrupt or prevent the illicit activities of terrorists, proliferators, insurgents, or other transnational threats, combating the financing of transnational threats has shown particular promise, especially when used in concert with other policy tools. My colleague Matt Levitt and I just completed a new study on this subject, which was published by the Emirati Center for Strategic Studies and Research. To read the study, click here. Al-Qaida's No. 3 in Afghanistan Sent Begging for Cash, AgainBy Evan Kohlmann
During the recording, Abu al-Yazid also spoke highly of "our Turkish brothers" and their growing role in the mujahideen in Afghanistan -- noting that several Turkish nationals have recently been "martyred" during jihadi operations along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier. An English transcript of Abu al-Yazid's remarks can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website. |