b. Remarkable Continuity: Despite this variation in legal and moral traditions, however, there is remarkable consistency across borders regarding what is being done in domestic legislation to combat political violence broadly and terrorism in particular. Regardless of how a given provision was expressed or justified in a particular state or tradition, acts of terrorism are outlawed on their own merits in all the nations examined at this conference and, one might argue, in virtually all jurisdictions able to make law and to make law binding.

c. National vice Transnational / Continuity vice Universality: This continuity, however, is difficult to translate into universally accepted rules when one leaves domestic settings and enters international ones. In the transnational environment, there is no authority that can make law or make law binding, at least not in the sense that we understand sovereign state authority. Adherence to rules and norms is voluntary and understanding of what is lawful or not has no essentially common cultural basis.

d. Questions Remain: While there is considerable agreement that war and war-like acts can and should be rule-governed, and that these rules can be agreed to and followed even in international settings like, for example, the law of armed conflict between states, this conference demonstrated that questions still remain about whether a government can fight terrorism effectively if it or its people politically agree with the goals of groups that violate the rules that govern violence and whether the methods used to achieve goals can be separated from the cause, from the goals themselves. There are no definitive answers to these questions but they must be addressed in order to further international cooperation to confront terrorism."

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Why American Government Leadership Doesn't Confront Jihad's Supremacist Ideology

On July 13, 2008, the Washington Post published a column by former CIA member Glenn Carle who stated "[w]e do not face a global jihadist 'movement' but a series of disparate ethnic and religious conflicts involving Muslim populations, each of which remains fundamentally regional in nature and almost all of which long predate the existence of al-Qaeda." This denial of anything "global" about Jihad and Islamic supremacism is the mantra of the mainstream media, intelligence agencies, government leaders, and too many in the counterterrorism community.

The idea that the Islamic supremacist ideology that is at the root of the women murdered by the Taliban in Pakistan on August 20, 2008 (crushing one of their faces) -- is the same Islamic supremacist ideology that drove MILF Jihadists to dismember innocent Philippine citizens on August 18, 2008 -- does not make sense to a policy world that view threats by regions, not by ideologies. Moreover, both U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson and U.S. Ambassador to Philippines Kristie Kenney have given credibility to proponents of this supremacist ideology in these countries. Ambassador Patterson has met with pro-Taliban, pro-Sharia leaders such as JUI-F's Maulana Fazlur Rehman to promote "free and fair elections." Ambassador Kenney has called for negotiations with MILF a day after MILF's jihadists were burning down buildings and dismembering Philippine citizens. This is who is representing America in the eyes of Islamic supremacists in these nations, which is another reason for the increasingly brazen acts by Jihadists in both countries.

To further prevent any confrontation of such an ideology, not only are threats specific to region, they are also considered to be nothing more than "extremism," as stated in the 2008 National Defense Strategy Report authorized by Secretary Gates. The ambiguous term "extremism" provides politically correct coverage that a "threat" has been acknowledged while allowing agencies to still deny the nature or identity of the threat. A threat that cannot defined, however, is certainly not a strategy.

Yet in facing other supremacist threats, America's counterterror analysts and governmental leaders did not take this tactic of creating barriers to ideological confrontation by creating regional categories and blurring the identity of the supremacist groups. This phenomenon is unique to the denial and fear of confrontation only when it comes to Islamic supremacism.

Why Denial is Not Part of American Historical Success against Supremacist Terror

Imagine the howls of outrage and disbelief from the majority of the American public and the mainstream media if 20th century counterterror analysts argued that white supremacist terrorism in Alabama was based on isolated incidents and local issues that were separate and different from white supremacist terrorism in Mississippi, in Michigan, on the West Coast, etc. Imagine how incredulous the public would be if analysts claimed if you had not spoken with whites in each of those community areas that you had no ability to recommend actions against white supremacism. Imagine the confusion if our government leaders had recommended that we not use the term "white supremacism" for fear that the very term would incite other whites to violence. Imagine the protests if analysts supported groups who praised scholars that supported segregationist policies or justified actions by white supremacist groups.

Yet these are precisely the failing tactics that American governmental and policy leaders are using and recommending regarding "extremism" (aka Islamic supremacism).

If 20th century counterterrorist and government leaders had used such tactics, we would have lost the war on white supremacism, and America would not have shown the courage of its convictions in defending the natural law that "all men are created equal." In fact, America's leadership was able to confront white supremacist ideology on a holistic, strategic basis, as a crushing, national effort against white supremacism throughout America in the 1960s through the 1980s. While that war continues today, the strength of national 20th century white supremacist ideology was smashed by a national relentless confrontation to every aspect of it that continues in cities, homes, offices, and public places today. As a result, the majority of the American public and mass media has zero tolerance for such white supremacism.

The question must be asked why American government leaders and policy analysts are now using tactics that fail to acknowledge our successes in fighting supremacism in the past.

Cold War Tactics to Fight Statists When Faced With Supremacists

In planning tactics against Jihad, an incorrect analogy gaining popularity in counterterrorism communities is the comparison of Islamic supremacism to the gradual Cold War efforts against Communism where some were encouraged to move from Communism to "Socialism" to merely being left-wing, as the nature of far-left statists evolved over decades. But looking at the evolution of a statist ideology in the same way as looking at an identity-based supremacist ideology (based on race, religion, etc.), is simply erroneous from both an ideological and a historical perspective.

I have previously pointed out that while there are some similarities in the activist nature of both the ideologies of Communism and Islamic supremacism, the latter has a true transnational activist appeal in that Islamic supremacism is not targeted merely at the transformation of states, but is targeted at the transformation and assimilation of individuals on a global basis.

All supremacist ideologies seek the transformation of individuals and their behavior, but the activist nature of Islamic supremacism is more dangerous in that it seeks assimilation as well as transformation of individuals. White supremacist Americans sought to impact the behavior of black Americans based on their supremacist ideology, but they never sought to convert them into white supremacists. Aryan supremacists sought to impact the behavior of Jews, but also did not seek to convert them into Aryan supremacists either. This is a boundary inherent in race-based supremacism.

But Islamic supremacism has no such boundaries either of state or of individual converts. Islamic supremacism has no limitations on assimilating others under its ideology. Islamic supremacism has the singular goal of total assimilation or submission of those not assimilated.

Therefore, not only are Cold War statist-based tactics not applicable to such a supremacist challenge, but also the regional categorization of threats is not applicable to such a supremacist challenge. In short, America's predominant policies and tactics for fighting the Jihadist enemy are designed to fight a completely different enemy altogether. This inability by government leaders to recognize such shortcomings leaves America totally exposed in the war of ideas against Islamic supremacists. While the Islamic supremacist ideology behind Jihad is activist like Communism, the strategic lessons that need to be learned from history must be drawn from wars on identity-based supremacist ideologies.

Those who would seek to argue for cold war tactics against Al-Qaeda believe that the same Cold War approach to fighting Communism in shades of grey to "de-radicalize" individuals will work for supremacist ideologies as well. The challenge is that such tactical arguments fail to recognize that there are no "grey areas" in a supremacist ideology; it is a truly binary challenge.

Andrew Cochran's July 23, 2008 posting of a commentary by Professor Rabbi Daniel M. Zucker, Chairman of "Americans for Democracy in the Middle-East," states:

"We need to understand the mentality of our fanatic fundamentalist enemies. Life is totally black or white for them -- there are no shades of grey. Surviving a battle with the superior forces of their enemy is seen as a victory by them -- proof that we in the West are too soft to defeat them ultimately."

Yet those who would pursue Cold War tactics make the argument that by persuading individuals to take steps away from Islamic supremacist violence that we are winning a war of ideas. This argument believes that such "de-radicalization" successes can be demonstrated: (1) if an individual goes from actively supporting Al-Qaeda to "merely" supporting "defensive jihad" in Afghanistan and elsewhere, (2) if an individual goes from Jihad to political Islamism, (3) if an individual goes from terrorism to Wahhabism, Salafism, Khumeinism, or (4) if an individual still supports Islamic supremacism but is more a polite public "citizen" about their views.  The "de-radicalization" theorists claim that such changes demonstrate western values winning a gradual war of ideas. In fact, this is only a change of tactics by supremacists, not a change in support for supremacist ideology at all.

A number in the counterterrorism community are comfortable with this incorrect argument that ignores the binary nature of supremacism, as such tactics suggest that persuasion (as opposed to confrontation) can be used to avoid inciting individuals to Jihadist terrorism and preventing them from "radicalization." Today's counterterrorism community is particularly vulnerable to this self-deception, due to its inherent focus on preventing terrorist violence, rather than a primary focus being the homeland security of our values of equality and liberty that defines America's identity.

The Cold War Thinking That Equality and Liberty is Someone Else's Fight

In addition to the failed government and policy perspectives focused on fighting an enemy different from Islamic supremacism, the actual change in the American sense of responsibility in our national defense is impacted by the Cold War history.

Of all the pernicious wrong-headed approaches that continue to be carried over from the Cold War, the worst of the Cold War ideas that are still alive in America is that our national security is someone else's fight. The approach during the Cold War in dealing with a communist, statist enemy with clearly defined military, troops, and weapons, such as the USSR, was to maintain a centralized, paternalistic military command.

The logical idea was that such centralized national security gave America the technology and the intelligence to fight a statist enemy with nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. While this tactical strategy was focused on the long term war with that specific enemy, the unintentional impact was that Americans became dependent on a centralized military and intelligence infrastructure to take on the majority of the burden of such a fight. After the elimination of the military conscription in 1973 (with a brief return in 1980), the call for the citizens to make a personal, significant sacrifice was blurred to only seeking tax dollars for volunteer military personnel and contracted equipment.

But with the 9/11 jihadist attack on America's homeland, many of us hoped that these attitudes had changed. To some extent, attitudes have changed among some Americans. Individuals around the nation have risen to the ideological challenge in researching Jihad and debating the war of ideas.

However, the majority of the American public has yet to fully realize that the battle in dealing with Islamic supremacism is truly their war and their personal responsibility, requiring their personal sacrifice and commitment. To a society used to being "led" by analysts, politicians, experts, mainstream media, this American public still has not yet grasped that it has to do its own research, reach its own conclusions, and tell its government representatives (in detail) what it seeks to have done to win this war. Some in a baby-boomer post-Cold War society find this terribly unfair. After all, isn't this the government's job? The simple answer is yes, if we want to lose the war against Islamic supremacism. Because what such government leaders and analysts have clearly demonstrated is that they are taking the wrong path, and academia, the media, and many analysts are keeping us on that wrong path.

In a representative democracy, fighting against supremacism and defending our values of equality and liberty is everyone's fight. The Cold War is over. It is time for America's baby-boomers to grow up. This is our generation's challenge and defining moment.

Why Confrontation is Essential in Fighting Supremacism

Confrontation is unpleasant. Engagement is an easy sell to a confused, misinformed, frightened, uninspired, poorly led public. To American government leaders trying to develop tactics around "extremism," the rat hole of engagement with an undefined ideology or enemy actually sounds better at government meetings and political discussions than the dreaded idea of "confrontation." In our political world, Americans constantly seek "engagement," because we believe that we can somehow persuade others of our viewpoints. We fail to understand that this perspective is unique to pluralistic democracies that value equality of opinion and ideas, and that value liberty of freedom of speech and press.

Moreover, American history is not a popular subject with collegians or with political analysts, especially in considering world issues. America's pluralistic outlook to the world drives us to seek answers based on other experiences in the world and balance our views based on other ideologies. This willingness to be relativist on other cultures and values is usually laudable in an open-minded, creative nation.

However, when it come to dealing with Islamic supremacism, American leaders fail to recognize America's own successes in dealing with supremacist ideologies and fail to recognize that there are supremacist cultures that are fundamentally inimical to natural laws of equality and liberty. Supremacism is not a negotiating, relativist culture. There are no half-measures with supremacism. Fighting supremacism is a life or death matter for America's culture and for the defense of equality and liberty.

History shows that in fighting supremacist ideologies, only confrontation works. White supremacists were not persuaded to change their views on segregation and equality - they were confronted by force and by law. Aryan supremacists were not persuaded to change their views on Jewish individuals, homosexuals, and others - they were confronted by military force. Change in those who supported supremacist ideologies was not the result merely of arguments and fine words in literature and the press; changed happened due to direct confrontation. History shows that supremacists are not readily argued away, bought away, or persuaded away from their ideology in a process of "de-radicalization"; supremacists can change their tactics from time to time to allow non-supremacist authorities to let down their guard, to allow for rebuilding and infiltration, and to develop other less obvious tactics of recruitment. A supremacist's change in tactics is not the same as a change in ideology - a war of ideas that merely seeks to change supremacist tactics, not fight in defense of equality, is not a "war of ideas" at all -- and is merely a plea to be "left alone."

American counterterrorism analysts need only to consult their own national history for lessons on fighting supremacism. The 1869 federal grand jury declaration that the Ku Klux Klan was a terrorist group did not end white supremacist activism in America. The 1929 arrest of Ku Klux Klan leaders by the FBI did not end white supremacist activism in America. The 1960s arrest of Ku Klux Klan leaders by the FBI did not end white supremacist activism in America. Arrests of Ku Klux Klan terrorists, arguments to persuade white supremacists to change, none of these alone were sufficient to break the back of the white supremacist ideology. Consistent, total, and unwavering confrontation was required. What American history demonstrated was that there were no shades of grey in fighting white supremacism. Tolerating some supremacist activities merely allowed for the re-growth of other more violent supremacist activities to rise up again. It took America 100 years to learn this vital lesson that there are no "half-way" measures in defending equality and there are no "half-way" measures in fighting supremacism. Why is this costly, painful lesson ignored by those leaders who are responsible for fighting Islamic supremacism today?   Because we are allowing them to ignore these lessons.  Our government is representative of its people; it is past time that American citizens concerned about Islamic supremacism speak out on the imperative need to use lessons from our history in confronting today's challenges on Islamic supremacism.

A Solution in Defying Supremacism with Equality

Equality is the one thing that supremacists can not and will not tolerate. The natural law that "all men are created equal" is America's strongest weapon against supremacists of every kind.

A proof of this is found in previous efforts of supremacist organizations to attempt to infiltrate and influence the American people. White supremacists could not and would not tolerate equality. When they were losing the war, they offered the segregationist compromise of "separate-but-equal" schools, public facilities, etc. Aryan supremacists also could not tolerate equality. The Nazi German American Bund that sought to infiltrate America did their best to pretend to be patriotic, complete with a birthday celebration to George Washington, and calls for "liberty." But the Nazi Aryan supremacists could not address the idea of equality, it choked in their throats.

In Europe, the continuing publicity by courageous women against Islamic supremacism has led to similar fractioning of Islamic supremacists. Even now, in the UK, Islamic supremacists are offering similar "separate-but-equal" new "rights" for women using a new charter under Sharia law (when British women already have equal rights under British law). The vast and obvious inequalities between men and women in Islamic supremacism are recognized as a fault line in the supremacists' global campaign. Of all the strategies that Americans should be concentrating on, the vital need to publicize the failure of Islamic supremacism when it comes to women's rights is the most promising near-term topic in the war of ideas.

Equality has been a threat to Islamic supremacists around the world and in international organizations. It is their greatest fear and is America's strongest weapon. But in promoting equality as a measure against Islamic supremacism, it must be understood that such confrontation will require a more aggressive war of ideas. Our respect for equality in a diverse nation is something that Islamic supremacists must attack. In fact, a nation dedicated to equality is indeed Islamic supremacists' greatest threat.

Those who seek to solely avoid additional violence will discourage this confrontation. Those who seek to demonstrate the courage of their convictions on equality and liberty will demand it.

Why Equality Will Defeat Supremacism

A supremacist society is dependent on its rigidity, conformance, and limited perspective in defining WHAT IS based on reinforcing the supremacist perspective. A supremacist society is dependent on its lie of a singular superiority of identity to control its populace. Without defending its lie of superiority, a supremacist society will crumble. When challenged by others who don't accept its supremacist ideology, a supremacist society will either crush those who don't conform, or if it is weak, it will call for so-called "separate-but-equal" segregation until it can gain more strength.

A nation dedicated to ensuring equality creates a transformational society. An egalitarian society utilizes its infinite diversity, creativity, and unlimited vision to define what COULD BE based on it acceptance of equality as a fundamental value. An egalitarian society can weather any storm and can transform its skills, talents, and focus to meet the needs of overall population. Its basis in the natural law of equality gives it transformational advantages over any other society. The concept of "separate-but-equal" segregation of the population is illogical in an egalitarian society which draws its strength from its diversity and unlimited ability to use its population in endlessly diverse combinations and permutations to promote human liberty and progress.

As a transformational, egalitarian society, Americans can seek to reinvent the American experience in ways that allow continuing new opportunities and liberties for fellow citizens to grow and contribute to their communities, their families, and themselves. Our societal development is based on the fundamental natural laws of individual equality and liberty. Our egalitarian ability to transform is multi-dimensional - it occurs on an individual, family, community, and national basis.

This is why supremacism will ultimately lose to America. No matter what weapons are used against Americans, no matter what attacks are made on America, its foundation in equality makes it a transformational society that allows infinite ways to defend itself, respond to attacks, rebuild and restore itself, and continue an endless war against its supremacist adversaries.

But every battle, like every journey, requires a first step. That first step for America in this war is in recognizing that it is neither "extremism" nor "terrorism" that it is fighting -- it is fighting the very idea of Islamic supremacism.

Our courage today creates the future that we leave our children tomorrow.

Sources and Other Documents:  

August 20, 2008 - AFP: MILF commander declares 'all-out war'

August 19, 2008 - Australia Broadcasting Corportation: Muslim rebels kill 28 in bloody Philippines attack

August 19, 2008 - Reuters: Philippines vows strong action against rebels

August 19, 2008 - AFP: Peace talks with MILF in peril as troops hunt rebels
-- "MILF's 30-year rebellion has left more than 120,000 dead"

August 19, 2008 - AFP: US will not withdraw aid in S. Philippines despite violence

Wikipedia: Map of Philippines

Wikipedia: Mindanao

Wikipedia: Mindanao Culture

Wikipedia: Political Divisions of Mindanao

Wikipedia: Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

Wikipedia: Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao - Economy

Wikipedia: Map of Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

Wikipedia: Supreme Court Case of Sema v. Comelec

August 19, 2008 - London Times: World news in brief: Rogue Muslims raid villages in Manila

August 27, 2007 - Times of India: India loses maximum lives to terror except Iraq
-- approximately 3,700 Indians were killed in terrorist attacks between January 2004 and March 2007

December 16-31, 2002 - BJP Today: Terrorism and India - Arun Jaitley
-- reports of 62,000 Indians killed in terrorist attacks in the 15 year period prior to December 2002

Human Rights Watch: Thailand - Militant Attacks on Civilians

January 7, 2008 - Reuters: Thailand's Muslim south grew bloodier in 2007

August 6, 2008 - New York Times: 500: Deadly U.S. Milestone in Afghan War

June 10, 2008 - Pakistan and the Growing Threat of a Sharia Mini-State - Counterterrorism Blog -- by Jeffrey Imm
-- Section 7.10. Pakistan Jihadists' Terror Attacks and Concentration on Destroying the Pakistan Government - 4,500 killed since 2006

January 6, 2008 - Pakistan Link: Fazl vows to enforce true Islamic system in country

November 21, 2007 - Dawn: US envoy meets Fazl

GlobalSecurity.org - Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)
-- "Maulana Fazlur Rehman of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F)... enjoys the prestige of having been a defender of the interests of the Taliban in the grand Deobandi alliance mostly spearheaded by the jehadi militias"

August 20, 2008 - AFP: Taliban executes women in Pakistan

August 19, 2008 - Daily Telegraph: Islamic terror cell 'may have been plotting to attack Queen'

BritishJihad.com Listing of UK Terrorist News

International Campaign Against Honour Killings

August 8, 2008 - Daily Telegraph: New Sharia law marriage contract gives Muslim women rights

August 16, 2008 - The Sham of Women's Rights Under the Shari'a -- by D. L. Perry

July 13, 2008 - Washington Post: Overstating Our Fears -- by Glenn L. Carle

July 16, 2008 - False Reports of Jihadists "Quitting" or Abandoning Islamic Supremacism - Counterterrorism Blog -- by Jeffrey Imm

Wikipedia: September 11, 2001 attacks

NPR: Alabama - 16th Street Baptist Church Bombing

Wikipedia: Mississippi - Assassination of Medgar Evers

Daily Oakland Press: Michigan - Historic desegregation case remembered 50 years later
-- Pontiac, Michigan August 1971 bus bombing

Wikipedia: H. Tomas Padilla

Wikipedia: The Order, also known as the Bruder Schweigen or Silent Brotherhood

Wikipedia: Ku Klux Klan

Wikipedia: Ku Klux Klan -- Decline and suppression
-- 1869 federal grand jury designation of KKK as a "terrorist organization"
 
News on White Supremacist Ku Klux Klan Terrorist Organization
 
July 2, 2008 - Crossroads in History: The Struggle against Jihad and Supremacist Ideologies - Counterterrorism Blog -- by Jeffrey Imm
Alternate Web Link
-- PDF format

June 2008 - 2008 U.S. National Defense Strategy document (PDF)

July 23, 2008 - Winning the War with Islamic Fanaticism - Counterterrorism Blog -- by Andrew Cochran

July 17, 2007 - Preventing the West from Understanding Jihad - by Dr. Walid Phares

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The Two Trees

In my last three books (the "Future Jihad Trilogy") I depicted the world web of jihadism as two large trees. The Salafist tree, emanating from radical Sunni circles and encompassing mainly the Wahhabis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Deobandis is the largest. But it has been evolving and some of its branches have mutated into layers of radicalism. Al-Qaida is one of the latest mutations, for now the most radical.

The Khomeinist tree, centered on the Iranian regime, has a single branch. It is centralized and has disciplined extensions in the region, mostly Hezbollah out of Lebanon.

Each "tree" has a worldview and a future jihad to accomplish. In many realms they oppose each other and they compete for the hearts and minds of Muslims worldwide.

But despite their "brotherly enmity" their respective agendas have two goals in common: one is to oppose the rise of democracy in the region, and the second is to defeat U.S. support for that democracy.

Salafist and Khomeinist jihadis have always claimed they reject each other's doctrines and plans. But despite their ideological bickering they have been able to find common ground -- when it suits them -- and some jihadist Salafis have collaborated with Iran and its Syrian ally, even though most Salafis heavily criticize Khomeinism.

The Lebanon "understanding" between some Salafis and Hezbollah is the first open joint declaration between followers of Tehran's jihadism and the followers of Salafist jihadism. It is a "premiere" with significant consequences.

Road to the Agreement

On Aug. 19, leaders from Hezbollah and Salafist organizations called a press conference at Al Safir Hotel in Beirut's Raouche district and signed a memo of understanding between the two forces.

Radwan Aqeel wrote in the Beirut daily An-Nahar (Aug. 18): "Hezbollah is practicing a calm policy of overture toward the Sunni political and religious forces, especially since last May (against the Sunni Future Movement) to save the image the party has developed in the past as an 'Islamic resistance' in the Arab and Muslim world including in the Arab Gulf, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian territories."

It is believed that the move by Hezbollah to sign an agreement of understanding with Salafist organizations aims ultimately at penetrating the Arab Sunni world via Lebanon's Muslim community and maintaining an influence over the region's attitude toward the West.

According to Aqeel, "this move didn't come [out of the] void, but after many meetings away from media between representatives of Hezbollah and some Salafist groups." These encounters, said An-Nahar, included the head of Hezbollah's political bureau Ibrahim al-Amin and Sheikh Safuan al-Zuhbi from the Salafist movement.

Another Beirut daily, Al-Mustaqbal (Aug. 18) wrote that Hezbollah has been successful in recruiting 15 Salafist groups in Lebanon including the Waqf Ahya' al-Turath al-Islami to form a "Salafist camp" allied to the Iranian-Syrian axis. Hezbollah officials, wrote Al-Mustaqbal, are declaring that Americans have been defeated in the region by "resistance" in Lebanon, Iraq and Gaza.

The founder of the Salafist current in Lebanon, Sheikh Daee al-Islam al-Shahhal said it is "a partial step." Al-Akhbar, the pro-Iranian daily, reported that Shahhal argued, during visits to jihadist movements, that these agreements are happening, because of the "aggression against Islam all over the world."

At first, Shahhal rejected the Hezbollah-Salafist memorandum of understanding. But he revealed that he was not against dialogue (with Hezbollah), "but we have some reservations concerning the attack against the Sunnis in May."

Observers said his declarations were to assure the Saudis that the classical Salafis are not slipping away to the Iranian camp. However the representatives of many other Salafist groups stayed the course firmly. Hassan Shahhal who heads the Belief and Justice Movement (BJM) called the memorandum a step in the right direction.

The agreement commits to:

1) Condemn any Islamic group that assaults another.

2) Abandon incitement, which creates trouble and will allow the "enemies" to take advantage of the situation.

3) "Confront" the American agenda.

4) Firmly support Hezbollah and the Salafist movement against others.

5) Form a religious committee to discuss any disagreements between the Shiites and the Sunnis.

6) Respect each others' opinions.

But under pressures from Salafists who are opposed to HezbollahSheikh Hassan Shahhal, who signed the understanding on Monday with Hizbullah's Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed, declared freezing the agreement pending "appropriate circumstances that allow its implementation." In other words, the document was produced and signed, which was the most difficult stage. The second stage, implementation, will depend on the ability of Hezbollah to recruit more Salafists via financial incentives and political backing.

Consequences of the Agreement

Undoubtedly, the consequences of this event will be filled with strategic implications. Certainly this joint declaration is only between a number of Salafist groups, not the entire tree, let alone the Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood web on one hand and Hezbollah; it remains confined to Lebanon; we're not dealing with an all-out two-trees jihadist merge.

Far from that, what we're witnessing is a massive move on behalf of one tree, the Khomeinists, to connect to some branches of the Salafist tree.

These attempts aren't new, for Iran has been funding "Sunni" Hamas and Islamic Jihad for decades. And the Syrian regime has been controlling Sunni-Salafist satellites for years.

Fatah al-Islam, a Salafist combat group which fought the Lebanese army during the summer of 2007 has been released from Syria into northern Lebanon. But all of these relationships were not declared openly nor were they organized officially.

The Salafist-Hezbollah agreement in Lebanon is a novelty from which there are a number of lessons to be learnt:

1) It demonstrates that Hezbollah continues to move forward after its big win in May against Lebanon's first Fouad Siniora government and the March 14 Coalition.

The organization relentlessly controls the national security decision making process of Lebanon and is stretching its military presence in areas it had never reached before, such as into the heart of the Christian areas north of Beirut; and soon, the Sunni north.

The agreement will serve as a launching pad to begin establishing a presence through these Salafis from the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli, all the way to the northern border with Syria. In short, and as Salafist leaders opposed to the agreement have stated, this is a strategic penetration of the Sunni community in Lebanon via its most militant segment, the Islamist Salafis.

2) Regionally, a Hezbollah-Salafist coordination space will receive highly-strategic aid from Iran's oil power and will profit from Syria's intelligence apparatus.

While since 2003 the Syrian-Iranian axis was extending a discrete support to the jihadist-Salafis, escorting them to the Sunni Triangle in Iraq to fight the U.S.-led coalition, as of the birth of this new consortium in Beirut, Hezbollah and its regional backers have no reason to be shy.

In fact as is the case with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the "Palestinian arms" of Tehran-Damascus, we may see the rise of a "Salafist arm" of that axis with all the unnatural ideological ingredients this could display. If the Shiite Khomeinists were able to accommodate Alawi socialists why not extend this market to Salafist forces? But the implications could be earth-shattering for the rest of the region.

Writing in Kuwait's Al-Siyassa (Aug. 18), Hamid Ghoriafi reported that "Iranian Pasdaran and Hezbollah have already started bringing Salafist groups to Lebanon from other countries to be trained and then sending them to Arab Gulf countries to deploy them for the greater battle to come against the United States and its allies."

This is a classical Iranian tactic: using a proxy force to terrorize their foes into submission. Saudis, Kuwaitis, Egyptians, Jordanians and beyond are on notice: There is now a Salafist force in a joint venture with Iranian backed Hezbollah.

3) Internationally, this will have a ripple effect far beyond Lebanon's borders. Pictures of Salafist and Hezbollah leaders embracing and committing to a unified Islamist jihad against the enemies of the "umma," or Muslim world, can send waves of emotional charges around the Arab world.

The mere image of branches from the two trees joining forces against the enemy will have a chilling effect on the jihadist movement.

The international community will be facing two networks, but three creatures: al-Qaida and its worldwide Salafist constellation on the one hand, and the Tehran-led nebulous with Syrian-Iranian intelligence services in the center, Hezbollah in the front and a web of small Salafis on Iran's payroll instead of the Wahhabis -- all-in-all pretty complicated for Western intelligence services to penetrate.

Failed Debate in West

Indeed, the major lesson from this small experiment of a marriage between a Khomeinist organization and a Salafist network -- even if it won't attract all Salafis, is that Western analysis has failed, one more time.

With some solid exceptions, the bulk of North American and European academic and expert literature has erred in the mass assertion that what we saw in Beirut was not to happen, cannot happen and will not happen. Pre- and post Sept. 11, 2001 research, which has seriously influenced governments on both sides of the Atlantic has been overconfident that since the Sunni-Shia religious divide cannot be bridged, these two spheres cannot converge.

Many scholars of Middle Eastern studies established in the United States and the West have argued for years against the possibility of a joint venture between the two branches of Islamism.

They even rejected the "limited possibility" of such a coordination between Salafis and Khomeinists. Hence their advice to decision-making institutions and to media has negatively affecting long-term national security strategic planning.

The essence of the analytical errors made by scholarly advisers to the war on terror can be encapsulated in two points:

First, the overwhelming majority of Middle Eastern studies apologist attitudes was to wrongly assert that traditional Salafism in its essence is neither political nor militant: 'just conservatives practicing spiritual revivalism,' they said.

But ironically those Salafis who joined Hezbollah in a strategic venture in Beirut were among the circles presented by the apologists as the "good Salafis," versus the "bad Salafis" of al-Qaida.

Second, that same dominant elite in academia kept theorizing that Salafis by nature cannot sit at the same table with Khomeinists.

Well some have just done so, and the "model" is here. Now, as these events are countering the most critical expert advice provided to Washington and Brussels, the next stage for the alternative counter-terrorism expertise is to help decision-makers realize how dramatic this Beirut experiment could become.

Even with a 10 percent chance of success the consequences of the so-called war on terror from the Middle East to Africa, Europe and the Americas are endless.

More important could be the effects of any model of Salafist-Khomeinist collaboration on U.S. Homeland Security. This particular chapter will be addressed later, but it is useful and astounding to observe how the jihadis are experimenting and evolving while recent efforts in America and Europe have led to the creation of a lexicon which, if anything, would blind the counter-terrorism communities and decision-makers from "seeing" these and other new dangers.

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Walid Phares is the director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy. He is the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad

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The simple answer is that in their efforts against political Islamism, Quilliam is seeking "scholars" that will justify their goal to develop a "Western Islam" as a method to counter political Islamism. Quilliam apparently believes that there are limited "scholars" that would provide such justification, and therefore the ends justifies the means (even though such an approach will not work in an ideological battle).

So the Quilliam Foundation chose Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa as an example of "Muslim scholastic giants" to provide guidance to Muslims in adapting "to local cultures and traditions, while remaining true to the essence of their faith..." despite the numerous negative media reports readily available about Ali Gomaa. While Mr. Nawaz continues to defend Quilliam's support for Gomaa by stating that "Mufti Ali Goma must stand innocent until proven guilty," perhaps he can explain how Americans should be supporting a group who admires and defends someone like Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa -- who supports the terrorist group Hezbollah, thinks that Sharia law is the answer to "extremism," views that "social violence is the result of the secularists' attempt to impose their principles upon society," is quoted as calling Israeli Jews "blood-suckers," is quoted as calling for the denial of freedom of religion, calls for the death penalty for adultery, and takes a relativistic view towards wife-beating. (This includes media reports from such "right-wing critics" as the Associated Press, the New York Times, and U.S. News and World Report, as well as Egypt's Al-Ahram that is frequently quoted by left-wing Counterpunch.)

If Mr. Nawaz continues to defend Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa as a role model for the Quilliam Foundation's objective in developing a "Western Islam," then it is fair for analysts to question what that vision of "Western Islam" really is. That is truly the challenge to the Quilliam Foundation. Moreover, it is not the responsibility of the general public to prove the worthiness or unworthiness of Quilliam's esteemed "Muslim scholastic giants," but it is the responsibility of the Quilliam Foundation to thoroughly vet individuals that they claim represent their guidance and message to Muslims. "Innocent until proven guilty" is not a coherent approach for promoting role models.

More troubling is the consistently uncritical view of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence regarding groups or individuals that claim to be against "extremism." Michael Jacobson accepts that Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (also known as Dr. Fadl) has renounced terrorism, when al-Sharif clearly supports Jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel, and states that "Jihad in Afghanistan will lead to the creation of an Islamic state with the triumph of the Taliban, God willing." Mr. Jacobson's article was published in the increasingly disturbing West Point Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) Sentinel -- a month after the Sentinel published George Mason University's Peter Mandaville call for engagement with Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood as a counterterrorism strategy. The Stein Program's Director Matthew Levitt makes the incredible claim that the "Way Back from Islamism" is through "political salafists [who] have credibility when it comes to deradicalizing others." Neither Mr. Levitt nor Mr. Jacobson makes any critical comments about Egyptian Grand Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa while uncritically praising the Quilliam Foundation. Moreover, the Stein Program's Matthew Levitt dismisses any such criticism by claims that "spending time in the communities" of the United Kingdom and the Europe is mandatory to being able to assess "the threat on the ground."

As a second-generation British American myself, I can assure the Stein Program's staff that I have spent plenty of time in the United Kingdom. Yet I recognize that the continuing threats from the United Kingdom to America's homeland security will not be resolved by looking the other way regarding inconsistencies in potential allies as a tactical short-term measure. It is not the micro analysis of individual "communities" that drives a war strategy, but a macro analysis of the enemy and its ideology. Facing such an ideological threat requires strategic honesty, criticality, consistency, and most of all a definition of the enemy and its ideology.

Where American governmental leadership and analysts in counterterrorism have failed is in the definition of the enemy and its ideology which allows such inconsistencies of tactical measures. When the enemy is "extremism," anyone can be an ally, because "extremism" can mean anything to anyone.

Moreover, the political science definition of "Islamism" has also clearly failed as well. I will recognize this as a personal failure as well, because I failed to imagine in my repeated statements of Islamism as a totalitarian and anti-freedom ideology, how others could claim to be against Islamism while seeing political salafism as an antidote or could claim to be against Islamism while supporting individuals who see Sharia as an answer to "extremism." Moreover, I failed to imagine that West Point would publish articles calling for embracing Islamism as a positive political force to fight terrorism. Unquestionably, this shows that the term "Islamism," while intended to refer to an Islamic supremacist political ideology, is too inexact a term to be used in further strategic discussion. Peter Mandaville, the Stein Program, and the Quilliam Foundation (among many others) have categorically proven this over the past several months.

As I discuss in my July 2, 2008 article "Crossroads in History: The Struggle against Jihad and Supremacist Ideologies," clearly our American historical experience against supremacism provides us with the direction to address the current enemy. But as we continue to struggle in the war of ideas, we must reframe the debate from "extremists" to "Jihadists", and from "Islamism" to "Islamic supremacism." Until we strategically address the supremacist nature of the enemy, the tactics and allies that we choose will not serve our cause over the long war.

Sources and Related Documents:

August 15, 2008 - Quilliam Responds -- Counterterrorism Blog - by Michael Jacobson (posted for Quilliam Foundation's Maajid Nawaz)

July 21, 2007 - Newsweek/Washington Post: Ali Gomaa: The Meaning of Jihad in Islam

Quilliam Foundation - About Us

July 17, 2008 - The Way Back from Islamism -- Counterterrorism Blog - by Matthew Levitt

July 16, 2008 - False Reports of Jihadists "Quitting" or Abandoning Islamic Supremacism -- Counterterrorism Blog - by Jeffrey Imm

West Point Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, July 2008 - Why Terrorists Quit: Gaining from Al-Qa'ida's Losses -- by Michael Jacobson

July 16, 2008 - Washington Institute for Near East Policy: The Way Back from Islamism - Featuring Maajid Nawaz

Washington Institute for Near East Policy - Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence
-- Experts

March 6, 2008 - U.S. News and World Report: Egypt's Grand Mufti Counters the Tide of Islamic Extremism -- by Jay Tolson

August 4, 2006 - New York Times: Hostilities in the Mideast: the Muslim world; Hezbollah's Prominence Has Many Arabs Worried

July 30, 2006 - AP: Hezbollah's resistance winning Arab support

April 3, 2006 - AFP: Fatwa against statues triggers uproar in Egypt
-- Egypt's Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa fatwa against statues

October 31, 2007 - MEMRI: In Interview, Egyptian Mufti Ali Gum'a Questioned On Treatment of Women in Islam, Blames 'Secularists' For Terrorism Worldwide

September 13, 2007 - MEMRI Video: Mufti of Egypt Ali Gum'a Confronted with Questions about the Treatment of Women in Islam and Blames "Secularists" for Terrorism Worldwide
-- Transcript

July 24, 2007 - Gulf News: Top cleric denies 'freedom to choose religion' comment
-- "What I actually said is that Islam prohibits a Muslim from changing his religion and that apostasy is a crime, which must be punished," Goma'a said

April 13, 2007 - MEMRI: As Part of Its Struggle Against the Muslim Brotherhood

August 18, 2006 - MEMRI: The Mufti of Egypt: The True Face of the Blood-Sucking Hebrew Entity has Been Exposed

May 26, 2006 - MEMRI: Mufti of Egypt Sheik Ali Gum'a: Wife-Beating Is Permitted by Islam in Muslim Countries, but Is Forbidden in the West

Egypt's Al-Ahram Weekly Online

Al-Ahram Frequent Quotations on Left-Wing Web-Sites

July 2, 2008 - Crossroads in History: The Struggle against Jihad and Supremacist Ideologies -- Counterterrorism Blog - by Jeffrey Imm

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BEYOND THE DROPZONE - World Defense Review

Phares on Hezbollah’s telecommunications expansion

by W. Tho