Douglas Farah on the need to Maintain a Focus on Terrorist Finances
By Douglas Farah
One of the striking aspects of the current policy debate, such as it is, over how to combat the terrorist threat, is the pervasive idea that terrorists don't need much money to operate. This conventional wisdom, a part of the 9-11 Commission Report and other prominent writings, is based on the assumption that, once bin Laden and al Qaeda were driven from Afghanistan, their operational costs decreased significantly because they no longer have to pay for camps or help keep the Taliban afloat. That, I believe, was true for a period after the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan. Certainly al Qaeda scattered, its financial structure was damaged and the ground shifted considerably. However, that assessment is outdated, although the official (and much of the unofficial) line has not kept up.
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