March 2005 Archives

MILF & GRP Served Notice

By Zachary Abuza

In a visit to Manila this week, Adm. William Fallon, head of the US Pacific Command, raised the issue of designating the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The links between the MILF and Jemaah Islamiyah, a regional affiliate of Al Qaeda that is responsible for three major terrorist attacks in Indonesia since October 2002, are clear and convincing. MILF offered JI training facilities in its camps in the 1990s; and several hundred JI members were trained by Al Qaeda operatives including Omar al-Faruq, Omar Al-Hadrani and al-Mughira al-Gaza�iri. The number of Indonesians in MILF camps, however, has decreased dramatically in the past few years. The MILF denies the existence of training camps, but the revelations of captured JI members in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia suggest that training continues and that the �classes� are roughly 20 people each. Moreover, there is evidence that Abu Sayyaf members are being trained in the same camps. These allegations were recently confirmed by Rohmat (Zaki), an Indonesian JI member captured as he was coming out of an MILF base command.

The links between the MILF and Jemaah Islamiyah, a regional affiliate of Al Qaeda that is responsible for three major terrorist attacks in Indonesia since October 2002, are clear and convincing. MILF offered JI training facilities in its camps in the 1990s; and several hundred JI members were trained by Al Qaeda operatives including Omar al-Faruq, Omar Al-Hadrani and al-Mughira al-Gaza�iri. The number of Indonesians in MILF camps, however, has decreased dramatically in the past few years. The MILF denies the existence of training camps, but the revelations of captured JI members in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia suggest that training continues and that the �classes� are roughly 20 people each. Moreover, there is evidence that Abu Sayyaf members are being trained in the same camps. These allegations were recently confirmed by Rohmat (Zaki), an Indonesian JI member captured as he was coming out of an MILF base command.

What is of significant concern to American and regional intelligence officials is not simply that the training is continuing, but that a cadre of first-generation, Afghan-trained JI members is now based in Mindanao, including Dulmatin and Umar Patek, two of the Bali bombers. Increasingly Mindanao is seen not just as a rear base of operations, but as a potential center of operations.

The problem with designation is the MILF is a popular national-liberation organization, and their grievances are very legitimate. They have been engaged in on-again, off-again peace talks with the government since 1997. Most recently, the ceasefire was shattered when the government over-ran their headquarters in Buliok in February 2003. Formal peace talks have still not resumed, though they are now scheduled to begin on 16 April.

In the fall of 2003, the US Government offered the MILF some $50 million over two years in development assistance if they signed a peace agreement with the government. The US calculus was simple, as long as the civil war continued, the less incentive the MILF, without state patrons, had to cut ties to JI and Al Qaeda. And yet, peace talks remain stalled.

Admiral Fallon�s statement, which has caused defensive pleas from Philippine Government officials, as well as President Arroyo herself, reflects US frustration with both the MILF and the Philippine Government. Regarding the former, the intelligence is making it hard for anyone to believe the MILF�s denials. Regarding the latter, the Philippine government has shown little seriousness or vision regarding the peace process. President Arroyo has shown little leadership that is needed if she is to succeed in reaching a deal with the MILF that will stabilize Mindanao.

Falon�s warning is correctly designed to pressure both sides. The Philippine government doesn�t want the US to do it, because it will stall the peace process, and potentially lead to a resumption of war; something the Philippine government can ill-afford.

The MILF must be held responsible for doing the right thing � ending the ties between some of its leaders and the Abu Sayyaf and JI, and turning over those individuals who discredit both their religion and an otherwise legitimate political movement. Regrettably, it is unlikely they will cut these ties until the peace process resumes in earnest and the MILF has some confidence that government commitments and agreements will be honored, and that the Philippine military will not undercut or obstruct their implementation. Ties to JI are a rational choice, a hedge, for the MILF.

While they say they don�t care about the designation, the MILF should. Designation will deligitimize their movement. Moreover, the UN Security Council will likely follow suit, and the MILF has no friends on the Security Council. UN designation will hurt their dream of an East-Timor styled UN-sponsored referendum. Moreover, it will set back the peace process and give hardliners in the Philippine military the incentive to continue the war. Then we�ll really have a terrorism problem in Southeast Asia.

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Final Report on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

By Evan Kohlmann

http://www.wmd.gov/report
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, MARCH 31, 2005

DOWNLOAD ENTIRE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT (3.3 MB)

By Victor Comras

Like many, I waited for, and read the second Volcker Commission Interim Report with great anticipation. I have now slugged through both interim reports, and all I can say is �Where�s the Beef!� Taken together the two interim reports appear to make the little things sound big, while missing the big things altogether. Let me start with the latest report. There�s really not that much in its 90 pages (144 pages with its appendix). It tells us only that:

1. Cotecna really shouldn�t have been selected by the UN because it was under investigation in Switzerland and Pakistan for making illegal kickbacks. The IIC does not address how Cotecna performed under its UN Contract or whether it carried out its contract responsibilities. Did they assure that the OFF goods conformed, and did they protect against the use of OFF contracts to cover contraband? Who is going to answer that one for us.

2. Cotecna�s hiring and retention of Kojo raises the appearances of a �conflict of interest� How trite. There is no convincing evidence, the report says, that there was actually a conflict of interest. No matter. I can�t get excited about this finding either way. With all the other great problems and questions surrounding the OFF program and its consequences, I don�t believe this question deserved the time and effort the Volcker Commission gave to it, especially if it comes at the expense of their dealing with the tougher issues.

3. Even if Kofi Annan wasn�t involved, he should have been more aware of what was going on with his son, and ought to have directed closer scrutiny over the renewal of Cotecna�s contract. That�s almost funny. It seems to me that Kofi Annan should have been aware of what was going on with the whole OFF program and the way it was being sabotaged to enrich Saddam and those willing to work with him. If we are going to tag Kofi Annan, it should be on that issue, not the issue of whether or not he followed up on a story about his son in a �The Sunday Times.�

4. Much of the real story about Kojo�s role is still unknown. That's probably right. But, hopefully the IIC will now turn to the bigger issues.

While I�m at it, let me pick at the earlier interim report. It did have more substance. But, I am troubled by its focus and conclusions. That report informed us that:

1. �The investigative record � is replete with convincing and uncontested evidence that the selection process for each of the three United Nations contractors �{BNP, Saybolt and Lloyd�s Register}did not conform to established financial and competitive bidding rules.� This came as no surprise to anyone. Everyone associated with the establishment of the OFF program was aware that the selection process was governed by �political factors. � The selection of the contractors was the result of negotiations between the principal players. The real scandal here is that the Volcker Commission, the United Nations, and the countries involved have been willing to tag this all on Joseph Stephanides who was really one of the �good guys. � He tried to make the Iraq sanctions work. I�m still waiting to see if any of the government officials involved stand up to the plate on this one.

2. ��Mr.Sevan, while employed as Executive Director of OIP, solicited and received on behalf of AMEP{African Middle East Petroleum Co) several million barrels of allocation of oil from 1998 to 2001. This IIC finding is serious and it confirms the strong suspicions that predated the IIC that Sevan dabbled also in the much bigger and broader international multi-billion dollar scam run by Saddam Hussein and his cronies to assure that they were the greatest beneficiaries of the Oil for Food Program. The question now is whether the IIC will delve more deeply into the extent of this enormous international scandal or leave it only with Sevan. Volcker and his team should help us understand how the international community and the United Nations allowed this to happen. What explains the failure of the officials in the United Nations overseeing the program to blow their whistles loudly, and what explains the absolute failure of government officials in the United States, Europe, Russia and elsewhere from cracking down.

Let�s hope that the final Volcker Commission Report goes beyond the parochial issues they have dealt with so far. Its time to get to the broader questions and issues that get to the true heart of this scandal.

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New Videos from the Ansar al-Sunnah Army and the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI)

By Evan Kohlmann

The Ansar al-Sunnah Army in Iraq has released a new full-length propaganda film titled "Purification of the Soul." Among other items of note, the video features extensive, previously-unseen footage of Ansar al-Sunnah insurgent training camps in Iraq, ambush attacks on civilian contractor vehicles entering Baghdad, and even the indoctrination and combat training of child recruits for the militant group. It is unknown if any of the training camps featured in the video included a facility near Samarra on the banks of Lake Tharthar reportedly raided last week by Iraqi forces. (Click to view video excerpts c/o Globalterroralert.com)

Separately, the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) has released video footage of several recent military operations in and around the Iraqi capital Baghdad--including a roadside bomb attack on a U.S. Humvee in Al-Latifiya, a rocket attack on the Al-Mansour Hotel, and a bombing ambush on U.S. soldiers in Taji. In the last attack, American troops were lured to a position in Taji with a decoy roadside bomb. As the arriving soldiers attempted to defuse the first device, a second, larger hidden explosive device was detonated, allegedly killing three of them.
- Mar. 23 video of IAI roadside bomb attack on U.S. Humvee
- Mar. 23 video of IAI rocket attack on Al-Mansour Hotel
- Mar. 29 video of IAI ambush bombing attack in Taji

Employment Visas Can Pose a Security Threat

By Bill West

On March 26, the Florida Sun-Sentinel ran an AP report about U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), the immigration benefits agency under DHS, exceeding the Congressionally mandated ceiling on H1-B "temporary skilled worker" visas. These visas, along with a similar temporary worker visa called the L-1, or "Intra-Company Transferee" visa which allows foreign workers of a foreign company to come to the US to temporarily work in a US-based subsidiary or branch of that company, have long been controversial and subject to fraud abuse. Hostile foreign Intelligence services and terrorist organizations have also used these visas as a mechanism to gain "legitimate" entry into the US for their sinister operatives.

One of the most significant and ongoing issues with the H and L visa programs is that so many of the recipients of these visas convert their "temporary" status to permanent resident alien status, often based upon the same employment skills that afforded them the temporary visa in the first place. In the "H" visa category, there is a parallel permanent resident visa category for skilled workers that is frequently pursued by employer and employee once the alien "H" is in the United States. For the "L" visa holder, once in the US, they often shop for a US employer who is willing to file the permanent resident skilled worker petition for them, using the same business and professional skills and contacts that landed them the "L" status once they are securely operating within the US. Thus, these so-called temporary work visas are very often anything but that.

Which is one reason the H and L visas are so attractive to those hostile foreign Intelligence services and terrorist organizations. Not only do they get their operatives into the US with solid immigration cover, the process can be easily manipulated to gain permanent resident status and ultimately naturalized US citizenship for those same operatives. The fraudulent utilization of legitimate US-based business entities with connections to foreign Intel services or terror groups makes the petition process for these visas exceptionally easy (there were at least two suspected bogus "H" visa capers linked to the ongoing Palestinian Islamic Jihad prosecution case in Tampa). Combine this with the fact that virtually all such petitions are remotely adjudicated by CIS, which means an Examining Officer sitting in some regional adjudication center reviews stacks of paper petitions and supporting documents hour after hour every day, and the opportunity for getting a bogus petition approved is very good. Essentially, if all the spaces in all the forms are filled out with information that looks convincing and the supporting documentation is reasonably good and nothing kicks out on the basic lookout queries, the petition will most likely sail through and the alien will get the visa.

CIS Director Eduardo Aguirre has publicly stated that one of the top priorities for CIS is to reduce application backlogs. That was also a constant problem with the old INS benefit processing system...simply because there were far too few resources to deal with far too many applications and petitions in a legal environment that was increasingly complex and forever changing. Those pressures have really not changed under CIS, especially considering that CIS is virtually all made up of former INS benefits division officials. The ability to root out potential fraud and other malafide applicants by the CIS is probably only slightly better than it was under the old INS, and the threat of such abuse of the benefit system is even greater.

The fact that CIS exceeded the Congressional mandate of H1-B visas by 10,000 should be a concern to all of us. That is 10,000 more opportunities for even one more terrorist alien or foreign spy to gain entry into the US and remain here with legitimate "cover" than need have happened if CIS officials had administered this program more effectively. Congress will hopefully conduct further inquiry into this matter.

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Oil for Food Update: UN Decides Not to Pay Benon Sevan's Legal Fees

By Victor Comras

The UN Secretary General's Press Spokesman, Fred Eckhard indicated yesterday afternoon that the UN had decided that "it is not appropriate to reimburse Benon Sevan�s legal bills for his appearances before the Volcker Commission (Independent Inquiry Committee)." They will review this decision if Sevan is later cleared of both internal breaches of UN rules and regulations and of any criminal wrongdoing. The decision was taken by Mark Mallock Brown in consultation with the UN Legal Department.

Sectarian Violence and Terrorism in Southeast Asia

By Zachary Abuza

Arrests in Ambon, Indonesia, an ominous warning in Mindanao, Philippines, and continued violence in Southern Thailand portend the future of militant Islam in Southeast Asia, and the revival of Jemaah Islamiyah.

Although Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has been the most active and lethal of Al Qaeda's regional affiliates, perpetrating three major terrorist attacks in Indonesia since 2002: Bali (October 2002), the JW Marriott in Jakarta (August 2003) and the Australian Embassy (September 2004), JI is a weakened organization. JI has been significantly degraded in terms of its capability and manpower since October 2001. There have been more than 300 arrests, including most of its senior leaders and founding members. JI's leadership structure, its shura and regional (mantiqi) structure no longer seem to be in place. What is left is a looser organization, autonomous cells, with little if any centralized command and control. There is considerable bomb-making expertise and a cadre of Afghan trained leaders still at large.

JI has not thrown in the towel, and the path to its regrouping and expansion lies less in bombing western targets and more through provoking sectarian conflict. This is what JI and its leaders were consumed with in 1998-2000. Then they established two separate paramilitaries, the Laskar Mujiheddin and the Laskar Jundullah in the Malukus and Sulawesi, respectively. This was an important tool for JI in indoctrinating their members, giving them a sense of defending their religion and reinforcing their Manichean view of the world. In 2004, there were a number of bombings, attacks, and assassinations that must be seen as an attempt to break the uneasy truce that has held since the negotiation of the Malino Accords in 2002.

In the past few weeks, further evidence of this strategy have emerged in three seperate countries: Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.

Yesterday, Indonesian police raided safe houses used by Islamic militants in Ambon, seizing a cache of some 95 IEDs and ammunition. Clearly militant seek to spoil the peace, and provoke a heavy handed government response.

Likewise, in the southern Philippines, the revived ASG, together with JI members/trainers have been calling for a jihad against the Christians. While the MILF has shied away from engaging in sectarian conflict, in the course of their revolution, radical elements of the group have lost patience with the peace process and seem to be willing to ratchet up the violence. Detained JI members who trained in Mindanao confirm that sectarian violence is part of the MO of the groups. Interestingly, the MILF posted a warning about the spectre of sectarian violence on their website earlier this week.

Finally, the violence in southern Thailand continues unabated, with several attacks each day in the three Muslim-dominated provinces. Some 600 people were killed in 2004, and the lvel/rate of violence has escalated since the October Tak Bai incident in which over 80 suspected militants were killed by the Thai army. Ominously, a Thai Buddhist monk was targeted this week. There is some alarm that the conflict in Southern Thailand is spiraling out of control and that JI will try to take advantage of it, as they did in the Malukus and Sulawesi in 1998. While there is no evidence to support that JI is behind the violence in southern Thailand, there are some links between JI and one of the groups that has been one of the main perpetrators of the violence.

While there is a debate amongst JI-watchers as to whether the group is divided factionally between advocates of terrorism and proponents of sectarian violence, one must understand that they are not mutually exclusive, indeed they are mutually reinforcing.

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Introducing New Contributing Expert Zachary Abuza

By Andrew Cochran

We are pleased to welcome our newest Contributing Expert, Zachary Abuza. Dr. Abuza is currently a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace and Associate Professor of Political Science at Simmons College, Boston. Dr. Abuza specializes in Southeast Asian politics and security issues. He received his SoMALD and PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the author of Militant Islam in Southeast Asia (2003) and Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam (2001). He has also authored two studies for the National Bureau of Asian Research, entitled "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya," NBR Analysis (2003) and "Muslims, Politics and Violence in Indonesia," NBR Analysis (2004). He is currently undertaking a major study of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front under support from USIP and the Smith Richardson Foundation. He is also working on two separate studies on the Abu Sayyaf Group and the insurgency in Southern Thailand. Dr. Abuza consults widely and is a frequent commentator in the press. He was recently quoted in South Asian press about links between Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

The Case Against Youssef Nada and Al Taqwa: Will Switzerland Now Prosecute?

By Victor Comras

There are growing signs that Switzerland will soon file formal criminal charges against Youssef Nada and his al Taqwa bank. Switzerland may also be prepared to follow up on a similar case against Saudi businessman Yasin Al-Qadi (see my earlier posting). These cases are likely to be a main topic of conversation when Swiss Justice Minister Christoph Blocher visits Washington this week The Swiss government has been working on the Nada case for over three years. Swiss and Italian police searched Nada�s Offices in Lugano and his home in Campione d�Italia shortly after he was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department and the UN Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee in November 2001. But, these local investigations failed to come up with sufficient evidence to prosecute. The Swiss then turned to the United States for further information.

The US Treasury Department wrote Swiss Deputy Federal prosecutor Claude Nicati in January 2002 laying out the reasons for Nada�s designation. The letter claimed that al-Taqwa and its founder, Youssef M. Nada, used concealed bank accounts, complex land deals and other hard-to-trace methods to channel funds to al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. It had also provided a clandestine line of credit to one of bin Baden�s lieutenants subsequently implicated in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings. Nicati came to the US in early 2002 to get the evidence backing up these claims. But, he left empty handed. The US agencies involved refused to provide the information which came from intelligence sources. The Swiss government complained at the time that without this information they could not proceed with the case against Nada or al Taqwa.

An agreement was finally reached last year when Attorney General Ashcroft visited Switzerland in June 2004 to exchange information on this and other terrorism related cases. Swiss Prosecutor Valentin Roschacher told the press at that time that an �Operative Working Arrangement� had been worked out to permit such information to be exchanged. But the accord has come in for heavy criticism in Switzerland, particularly since the government had not sought parliament's approval for it. Roschacher has assured his constituents that this arrangement would expire as soon as the terrorism investigations were completed.

Third Blast in Lebanon Serves Notice of Life without Syria

By Larry Johnson

by
Larry C. Johnson

Another day and another bomb in Christian neighborhood. The Syrian intelligence service is sending a clear message to the fractious Lebanese that violence and uncertainty will be the rule if Syrian security forces are not in place throughout the country. Lebanon lacks an effective Army capable of taking control of the Hezbollah forces in place, who are protecting the Shia population. It is no coincidence that Syrian forces have withdrawn from key sites in Lebanon and the frequency of bombs against civilian targets, particularly in Christian neighborhoods is escalating. More to come.

Chaos in Iraq Fuels Worry among Persian Gulf Neighbors

By Larry Johnson

by
Larry C. Johnson

Extended discussions during the last two months with political and security officials from Persian Gulf States reveals a growing nervousness about the failure of the United States to contain the insurgency in Iraq. Our friends worry that we are creating a situation akin to that produced by the Soviet Union when it invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet invasion ignited a jihadist passion that spread thru the Islamic world. That passion fueled the group responsible for the 9-11 attacks. Today our friends in the Persian Gulf see the images of US soldiers entering Iraqi homes and the rising death toll among the Iraqi civilian population as providing new grist for the jihadist mill of hatred. They have told me they are seeing levels of unrest and militant activity that are scaring the hell out of them. The recent attacks in Qatar and Kuwait inflame their concern.

Despite happy talk from Washington about the amazing success of the January 30 elections, our friends are reading accounts reporting that there was a deliberate effort backed by the United States to steal the election. Moreover, they see very clearly that there is still no Government in place that reflects the results of the election. You cannot continu to call something a success while the insurgents continue their attacks. In fact the Iraqi insurgents have shifted their attacks from US military targets to hitting Iraqis sympathetic to the United States and its coalition partners.

Our friends in the Persian Gulf want to see effective security put in place in Iraq. But, as reported in today's Washington Post, US troops are spending more time in garrison and less time on patrol. With fewer patrols insurgents have an easier time of moving about the country to collect intelligence, to recruit new fighters, to provide training for fighters, and to expand logistic networks to support the insurgents. The key to defeating an insurgency is convincing the local population that the Government is more powerful and more effective than the insurgents. Don't take my word for it, just ask Lord Cornwallis about the smashing success of the British counter insurgency operation in the American Colonies 226 years ago.

Washington Times Gets it Wrong on the FARC

By Larry Johnson

by
Larry C. Johnson

Washington Times correspondent, Jerry Seper, produced an alarmist and misleading piece in today's paper titled, "Colombia's FARC Spreads in Central America". The FARC is not spreading, but a U.S. born threat is.

The FARC remains on the defensive. They are too busy in Colombia battling against the persistent offensive unleashed by Alvaro Uribe's Government starting two years ago. While they continue to fight and have inflicted some serious casualties on Colombian Government forces in the last six months, the level of violence in Colombia, particularly international terrorist attacks, is down signifcantly compared to four years ago. Seper also suggests that Colombia's status as the primary source of cocaine is something new and unusual. Not so. Colombia has enjoyed that dubious distinction for several years.

So, who's the emerging U.S. based threat? So-called youth gangs, like Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS 13). MS 13 got its start in the barrios of Los Angeles, initially as a group protecting their sisters from marauding Mexican gangs. They also engaged in theft. But MS 13 is far from a youth gang. Some of the MS 13 leaders have spent more than 20 years in American prisons and are now well into their 40s. These gangs have returned to Central America with a vengeance and are challenging the power of local law enforcement in places like El Salvador and Honduras. As a result they are pushing aggressively into narcotics, money laundering and weapons trafficking. They have also been guilty of heinous mass murders. With ties into the United States and a willingness to do almost anything for a buck, these gangs represent a significant threat to American security. To make matters worse, they are taking advantage of the US focus on Islamic terrorism to expand their activities and solidify their base. Rather than worry about the FARC we ought to pay attention to this developing threat.

Washington Times article: Colombia's FARC spreads in Central America

By Michael Cutler

This article should make it crystal clear as to why we absolutely need to secure our border with Mexico.

We are currently supposed to be engaged in two domestic wars- "The War on Drugs" and the ever popular "War on Terrorism." According to this article, 90% of the cocaine and 47% of the heroin sold in the United States originates in, or passes through Colombia. The drug cartels in Colombia have a reputation for utter ruthlessness comparable to what the terrorists who attacked us on September 11, 2001 demonstrated so graphically. In addition to this, we also have been seeing reports of MS-13, an extremely violent gang that originated in El Salvador, that has a rapidly growing presence in the United States that is possibly involved in smuggling terrorists into the United States.

Yet, the administration and politicians on both sides of the 'aisle' seemingly continue to do everything they can to dissolve the border between the United States and Mexico.

Once again, I have to ask the same question that has no apparent or immediate answer, "What will it take to get our 'leaders' to take the security of our borders and the enforcement of our nation's immigration laws seriously?"

If our nation fought World War II the way we are fighting these two "wars" I am certain that Old Glory would no longer be flying over our nation's Capitol!

The article can be found at "http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050325-110524-1743r.htm

The Washington Times

www.washingtontimes.com

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Colombia's FARC spreads in Central America
By Jerry Seper
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published March 26, 2005

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Marxist guerrillas in Colombia have established cells in Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama in what U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement authorities say is an effort by the rebel organization to expand its arms- and drug-trafficking operations.
Honduran Security Minister Oscar Alvarez confirmed the presence of members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, in the three Central American countries last week, saying the organization was seeking to "infiltrate Central America to buy more weapons and destabilize the rule of law ...."
Mr. Alvarez told reporters in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, that arms traffickers in that country were trading automatic weapons, mostly AK-47 assault rifles, to the FARC in exchange for drugs, which were being sold to buyers in the United States. The weapons were identified as coming from Nicaragua, left over from that country's civil war in the 1980s.
Three Hondurans have been identified in the scheme, including one man who managed the operation from his Honduran prison cell, although Honduran authorities and U.S. officials have said that many more are involved.
U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement authorities yesterday said the FARC -- considered Latin America's oldest, largest, most capable and best-equipped insurgency -- has continued its high-profile terrorist attacks in Colombia and expanded its arms- and drug-trafficking operations into Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
The authorities said the FARC engaged in a concerted campaign to destabilize municipal governments in Colombia by killing local officials and threatening to execute others, and that it had kidnapped hundreds of civilians to help finance subversion and put political pressure on the Colombian government -- tactics that now have been exported to Central America.
They added, however, that the Colombian government's recent successes in combating the FARC -- aided by the United States -- may also have forced the organization to seek refuge elsewhere.
Earlier this month, a high-ranking FARC leader, Nayibe Rojas Valderrama, also known as "Comandante Sonia," was extradited to the United States to face prosecution on drug charges. Rojas Valderrama's capture last year by Colombian special-forces commandos was viewed as a major step in that government's ongoing U.S.-led effort to attack the FARC.
The FARC, with as many as 12,000 armed combatants, has been named in connection with numerous bombings, murders, mortar attacks, narcotrafficking, kidnappings, extortion and hijackings, as well as guerrilla and conventional military actions against Colombian political, military and economic targets.
Earlier this month, Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, commander of the U.S. Southern Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that many nations in Latin America and specifically the Andean Ridge were threatened by regional terrorist organizations supported and funded by illegal drug trafficking and other criminal ventures, including the FARC.
Gen. Craddock said 90 percent of the cocaine and 47 percent of the heroin that reaches the United States annually originates in or passes through Colombia.

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More Attention to Terrorists at Sea

By Andrew Cochran

Much more attention is being given in the press now to the possibility of terrorists using or pirating ships for either smuggling and transportation, or as actual attack vehicles. Newsweek has an article about it in this week's edition. James Dunnigan has one of his tidbits on the capture of 14 small ships in the Persian Gulf this year by American and British warships. The website that I've found thus far that pays continuous attention to the subject is EagleSpeak, so I've added it to the "Centers and Websites" box (apologies to ES for not doing it weeks ago). I would welcome all e-mails on the subject, especially from naval intel types.

Introducing New Contributing Expert Michael Chandler

By Andrew Cochran

We are very pleased to welcome our first European-based Contributing Expert, Michael Chandler. Mr. Chandler was the Chairman of the U.N.'s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Group, where he worked with Victor Comras, until early 2004, and he was the co-author of seven reports to the UN Security Council, issued from June 2001 to December 2003. Prior to that, he was as a career officer in the British Army, in which he held command and staff appointments in numerous countries, and then held senior management positions in the oil and high-tech industries. He joined the U.N. in 1993 and was a senior official involved in the the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Bosnia-Herzegovina area, where he established and oversaw the operation of the joint civilian/military logistics organisation throughout the mission area. From Janury 1999 until late 2000, he directed the establishment of the new �State Border Service� for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country�s first substantive multi-ethnic and cross-entity institution with a single commander.

In February 2004 Mr. Chandler was awarded the Risks Management Solutions (RMS) Visiting Fellowship for Terrorism Research at Singapore�s Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. He is called upon regularly to give presentations and participate in panel discussions at international gatherings and to speak on television and radio on matters relating to countering terrorism and the al-Qaeda network. He was a member of the 2004 Club de Madrid Summit Working Group on Terrorist Financing and is a consultant on a variety of matters relating to countering trans-national terrorism, including command and control and effective inter-agency cooperation. He is a member of the Advisory Council of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore and the Advisory Board of the International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel.

Michael Cutler on CNN's "Lou Dobbs Tonight"

By Andrew Cochran

Contributing Expert Michael Cutler will appear tonight on CNN's "Lou Dobbs Tonight," which airs from 6 to 7 p.m. Eastern time, to discuss the summit between President Bush, Mexican President Vicente Fox, and Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, and the issue of our porous borders.

Annan Proposes International Definition of Terrorism

By Matthew Levitt

An indispensable part of UN secretary-general Kofi Annan�s recent report �In Larger Freedom,� which outlines much needed recommendations for the structure of the United Nations, was the call for an international definition of terrorism that encompasses all attacks on civilians. The report proposed the adoption of a new international convention on terrorism by September 2006 that would define terrorism as any act �intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.� This recommendation echoes his �High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and, Change� report on security threats, released in early December 2004.

It may be difficult to convince Arab states to accept such a definition, though. A recent report released by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan found that Westerners and Arabs have different ideas about what constitutes terrorism. The report concluded that while Westerners draw the line at the nature of the act itself, a majority of Arabs make exceptions when considering the motivations behind the act. Thus, they consider various actions perpetrated by the United States and Israel as terrorism, and actions perpetrated against them as legitimate resistance.

For more on the debate over defining terrorism, see Andrew Eastman's policywatch on "Defining Terrorism."

Update on Sevan's Legal Fees: The Makings of Another UN Imbroglio!

By Victor Comras

The UN was caught short on its explanation yesterday concerning its agreement to pay Benon Sevan's legal fees. Their initial written statement implied that the Volcker Commission had condoned the payment in order to facilitate Sevan's appearance. That riled members of the Commission (IIC) and today, IIC spokesman Michael Holtzman responded, making it clear that it had had nothing to do with that UN decision. For its part the IIC had permitted Sevan to appear with the attorney because he was the "single individual against whom the most serious and direct allegations of corruption had been made, as of that time."

UN Chief of Staff Mark Malloch Brown admitted at the UN Press Briefing Today that "we boobed, we got it wrong." He went on to explain that the Secretary General and the previous Chief of Staff had agreed to pay Mr. Sevan legal fees after Sevan threatened to simply leave and go back to Cyprus. According to Brown, Sevan made it clear that if he could not avail himself of legal counsel, he was going home. "The reason this decision was made," Brown said, " was that {Sevan} was at the centre of this web that the Panel was seeking to unravel; that his role came about because of his official responsibilities as head of the oil-for-food programme, and that, therefore, any transgressions that had occurred were related to his official duties. We just felt that the range of questions he was being expected to answer and the range of subjects he needed to respond to was just too great for him to be able to organize himself and to present himself on those issues properly before the Panel without legal advice."

Much skepticism still reigns concerning the UN decision, which it apparently intends to stand by, to pay part or all of Sevan's legal fees from the Iraq Oil for Food 2.2 Account. And questions began to surface whether the Secretary General, or any other UN party might want re-embursement for legal fees. Brown admitted that the Secretary General had, in fact, sought the advice of private counsel regarding his Volcker Commission appearances, but that he had no intention of having the attorney appear with him or to seek any reimbursement for his legal consultations.

I have attached below further excerpts of today's UN Press Briefing on this issue.

EXCERPTS FROM THE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING BY THE OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WEDNESDAY MARCH 23,

Quote

Mark Malloch Brown On the second issue you raised, of the Volcker statement today correcting our statement of yesterday: we boobed, we got it wrong. I would say, though, that I was a little surprised, actually, that all of you relied only on the statement, given the fact that we released at the same time a letter signed by me to Benon Sevan, explaining the terms and circumstances under which we would pay for a portion of his legal fees. I say that because there is no effort at buck-passing here, there is no effort to dump this all on Riza, as this morning�s Sun seems to suggest. The letter has my signature on it. It makes very clear, in the first line, that this was a decision of both the Secretary-General and the previous Chief of Staff. While I think that our statement, which was written extremely hurriedly to try to respond to all of you as quickly as possible, was inaccurate in that it misrepresented the position of the Panel through a poor syntax and juxtaposition of sentences. The attached letter from me, which was indeed the basis of the statement, made no such mistake.

Question: I am glad that you acknowledge that yesterday�s statement is inaccurate, and that is putting it lightly. It said that Mr. Sevan was a retired official and that is incorrect, isn�t it. He got a $1 a year salary. He is not a retired official, he is on salary, isn�t that correct?

Mark Malloch Brown: He is a retired official who was kept on a salary of $1 a year to make him available to the panel.

Question: The rationale was that you don�t have any sanction or control over him because he is retired and that is why you have to pay his legal fees.

Mark Malloch Brown: Mr. Sevan made it clear that, if he could not avail himself of legal counsel, he was going home to Cyprus. He did not see why he should subject himself to this continuous indignity of leaks in the media, of trial by whatever, without even the basic legal needs available to him to clear his name. Let me elaborate further. The reason this decision was made, was that he was at the centre of this web that the Panel was seeking to unravel; that his role came about because of his official responsibilities as head of the oil-for-food programme, and that, therefore, any transgressions that had occurred were related to his official duties. We just felt that the range of questions he was being expected to answer and the range of subjects he needed to respond to was just too great for him to be able to organize himself and to present himself on those issues properly before the Panel without legal advice.

While you are right that yesterday�s statement was inaccurate in the way that it appeared to suggest that the Panel was endorsing the payment of those fees, which they did not endorse -� that was our decision �- they did agree that he should be represented by counsel because of the complexity of issues that he had to address. That is confirmed by the statement this morning and that is the point we are trying to make regarding the Panel.

Question: Why is it that the Volcker feels it has to pay a UN official in order to cooperate with an inquiry? Why is it that, given that he did not cooperate with the inquiry -� he said he had lied on a number of points in the inquiry -� that the UN still was even considering his request for reimbursement of legal fees?

Mark Malloch Brown: The key point there is, considering I am dealing with a situation where a commitment had been given last year, based on legal advice, and where my predecessor and the Secretary-General had both confirmed to Mr. Sevan that, until proven guilty, he could be helped with his first presentation to the Panel. The fact is, you are correct. The Panel concluded that he had not fully cooperated with them. It is also the case that our offer was limited to his representation before the Panel. Those two issues -- and therefore not other legal matters such as, for example, advice on other legal proceedings he might later face -� are exactly why he is not currently being paid. I want to be clear: you asked, we disclosed. There has been no effort to cover this up.

Question: I find it impossible to believe that the chief UN legal officer would recommend that this decision be taken in the best interest of the Organization. I believe that the case is that the Secretary-General, the Chief of Staff, or whoever, took the decision that they wanted to pay the legal fees and asked the legal officer how that could be done. I would like you to release the legal advice to make it clear that it was actually the Secretary-General who took the decision, rather than the chief legal officer.

Mark Malloch Brown: You would like me to release the legal advice to prove that there was no legal advice, you seem to be saying. It was just not a matter of policy in any organization that I know of, any government, any company, any client-lawyer situation, where you release the legal advice given to somebody. It is a client-attorney privilege, if you like. I am sure that the Office of Legal Affairs would be happy to confirm to you that it was indeed their advice that these fees be paid at that period.

Frankly, I think it is a great pity that the Organization did not heave itself into action to do it when it said it would. What had complicated the whole thing was the fact that, while the commitment was given to Mr. Sevan, it was not acted on, which is something that happens a lot to much around here. The issue became much complicated by the fact that it had not been acted on at the point of the release of the report, which materially changes the situation. Because now we know that, indeed, he had not fully cooperated and is accused of major breaches of the Staff Rules. That is why this thing is stuck at the moment as we review it.

....

On your second point -- that really is a matter for the lawyers. I want you to understand that this is being dealt with as a legal issue, not a political issue; the terms and circumstances under which either payments to Mr. Sevan or reclaiming payments from him is possible. In the case of reclaiming, I think that the practical fact is it would need some criminal conviction, which then allowed funds to be reclaimed through a civil court proceeding of our own. Reclaiming is different from paying, which is the state we are currently in.

Question: Would you rather have a vindication by an outside judicial party, not by the United Nation�s internal...

mark Malloch Brown: It is ultimately a matter of the lawyers, but I am pointing out that, as a practical matter of fact, it would need some kind of civil action, which, in turn, would be likely to be hinged on some previous criminal action. It might be possible to hinge it on an Administrative Tribunal finding. Again, the lawyers would have to determine that.

Question: How was the decision made to effectively use Iraqi oil money to pay for the defence of somebody accused of stealing money from the people of Iraq?

Mark Malloch Brown: The �2.2 account� that would be charged for any payments finally made was set up for the management of that oil money by the UN. As you know, it was used in an exchange which was endorsed by the Security Council over the objections of the Iraqi Permanent Representative for the payment of the Volcker Panel and its costs. We look at proper representation before that Panel to secure the truth from Benon Sevan as an extension of that same process. It is ensuring that the great bulk of those oil moneys were properly used, and that corrective action is taken where they were not. That was the purpose of the �2.2 account�, to ensure good management of the other
98 per cent of the oil revenues.

Question: This is where the real outrage is being expressed by the Iraqis themselves. It is like if an employee steals from funds from a bank, it is like asking the depositors whose funds are stolen to pay for his legal fees. Does it not seem to be at least a political misjudgement to use that particular money?

Mark Malloch Brown: If you take that example, it might be very likely that that employee of the bank was a senior manager of the bank and was sued as result of a criminal investigation of having stolen from accounts of people at that bank. It would be normal corporate practice that, initially, the bank would indeed underwrite a senior executive�s legal costs. As soon as the executive was found guilty in any proceeding, that financial support would stop. Check with normal legal practice here in the United States, and you�ll find that that is the case, whether it is Enron or any of the other scandals. These kinds of legal support are initially available, but as soon as there is proof of wrongdoing by the senior manager, any legal support of the company is withdrawn. It is there in the first stages, again, because as an officer of the company, that individual is being charged because of activities they have undertaken in the course of their official duties.

Question: The bank would not pay those fees if the funds of the...

Mark Malloch Brown: Well, they would pay it out of their resources. Let me make it clear that the money of the �2.2 account� is moneys given to the UN for the management of the other 98 per cent.

....

Question: We were given the impression that, when the investigation began and the dollar-retainer was organized, that would be a mechanism by which Sevan would have a direct conversation with Volcker. Now we have learned about a lawyer. Of course, that creates a kind a scepticism in the press corps and around the world. Even with these confusions, we still have not been able to put to sleep those feelings of scepticism that by having a lawyer you never are going to get to the bottom of the truth here. Can you please address that and try to put that to sleep. Secondly, can you explain what the relationship is between Mr. Sevan�s current lawyer and the UN is, if there is such a link. Thirdly, does the Secretary-General have a similar type of legal arrangement now that he is also under investigation?

Mark Malloch Brown: On the first two, let me just say that the idea of an accused being represented by counsel in an investigative procedure is as old as the notion of justice itself. While it is to ensure the accused their rights to defend themselves, which becomes enormously important in complex commercial investigations or legal proceedings, it has a second element too. The lawyer�s job in a situation like this is to ensure that the proceeding moves smoothly, to the extent that, if Mr. Sevan has answers to the questions the Volcker Panel raises, those answers are organized and documented. That there is not an individual on the defensive reluctantly answering and not being able to make his case effectively. That is the essence of any system of justice.

secondly, as regards the Secretary-General -� I am glad you asked -- the Secretary-General has indeed sought private legal advice in making his own response to the queries that the Volcker Panel had put to him. He has not sought, and he will not seek, any financial support from the UN in regard to that. It is entirely a private matter between him and a lawyer he has consulted on these matters. Nobody else is paying for it.

Question: Are you sure the Secretary-General will cooperate with Volcker? Also, you have used several times the term �found guilty�. To my knowledge, Benon Sevan has been found guilty of nothing, as of yet. Secondly, if it was important to ensure his cooperation so much that you needed to reimburse his lawyer fees, you need to address that, too. Was that only lawyer fees or also travel costs or other things? Has Benon Sevan since the 3 February findings appeared before the Volcker Commission. If the Volcker Commission asks him to reappear, do you assume that now he will not cooperate? Thirdly, since he was not found guilty of anything, why stop payments?

Mark Malloch Brown: Let me take the third first. We have always said that the Volcker Panel, while independent, if it makes allegations against people, we consider those to have the full force of the UN�s own investigation. Therefore, they have alleged serious misconduct against Mr. Sevan and I, as now Chief of Staff, feel a clear fiduciary responsibility to stop any payment for any legal services after those findings.

Mr. Sevan is now engaged in his right of rebuttal, because we took action against him, sent a letter of charges based on the Volcker findings. Obviously, if he is able to rebut all the allegations against him, and that rebuttal is accepted by the internal justice system of the UN, and no criminal charges came �- despite all we have heard out of Congress and out of different District Attorney�s Offices �- and he was completely vindicated by the justice system, then the situation is very different. At the moment, we consider him, because of the Volcker investigation, to be the subject of very serious charges. It would be utterly inappropriate, in my view, to allow further payments for work after 3 February.

As to your question on the Secretary-General, while it is a mischievous question, let me give it a straightforward answer. There is total and utter cooperation by the Secretary-General with the Volcker Panel. He has met with them, as you know, on several occasions, he has responded fully to any questions they had, he has made sure that the staff of his office, like the staff of the whole UN, have been equally forthcoming. The proof in that would be in what Mr. Volcker has to say next week.

Question: As for the other expenses...

Mark Malloch Brown: These legal bills are subject of discussion between the Office of Legal Affairs and Mr. Sevan�s lawyer. It is not money going to Mr. Sevan. As I understand it, it is reimbursement of the lawyer for a yet-to-be-agreed-upon scope of services because of the disputes we raised earlier. I am sure that if there are non-billable hours and expenses, that they are going to be subject to the same scrutiny. I have not seen the bills, but we are very clear that the terms are for his representation and his preparation for his representation before the International Inquiry Commission. That was what would be paid subject to the other issues we have discussed.

I can�t confirm the numbers, but I will acknowledge that it was a big number, because it was very difficult for a staff member alone to meet those legal bills on that scale because of the extensive questioning and scope of investigation to which he was subjected. That was one of the reasons that made the Office of Legal Affairs deem it an exceptional circumstance. It is beyond the few thousand dollars that a staff member might incur in other legal proceedings. It is exceptional for that reason, that it was beyond the means of a staff member -� unless that staff member enriched himself �- to meet. Secondly, it is exceptional because the Volcker Panel is exceptional. There has been no justice device of that kind before.

Spokesman: Marc Carnegie, did you have a question?

Question: Given the lawyers, the extent legal advice was involved in consultations with lawyers, why, can you tell us, was assurance given to Mr. Sevan only orally that you would pay the fees, or was there in fact some kind of document? And secondly, you just spoke about clear fiduciary responsibility to stop payment immediately. If that was the case, why did it take three weeks to send Mr. Sevan a letter to that effect? And thirdly, you�ve spoken now of him being accused of major breaches. As I recall, I don�t know the language exactly, but the day after the report came out you [inaudible] here saying that the Secretary-General was shocked and did not see any way that Mr. Sevan could be vindicated, or that his behaviour could be improved. Now you seem to be taking a step back, you�re saying, he�s only accused of major breaches and [inaudible] if he�s vindicated, we might pay. Has there been any shift on your part in how you feel about Mr. Sevan�s [inaudible]?

Mark Malloch Brown: No, Benny was taking the unusual role of being the champion of Mr. Sevan�s rights. So I was acknowledging that, of course, somebody is ultimately innocent until proven guilty, but we believe that the Volcker Panel has shifted the burden of proof to Mr. Sevan. It makes very serious allegations, which we at this point believe. And let me be very, very clear about that. As to why this letter took three weeks -- the issue, you know this a very controversial and difficult issue where my own instinct was to just give a one word reply to the whole issue -- �Nyet, No� -- in any language you like, because I was so concerned about the issues raised by it. But finally came to conclude, based on the advice I was given, that the prior commitments required us to honour them up to the period of 3 February.

But the point is, action on payment anyway had to be taken in terms of bills being cleared and paid. And there was no question of that happening. So this was a matter of serious, urgent, high-level review, and the choices that I faced and my predecessor before me faced were not palatable choices.

Question: Why were we told for the longest time that this arrangement didn�t exist?

Mark Malloch Brown: Because I believe, and you, Benny, seem to suggest in your question yesterday to Fred that you had asked this of him sometime last year. And I imagine at the time you asked him, it was not true.

Correspondent: I asked him last week, as well. It took five days to prepare a hurried statement.

Mark Malloch Brown: Well let me tell you, within hours -- no, Benny -- you came and asked him for it yesterday.

Correspondent: I came and asked him last week.

Mark Malloch Brown: The day that Fred raised this with me I gave the statement to Fred that he used with you the day before yesterday or whenever this was. You -- and I checked with him -- that you had only come to see him the day before yesterday �- Monday, I suppose. You had not come to see him at the end of last week. It was there waiting for you. There has been on my watch full disclosure of this. The moment you asked, you got the answer.

Correspondent: But then you say that three days later your response was hurried.

Mark Malloch Brown: No, we�re talking about the first response that led you to filing a story on Monday. That would have been available to you at the end of the previous week. It was sitting with Fred, and you did not come and ask for it. You had other more important leads to follow, no doubt, at that time.

Spokesman: Mark, you had -- Louie, don�t jump in. We have a long list here. You�ve got to wait your turn. Mark, did you get all your questions answered?

Question: Can you shed any light on why the decision was made to only give oral assurance that his legal fees would be paid. And secondly, please correct me if I�m wrong, but you said it�s a very old idea that those who are accused should be represented by counsel, and you raised a parallel with the private sector when people in companies are charged with what not they should have counsel. But those cases, unless I�m misunderstanding, those cases have to do with employees in companies that are accused of violating of outside federal law or sometimes State law. In this case, are we not talking about an official who is also basically on the dock for breaking United Nations rules and you pay his legal fees when he�s being investigated for breaking United Nations rules? And in fact now that you say [inaudible] shifted the burden of proof and you at this point believe that he may be guilty of these things, then at the moment when he is actually facing the outside possibility of being charged with United States law or some kind of outside law, you cut off the legal support.

Mark Malloch Brown: I mean, look, I don�t think the issue is material about an internal versus external justice system �- justice. The point is that this man was clearly at the centre of the Volcker investigations. He was being asked to respond over a wide web of commercial actions and a long period of time when he was being cross-examined for events and actions taken over whatever it was -� a three- or four-year period. And a decision was made that he was not going to be able do this effectively without legal counsel and that the scale of the legal support he would need was beyond his means as a United Nations staff member to finance alone. And we�re getting a little repetitive here. I am only going to be able to take one or two more, because I�m very, very late for a meeting at the moment.

....

Marc Malloch Brown: Well, let us be very clear. Benon has been subject to the interim findings of a $30 million 65-investigator investigation, which says, in its view, he is guilty. Not necessarily of criminal wrongdoing, but guilty of major breaches of the staff rules. If an investigation commission by us says that, well, until he is able to prove otherwise... As I made clear, the day the Volcker report came out, we now... our presumption is that this investigation, which the Secretary-General commissioned, is right. The burden is on Mr. Sevan to prove otherwise, and he has an internal justice process to allow him to do that. And we are giving him every opportunity to avail himself of that.

End Quote
END EXCERPT

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Is the UN Really Paying Benon Sevan's Legal Fees?

By Victor Comras

Today's Press Briefing at the United Nations was out of the ordinary. These briefings are usually staid affairs and fireworks are quite rare. But today's dialogue between the press and UN Spokesman Fred Eckhard had considerable tension and drama. The press wanted to know whether the UN was really going to pay some $300,000 in legal fees on behalf of Benon Sevan. The story first surfaced this morning in the New York Sun. I have attached below the excerpt from the transcript of today's UN Press Briefing for your reading. I'm sure you will be as much surprised as I was with some of Fred Eckhard answers.

EXCERPT FROM DAILY PRESS BRIEFING BY THE OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL, TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 2005

QUOTE:

Question: The other question was a follow-up to a story in the New York Sun today. The United Nations has been paying Benon Sevan�s legal fees. Is this appropriate? Is this normal practice? And why did the United Nations not announce this?

Spokesman: Indeed -- well, first of all, we haven�t paid for anything yet. But it is true that the Secretary-General decided, in principle, to reimburse Mr. Sevan for what we called �reasonable legal fees� as determined by the United Nations for services in connection with his appearance before the Volcker Commission. The payment of these fees was to be made on a strictly exceptional basis, for the purposes of facilitating the work of the Commission. Mr. Sevan has submitted some bills to us. We are reviewing them now. And as I said, nothing yet has been paid.

Exceptional -� it is exceptional. The oil-for-food programme was an exceptional programme. The Volcker Commission is an exceptional commission. And Benon Sevan was in a unique position as the head of that programme.

I�m not aware that in the past we�ve ever reimbursed staff for legal fees. I don�t believe that any other �- well there�s only one other Secretariat member charged by the Volcker Commission, Joseph Stephanides, and we have not agreed to reimburse him. So it�s Benon Sevan as the head of the Programme on an exceptional basis.

Question: And is this definitely going to go ahead? You sort of mentioned in theory. Will this decision be reviewed, or is it an agreement? I�m sorry, and whose advice was this on?

Spokesman: The Secretary-General took this advice, this decision on the advice of his legal department, the Office of Legal Affairs. And it was taken before the Volcker report came out that laid specific charges against Mr. Sevan. So I can�t say at this time whether the decision is being reviewed for the period prior to that Volcker report, but it is not our intention to reimburse Mr. Sevan for any fees since the Volcker report laid charges against him.

Question: Fred, I don�t quite understand where the justification to pay for Mr. Sevan�s legal fees comes from exactly. Maybe you could explain that again so that I can understand that. Where does this money come from? What budget within the United Nations is paying for this, and also, I was just wondering, the Secretary-General also is being looked at by the Volcker Commission. Does this mean that he also has legal fees being paid by the United Nations?

Spokesman: I don�t know the answers to those questions. I�d have to go back to the Office of Legal Affairs and ask what the basis for this is. I understand in the private sector, it�s commonly done. But I don�t know whether that was a factor in the Office of Legal Affairs� advice to the Secretary-General; so, let me look into that for you.

Question: Can you tell us how much the total legal fees that Sevan is being asked to be reimbursed?

Spokesman: I cannot; as I said, the bills he gave us are now being reviewed by us, and I don�t think we have a total.

....

Question: Did Mr. Sevan call the Secretary-General about the fees? Who initiated the conversation about paying the legal fees?

Spokesman: I don�t know. I have to assume it was Mr. Sevan who asked for the reimbursement.

Question: Fred, I�m sure that the Iraqi Government will be concerned that more of the Iraqi oil-for-food money will be used in this case. Can you assure us that Iraqi oil-for-food money will not be used to pay Mr. Sevan�s legal fees?

Spokesman: As I just said, I don�t know where this money was to come from, if it were to be paid. So, let me try to find out and get back to you.

Question: I still don�t understand why you would pay Mr. Sevan�s legal fees and not Mr. Stephanides� legal fees. The fact that he was the head of the programme, what difference would that make? And, for example, are you also planning to pay Ruud Lubbers� legal fees for his defence against sexual molestation charges. Are you planning to pay for that French guy�s legal fees [inaudible]?

Spokesman: Excuse me, Mark. I said it was on an exceptional basis -- excuse me �- I said the decision was taken before the Volcker Commission laid specific charges against Mr. Sevan. So, let me find out the answers to the rest of your questions as best I can.

Question: Fred, given that the United Nations is pushing United Nations reform, is it timely for the Secretary-General to be wasting United Nations money on defending United Nations officials that are charged with ethical lapses and conflicts of interest? Is that not a waste of United Nations money at a time when the United Nations is pushing reform?

Spokesman: You�ve asked me about the rationale for the decision and I said I would try to find out what the legal advice of the Office of Legal Affairs to the Secretary-General was, why they advised him to do this. Yes?

Question: Can we specifically request that Kofi Annan, because it�s an exceptional decision with no precedent, publish the legal advice so that we can all see what the basis of this exceptional decision is? That�s one part of my question. The second part of my question is, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former United Nations Secretary-General, has been involved and interviewed in the investigation. Is there any similar consideration of paying any legal costs that Boutros Boutros-Ghali might incur?

Spokesman: No, I think when I said it�s exceptional, it�s exactly that. So, it starts and stops with Benon Sevan, and I will relay your first request to the people I answer to.

Question: Is there a [inaudible] reviewing those fees? Is the Secretariat considering not paying any of the fees that Mr. Sevan submitted paperwork for, prior to the Volcker report?

Spokesman: I can�t say that -� I cannot say that at this time.

Question: Might there be a decision to review -� is the Secretary-General considering whether to revoke that exceptional...?

Spokesman: I cannot answer that question. I don�t have a basis to answer that question.

Question: Well, the Sun article, it seems like there was the impression at least given, or maybe the straight answer given, that the United Nations wasn�t considering paying for Mr. Sevan�s fees, and now we�ve learned that they are considering. Can you explain why there is that difference? Where did the decision come from to drop paying the fees once Benon Sevan was cited in the Volcker report?

Spokesman: All of these decisions, or these two decisions, first to, in principle, to reimburse Mr. Sevan for his legal fees, using the language that I used initially, and the decision to no longer do so once charges were raised against him were both taken by the Secretary-General. And your other question was what?

Question: The other question was just trying to understand -- initially you denied, at least that�s the sense we got from the Sun article, that you denied that there was some sort of arrangement being made, but now we�re learning that there is some kind...

Spokesman: I don�t think we ever dealt with this question. I don�t think it ever came up in a briefing.

Question: Fred, seems [inaudible] this sum of $300,000 [inaudible]...correct?

Spokesman: That�s not a figure that I can confirm. They haven�t told me.

Question: Can you tell us how many United Nations staff employees that figure of $300,000 would pay for in a year as employment?

Spokesman: Well, first of all, I can�t confirm the $300,000 figure is correct.

Question: I�m just saying how many United Nations employees?

Spokesman: It�s still a hypothetical question.

Question: $300,000 �- how many United Nations staff members does that pay for in a year? One, two, three?

Spokesman: The pay scale at the United Nations goes from the lowest General Service member to the most senior Professional...

Question: It could be several, couldn�t it?

Spokesman: I�m not going to speculate, James. Richard?

Question: The decision was taken by the Secretary-General. Do you believe it would be fair criticism that it raises still questions about the Secretary-General�s judgement regarding conflict of interest, the perception of the image of the place, this story coming out one day after his big reform effort, can totally undercut the efforts made in that direction? He wanted an internal probe first on oil-for-food. The same legal office said on Ruud Lubbers that there wasn�t enough to go against him. Can you address the perception issue?

Spokesman: I think until we get from upstairs the ration

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Chaos in Iraq Fuels Worry among Persian Gulf Neighbors

By Larry Johnson

Washington Times Gets it Wrong on the FARC

By Larry Johnson

Washington Times article: Colombia's FARC spreads in Central America

By Michael Cutler

More Attention to Terrorists at Sea

By Andrew Cochran

Introducing New Contributing Expert Michael Chandler

By Andrew Cochran

Michael Cutler on CNN's "Lou Dobbs Tonight"

By Andrew Cochran

Annan Proposes International Definition of Terrorism

By Matthew Levitt

Update on Sevan's Legal Fees: The Makings of Another UN Imbroglio!

By Victor Comras

Iraqi Raid on Insurgent Training Camp Leads to Capture of Suspected Algerian Terrorist

By Evan Kohlmann

GSPC Commander in Algeria Hails Al-Qaida in New Video

By Evan Kohlmann

Is the UN Really Paying Benon Sevan's Legal Fees?

By Victor Comras