The compilation of data about terrorist attacks is not a required part of the report, but traditionally had been provided by the State Department, going back to the years in which the State Department was basically the public voice of the U.S. Government on international terrorism, generally. . . . But what's important for our purposes is what the law said the NCTC should do. It said the NCTC was the primary organization for analysis and integration of -- and I'm quoting from the law now -- "All intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism." The law further stated that the NCTC would be the United States Government's "shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contact and support." (Phil Zelikow)

State Department�s role as the lead for coordinating international terrorism was established by a National Security Decision Directive signed by President Reagan in early 1986. This was in response to an interagency fight that broke out during an effort to apprehend the terrorists responsible for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship. While flying over Italy in late 1985 in pursuit of Abu Abbas, a State Department official and a CIA officer argued heatedly over who was in charge of the mission. Recognizing the need for a clear chain of command the Department of State was put in charge of coordinating the efforts of CIA, DOD, and FBI efforts to track and deal with terrorism. The first man put in charge of this effort was L. Paul (Jerry) Bremer.

Mr. Zelikow is misleading the media by asserting that the State Department �traditionally compiled the data�. That is simply not true. The State Department never was in charge of collecting or compiling the statistics. It simply coordinated the process of assembling the data in order to provide the Congress and the American people with a comprehensive view of international terrorist activity. Since 1986 the Counter Terrorism Center at the CIA had the task of compiling the data and writing the narrative analysis. Don�t take my word for it, just ask the former Chiefs of the Counter Terrorism Center starting with Dewey Claridge and ending with Cofer Black.

By splitting the statistics on terrorism from the country reports, Zelikow is creating the kind of stovepiping of information which the 9-11 Commission claimed helped undermine US efforts to detect and defeat Al Qaeda�s effort to launch their suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. There is nothing in the new law requiring this move.

John Brennan, the head of the National Counter Terrorism Center, made the unbelievable admission that when the CIA shifted responsibility for counting terrorist incidents to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) in the fall of 2003 only three part time people were assigned to the task. Brennan said:

To ensure a more comprehensive accounting of terrorist incidents, we in the NCTC significantly increased the level of effort from three part-time individuals to 10 full-time analysts, and we took a number of other steps to improve quality control and database management. This increased level of effort allowed a much deeper review of far more information and, along with Iraq, are the primary reasons for the significant growth in a number of terrorist incidents being reported.

The American people are asked to believe that nobody at TTIC understood in the aftermath of 2001 that we needed to keep a comprehensive count of terrorist events. Implicit in this criticism is a smear on the good work done previously at the Counter Terrorism Center. CTC did not consider counting terrorism events an afterthought. They used a sound methodology of monitoring news media reports, FBIS reports, and cables from US Embassies and Defense Attaches to identify possible acts of international terrorism. An act of violence did not necessarily mean that terrorism was involved. Instead expert analysts from CTC and State Department�s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) would meet periodically to review and decide what incidents represented acts of international terrorism.

This process broke down when the responsibility for doing this was shifted from CTC and put under Mr. Brennan�s stewardship at the Terrorist Threat Integration Center in late 2003. Mr. Brennan in fact shares much of the responsibility for the debacle with the statistics that were misreported in the report issued in April 2004. He did not ensure that his part time employees could count.

With the beefed up work force at NCTC we now know that 10 analysts were involved in counting 651 significant international terrorist attacks in 2004. Geez, I guess that means it took each analyst one year to keep track of 65 attacks.

Brennan asks the media and the American people to believe that the rise in attacks is simply the result of better counting by more people. Not true. An independent data source from RAND-MIPT shows a similar dramatic rise in attacks and deaths. This is not an artifice of methodology. Something bad is going on out there.

Two countries account for a major portion of the increased terrorist activity�the Kashmir region of India and Iraq. With respect to Kashmir it is important to note that since 1998 this area has consistently appeared in the appendix in Patterns of Global Terrorism that described significant incidents. I have used this data in briefing for foreign governments during that period to point out that not only was India being repeatedly attacked by Islamic jihadists (who were funded and trained by Pakistan), but that the people of Kashmir repeatedly suffered one of the highest death tolls of any country in the world from terrorist attacks. The sad fact is that media, and to a lesser extent the U.S. Government, tended to ignore these attacks.

It is worth recalling that the cruise missiles fired by President Clinton in August of 1998 in retaliation for the Al Qaeda bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania struck a camp in Afghanistan and killed members of one of the groups that carried out attacks in the Kashmir as well as two Pakistani intelligence officers. In the war against Islamic extremists Kashmir matters.
Brennan�s response on Iraq is more puzzling:

QUESTION: Do you regard the Iraq numbers that you just gave us -- for which, thank you -- as comparable? And the reason I ask is that I've got to figure that if there's one piece of real estate that the U.S. intelligence community has devoted enormous resources to in the last two years, it's got to be -- two-and-a-half years -- it's Iraq. Therefore, do you think those figures are comparable, '03 to '02?
MR. BRENNAN: In terms of what the term you're using -- "comparable" -- to sort of denote here, I'm not certain. The rigor that we applied worldwide for the 2004 data also applied to Iraq. So it was Iraq, Kashmir, and others. So that number, I think, is the result of exhaustive search and research on that. Also, as I pointed out, the number of civilians that have come not just from the United States, but also from other countries -- the number of individuals who, in fact, are in different places in Iraq that have been involved in some of the attacks that have taken place there, I think that is the reason why, in fact, we're seeing an increase in that number.

Although Brennan is not certain about the comparability of the numbers we do not have to rely on him. Data maintained by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is reported on at least a weekly basis to the Secretary of Defense, shows clear unambiguous data that the level of terrorist activity in Iraq mushroomed in 2004. In fact, the highest level of attacks ever recorded in Iraq occurred in December 2004.

Iraq is relevant to the threat of international terrorism principally because it is serving as a drawing card for jihadists throughout the Islamic world. I have had recent discussions with senior government officials representing three countries in the Persian Gulf. To a man they were alarmed by the images coming out of Iraq showing US soldiers abusing muslim women and the shooting of unarmed insurgents. The perception of the United States as an invader is inciting terrorism in the region, not quelling it. Several commented on the perceived parallel of the U.S. presence in Iraq as comparable to what the Soviets did in Afghanistan during the 1980s. They worry that we are sowing the seeds of future jihadist terrorism.

The real news from the press conference of Messrs. Zelikow and Brennan is that they have not finished counting the incidents from last year and that the numbers are likely to go up when revised statistics are issued in June. Moreover, both conceded that events in Russia and Philippines, where several hundred were killed, were excluded from the data.

I welcome Mr. Brennan�s commitment to look at the methodology and recommend corrections. The failure to count attacks inside Russia by Chechen separatists, for example, needs to be re-examined. While ten years ago there was no evidence that the Chechen were receiving outside assistance, that is not the case today. In fact Chechen fighters in the battle of Anaconda in Afghanistan in March 2002 killed American soldiers. The Chechen movement has clear economic and military ties to international jihadists. In future reports it would be entirely appropriate to classify as international attacks something carried out by any group with established ties to groups outside of their country.

There is no single statistic that can tell us what is happening in the war on terrorism. Reporting multiple attacks does not necessarily mean that casualties will follow. As Brennan and Zelikow correctly note most of the casualties were caused by a relatively small number of attacks. But, those attacks were carried out by Islamic extremists that have clear ties with Al Qaeda.

In light of this it is breathtaking that someone with Zelikow�s intellect can argue that numbers don�t matter. The following exchange occurred during the Wednesday afternoon press conference:

QUESTION: Um, 651 attacks in 2004, compared to 175 attacks in your report in 2003. That's a sharp increase in terrorist attacks. What does that tell us about the war on terrorism -- the global war on terrorism and the cooperation? . . . .
MR. ZELIKOW: I mean, the short answer is it doesn't tell us anything about the war on terror. The statistics are simply not valid for any inference about the progress, either good or bad, of American policy. I think that's the honest answer. If you just look at what the statistics are and what kind of inferences can legitimately be drawn from them, I can't come up with a defensible inference.

Here�s the bottomline. Numbers do matter. If more people are being killed in Iraq and India then we need to ensure that US policy for combating terrorism is focused on those areas. To pretend that the threat of terrorism is as great in Brazil as in Iraq is delusional. And to pretend that objective facts say nothing about the reality of terrorism perhaps shows us why the US effort to deal with Islamic extremists is going in the wrong direction.

Friends in the intelligence community tell me that Zelikow, when confronted with the higher numbers, tried to have those numbers suppressed. Once word of this leaked out Zelikow shifted gears to damage control and constructed the artificial and misleading explanation that NCTC is now doing something new that was never done before. Oh yeah, and it is mandated by law.

Sadly this simply shows how uninformed Zelikow is about the history of counter terrorism policies and procedures during the last 25 years, notwithstanding his post as staff director of the 9-11 Commission. Maybe this explains why the Commission had such difficulty identifying who failed in their duty to prevent those terrible attacks in September 2001. Phil Zelikow by his own admission has trouble making sense of numbers.

Starting at least in June 1981, the CIA released a report titled, PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 1980. The CIA was responsible for collecting the data and writing the analysis. This was produced by the National Foreign Assessment Center. (I have one of the originals.)

In 1986, following the creation of the Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) at CIA, the State Department took charge of releasing the report and it was renamed, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM. However, the CTC continued its job of collecting the data and writing the analysis in conjunction with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). The Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism (S/CT) issued the report. Until this year, that is how the report was produced. CIA collected the statistics, the CTC with INR wrote the narrative of the report, and the Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism coordinated the effort and wrote the regional summary sections of the report.

Problems arose in late 2003 when the responsibility for compiling the statistics and writing the narrative shifted from CTC to the new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). As a result State Department coordinated with TTIC rather than CTC, but the process remained the same. As a side note, the failure to totally and accurately count all incidents of international terrorism in 2003 was essentially a clerical error by TTIC.

As a result of the Intelligence Reform Act TTIC has been folded into the National Counter Terrorism Center(NCTC). NCTC has assumed the task of compiling statistics and writing the analysis as was the case with its predecessor, CTC.

For Phil Zelikow to claim like a 21st Century version of Freddie Prinze, "It's not our yob" would be funny if the issues were not so serious. State Department still has the lead for dealing with international terrorism on a country by country basis. What do we do about Pakistan, for example, where elements of their Intelligence service continue to protect and host Al Qaida and other Islamic extremists implicated in terrorist attacks in the Kashmir region of India? While NCTC may provide the data it is up to the State Department to craft and implement a policy towards Pakistan that meets the goal of reducing terrorism and promoting security between Pakistan and India. How can they do this if, "the numbers don't matter"?

If State Department does not work closely with NCTC to figure out which groups in the world are killing and wounding innocent civilians how in the world can they construct an effective policy to deal with the terrorist threat? The report may be out but some tough questions still need to be asked and some honest answers provided. Prior to 2005 we had one report that brought together the intelligence community and policymakers in a joint effort to report on international terrorism. Now we have two reports going in different directions. This is exactly what the 9-11 Commission said we should not be doing.

NOTE: You can obtain the "Patterns" reports back to 1986 on the MIPT site.

First, the Security Council has adopted a new tone of language with regard to terrorism. The Security Council President�s Statement, this time, forthrightly condemned terrorism �in all its forms and manifestations� as �criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, whenever and whomsoever committed.� This language seems closer in tone to the �definition of terrorism� now being considered for adoption.

A new emphasis was also placed on expanding counter-terrorism cooperation with various regional and international organizations, notably Interpol. This is a positive step and the UN should be encouraged to look even more broadly to international and regional enforcement agencies to garner increased compliance with its sanctions measures.

There was also a new degree of frustration and impatience with the slow pace of work manifested by the various terrorism committees. Most of this was directed at the Secretariat�s failure to get the new Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) up and running. CTED was established by the Security Council over a year ago and remains woefully understaffed. The success of the Security Council�s counter-terrorism program, US Security Council Representative Stuart Halliday warned, is dependent on getting the CTED fully operational, �Without a fully operational Executive Directorate, it would be difficult for the CTC to fulfill its mandate, let alone the latest 90-day work programme,� he said.

There was also growing impatience with the failure of some 75 countries to provide the chapter VII required reports on the steps they were taking to deal with terrorism. The absence of reports was viewed as seriously hampering the work of the 1640 Committee charged with developing recommendations on stemming risks of WMD proliferation.

The Security Council will soon reconsider the mandate of the 1267 Committee and develop new, strengthened measures to deal with Al Qaeda and related groups. Regrettably, there is no indication they are yet considering measures to bring greater accountability and transparency to the sanctions implementation process. A healthy dose of �name and shame� authority could go a long way toward making the UN counter-terrorism measures more effective.

The 2004 Data

Officials from the State Department and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) came to Congress yesterday to provide a private briefing to committee staffs on the Patterns of Global Terrorism report. The officials who conducted the briefing, Karen Aguilar, the Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department, and Russ Travers, the Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, indicated that the data on terrorist attacks in 2004 is the most comprehensive and most reviewed data ever compiled. They reported that both the State Department and the NCTC devoted significant time, personnel, and resources to developing the most reliable terrorism data possible.

During the briefing, the officials provided a summary of this 2004 terrorism data. Although the data is not classified and has been released publicly in the past, the handout summarizing the data was marked "FOUO," meaning "for official use only."

According to the 2004 data presented at the briefing, there has been a "dramatic up-tick" in significant terrorism attacks throughout the world. Overall, there were approximately 650 significant terrorist attacks in 2004, compared with 175 attacks in 2003. Prior to 2004, the
175 significant terrorist attacks in 2003 represented a 20-year high.[1]

Ms. Aguilar and Mr. Travers indicated that a major source of this increase was the high number of terrorist attacks in Iraq.
According to information provided at the briefing, there were approximately 198 significant terrorist attacks in Iraq in 2004. This is nine times more than the 22 significant terrorist attacks in Iraq identified in the State Department's 2003 report. Indeed, the number of significant terrorist attacks in Iraq in 2004 exceeded the 175 significant terrorist attacks that occurred throughout the entire world in 2003.

Ms. Aguilar and Mr. Travers said another factor in the global increase was greater awareness of terrorist events. In particular, they emphasized that enhanced efforts to monitor newspapers, television, and other media for incidents of terrorist attacks resulted in identifying many more attacks in India and Pakistan related to Kashmir. Yet even if every terrorist attack in India and Pakistan is removed from the database, the 2004 data still shows a record increase in terrorist attacks. Excluding attacks in India and Pakistan, more than 350 significant terrorist attacks occurred worldwide last year, still double the total number of attacks in 2003.

Other parts of the world also experienced significant increases in terrorist attacks in 2004. In Afghanistan, for example, the number of significant terrorist attacks doubled, increasing from 14 in 2003 to approximately 27 in 2004. The number of significant terrorist attacks in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank also more than doubled, increasing from 19 in 2003 to approximately 45 in 2004.[2]

Despite the large increase in terrorist attacks in 2004, it appears that the 2004 data may be a significant underestimate. Many incidents that most Americans would regard as terrorist attacks were excluded from the database because they did not meet the strict State Department definitions of an international terrorist attack. Mr. Travers explained that the data collected for Iraq did not include a large number of attacks by insurgents that resulted in only Iraqi fatalities or that were directed at U.S. armed forces. Over 100 attacks by "foreign terrorist organizations" were "not counted" because they were not considered "international" attacks.

No data was presented at the briefing on the number of fatalities or injuries caused by the terrorist attacks. This essential information has traditionally been released as part of the annual global terrorism report.

The Decision to Withhold the 2004 Data

During the briefing yesterday, Ms. Aguilar and Mr. Travers also discussed whether the terrorism data would be released to the public. What they said about this question appears to conflict with the previous claims by State Department officials.

Last week, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated that the "people of the United States will get all the facts."[3] He said "the government has decided that the [NCTC] should compile and publish the statistical data on terrorism."[4] Yesterday, however, Ms.
Aguilar and Mr. Travers contradicted these statements, saying that no decision to publish the data has been made. Instead, they said that Ambassador Negroponte, the recently confirmed Director for National Intelligence, was in the process of making this decision. Ms. Aguilar also said the State Department would not publish the data, even if Ambassador Negroponte decided that the NCTC was not the proper office to release this information.

Mr. Boucher also stated last week that the State Department would not release the data because it would be inappropriate to have "some State Department cutout trying to explain someone else's methodology."[5] However, Ms. Aguilar and Mr. Travers indicated at the briefing that the methodology and definitions used to vet the data were identical to last year's and were taken directly from the statute governing the State Department's annual report. They also made clear that NCTC compiled the data specifically for the State Department's annual report. Mr. Travers called the State Department "the client" for this information. And the briefing document provided yesterday describes the NCTC as providing "support" for the "Patterns" report, depicting the Department's annual report as the final stop on a terrorism data flow chart.

Moreover, Ms. Aguilar conceded at yesterday's briefing that numerous Department officials - including officials from the Department's Counterterrorism Center and the Department's Bureau for Intelligence and Research - had extensive involvement in the preparation of this terrorism data. Not only did they identify and submit information about specific terrorism incidents, but they also participated in an interagency adjudication process that had as its sole purpose determining whether these terrorist incidents met the statutory standards for inclusion in the Department's annual report.

We also learned at the briefing that the State Department failed to implement numerous recommendations made by the Inspector General last September that could have prevented questions about the data's origins and methodology from arising. For example, the Inspector General recommended that the data be distributed to State Department bureaus "at a minimum on a quarterly basis," enabling the bureaus to evaluate the data regularly.[6] The Inspector General also recommended that the State Department conclude a "Memorandum of Understanding" to govern how the Department obtains terrorism data from organizations outside the Department, including "complete minutes of meetings and notes on how decisions were made."[7] Ms. Aguilar reported yesterday that neither recommendation had been implemented over the past seven months.

The main rationale given by Ms. Aguilar for your decision to exclude the 2004 data from the Patterns of Global Terrorism report is that the terrorism data is not "relevant" to the report itself. With all due respect, this is a ludicrous position. As the Inspector General concluded last year, "The accuracy of the report is dependent on accurate and complete data."[8]

Conclusion

Last year, Bush Administration officials cited the annual terrorism data as an illustration of "the great progress that has been made in fighting terrorism."[9] Members of Congress and the public discovered that these statements were erroneous only because the underlying data on terrorist attacks was available for scrutiny.[10] In effect, your decision to withhold the data this year eliminates this vital check on the veracity of the Administration's claims.

The contrast between your approach and the approach of your predecessor, former Secretary of State Colin Powell, could not be more stark. To Secretary Powell's credit, he recognized that the 2003 report contained major errors. He withdrew the initial report, directed his staff to scrub the data for errors, discussed these problems personally with Members of Congress, including myself, and issued a revised report based on the most up-to-date information.[11] Although the revised report undercut the Administration's claims that terrorist attacks were declining, Secretary Powell never sought to hide behind the actions of another agency, avoid responsibility, or conceal data.

I urge you to follow Secretary Powell's example. The large increases in terrorist attacks reported in 2004 may undermine Administration claims of success in the war on terror, but political inconvenience has never been a legitimate basis for withholding facts from the American people.

Sincerely,

Rep. Henry A. Waxman

Ranking Minority Member

Yesterday, the Associated Press ran an interesting story about Jama. It seems the Feds, in duly attempting to execute their sworn duty to finally deport Jama, who, over four years, had fully exhausted his extensive legal appeals under U.S. law (yes, the very immigration laws and procedures that some media and special interest groups deem to be something akin to a draconian �star chamber�) and lost his case before the Nation�s highest Court, could not be physically removed to Somalia, after all.

But, it wasn�t for lack of trying. According to the AP report, last week, ICE officials flew Jama to Kenya, where they turned him over to a private security firm for further transport to Bossasso, Somalia. When Jama got to Bossasso, �authorities� there refused to allow him to enter the country and he was ultimately returned to the custody of the ICE officers. He was then flown back to the United States, and remains in custody in the St. Paul, Minnesota area pending further decisions in his case.

The Supreme Court decided that, legally, there was no bar to the U.S. Government deporting Jama, or any other similarly situated deportable alien, to Somalia or any other country that just didn�t happen to have a viable national government that would �officially� accept their return. There are about 3500 other Somalis under final removal orders who are no doubt anxiously waiting to see what happens in the Jama case. The rest of us should at least pay some attention, as well.

We probably don�t need to imagine too hard who those �authorities� in Bossasso really were. Somalia is essentially a country divided into warlord fiefdoms. Bossasso was no doubt chosen by that contract security company as a place they thought they could most easily and quickly accomplish an entry, drop-off and departure with the minimum amount of payoff to the local gunmen at the airport. Something obviously did not go according to plan, and the private security escorts, possibly unarmed and undoubtedly outgunned even if they were armed, decided retreat in the face of whatever potential trouble they faced was the better part of valor.

The Jama case is significantly noteworthy because it highlights how complex immigration issues can be, particularly when dealing with volatile third world countries with a long history of terrorism and violence. Somalia, a hotbed of al-Qaeda sympathizers and operatives, with no viable government beyond heavily armed drug smuggling warlords overseeing their own chunk of geography, may be a place to where we can �legally� deport aliens, but actually doing that is clearly going to be another matter. The physical process of safely and securely moving human beings from here to there suddenly becomes a whole other issue.

And, that becomes an issue of foreign policy and even national security. Consider the options. If the United States cannot effectively deport these Somalis under this �normal� process, then what? How far do we go? Surely, with the utilization of enough military resources�military transport planes and armed troops for security�these deportees could be flown in unannounced at remote locations, dropped off (deported) and the U.S. personnel then depart with relative safety. Is that an alternative we should really employ? And, that is an expensive alternative, which theoretically employs an armed military incursion each time we deport people. Then again, where�s the Somali government to resist or complain?

And, what if we do nothing and we don�t deport those 3500 Somalis the Supreme Court now says we can legally remove? We can say we�re temporarily deferring their removal for humanitarian purposes. But, if we do that, we also run the risk of being perceived by many, not the least of which would be many in the radical Islamic world, of being afraid and incapable of conducting these deportations because of�what? The radical Muslim warlords controlling Somalia�some of whom are aligned with al-Qaeda? Is that really an option?

The case of Keyse Jama will remain one to watch.

She writes that, "No financial intelligence unit actually exists today in Saudi Arabia. This is unacceptable...The Saudis deserve a measure of credit for recently trying to place controls on their government-sponsored charities. But international Islamic charities based in Saudi Arabia are mostly unaffected...And while the Saudis have been perhaps more aggressive than any country in the region in urging its citizens to reject terrorism, it is still difficult to say a strong message has been delivered with regard to terror finance. The virtual absence of convictions for terror finance offenses in Saudi Arabia since 9/11 has often been mentioned."

Preservation of human rights in the war on terrorism was a key topic at both the Riyadh and Madrid Conferences, and in Secretary-General Kofi Annan�s new counter-terrorism strategy. It was also reflected at this week�s general session of the UN Commission on Human Rights which agreed to appoint, for three years, a Special Rapporteur to oversee and report on the effects counter-terrorism actions are having on human rights. His mandate includes gathering information on relevant human rights violations, and on making recommendations concerning best practices on �measures to counter terrorism that respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.�

The delegates to the Madrid Conference recognized that �we owe it to the victims� to ensure that law enforcement agencies are given adequate power and resources to bring terrorists to justice. Yet, they added, �they must never sacrifice the principles they are dedicated to defend. Measures to counter terrorism should fully respect international standards of human right and the rule of law.

Achieving such compatibility between effective police and military actions and human rights safeguards has not been an easy task. Normal police and investigative methods are often not sufficient to obtain from fanatical terrorists the vital information necessary to prevent an horrendous attack. This has led some countries, including the United States, to sometimes seek to side-step the human rights issue. Rendition is a case in point.

Rendition involves turning over suspected foreign terrorists to their country of origin, or a third country, for interrogation and possible incarceration. One motivation for such action is to put greater pressure on the suspect to divulge information. In several cases, suspects picked up in the United States and abroad by US agents were turned over to foreign government�s whose standards of interrogation were, at the least, questionable.

In 1998, Congress passed legislation declaring that it is �the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.� Nevertheless, the Bush Administration relaxed restrictions on rendition as part of its more aggressive counter-terrorism posture after 9/11. Then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, argued that rendition, in appropriate cases, was justified in order to provide �the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against American civilians�.�

This practice is now coming in for increased criticism from both within and outside the US government. Several Members of Congress have called on the Bush administration to sharply curtail this practice. Congressman Ed Markey (D) Massachusetts recently introduced legislation that would prohibit direct or indirect use of the rendition technique by the United States. But, while CIA Director Porter Goss has come in for some sharp questioning about the practice, Congress still appears to want to stay away from confronting the administration on this issue.

In that letter, the ABA and state regulators requested clarity and more consistency in federal BSA examination procedures. They wrote, "(T)he lack of consistency in examination oversight and compliance guidance is a major theme of regulatory complaints received by ABA and the state banking associations." While pledging to work with the industry to avoid confusion and defensive filing of BSA-required disclosures, the FBAs (federal banking regulators) has something interesting to add about another federal agency which did not sign the letter:

"It is also important to consider the role of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in BSA-related enforcement matters. The FBAs and FinCEN believe that the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) process is a valuable tool in the civil regulatory and criminal enforcement scheme. Currently, we are working with our colleagues at DOJ to attempt to better define the value and appropriate uses of SARs as well as the appropriate role for criminal prosecutions of banks under the BSA. We are hopeful that this effort will result in a clear and consistent approach that will alleviate some of the concerns that have led to defensive SAR filings."

This is another tacit admission of what has been obvious in public conferences this year - that the Justice Department does not think that it should be held responsible for any confusion. The industry became very upset when a U.S. Attorney in Mississippi prosecuted AmSouth last year without a prior regulatory action or DOJ headquarters review. As I posted on April 13, that led to an effort to take the prosecutorial discretion for BSA bank prosecutions away from the U.S. Attorneys in the field and centralize it at DOJ headquarters. Although that effort has support in Washington, the industry shouldn't think that DOJ will just step out of BSA prosecutions. As far as DOJ prosecutors are concerned, the industry had many years after the BSA was passed to prepare their systems to avoid criminal prosecutions, and the banks and the FBAs ought to do their job and let DOJ do theirs.

Moreover, DOJ is not the only player in the field. The DHS Office of Immigrations & Customs Enforcement (ICE) has begun a vigorous nationwide task force to investigate money service businesses, with big cases in Philadelphia this weekend and the Rahim Bariek indictment in northern Virginia last week. I can't expect that new DHS Secretary Chertoff, a former federal prosecutor who was instrumental in the pursuing the corporate fraud prosecutions, will tell his ICE agents to back off and let the regulators and banks work things out.

A State Department official commenting on the decision to not publish the statistics on international terrorism said they would let NCTC worry about the statistics and State would do the "policy". Really? How can you formulate a coherent policy if you don't know what the numbers are? Who is doing the killing? In which countries are there attacks where terrorists are killing and wounding scores of people? One of the uncomfortable answers buried in the data concerns the attacks in Kashmir. The groups responsible for these attacks--e.g., the Lashkar Tayibba, the Harakat ul-Ansar--have received funding and support from elements of Pakistan's intelligence service. In the past these groups were training in Afghanistan alongside Al Qaida. In other words one of our key allies in the war on terrorism has been a sponsor of terrorism.

This is but one example of the unpleasant, difficult policy issues that lurk behind the so-called meaningless statistics. Until you have someone at the State Department in a leadership position who understands that the numbers matter you will not have an effective policy to combat terrorism. For now the policy is adrift.

What should Condi do? For starters she might want to consider naming her buddy Phil Zelikow as the new Coordinator for Counter Terrorism. He is the right man for the job--he has access to Condi and knows the issues. However, I fear Zelikow would view this as a step down from his current perch. That, my friends, speaks volumes about the gulf between the lip service being provided to fighting the war on terrorism and the actual commitment to put some bodies on the line that can make a difference.

So, as State Department continues to tap dance about justifying not putting out a public report that provides specific data on the level of international terrorism around the world, perhaps Secretary Rice could better spend her time by naming a new Coordinator that has the clout to get something done, including putting out reports with good analysis and accurate numbers.

The G-8 created the Counter-terrorism Action Group at Evian in 2003 to place increased pressure on countries to comply with their international obligations to cut off terrorism funding and freeze terrorism-related assets. CTAG was given a mandate to identify countries that either lacked the resources or the political will carry out these responsibilities. CTAG has joined up with the UN�s Counter-Terrorism Committee�s new Executive Directorate (CTED) to identify and focus on candidates for technical and financial assistance. But, this process is still in its early stages. Dealing with the �political issue� has proved even more problematic. (See my earlier Blog on What's Happened To CTAG?

The SAFTI initiative was put in place at the 2004 Sea Island Summit. It is directed at �raising standards, modernizing procedures, and exchanging information in order to deter threats, reduce costs, and help ensure safe and efficient movement of passengers and cargo.�� But, it has already embroiled Europe and the United States in a serious dispute regarding the introduction of new �biometric� traveler identification documents. EU countries are behind schedule in introducing new passports with biometric data and there are important differences with the United States with regarded to the use of embedded chip technology. This could lead to new visa requirements for travelers between the United States and Europe later this year. (See my earlier Blog on Europe: Biometric Passports May be Years Away

And, so far, it would be hard to argue otherwise. The facts seem to bear out that a large, motivated, disciplined, self-contained organization composed of ordinary American citizens managed to perform a fairly dramatic and risky task in a potentially dangerous environment and actually accomplished something good and did so without anyone getting hurt. And by doing so, demonstrated that certain Government officials were simply wrong. Wrong about their organization and wrong about what they were trying to do.

Hopefully, the remaining twelve days or so the Minutemen officially have on the Arizona border will continue as their first nineteen. They have already inspired thousands of other volunteers and there is a plan to expand this effort to other parts of the U.S. Mexican border in the fall. We�ll have to wait and see if the current enthusiasm plays out over the coming months. Even so, what has happened so far is remarkable.

The Minutemen have clearly shown that manpower on the border can have a drastic effect on reducing illegal border crossings. Prior intensive Border Patrol operations, like Operation Hold the Line, wherein there was a serious augmentation of agents in key border crossing areas have proven the same. Why then, do we not have a Border Patrol that is properly staffed? Or, in the alternative, why do we not seriously consider using National Guard or other military personnel to augment Border Patrol agents along certain critical border crossing areas? If citizen volunteers can man static observation posts and report border crossers, surely trained military personnel, such as Military Police, can do that and maybe even more. Perhaps even other Government alternatives, such as a Reserve Homeland Security Force, composed of retired law enforcement officer volunteers could be considered.

Beyond the immigration and border security issues in this, the Minuteman Project has reminded us of something else. While perhaps an initial reaction of some Americans was that a group of angry armed civilians is a recipe for disaster, the Minuteman Project thus far has proven those doomsayers wrong. In fact, as their namesake should remind us, it was angry armed civilians a couple hundred years ago that gave birth to something called the United States of America.

If the Minutemen go home the end of April, their project ending with no serious incidents, no one hurt and their point proven, apart from showing the Government some of what needs to be done on the border, they will have reminded the rest of us that in America, power still really does flow from the People to the government and not the other way around. That is even more important and something, perhaps, a lot of Government officials and civil servants need to remember. And, just maybe, it�s also time for some in the mainstream media to give more credit to the citizenry.

22 USCS � 2656f (2005)

� 2656f. Annual country reports on terrorism

(a) Requirement of annual country reports on terrorism. The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report providing--
(1) (A) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country--
(i) in which acts of international terrorism occurred which were, in the opinion of the Secretary, of major significance;
(ii) about which the Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [50 USCS Appx � 2405(j)]; and
(iii) which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report; and
(B) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country whose territory is being used as a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations;
(2) all relevant information about the activities during the preceding year of any terrorist group, and any umbrella group under which such terrorist group falls, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of an American citizen during the preceding five years, any terrorist group known to have obtained or developed, or to have attempted to obtain or develop, weapons of mass destruction, any terrorist group known to be financed by countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding year pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [50 USCS Appx � 2405(j)], any group designated by the Secretary as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), and any other known international terrorist group which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report;
(3) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the investigation or prosecution of an act of international terrorism against United States citizens or interests, information on--
(A) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating with the United States Government in apprehending, convicting, and punishing the individual or individuals responsible for the act; and
(B) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating in preventing further acts of terrorism against United States citizens in the foreign country; and
(4) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the prevention of an act of international terrorism against such citizens or interests, the information described in paragraph (3)(B).

(b) Provisions to be included in report. The report required under subsection (a) should to the extent feasible include (but not be limited to)--
(1) with respect to subsection (a)(1)(A)--
(A) a review of major counterterrorism efforts undertaken by countries which are the subject of such report, including, as appropriate, steps taken in international fora;
(B) the response of the judicial system of each country which is the subject of such report with respect to matters relating to terrorism affecting American citizens or facilities, or which have, in the opinion of the Secretary, a significant impact on United States counterterrorism efforts, including responses to extradition requests; and
(C) significant support, if any, for international terrorism by each country which is the subject of such report, including (but not limited to)--
(i) political and financial support;
(ii) diplomatic support through diplomatic recognition and use of the diplomatic pouch;
(iii) providing sanctuary to terrorists or terrorist groups;
(iv) providing weapons of mass destruction, or assistance in obtaining or developing such weapons, to terrorists or terrorist groups;
(v) the positions (including voting records) on matters relating to terrorism in the General Assembly of the United Nations and other international bodies and fora of each country which is the subject of such report;
(2) with respect to subsection (a)(1)(B)--
(A) the extent of knowledge by the government of the country with respect to terrorist activities in the territory of the country; and
(B) the actions by the country--
(i) to eliminate each terrorist sanctuary in the territory of the country;
(ii) to cooperate with United States antiterrorism efforts; and
(iii) to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and through the territory of the country;
(3) with respect to subsection (a)(2), any--
(A) significant financial support provided by foreign governments to those groups directly, or provided in support of their activities;
(B) provisions of significant military or paramilitary training or transfer of weapons by foreign governments to those groups;
(C) efforts by those groups to obtain or develop weapons of mass destruction;
(D) provision of diplomatic recognition or privileges by foreign governments to those groups;
(E) provision by foreign governments of sanctuary from prosecution to these groups or their members responsible for the commission, attempt, or planning of an act of international terrorism; and
(F) efforts by the United States to eliminate international financial support provided to those groups directly or provided in support of their activities;
(4) a strategy for addressing, and where possible eliminating, terrorist sanctuaries that shall include--
(A) a description of terrorist sanctuaries, together with an assessment of the priorities of addressing and eliminating such sanctuaries;
(B) an outline of strategies for disrupting or eliminating the security provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries;
(C) a description of efforts by the United States to work with other countries in bilateral and multilateral fora to address or eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and disrupt or eliminate the security provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries; and
(D) a description of long-term goals and actions designed to reduce the conditions that allow the formation of terrorist sanctuaries; and
(5) an update of the information contained in the report required to be transmitted to Congress under 7120(b) of the 9/11 Commission Implementation Act of 2004 [unclassified].[;]
[(6)](3) to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year; and
[(7)](4) an analysis, as appropriate, of trends in international terrorism, including changes in technology used, methods and targets of attack, demographic information on terrorists, and other appropriate information.

(c) Classification of report.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the report required under subsection (a) shall, to the extent practicable, be submitted in an unclassified form and may be accompanied by a classified appendix.
(2) If the Secretary of State determines that the transmittal of the information with respect to a foreign country under paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (a) in classified form would make more likely the cooperation of the government of the foreign country as specified in such paragraph, the Secretary may transmit the information under such paragraph in classified form.

(d) Definitions. As used in this section--
(1) the term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than 1 country;
(2) the term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents;
(3) the term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism;
(4) the terms "territory" and "territory of the country" mean the land, waters, and airspace of the country; and
(5) the terms "terrorist sanctuary" and "sanctuary" mean an area in the territory of the country--
(A) that is used by a terrorist or terrorist organization--
(i) to carry out terrorist activities, including training, fundraising, financing, and recruitment; or
(ii) as a transit point; and
(B) the government of which expressly consents to, or with knowledge, allows, tolerates, or disregards such use of its territory and is not subject to a determination under--
(i) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A));
(ii) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)); or
(iii) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).

(e) Reporting period.
(1) The report required under subsection (a) shall cover the events of the calendar year preceding the year in which the report is submitted.
(2) The report required by subsection (a) to be submitted by March 31, 1988, may be submitted no later than August 31, 1988.

Let me start off with a disclaimer: I have not seen or dealt with John Bolton for more than twelve years. I doubt he even remembers me. Other than the fact that he's a committed conservative and I am not, I have no direct insights into his qualifications for the job. I tell this story because he treated me as a straight shooter.

My encounter with John Bolton was at the 1992 London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Both John Bolton and I were there as members of Secretary Eagleburger's delegation. Bolton was then Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, and I was an underling in a different bureau. A key objective for Eagleburger at the London Conference was "putting some teeth" into the international sanctions on Serbia, and Eagleburger called one of his "rough elbow" delegation meetings to develop some ideas on how to handle this.

UN Sanctions normally fell within John Bolton's balliwick. and he made an eloquent presentation on the need for us to adopt a more activist approach in the Security Council to hold all countries accountable. Frankly, I did not agree with this approach. It ran counter to my own experience in dealing with various other UN sanctions programs. Eagleburger had invited dissenting views, and I gave mine.

I put forth a plan that would leave sanctions policy in the hands of the Security Council, but place sanctions enforcement in the hands of a separate independent regional mechanism. I suggested treating sanctions violations as border smuggling (that is customs issues) rather than political issues. My ideas ran directly counter to Bolton's presentation.

To my surprise Eagleburger agreed with me. And to my chagrin, he took the sanctions portfolio out of Bolton's hand and put me in charge of negotiating what I had described.

I remember very vividly John Bolton walking up to me after that meeting, extending his hand and telling me he wanted to help me anyway he could. He also directed his staff to provide me any needed assistance. His help and support during the London Conference, and afterward, were critical elements to my success. I will always remain grateful for his extended hand and his support.

The statement in the NYT story is based on comments by a senior Federal Reserve anti-money laundering official at a conference in March. But elements of the Treasury Department, as well as key players in the industry, are believed to strongly agree with the Federal Reserve System, in part to resolve a basic inconsistency in prosecutorial procedures. In contrast to BSA criminal cases such as the AmSouth matter, criminal money laundering cases involving banks brought under the Annunzio-Wylie Money Laundering Act of 1992 have always been overseen by Justice Department headquarters, not by U.S. Attorneys acting individually. The Justice Department established the Annunzio-Wylie Act case oversight policy in 1993 in consideration of the considerable impact that such a case could have on the banking system. The same consideration is leading the Federal Reserve, possibly with backing by the Treasury Department and industry, to request a similar shift in BSA criminal case oversight policy. I think it is safe to predict that they would find support inside DOJ headquarters and on Capitol Hill.

Longtime CT Blog readers will recall that I posted comments during the Riggs investigation to the effect that nobody in Washington wants to see an American corporation taken down, a la Arthur Andersen, even for numerous violations of the anti-money laundering laws. Centralizing BSA criminal case oversight in Washignton would sharply reduce the odds of an AmSouth-like prosecution without prior civil action by the regulators. The proponents would call that intelligent banking policy in the face of extremely costly regulation (see Dennis Lormel's post today). Opponents would label it undeserved protection for egregious and repeat BSA violators during the war on terror.

In the �Overt Acts� section of Count One, Defendant Dhiren Barot, who is alleged to be a lead al-Qaeda operative, �in or about June 2000�applied to a college in New York in order to conceal the true purpose of his subsequent trips to the United States and was later admitted for the 2000 and 2001 school years, but never enrolled or attended any classes at the college.� Further, �on or about August 17, 2000, Dhiren Barot and Nadeem Tarmohamed, the defendants, entered the United States at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York, arriving on the same flight from the United Kingdom, and listed the same New York hotel on their immigration forms.�

Further overt act allegations in the indictment relate to the defendants� entry into and departure from the U.S. at various times so they could conduct surveillance against potential targets. Assuming the allegations in the indictment are true, every time the defendants entered the US, they committed immigration fraud by misrepresenting their intended purpose. Apart from that, Defendant Barot, by allegedly obtaining a student visa by clear and blatant fraud, and using that visa to enter the U.S. to further his terrorism efforts, is one of the clearest examples yet of abuse of the student visa system by terror suspects since the 9-11 hijackers.

Barot allegedly never enrolled nor attended the college wherein the visa issuance was based. This was in 2000 and 2001, presumably before the 9-11 attacks. Did that college report his non-attendance to the INS at the time? If so, did INS conduct any follow up investigative action? Even if the college made a routine notification to INS, it is highly unlikely that INS would have done anything with that information at the time, since such student visa violations, pre-911, were barely given a glance by INS enforcement personnel; there simply were too many such violations, too many other priorities and not enough resources to devote to such matters.

Which raises another interesting question. Post 9-11, the Government has made much of �cracking down� on student visa violators. Indeed, an enhanced computer tracking system was ramped up requiring colleges to make real-time reports of visa violators to ICE (INS� DHS successor). ICE, however, is mired in its own internal mission struggles. Is it really focusing on and tracking down large numbers of student visa violators? The answer is no.

And, what does this mean for the larger issue of the US VISIT departure control system? US VISIT, the biometric nonimmigrant entry/exit control system that supposedly will track temporary foreign visitors to the U.S., was implemented soon after 9-11. The departure control part, the other �big half,� is still only in the test phase and will not likely be fully operational for another several years. Reliable analysis over the years has established that over 40% of the illegal alien population within the U.S. started out as nonimmigrant visa entrants�meaning they originally entered the U.S. with a �valid� temporary visa and simply overstayed their authorized time or otherwise violated their status.

This does not bode well for enforcement follow up with US VISIT. Presumably, at some point the departure control system will be fully operational. That means the system will dutifully report nearly real-time non-departures of very many temporary entrant aliens to some element of the DHS. What then? What will happen to that huge body of violator lead information, among which will surely be some potential terror suspects like the defendants described in the just unsealed New York indictment? Currently, the investigative agency for DHS, ICE, is hardly capable of handling such a new mission, at least not without standing down from some other missions or without getting a large influx of new resources. And, such raw violator information will clearly require solid intelligence analysis to ferret out the genuine potential terror threats from the potential hotel housekeepers. And, since the US VISIT departure control system is still years from being operational, what about all those entrant violators since 9-11 that are being �lost� to the system now? Are there any plans to even try to look at those?

As noted at the beginning of this article, this latest New York indictment has again reminded us that immigration law violations are often inextricably linked to national security threats. Our political leaders and Government policy makers in the national security arena should always remember that.

. In view of stringent anti-money laundering and terrorist financing reporting requirements, there has been an ongoing debate concerning the burden versus the benefit of Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reporting requirements. On each side of the debate, there are valid issues and concerns. Media articles in recent days have reported that a working group within the Treasury Department is considering a plan to give the government access to international banking records in accordance with the Intelligence Reform Bill passed by Congress in December 2004. The provision would require financial institutions to turn over �certain cross-border electronic transmittals of funds� in furtherance of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing initiatives. These reports have energized the debate and anxiety in all segments of the financial community.

We should take a step back and remember that the stringent BSA reporting requirements were implemented through the USA Patriot Act as a direct result of the events of 9/11. We have had to live with the realization that we as a society are vulnerable to terrorist attack and that our financial system is vulnerable to exploitation.

Interests on both sides of this debate must be sensitive to the legitimate concerns of the opposing viewpoint and strive to establish a middle ground that can best balance the burden versus the benefit of reporting. There will always be a burden on financial institutions due to the risk of their inherent vulnerability to exploitation. The government sector and the financial community must work together to establish systemic controls that help justify the burdens imposed relative to the benefits attained. They must also establish clear and consistent examination and review protocols. Financial institutions have valid concerns ranging from regulatory actions taken against banks to a lack of consistency and direction from federal regulators. In addition, there are issues of privacy concerns. The American Bankers Association (ABA), in partnership with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), is addressing these issues through the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group. The ABA and FinCEN have been engaged in identifying mechanisms to reduce the burden of reporting requirements.

By way of background, I established the Terrorist Financing Operations Section at the FBI in the aftermath of 9/11. Prior to that, I oversaw the FBI�s Financial Crimes Program. In both capacities, I was a direct beneficiary of Suspicious Activity Reporting and BSA Compliance. Notably, in the post 9/11 environment, there were numerous successes in disrupting and dismantling terrorist activity through financial tracking. Unfortunately, most of these successes cannot be publicized due to investigative and intelligence considerations.

Finance and communications are the two key vulnerabilities to terrorists. We must ensure every available tool is used to exploit these vulnerabilities. Tactical and strategic investigative strategies have been implemented based on BSA reporting. The government clearly must do a better job of providing information and guidance to the financial sector.

To reiterate an earlier comment, I was a direct beneficiary of financial tracking and BSA reporting. Based on my experience and in this context, I believe the benefit outweighs the burden. However, the government needs to articulate clear guidance to relieve undue burden. In addition, the government must develop and implement consistent mechanisms to provide information to the financial sector to demonstrate the value and importance of strong anti-money laundering programs. The financial community would better justify the burden and the expense of BSA requirements if they truly understood their contributions

Tracking funds, the US hopes, will lead investigators to recipient terrorist cells as well as help identify sources of terrorism funding. But, the successes -- and there have been some � are still few and far between. The difficulties with tracking were described in some detail by Senior Customs Agent David Kane in an affidavit filed in the SAFA cases. He told the court ��the finances of the Safa Group, including charities required by law to open their books to the public, exhibited a convoluted web of multiple transactions between related corporations and charities that made it virtually impossible for federal investigators to ascertain where the money �ultimately went. Indeed, the current investigation has traced millions of dollars through layers of related companies and charities to the Isle of Man � from which point the trail cannot practically be followed.� This is why even the successful terrorism funding investigations usually end up with plea bargains on lesser charges. Some experts argue that the US must continue to pursue freezing actions in order to punish terrorist financiers and deter terrorist financing. Putting their assets at risk may be the most effective penalty and deterrent we have.

FinCen is the US agency most active in combing banking data for leads to terrorism. They mine data collected under the Bank Secrecy Act and link it with law enforcement, commercial, and other intelligence data sources to �follow the money� and to identify the financial networks tied to terrorism and other illegal activities. OFAC, on the other hand, is charged with issuing asset and bank account freezing orders, and following up with banks to ensure that targeted assets are identified and frozen.

Some 14.8 million reports were filed with FinCen in 2004. These reports were imposed on the US banking and financial community by the Bank Secrecy Act These reports included 663,655 so-called SAR�s (Suspicious Activity Reports), an increase of over 250,000 in one year. SARs provide the basic gristmill for possible money laundering and terrorism funding research and investigation. But only a very small percentage of these actually lead to any investigations.

The United States has been the biggest champion of tracking terrorist funds. While other countries have also established Financial Intelligence Units (FIU�s) similar to FinCen, these FIUs are, for the most part, less active. They rely heavily on their banking and financial communities to do their own self-policing. Few countries other than the United States have imposed penalties on banks for failing to file SARs or to meet other due diligence requirements. This is one reason why the US has decided to look more closely at the millions of international transactions that flow through the US banking system. According to a report in the New York Times, the Bush administration is working on a new plan that will give US government agencies access to logs of international wire transfers into and out of American banks. Such access is authorized by Section 6302 of The Intelligence Reform Bill passed by Congress in December, 2004. That bill authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations requiring financial institutions to report on �cross-border electronic transmittals of funds.� But first the Secretary must consult with the Federal Reserve and inform Congress of the rationale and criteria used to determine that such regulations are reasonably necessary to identify money laundering and terrorism financing.

The American banking community is beginning to take umbrage at these potential new measures. They are concerned that further government probing will encroach on client and banking privacy, and will place increased reporting burdens, costs and risks on their business activities. They are also concerned that they will simply loose business to overseas banks

Damrah, upon conviction, had his naturalized U.S. citizenship revoked. That revocation would not be final, however, and removal proceedings (deportation) could not begin until after the appeals process. While Damrah may appeal his case to the U.S. Supreme Court, for the purposes of initiating deportation action, the Government is now essentially free to proceed. Interestingly, given the vagaries of the Immigration and Nationality Act, it is likely that Damrah, now a lawful permanent resident alien again, can be charged with only a limited number of removal violations. Such violations, however, would likely relate to the very activities of support for the PIJ and his connections to other radical Islamists that resulted in his criminal conviction. Deportation charges are not criminal and are separate proceedings; therefore, double jeopardy within the Federal criminal justice system is not an issue and the same evidence that was used in the criminal case can be utilized in Immigration Court.

The Government might well choose to await any action by Damrah�s attorneys relative to a possible Supreme Court appeal before taking further action, though it is under no obligation to do so. Contested deportation cases, even if the respondents are detained, can take many months and even years to resolve. So, when ultimately the Feds do charge the Cleveland Imam with removal violations, the case may well drag on for a long time. The saga of Fawaz Damrah, which has been on the Government�s radar screen for more than a decade, proves that while the wheels of justice may sometimes grind slowly, at least they do move.

First the bombs became slightly larger and more sophisticated, being detonated by cell phone. While most of the bombs were approximately 2kg, a number were larger, in the 10kg range. They still have been able to detonate bombs larger than 10 kg on a regular basis. Militants attempted to use excelerents. Second, there were a handful of double bombings. Third, beginning in August the insurgents were using road-side IEDs to target army convoys. In several cases the insurgents used delayed bombs to target police and military investigators following a smaller initial explosion.

Following the Thai Army�s debacle at Tak Bai on 25 October 2005, the violence hit a new level. Between 25 October and the end of January 2005, the violence surged and included roughly, 42 bombings, 5 double or triple bombings, 5 fire-bombings, 5 attempted bombings, 32 assassinations, and over 32 arson attacks. Over 60 people were killed, including 15 police and four soldiers, and over 200 people were injured. Since October, bombings have averaged almost 15 per month. On 17 February, the first car bomb, comprised of 100kg of ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel was detonated, killing six.

While the three bombs on Sunday were not large or sophisticated they are important for four reasons:

1) Simultaneous bombings across two provinces are a hallmark of a sophisticated organization. The militants are more sophisticated than they are often given credit for.

2) Two of the three occurred in Songkhla province, which has been spared most of the violence, and is not seen as a safe haven for the militants. While some Thai security authorities stated that the militants were forced there because of the effective counter-insurgency operations in Narathiwat, Yala and Patani, there is considerable consternation that they are moving closer to the tourist regions. Indeed at least four foreigners were injured in the attack at Hat Yai airport.

3) They bombed the regional airport at Hat Yai, the largest in the deep-south, and also targeted a hotel. Coupled with an attack on a rubber plantation, it is clear the militants seek to target the southern economy. This fits into a pattern that we saw develop in 2004 to the present.

4) These attacks have come at a time when the Prime Minister has acknowledged his policies of the past year were overly aggressive, and that the government would try to pursue a softer approach. These militants have shown no interest in negotiating; indeed none of the organizations believed to be involved has taken credit for the attacks nor posted their demands. They seem interested only in provoking a heavy-handed government response that will create the conditions for their organizations to flourish.

Over one year into the insurgency, there is still precious little understanding of the movement and organizations involved. While there is no evidence that JI has been directly involved, there are clear social ties between JI and some of the Thai militants. JI reached out to them in 1999-2000 inviting them to join an umbrella grouping known as the Rabitatul Mujiheddin, while Hambali and his lieutenants sought to recruit Thais to carry out terrorist operations in Bangkok. We need to be aware that at some point, if the conflict continues to surge, that JI will inject itself, taking the unrest to a whole new level.

For starters we have George "Slam Dunk" Tenet. Tenet had the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that all intelligence provided to the President was thoroughly vetted and challenged. Tenet sent mixed messages. He did intervene in the fall of 2002 to stop the White House from misusing bogus intellligence about Iraq's alleged effort to acquire uranium from Niger. Then, did a complete reversal in January and February of 2003, and allowed this info to stay in the President's State of the Union Address. Tenet is gone but got the medal of freedom for his "excellent" work. Message to analysts, if you screw up but are a loyal team player you will be rewarded.

The Deputy Director for Intelligence until December 2004 was Jamie Miscik. Jamie is a nice lady and would be a good neighbor. But she too failed to do her job and did not aggressively probe analysts writing on WMD issues about the strength and veracity of their sources. She got the top job in the analytical community thanks to making a favorable impression on Tenet while assigned to the NSC in the mid-1990s. How much blame should Miscik shoulder for the debacle in Iraq? Some, particularly to the extent that she failed to insist that analysis based on faulty sources should have been subjected to greater scrutiny. Nonetheless she does not deserve a lot of blame because the much maligned October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate was generated in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) by old hands who were not under her control.

It is astonishing at this juncture that there has not been a major shake up at the NIC. In fact, those responsible for the sections with the most errors are still on the job and, in one instance, given more authority. The principal drafters of the October 2002 NIE were Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation; Lawrence K. Gershwin, the National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology; retired Army Maj. Gen. John R. Landry, National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Military Issues, and Paul R. Pillar, NIO for the Near East and South Asia. Walpole oversaw the entire effort but had specific responsibility for nuclear issues. Gershwin handled issues related to biological weapons, Gordon focused on chemical weapons, and Pillar dealt with the issues pertaining to international terrorism.

Of the four, the one who got it right in the estimate was Paul Pillar. Yet, both President Bush and Vice President Cheney have continued to insist that Pillar's judgments on terrorism were wrong. Fortunately for Pillar his judgments have been endorsed by the Senate Intelligence Committee and the 9-11 Commission, among others. But Pillar is not out of danger. Only he has been attacked by reporters who are perceived as mouthpieces for the Bush Administration (Robert Novak and John Roberts). He has been called disloyal for the simple act of providing an assessment of what was happening in Iraq that did not square with the wishful thinking and rosy scenarios emanating from the West Wing of the White House. Message to analysts, be careful about telling the truth to the President because you will be accused of being disloyal.

What has been the fate of Walpole, Gershwin, and Landry? Even though they presided over a sloppy NIE that was used in part to justify the war in Iraq, they are still on the job. In fact, Gershwin and Landry were given the task in the fall of 2003 of doing the review of their respective parts about what went wrong in the 2002 October estimate. Not bad, when you screw up you get to do the post-mortem to find out what went wrong. Gershwin now has the job of National Intelligence Officer for Intelligence Assurance. Message to analysts, even if you write a bad estimate you will get a promotion.

The President, regardless of political affiliation, needs an intelligence community that will tell him or her uncomfortable truths. If President Bush is serious about fixing the problems in the intelligence community he needs to start with a house cleaning at the NIC. Messrs. Walpole, Gershwin and Landry should be fired. That would send a clear message to the analysts that sloppy work based on questionable sources and weak assumptions will be punished. At this point, however, no one of any consequence has been called on the carpet.

I am afraid, however, that those guys will skate and that Paul Pillar will be fingered for blame. Firing Pillar would send the wrong message, namely, if you tell the President truths that go against the Administration's policy goals you will be punished. Analysts still on the job are watching carefully how this plays out. Fixing the problems at throughout the intelligence community starts with insisting officers be held accountable and that accountablility starts at the top.

Miraculously, the coalition of high priests of political correctness, Wahabi groups masquerading as pluralists, and the elite censors of fair and balanced journalism did not prevail. Mr. Ramadan was not given a visa and soon, in an act of righteous indignation, refused to reapply for another visa.

Even after the murderous actions by Islamic militants on 9-11 in the US, and in fact in carrying out or planning terrorist operations in more than 90 countries between 1990 and 2003, the American intelligentsia in a devilish collusion with radical Islamic groups hiding under false veneer, have managed to perpetrate the grand deception of militant Islam: pretending to be moderate, democrats with a small d, pluralists and victims of hate, radical Islamic groups have continued to invert reality, turning facts on their head, in a stunning ability to anoint themselves as the victims of hate as opposed to the murderous reality that they are the progenitors of hate. Where else could radical Islamic leaders like Yousef Al Qardawi, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood who calls for killing Jews (not just Israelis but Jews) and Americans (not just occupiers) be described as "moderate" or a pro-western "reformer" or variations of this theme (Washington Post, New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, La Times)? Where else could one hear that Jihad was a "beautiful" concept, as was broadcast on NPR recently, devoid of any violent or militant meaning? NPR's commentator was the daughter of an Islamic American leader who justified the killing of Robert Kennedy-a fact NPR withheld from its listeners but paled in comparison to its brazen willingness to air a de facto commercial for al Qaeda with the commentator ending her Islamist (tax-payer subsidized) infomercial with the following line: "Someday, I hope 'jihad' will find its way back into our lexicon, when it can be used properly, in sentences like 'She's on a jihad to achieve the American Dream.'"

In the decade and a half before 9-11, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, al Qaeda and virtually every other radical Islamic group and leader successfully perpetrated the most brilliant strategic enemy deception in US history by planting themselves in the heart of enemy territory under false cover as non-profit (and or course tax deductible) humanitarian groups, civil rights groups, and apolitical religious institutions. Until 9-11, the deceit had continued with staggering success as radical Islamic groups and leaders were routinely invited to the White House, provided with federal funding, praised by politicians, and lionized by the media.

But before this charade was exposed, nearly 3000 Americans were forced to pay with their lives as the price for the belated realization that we had been had. Suddenly, charities that had been secretly operating as conduits for terrorists and established American Muslim leaders leading double lives as terrorist masterminds were finally being recognized for who they were: Terrorists. And instead of being toasted at the State Department, they were now more appropriately being prosecuted, shut down and deported.

And yet, more than 3 years after 9-11, it would seem that this same homicidal self-delusion is alive and well in the United States. This is where Mr. Ramadan comes to play such a pivotal role in highlighting the danger of this continued self-deception.

First, Mr. Ramadan is not any more a moderate than David Duke would be considered a moderate on race relations. The only difference is that David Duke is not smart enough to speak in two languages, cloak his racism under the mantle of pluralism or enjoy the witting collaboration of the media.

In several interviews given to various European publications over the last few years, Mr. Ramadan has repeatedly provided a justification for terrorist acts against US allies such as Israel and Russia and, more recently, against the US itself. Asked by the Italian magazine Panorama if the killing of civilians is right, Mr. Ramadan unambiguously responded that "In Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya, there is a situation of oppression, repression and dictatorship. It is legitimate for Muslims to resist fascism that kills the innocent." When asked if car bombing against US forces in Iraq were legitimate, Professor Ramadan responded that "Iraq was colonized by the Americans. The resistance against the army is just."

Mastering the art of taqiyya (double speaking to fool the unbelievers), Tariq Ramadan has enchanted many with his apparent moderation. But a careful examination of his words reveals that Professor Ramadan is not what he seems and claims to be. Yes, he says that he "agrees with integration" of Muslims in the West, but he is careful to say that "we [Muslims] are the ones who are going to decide the content." He makes us happy by saying that he accepts Western secular law, but, here's the catch, "only if this law doesn't force me to do things against my religion." And when he is cornered with questions on the brutality of some punishments of Islamic law, such as stoning, he tells us that he is against them, but (there is always a "but".) they are in Quranic texts and so he cannot fully condemn them and we have to settle for "an absolute moratorium on all physical punishments."

The telegenic, soft-spoken and charming professor is just the modern, westernized face of the same enemy that wears a different mask on other battlefields. As the distinguished expert of Middle East affairs Fouad Ajami recently wrote, Tariq Ramadan is, "in the world of the new Islamism, pure nobility." His moderate fa�ade hides his radical heart and just a careful read of his words would reveal it. France, the country that knows him best, has made up its mind on him. A court in Lyon recently said that preachers like Tariq Ramadan "can exert an influence on young Islamists and therefore constitute an incitement that can lead them to join violent groups."

In France at least, some leftist intellectuals have recognized Mr. Ramadan for what he is. The self-censorious NY Times was even forced to report that Bernard-Henri Levy, who wrote the best-seller "Who Killed Daniel Pearl" accused Ramadan of being the "intellectual champion of all kinds of double-talk" with a "racist vision of the world" and having promoted anti-Semitism. The Times further reported that Bernard Kouchner, the foreign aid advocate and former health minister of France, called Mr. Ramadan "absolutely a kook with no historical memory" and "a dangerous man." He added, "The way he denounced some Jewish intellectuals is close to anti-Semitism."

Still, the Ramadan fan club in the US continued to portray the exclusion of Mr. Ramadan as part of an anti-Muslim campaign; the charge of anti-Muslim racism, part of the larger orchestration by radical Muslims to portray themselves as the victims of hate, has been mastered perfectly, requiring only the collaboration of the American media. At the height of the controversy last year, The New York Times opined that "American Muslim groups questioned the government's ability or willingness to distinguish between what they see as Muslim moderates like Mr. Ramadan and extremists." But who were these American Muslim groups, portrayed by the Times as intellectually honest arbiters of who really is a moderate? None other than off-shoots and branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic radical movement that gave birth to al Qaeda and Hamas, and whose founder was none other than Hassan Al-Banna, the grandfather of Mr. Ramadan.

And there are those who fall back on the free market response: Is the most powerful nation in the world afraid of allowing Mr. Ramadan access to the intellectual pluralism of the US, where free speech is honored as the most sacred privilege that we have?

Well, Mr. Ramadan does not need to be in the United States to convey his message and thoughts. Through the internet, media and instant telecommunications, the American public is not being denied one iota of Mr. Ramadan's propaganda.

After the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the same defenders of Mr. Ramadan-the New York Times and other elite media-were the first to ask probing and indignant questions about how the blind Sheik, with his radical views, was able to get visas to the United States in the early 1990's. But that was before he was indicted or convicted of any US crime. So apparently, the high priests at the time decided that the premium of free speech for non-US guests was not sacred; that in fact, the right to visit the US was not a constitutional right afforded to any citizen of the world, a view unfortunately increasingly espoused by editorial boards.

Title 8 United States Code Section 1182 requires the exclusion from the US of any alien who has "used his position of prominence within any country to endorse or espouse terrorist activity, or to persuade others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist organization." The provision seems written to fit Ramadan's case. The entry into the United States of any foreign national is, by law, a privilege and not a right. It is preposterous to ask the US government to disregard its own laws and to grant this privilege to a person who openly condones attacks against U.S. forces and interests.

Aside from the legal justification for barring Mr. Ramadan, the moral reason for keeping Mr. Ramadan out is the same reason why the US has for years denied visas to neo-Nazi proponents from Western Europe. It is not only the access to the United States that both neo-Nazis and Mr. Ramadan have sought. Rather it is the official imprimatur of the US government, an effective declaration of political legitimacy attending to the granting of the visa. And that is precisely same legitimacy that allowed militant Islamic groups to operate for so long in the United States. Do we really want to repeat history?

But do not take my word for it. Consider what is presented in the Chapter on the Iraq failure. According to the report the analysts said,

The pre-war estimate of Iraq�s nuclear program, as reflected in the October 2002 NIE Iraq�s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, was that, in the view of most agencies, Baghdad was �reconstituting its nuclear weapons program� and �if left unchecked, [would] probably�have a nuclear weapon during this decade,� although it would be unlikely before 2007 to 2009. The NIE explained that, in the view of most agencies, �compelling evidence� of reconstitution was provided by Iraq�s �aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum tubes.� The NIE also pointed to additional indicators, such as other dual-use procurement activity, supporting reconstitution. The assessment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program and could therefore have a weapon by the end of the decade was made with �moderate confidence.�

Yes the analysts were wrong. They believed that Iraq was reconstituting the nuke program. But there were important caveats. First, Iraq would only have a nuke if left "unmolested" to develop such a capability. That is not codeword for invasion. Second, even if left unmolested Iraq would not have acquired a nuke until at least 2007. And how strong was this judgment? The analysts made it with "moderate confidence". It was the policymakers, not the analysts, who made the decision to go to war and who misrepresented to the public what the estimate actually said.

I am not saying the CIA is free of blame. There were major mistakes of leadership. For example, the man who led the drafting of the October 2002 estimate surrounded himself with true believers who shared the view of Bush Administration policymakers at the NSC and Department of Defense that military action in Iraq was required. This National Intelligence Officer created obstacles to dissident voices within the CIA and other parts of the intelligence community from being heard. But to pretend that the flaws in the intelligence explains why President Bush took us to war requires that we ignore a host of other uncomfortable facts.

CIA analysts got it right on the lack of operational relationship between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. Yet, notwithstanding the correct judgment of the analysts, President Bush and Vice President Cheney have continued to insist that there was such a relationship. In their words, the war in Iraq was an extension of the war on terrorism.

Analysts also got it right on the alleged link between Iraq and Niger on the question of uranium. The analysts who briefed Congress in October 2002 said there was no truth to the allegation. Yet, the White House wanted to run with it. We know from a previous Congressional report that the Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence asked George Tenet in early October 2002 to intervene with the White House, who insisted on putting the Iraq/Niger allegation in the President's speech in Cincinnati. Only after Tenet called Stephen Hadley was the info removed. The CIA analysts consistently warned the Administration that the info the Brits had also was unreliable and the reports of Iraq trying to get their hands on a nuke were wrong.

But the policymakers did not want to hear it. In fact, Don Rumsfeld and his minions were briefing TV and newspaper pundits just two weeks before the President's 2003 State of the Union address that Iraq was trying to acquire uranium in Niger.

But policymakers do not deserve all of the blame. There was a failure of leadership at CIA. Analysts were undermined by their immediate boss, George Tenet. Although Tenet had intervened to keep the erroneous material out of the Cincinnati speech he decided to take a pass when it came to the State of the Union speech. He didn't make a stink and he left it in. Worse still, he failed in his duty to tell the President truths he did not want to hear. Sharing in this debacle was the Deputy Director of Intelligence, Jamie Miscik. When an analyst reports intelligence about a newly acquire biological weapons capability in Iraq it is incumbent on those running the Agency to ask one simple question, "What is the source of this info?". During my time as an analyst I had to justify conclusions by providing an assessment of sources. My bosses, especially a DCI, could call the Directorate of Operations and get a clear read on a questionable source. In the case of Iraq, however, top CIA managers decided to go along with policymakers in trumping up the case for war rather than insisting on the integrity of the intelligence.

Here is the bottomline. There is no such thing as perfect intelligence or perfect analysis. However, we do not serve the security of this country by perpetuating the myth that we went to war in Iraq because a couple of analysts believed Saddam's acquisition of aluminum tubes was part of a secret program to build a nuke. Going to war was and remains a political decision.

The espionage efforts Mr. Devenny describes include the utilization of an estimated three thousand �front companies� operating within the United States with links to Chinese Intelligence. These companies are often involved in the illicit transfer of technology, which is ultimately destined to China�s military.

Mr. Devenny notes the three thousand front company estimate comes from the senior command of the FBI�s Counterintelligence Division; therefore, presumably the information is reliable. One can only wonder how many �H� and �L� visa petitions have been filed by and approved for those three thousand companies over the years. Hopefully someone is bothering to look.