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Contributing Expert Michael Cutler to Testify & List of Congressional Hearings
By Andrew Cochran
Michael Cutler will testify at a U.S. House Judiciary Committee hearing on May 5 on the missions of the immigration enforcement agencies at the Homeland Security Department. Here is the list of terrorism-related open hearings (downloadable Word file) in the U.S. House next week - the U.S. Senate will be out all week.
Dr. Walid Phares Joins Us As Contributing Expert
By Andrew Cochran
I am very pleased to welcome Dr. Walid Phares, highly respected for his expertise on terrorism, Jihad movements, and the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, to The Counterterrorism Blog as a Contributing Expert. Dr. Phares is a professor at Florida Atlantic University and a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. He has written seven books on the Middle East, and published hundreds of articles in newspapers and scholarly publications, and appears often in the international and national media. We are very pleased to welcome Dr. Phares to The Counterterrorism Blog and look forward to his illuminating contributions.
TERRORISM: WHY THE NUMBERS MATTER
By Larry Johnson
By
Larry C Johnson
The numbers are in and the news is not good for U.S. efforts to contain and reduce the threat of international terrorism. 2004 marked the highest number of significant incidents of terrorism since the intelligence community started keeping statistics in 1968. (An incident is counted as significant if an attack results in the death, injury or kidnapping of one or more persons or property damage in excess of $10,000). Attacks jumped from 175 in 2003 to 651 in 2004. This surpasses the previous high of 273 significant attacks in 1985.
The bad news kept on coming. One thousand nine hundred and seven (1907) people died in international terrorist attacks last year. This marks the second highest death toll since 1968; falling short of the infamous record of 2001.
Unfortunately, former 9-11 Commission Staff Director, Phil Zelikow, and chief of the National Counter Terrorism Center, John Brennan, tried with some success to confuse the press and suggest that the numbers do not matter. In a deft display of obfuscation and spin Messrs. Zelikow and Brennan made several points. It started with Zelikows claim that:
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The compilation of data about terrorist attacks is not a required part of the report, but traditionally had been provided by the State Department, going back to the years in which the State Department was basically the public voice of the U.S. Government on international terrorism, generally. . . . But what's important for our purposes is what the law said the NCTC should do. It said the NCTC was the primary organization for analysis and integration of -- and I'm quoting from the law now -- "All intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism." The law further stated that the NCTC would be the United States Government's "shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contact and support." (Phil Zelikow)
State Departments role as the lead for coordinating international terrorism was established by a National Security Decision Directive signed by President Reagan in early 1986. This was in response to an interagency fight that broke out during an effort to apprehend the terrorists responsible for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship. While flying over Italy in late 1985 in pursuit of Abu Abbas, a State Department official and a CIA officer argued heatedly over who was in charge of the mission. Recognizing the need for a clear chain of command the Department of State was put in charge of coordinating the efforts of CIA, DOD, and FBI efforts to track and deal with terrorism. The first man put in charge of this effort was L. Paul (Jerry) Bremer.
Mr. Zelikow is misleading the media by asserting that the State Department traditionally compiled the data. That is simply not true. The State Department never was in charge of collecting or compiling the statistics. It simply coordinated the process of assembling the data in order to provide the Congress and the American people with a comprehensive view of international terrorist activity. Since 1986 the Counter Terrorism Center at the CIA had the task of compiling the data and writing the narrative analysis. Dont take my word for it, just ask the former Chiefs of the Counter Terrorism Center starting with Dewey Claridge and ending with Cofer Black.
By splitting the statistics on terrorism from the country reports, Zelikow is creating the kind of stovepiping of information which the 9-11 Commission claimed helped undermine US efforts to detect and defeat Al Qaedas effort to launch their suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. There is nothing in the new law requiring this move.
John Brennan, the head of the National Counter Terrorism Center, made the unbelievable admission that when the CIA shifted responsibility for counting terrorist incidents to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) in the fall of 2003 only three part time people were assigned to the task. Brennan said:
To ensure a more comprehensive accounting of terrorist incidents, we in the NCTC significantly increased the level of effort from three part-time individuals to 10 full-time analysts, and we took a number of other steps to improve quality control and database management. This increased level of effort allowed a much deeper review of far more information and, along with Iraq, are the primary reasons for the significant growth in a number of terrorist incidents being reported.
The American people are asked to believe that nobody at TTIC understood in the aftermath of 2001 that we needed to keep a comprehensive count of terrorist events. Implicit in this criticism is a smear on the good work done previously at the Counter Terrorism Center. CTC did not consider counting terrorism events an afterthought. They used a sound methodology of monitoring news media reports, FBIS reports, and cables from US Embassies and Defense Attaches to identify possible acts of international terrorism. An act of violence did not necessarily mean that terrorism was involved. Instead expert analysts from CTC and State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) would meet periodically to review and decide what incidents represented acts of international terrorism.
This process broke down when the responsibility for doing this was shifted from CTC and put under Mr. Brennans stewardship at the Terrorist Threat Integration Center in late 2003. Mr. Brennan in fact shares much of the responsibility for the debacle with the statistics that were misreported in the report issued in April 2004. He did not ensure that his part time employees could count.
With the beefed up work force at NCTC we now know that 10 analysts were involved in counting 651 significant international terrorist attacks in 2004. Geez, I guess that means it took each analyst one year to keep track of 65 attacks.
Brennan asks the media and the American people to believe that the rise in attacks is simply the result of better counting by more people. Not true. An independent data source from RAND-MIPT shows a similar dramatic rise in attacks and deaths. This is not an artifice of methodology. Something bad is going on out there.
Two countries account for a major portion of the increased terrorist activitythe Kashmir region of India and Iraq. With respect to Kashmir it is important to note that since 1998 this area has consistently appeared in the appendix in Patterns of Global Terrorism that described significant incidents. I have used this data in briefing for foreign governments during that period to point out that not only was India being repeatedly attacked by Islamic jihadists (who were funded and trained by Pakistan), but that the people of Kashmir repeatedly suffered one of the highest death tolls of any country in the world from terrorist attacks. The sad fact is that media, and to a lesser extent the U.S. Government, tended to ignore these attacks.
It is worth recalling that the cruise missiles fired by President Clinton in August of 1998 in retaliation for the Al Qaeda bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania struck a camp in Afghanistan and killed members of one of the groups that carried out attacks in the Kashmir as well as two Pakistani intelligence officers. In the war against Islamic extremists Kashmir matters.
Brennans response on Iraq is more puzzling:
QUESTION: Do you regard the Iraq numbers that you just gave us -- for which, thank you -- as comparable? And the reason I ask is that I've got to figure that if there's one piece of real estate that the U.S. intelligence community has devoted enormous resources to in the last two years, it's got to be -- two-and-a-half years -- it's Iraq. Therefore, do you think those figures are comparable, '03 to '02?
MR. BRENNAN: In terms of what the term you're using -- "comparable" -- to sort of denote here, I'm not certain. The rigor that we applied worldwide for the 2004 data also applied to Iraq. So it was Iraq, Kashmir, and others. So that number, I think, is the result of exhaustive search and research on that. Also, as I pointed out, the number of civilians that have come not just from the United States, but also from other countries -- the number of individuals who, in fact, are in different places in Iraq that have been involved in some of the attacks that have taken place there, I think that is the reason why, in fact, we're seeing an increase in that number.
Although Brennan is not certain about the comparability of the numbers we do not have to rely on him. Data maintained by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is reported on at least a weekly basis to the Secretary of Defense, shows clear unambiguous data that the level of terrorist activity in Iraq mushroomed in 2004. In fact, the highest level of attacks ever recorded in Iraq occurred in December 2004.
Iraq is relevant to the threat of international terrorism principally because it is serving as a drawing card for jihadists throughout the Islamic world. I have had recent discussions with senior government officials representing three countries in the Persian Gulf. To a man they were alarmed by the images coming out of Iraq showing US soldiers abusing muslim women and the shooting of unarmed insurgents. The perception of the United States as an invader is inciting terrorism in the region, not quelling it. Several commented on the perceived parallel of the U.S. presence in Iraq as comparable to what the Soviets did in Afghanistan during the 1980s. They worry that we are sowing the seeds of future jihadist terrorism.
The real news from the press conference of Messrs. Zelikow and Brennan is that they have not finished counting the incidents from last year and that the numbers are likely to go up when revised statistics are issued in June. Moreover, both conceded that events in Russia and Philippines, where several hundred were killed, were excluded from the data.
I welcome Mr. Brennans commitment to look at the methodology and recommend corrections. The failure to count attacks inside Russia by Chechen separatists, for example, needs to be re-examined. While ten years ago there was no evidence that the Chechen were receiving outside assistance, that is not the case today. In fact Chechen fighters in the battle of Anaconda in Afghanistan in March 2002 killed American soldiers. The Chechen movement has clear economic and military ties to international jihadists. In future reports it would be entirely appropriate to classify as international attacks something carried out by any group with established ties to groups outside of their country.
There is no single statistic that can tell us what is happening in the war on terrorism. Reporting multiple attacks does not necessarily mean that casualties will follow. As Brennan and Zelikow correctly note most of the casualties were caused by a relatively small number of attacks. But, those attacks were carried out by Islamic extremists that have clear ties with Al Qaeda.
In light of this it is breathtaking that someone with Zelikows intellect can argue that numbers dont matter. The following exchange occurred during the Wednesday afternoon press conference:
QUESTION: Um, 651 attacks in 2004, compared to 175 attacks in your report in 2003. That's a sharp increase in terrorist attacks. What does that tell us about the war on terrorism -- the global war on terrorism and the cooperation? . . . .
MR. ZELIKOW: I mean, the short answer is it doesn't tell us anything about the war on terror. The statistics are simply not valid for any inference about the progress, either good or bad, of American policy. I think that's the honest answer. If you just look at what the statistics are and what kind of inferences can legitimately be drawn from them, I can't come up with a defensible inference.
Heres the bottomline. Numbers do matter. If more people are being killed in Iraq and India then we need to ensure that US policy for combating terrorism is focused on those areas. To pretend that the threat of terrorism is as great in Brazil as in Iraq is delusional. And to pretend that objective facts say nothing about the reality of terrorism perhaps shows us why the US effort to deal with Islamic extremists is going in the wrong direction.
Friends in the intelligence community tell me that Zelikow, when confronted with the higher numbers, tried to have those numbers suppressed. Once word of this leaked out Zelikow shifted gears to damage control and constructed the artificial and misleading explanation that NCTC is now doing something new that was never done before. Oh yeah, and it is mandated by law.
Sadly this simply shows how uninformed Zelikow is about the history of counter terrorism policies and procedures during the last 25 years, notwithstanding his post as staff director of the 9-11 Commission. Maybe this explains why the Commission had such difficulty identifying who failed in their duty to prevent those terrible attacks in September 2001. Phil Zelikow by his own admission has trouble making sense of numbers. « Close It
Testimony by Contributing Experts on Islamic Extremism in Europe
By Andrew Cochran
Matthew Levitt and the Investigative Project's Lorenzo Vidino testified yesterday before a U.S. House International Relations subcommittee on Islamic extremism in Europe. Matthew Levitt testified about the "crossover" between al-Qaeda and Hamas oepratives. Muhammad Zouaydi, a senior al-Qaeda financier in Madrid, financed the Hamburg cell responsible for the September 11 attacks and, through other figures, Hamas. He also testified on the extent of Hezbollah operations in Europe. You can link to Matthew's "Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God," in the Counterterrorism Library in the left sidebar. Lorenzo testified that the escalation of Islamist terrorist and extremist activity in Europe is due chiefly to lax immigration policies, radicalization of the continents Muslim population, and law enforcement's inability to dismantle terrorist networks. You can link to Lorenzo's "The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe" in the Counterterrorism Library in the left sidebar. Other hearing witnesses included Peter Bergen and Claude Moniquet.
THE FACTS ABOUT "PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM" (UPDATED with released "Country Reports on Terrorism 2004" and NCTC Chronology)
By Larry Johnson
by
Larry C. Johnson
(UPDATE: Larry appeared on MSNBC today on this story.) After being outed on this blog site for their surreptitious effort to keep the statistics on international terrorism away from the Congress and the American people, the State Department and the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) did a partial reverse today and released some statistics. (UPDATE: Here is link to "Country Reports on Terrorism 2004", and here is the new NCTC "Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004.") As we reported earlier the number of significant incidents of terrorism in 2004 (a significant incidents means someone was killed, wounded, or kidnapped or there was property damage greater than $10,000) was the highest ever recorded. In addition, the number of fatalities is the second highest total recorded in 37 years--2001 still holds the infamous record for first place.
Rather than admit that the seventh floor at State was stunned by the figures, Phil Zelikow offers spin that this is a new effort that flows from the recommendations of the 9-11 Commission. This my friends is pure, unadulterated horse manure. What is truly ironic is that although the 9-11 Commission called for greater coordination within the intelligence community and between the intelligence community and policymakers, it is Zelikow, the Commission's former Staff Director, who is leading the charge to hinder such cooperation. Here are the facts about how Patterns of Global Terrorism has been produced prior to this year:
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Starting at least in June 1981, the CIA released a report titled, PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 1980. The CIA was responsible for collecting the data and writing the analysis. This was produced by the National Foreign Assessment Center. (I have one of the originals.)
In 1986, following the creation of the Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) at CIA, the State Department took charge of releasing the report and it was renamed, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM. However, the CTC continued its job of collecting the data and writing the analysis in conjunction with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). The Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism (S/CT) issued the report. Until this year, that is how the report was produced. CIA collected the statistics, the CTC with INR wrote the narrative of the report, and the Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism coordinated the effort and wrote the regional summary sections of the report.
Problems arose in late 2003 when the responsibility for compiling the statistics and writing the narrative shifted from CTC to the new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). As a result State Department coordinated with TTIC rather than CTC, but the process remained the same. As a side note, the failure to totally and accurately count all incidents of international terrorism in 2003 was essentially a clerical error by TTIC.
As a result of the Intelligence Reform Act TTIC has been folded into the National Counter Terrorism Center(NCTC). NCTC has assumed the task of compiling statistics and writing the analysis as was the case with its predecessor, CTC.
For Phil Zelikow to claim like a 21st Century version of Freddie Prinze, "It's not our yob" would be funny if the issues were not so serious. State Department still has the lead for dealing with international terrorism on a country by country basis. What do we do about Pakistan, for example, where elements of their Intelligence service continue to protect and host Al Qaida and other Islamic extremists implicated in terrorist attacks in the Kashmir region of India? While NCTC may provide the data it is up to the State Department to craft and implement a policy towards Pakistan that meets the goal of reducing terrorism and promoting security between Pakistan and India. How can they do this if, "the numbers don't matter"?
If State Department does not work closely with NCTC to figure out which groups in the world are killing and wounding innocent civilians how in the world can they construct an effective policy to deal with the terrorist threat? The report may be out but some tough questions still need to be asked and some honest answers provided. Prior to 2005 we had one report that brought together the intelligence community and policymakers in a joint effort to report on international terrorism. Now we have two reports going in different directions. This is exactly what the 9-11 Commission said we should not be doing.
NOTE: You can obtain the "Patterns" reports back to 1986 on the MIPT site. « Close It
Michael Cutler on Washington Times article: More Special Agents Needed to Stop Terrorists' Entry
By Andrew Cochran
Michael Cutler asked me to post his comments about a "Washington Times" article today. First, an excerpt from the story: "The Homeland Security Department's inspector general is investigating an incident involving 14 Syrian passengers aboard a flight from Detroit to Los Angeles last summer described by many federal air marshals and passengers as a dry run for a terrorist attack."
Michael's comments: "I noticed a reference to the fact that a couple of the individuals who were acting suspiciously on the flight may have overstayed their authorized periods of admission but that this issue was overloooked by the law enforcement officers who questioned them. It is entirely possible that others of the suspicious passengers were also in violation of their immigration status. This is why it is critical that we dedicate for more resources to the critical mission of the enforcement of the immigration laws from within the interior of the United States. This is the sort of thing that immigration special agents would not have ignored and might have given them the leverage that could have been extremely helpful in launching an investigation and to also detain these guys should it have been seen as being in our best interests from a security perspective. It shows the need for having enough agents who truly understand how proper enforcement of the INA can help contribute to waging a successful war on terrorism. Yet the administration only wanted to hire 143 new special agents this year for immigration law enforcement as compared with the 800 agents authorized by Congress."
Financial Regulators Release Bank Secrecy Act Guidance to Money Service Businesses
By Andrew Cochran
FinCEN and the federal banking agencies (FBAs) at the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC, the National Credit Union Administration, the OCC, and the Office of Thrift Supervision today issued interpretive guidance setting forth the minimum steps that banking organizations should take when providing banking services to money services businesses. FinCEN has issued a concurrent advisory to money services businesses to emphasize their Bank Secrecy Act regulatory obligations and to notify them of the types of information that they will be expected to produce to a banking organization in the course of opening or maintaining account relationships. FinCEN and the FBAs issued a joint press release on the guidance and the advisory. CT Blog regulars will recall last week's letter from the FBAs, which was in turn a reply to the January 10 letter from the American Bankers Association and state regulators on the consistency of BSA examinations. The new guidance was issued well ahead of the announced deadline and during the hearing today at the Senate Banking Committee on the regulators' oversight of MSB compliance with the BSA.
Security Council Reviews Progress Against Terrorism
By Victor Comras
It may be a sign of the times that the UN Security Council could hold an open session on the progress in the war on terrorism, as it did yesterday, and attract so little press and other attention. During yesterday's session, the Security Council received briefings from its three specialized anti-terrorism committees -- the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions (1267) Committee, the Counter-Terrorism (1373) Committee and the new (1540) Committee on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The briefings were devoid of anything controversial, and really didnt provide any new insights into how the war on terrorism was progressing. At first brush the session did not appear newsworthy. But, reading through the lines there are several items that do merit attention.
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First, the Security Council has adopted a new tone of language with regard to terrorism. The Security Council Presidents Statement, this time, forthrightly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, whenever and whomsoever committed. This language seems closer in tone to the definition of terrorism now being considered for adoption.
A new emphasis was also placed on expanding counter-terrorism cooperation with various regional and international organizations, notably Interpol. This is a positive step and the UN should be encouraged to look even more broadly to international and regional enforcement agencies to garner increased compliance with its sanctions measures.
There was also a new degree of frustration and impatience with the slow pace of work manifested by the various terrorism committees. Most of this was directed at the Secretariats failure to get the new Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) up and running. CTED was established by the Security Council over a year ago and remains woefully understaffed. The success of the Security Councils counter-terrorism program, US Security Council Representative Stuart Halliday warned, is dependent on getting the CTED fully operational, Without a fully operational Executive Directorate, it would be difficult for the CTC to fulfill its mandate, let alone the latest 90-day work programme, he said.
There was also growing impatience with the failure of some 75 countries to provide the chapter VII required reports on the steps they were taking to deal with terrorism. The absence of reports was viewed as seriously hampering the work of the 1640 Committee charged with developing recommendations on stemming risks of WMD proliferation.
The Security Council will soon reconsider the mandate of the 1267 Committee and develop new, strengthened measures to deal with Al Qaeda and related groups. Regrettably, there is no indication they are yet considering measures to bring greater accountability and transparency to the sanctions implementation process. A healthy dose of name and shame authority could go a long way toward making the UN counter-terrorism measures more effective. « Close It
The Conviction of Ali al-Timimi
By Evan Kohlmann
After days of deliberations, jurors have finally returned with a guilty verdict in the case of would-be "Islamic scholar" Ali al-Timimi in Alexandria, Virginia. Timimi is a prominent advocate of a puritanical and often extremist form of fundamentalist Islam known as Salafism. As the federal prosecutors in Alexandria demonstrated over the past month, Timimi's "religious" teachings included directly encouraging his followers to take up arms against America in order to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan and their "Arab mujahideen" allies--read Al-Qaida. Timimi's attorneys had attempted to shield their client in the protection of the First Amendment, arguing that Timimi's language never rose to the stringent incitement standard delineated in the landmark Brandenburg v. Ohio case. The jurors were apparently unpersuaded.
The conviction of Ali al-Timimi is a significant victory for the Department of Justice in its ongoing counterterrorism efforts. At a time when the DOJ is still coming to grips with regrettable evidentiary and legal defeats in a number of recent cases (such as those of London-based Al-Qaida recruiter Abu Doha and former University of Idaho student Sami Omar al-Hussayen), Timimi's conviction seems to confirm that the U.S. government is still able to successfully prosecute controversial terrorism cases without resorting to extrajudicial means, such as designating an individual as an enemy combatant. One final note: this latest conviction is due--in no small part--to the tireless work of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Once again, the EDVA has proven itself to be a model of efficiency and success in tackling complex and critically important terrorism cases. Americans should come to expect the same level of professionalism and expertise in all facets of our national counterterrorism strategy.
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Finally Some Action on Viktor Bout
By Douglas Farah
Well, the Treasury Department today announced its long-anticipated designations of Viktor Bout's people and front companies. Bout, provider of weapons to the Taliban and most sides of most wars in sub-Saharan African in violation of U.N. embargos, has long escaped scrutiny in the United States.
The reason the announcement was delayed by several weeks was the inclusion of U.S. citizen Richard Chichakli, Bout's U.S. financial handler. Including U.S. citizens requires a higher threshold be reached before the person is designated. Of the 30 companies and four individuals designated, he is clearly the most important and newsworthy. Nine "Chichakli-controlled firms" were also designated, showing just how active Bout's financial network was in the United States.
For the first time the U.S. government, in its press release, confirms Bout's dealings with the Taliban, an assertion that was often questioned in U.S. circles. Today's release says that "information available to the U.S. government shows that Bout profited $50 million from supplying the Taliban with military equipment when they ruled Afghanistan." The full release can be found here and the full list of designated companies can be found here.
For years Chichakli, the son fo a former Syrian president and self-proclaimed childhood friend of Osama bin Laden, has helped Bout on many fronts, while happily residing in Richardson, Tx. Texas. For my full blog, see here.
STATE DEPARTMENT INTENT ON STONEWALLING ON TERRORISM (UPDATE 4/27)
By Larry Johnson
by
Larry C. Johnson
(UPDATE: April 27 Washington Post cites Larry's scoop.) The State Department and the National Counter Terrorism Center briefed a bipartisan group of the House of Representatives yesterday (Monday) on some of the numbers that will not appear in the Annual Report, Patterns of Global Terrorism. In one of the few welcome indicators that the Congress can put aside partisan activity and focus on a problem, both Republicans and Democrats were outraged by the cavalier and shallow treatment the data on terrorism is being given by the State Department. The following letter from Congressman Henry Waxman aptly summarizes the problems. Note, the letter acknowledges the role the Counterterrorism Blog played in flagging this disturbing development.
April 26, 2005
The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520
Dear Madam Secretary:
I am writing to urge you to reverse your decision to withhold government data on significant terrorist attacks from the State Department's annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report. At a congressional briefing yesterday, Administration officials revealed that the information you are withholding shows a "dramatic up-tick" in terrorist attacks. According to the data being concealed from the public, global terror attacks were more than three times higher in 2004 than the record levels set in 2003. In Iraq, where we are spending billions to restore order, terrorist attacks were nine times higher in 2004 than in 2003.
These are important facts that the American public has a right to know.
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The 2004 Data
Officials from the State Department and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) came to Congress yesterday to provide a private briefing to committee staffs on the Patterns of Global Terrorism report. The officials who conducted the briefing, Karen Aguilar, the Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department, and Russ Travers, the Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, indicated that the data on terrorist attacks in 2004 is the most comprehensive and most reviewed data ever compiled. They reported that both the State Department and the NCTC devoted significant time, personnel, and resources to developing the most reliable terrorism data possible.
During the briefing, the officials provided a summary of this 2004 terrorism data. Although the data is not classified and has been released publicly in the past, the handout summarizing the data was marked "FOUO," meaning "for official use only."
According to the 2004 data presented at the briefing, there has been a "dramatic up-tick" in significant terrorism attacks throughout the world. Overall, there were approximately 650 significant terrorist attacks in 2004, compared with 175 attacks in 2003. Prior to 2004, the
175 significant terrorist attacks in 2003 represented a 20-year high.[1]
Ms. Aguilar and Mr. Travers indicated that a major source of this increase was the high number of terrorist attacks in Iraq.
According to information provided at the briefing, there were approximately 198 significant terrorist attacks in Iraq in 2004. This is nine times more than the 22 significant terrorist attacks in Iraq identified in the State Department's 2003 report. Indeed, the number of significant terrorist attacks in Iraq in 2004 exceeded the 175 significant terrorist attacks that occurred throughout the entire world in 2003.
Ms. Aguilar and Mr. Travers said another factor in the global increase was greater awareness of terrorist events. In particular, they emphasized that enhanced efforts to monitor newspapers, television, and other media for incidents of terrorist attacks resulted in identifying many more attacks in India and Pakistan related to Kashmir. Yet even if every terrorist attack in India and Pakistan is removed from the database, the 2004 data still shows a record increase in terrorist attacks. Excluding attacks in India and Pakistan, more than 350 significant terrorist attacks occurred worldwide last year, still double the total number of attacks in 2003.
Other parts of the world also experienced significant increases in terrorist attacks in 2004. In Afghanistan, for example, the number of significant terrorist attacks doubled, increasing from 14 in 2003 to approximately 27 in 2004. The number of significant terrorist attacks in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank also more than doubled, increasing from 19 in 2003 to approximately 45 in 2004.[2]
Despite the large increase in terrorist attacks in 2004, it appears that the 2004 data may be a significant underestimate. Many incidents that most Americans would regard as terrorist attacks were excluded from the database because they did not meet the strict State Department definitions of an international terrorist attack. Mr. Travers explained that the data collected for Iraq did not include a large number of attacks by insurgents that resulted in only Iraqi fatalities or that were directed at U.S. armed forces. Over 100 attacks by "foreign terrorist organizations" were "not counted" because they were not considered "international" attacks.
No data was presented at the briefing on the number of fatalities or injuries caused by the terrorist attacks. This essential information has traditionally been released as part of the annual global terrorism report.
The Decision to Withhold the 2004 Data
During the briefing yesterday, Ms. Aguilar and Mr. Travers also discussed whether the terrorism data would be released to the public. What they said about this question appears to conflict with the previous claims by State Department officials.
Last week, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated that the "people of the United States will get all the facts."[3] He said "the government has decided that the [NCTC] should compile and publish the statistical data on terrorism."[4] Yesterday, however, Ms.
Aguilar and Mr. Travers contradicted these statements, saying that no decision to publish the data has been made. Instead, they said that Ambassador Negroponte, the recently confirmed Director for National Intelligence, was in the process of making this decision. Ms. Aguilar also said the State Department would not publish the data, even if Ambassador Negroponte decided that the NCTC was not the proper office to release this information.
Mr. Boucher also stated last week that the State Department would not release the data because it would be inappropriate to have "some State Department cutout trying to explain someone else's methodology."[5] However, Ms. Aguilar and Mr. Travers indicated at the briefing that the methodology and definitions used to vet the data were identical to last year's and were taken directly from the statute governing the State Department's annual report. They also made clear that NCTC compiled the data specifically for the State Department's annual report. Mr. Travers called the State Department "the client" for this information. And the briefing document provided yesterday describes the NCTC as providing "support" for the "Patterns" report, depicting the Department's annual report as the final stop on a terrorism data flow chart.
Moreover, Ms. Aguilar conceded at yesterday's briefing that numerous Department officials - including officials from the Department's Counterterrorism Center and the Department's Bureau for Intelligence and Research - had extensive involvement in the preparation of this terrorism data. Not only did they identify and submit information about specific terrorism incidents, but they also participated in an interagency adjudication process that had as its sole purpose determining whether these terrorist incidents met the statutory standards for inclusion in the Department's annual report.
We also learned at the briefing that the State Department failed to implement numerous recommendations made by the Inspector General last September that could have prevented questions about the data's origins and methodology from arising. For example, the Inspector General recommended that the data be distributed to State Department bureaus "at a minimum on a quarterly basis," enabling the bureaus to evaluate the data regularly.[6] The Inspector General also recommended that the State Department conclude a "Memorandum of Understanding" to govern how the Department obtains terrorism data from organizations outside the Department, including "complete minutes of meetings and notes on how decisions were made."[7] Ms. Aguilar reported yesterday that neither recommendation had been implemented over the past seven months.
The main rationale given by Ms. Aguilar for your decision to exclude the 2004 data from the Patterns of Global Terrorism report is that the terrorism data is not "relevant" to the report itself. With all due respect, this is a ludicrous position. As the Inspector General concluded last year, "The accuracy of the report is dependent on accurate and complete data."[8]
Conclusion
Last year, Bush Administration officials cited the annual terrorism data as an illustration of "the great progress that has been made in fighting terrorism."[9] Members of Congress and the public discovered that these statements were erroneous only because the underlying data on terrorist attacks was available for scrutiny.[10] In effect, your decision to withhold the data this year eliminates this vital check on the veracity of the Administration's claims.
The contrast between your approach and the approach of your predecessor, former Secretary of State Colin Powell, could not be more stark. To Secretary Powell's credit, he recognized that the 2003 report contained major errors. He withdrew the initial report, directed his staff to scrub the data for errors, discussed these problems personally with Members of Congress, including myself, and issued a revised report based on the most up-to-date information.[11] Although the revised report undercut the Administration's claims that terrorist attacks were declining, Secretary Powell never sought to hide behind the actions of another agency, avoid responsibility, or conceal data.
I urge you to follow Secretary Powell's example. The large increases in terrorist attacks reported in 2004 may undermine Administration claims of success in the war on terror, but political inconvenience has never been a legitimate basis for withholding facts from the American people.
Sincerely,
Rep. Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member « Close It
Treasury Department Designates Victor Bout Arms Network
By Andrew Cochran
"The U.S. Department of the Treasury today identified 30 companies and four individuals linked to Viktor Bout, an international arms dealer and war profiteer. Today's action took place pursuant to Executive Order 13348, which targets family members and associates of former Liberian President Charles Ghankay Taylor. Bout himself was designated under the same authority in July 2004 because his association with Taylor." Doug Farah will comment on this later today.
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Syria to Sign Counter-Terrorism Financing Convention: An Empty Gesture!
By Victor Comras
Syria has announced its intention to sign the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Financing. Under the treaty, states must "make the provision of such funding a criminal offence under their domestic laws, and confiscate assets allocated for terrorist purposes". Normally, this would be an important milestone in joining the international effort to combat terrorism. But, in Syrias case, it looks like another empty gesture. Syria has long proclaimed that there are no al Qaeda cells in Syria nor funds held there on its behalf (See Syria's Report to the 1267 Committee). And the counter terrorism financing treaty is not likely to deter Syria from providing funds to Iraqi insurgents, or to Hizballah, Hamas or the PFLP.
Syrias new found interest in supporting UN counter-terrorism measures, like its pull back from Lebanon, may just be part of a defensive gambit to defuse the intense pressure resulting from the Harari assassination and growing evidence linking Syria to the Iraq insurgency. The real test will be Syrias willingness to distance itself from the Iraq insurgents, and to cut off their channel of funds from Syria and Lebanon. Its even harder to imagine that Syria will sever its financial and other support ties to Hizballah, Hamas and the PFLP. In fact, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Shara has made it clear, time and again, that Syria considers these groups as freedom fighters and not terrorists. In the absence of a no wiggle-room definition of terrorism, Syrias signature on the Suppression of Terrorism Financing Convention is not likely to have an impact on its support for any of these groups.
Syrias role in the war on terrorism has been ambiguous at best. While it has provided some intelligence and interrogation assistance in dealing with al Qaeda, it remains high on the list of countries designated as supporting terrorism. Its links with Hizballah and the PFLP are as strong as ever. And funds continue to flow from Syria, along with volunteers, to fuel Zarqari and other Iraq insurgent groups. The U.S Treasury Department, last May,.designated the Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS) as a funding conduit for the Iraqi insurgents. CBS was also directly implicated in laundering money for Saddam Hussein and his regime, as part of the Oil for Food scandal. This, despite the fact that Syria has long exercised an iron hand of control over its state run banks, and the informal hawala system that operates within its borders.
Somalia Demonstrates How Vexing & Complex Immigration Issues Can Be
By Bill West
Remember the case of Somali alien Keyse Jama? He is the refugee who became a criminal alien in Minnesota who was placed in deportation proceedings and appealed his case all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, claiming he shouldnt be deported because Somalia has no viable national government that can officially accept his return. In January, he lostat least at the Supreme Court level (an issue covered in the CT Blog on 1/27).
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Yesterday, the Associated Press ran an interesting story about Jama. It seems the Feds, in duly attempting to execute their sworn duty to finally deport Jama, who, over four years, had fully exhausted his extensive legal appeals under U.S. law (yes, the very immigration laws and procedures that some media and special interest groups deem to be something akin to a draconian star chamber) and lost his case before the Nations highest Court, could not be physically removed to Somalia, after all.
But, it wasnt for lack of trying. According to the AP report, last week, ICE officials flew Jama to Kenya, where they turned him over to a private security firm for further transport to Bossasso, Somalia. When Jama got to Bossasso, authorities there refused to allow him to enter the country and he was ultimately returned to the custody of the ICE officers. He was then flown back to the United States, and remains in custody in the St. Paul, Minnesota area pending further decisions in his case.
The Supreme Court decided that, legally, there was no bar to the U.S. Government deporting Jama, or any other similarly situated deportable alien, to Somalia or any other country that just didnt happen to have a viable national government that would officially accept their return. There are about 3500 other Somalis under final removal orders who are no doubt anxiously waiting to see what happens in the Jama case. The rest of us should at least pay some attention, as well.
We probably dont need to imagine too hard who those authorities in Bossasso really were. Somalia is essentially a country divided into warlord fiefdoms. Bossasso was no doubt chosen by that contract security company as a place they thought they could most easily and quickly accomplish an entry, drop-off and departure with the minimum amount of payoff to the local gunmen at the airport. Something obviously did not go according to plan, and the private security escorts, possibly unarmed and undoubtedly outgunned even if they were armed, decided retreat in the face of whatever potential trouble they faced was the better part of valor.
The Jama case is significantly noteworthy because it highlights how complex immigration issues can be, particularly when dealing with volatile third world countries with a long history of terrorism and violence. Somalia, a hotbed of al-Qaeda sympathizers and operatives, with no viable government beyond heavily armed drug smuggling warlords overseeing their own chunk of geography, may be a place to where we can legally deport aliens, but actually doing that is clearly going to be another matter. The physical process of safely and securely moving human beings from here to there suddenly becomes a whole other issue.
And, that becomes an issue of foreign policy and even national security. Consider the options. If the United States cannot effectively deport these Somalis under this normal process, then what? How far do we go? Surely, with the utilization of enough military resourcesmilitary transport planes and armed troops for securitythese deportees could be flown in unannounced at remote locations, dropped off (deported) and the U.S. personnel then depart with relative safety. Is that an alternative we should really employ? And, that is an expensive alternative, which theoretically employs an armed military incursion each time we deport people. Then again, wheres the Somali government to resist or complain?
And, what if we do nothing and we dont deport those 3500 Somalis the Supreme Court now says we can legally remove? We can say were temporarily deferring their removal for humanitarian purposes. But, if we do that, we also run the risk of being perceived by many, not the least of which would be many in the radical Islamic world, of being afraid and incapable of conducting these deportations because ofwhat? The radical Muslim warlords controlling Somaliasome of whom are aligned with al-Qaeda? Is that really an option?
The case of Keyse Jama will remain one to watch. « Close It
Congresswoman: Saudi Prince's Visit Should Include Commitments on Terrorism
By Andrew Cochran
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is visiting President Bush's ranch in Texas at a sensitive time. A former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia says that the Saudis have assisted the U.S. in Lebanon, increased oil production at crucial times, and taken initial steps towards introducing democratic reforms. But the extent of Saudi cooperation in counterterrorism (or lack thereof) is getting overlooked in wire service stories (the linked AP story gives the last two sentences to the issue). Rep. Sue Kelly (R-NY) reminds us today in an op-ed and in the NYT's story on the visit that the Saudis have a long way to go before they can claim that they are fully engaged against Al Qaeda and other Islamic-based terrorists. Rep. Kelly chairs a key oversight committee in the U.S. House, founded a special task force on terrorist financing, and recently visited Saudi Arabia, where she met with senior Saudi leaders.
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She writes that, "No financial intelligence unit actually exists today in Saudi Arabia. This is unacceptable...The Saudis deserve a measure of credit for recently trying to place controls on their government-sponsored charities. But international Islamic charities based in Saudi Arabia are mostly unaffected...And while the Saudis have been perhaps more aggressive than any country in the region in urging its citizens to reject terrorism, it is still difficult to say a strong message has been delivered with regard to terror finance. The virtual absence of convictions for terror finance offenses in Saudi Arabia since 9/11 has often been mentioned." « Close It
Doug Farah in today's Washington Post on Charles Taylor: "A Protected Friend of Terrorism"
By Andrew Cochran
Today's Washington Post (free registration) includes an op-ed by Contributing Expert Doug Farah on the inaction by the Bush Administration against Charles Taylor, the former dictator of Liberia and indicted war criminal whom Doug also describes as "an abettor of al Qaeda and Hezbollah." Taylor will escape prosecution for his crimes unless the U.S. soon takes the lead in his extradition from Nigeria to Sierra Leone, where a special court awaits. The premier expert in the U.S. on Taylor's atrocities and his ties to terrorists, Doug has posted on this issue here and on his own site, which I encourage you to visit. An excerpt from today's op-ed on Taylor's brutality and alliances:
"Taylor's were brutal, vicious crimes. For more than a decade he presided over forces that murdered, raped and mutilated children; they also abducted children to use them as cannon fodder. He created "Small Boys Units" made up of specially trained children who, while high on amphetamines, were used to raze villages and murder civilians. He trained and supplied the Revolutionary United Front in neighboring Sierra Leone, whose signature atrocity was hacking off the arms, legs and ears of civilians, many of them children. Taylor also hosted diamond buyers from al Qaeda and Hezbollah for several years, allowing the two designated terrorist groups to earn and hide their wealth in an asset that is untraceable and easily convertible to cash."
This Week in Congress: Matthew Levitt & Lorenzo Vidino Testify on Islamic Extremism in Europe
By Andrew Cochran
Contributing Experts Matthew Levitt and Lorenzo Vidino will testify this week at a House International Relations Committee hearing on Islamic extremism in Europe. This week's open terrorism-related hearings in the U.S. Congress (downloadable Word file) include numerous USA Patriot Act and border security hearings and a Senate Banking Committee hearing on Bank Secrecy Act issues involving money service businesses. I will save selected hearing links in the "Events" box on the left sidebar.
Balancing Human Rights and Aggressive Tactics in the War on Terrorism
By Victor Comras
Now that the War on Terrorism is settling in for the long haul, there is a growing perception, at home and abroad, that counter-terrorism actions are taking a toll on human rights. More than one repressive regime has used the excuse of combating terrorism to clamp down on legitimate opposition groups. And several watchdog groups are beginning to questions some of the tactics being used by more democratic regimes. There are growing questions here and abroad, for example, on the use of rendition to pressure terrorist suspects, and with regard to the treatment of war on terrorism prisoners. The UN Commission on Human Rights has just established a new international Special Rapporteur and given him a broad mandate to oversee and report on human rights abuses related to the conduct of the war on terrorism.
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Preservation of human rights in the war on terrorism was a key topic at both the Riyadh and Madrid Conferences, and in Secretary-General Kofi Annans new counter-terrorism strategy. It was also reflected at this weeks general session of the UN Commission on Human Rights which agreed to appoint, for three years, a Special Rapporteur to oversee and report on the effects counter-terrorism actions are having on human rights. His mandate includes gathering information on relevant human rights violations, and on making recommendations concerning best practices on measures to counter terrorism that respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The delegates to the Madrid Conference recognized that we owe it to the victims to ensure that law enforcement agencies are given adequate power and resources to bring terrorists to justice. Yet, they added, they must never sacrifice the principles they are dedicated to defend. Measures to counter terrorism should fully respect international standards of human right and the rule of law.
Achieving such compatibility between effective police and military actions and human rights safeguards has not been an easy task. Normal police and investigative methods are often not sufficient to obtain from fanatical terrorists the vital information necessary to prevent an horrendous attack. This has led some countries, including the United States, to sometimes seek to side-step the human rights issue. Rendition is a case in point.
Rendition involves turning over suspected foreign terrorists to their country of origin, or a third country, for interrogation and possible incarceration. One motivation for such action is to put greater pressure on the suspect to divulge information. In several cases, suspects picked up in the United States and abroad by US agents were turned over to foreign governments whose standards of interrogation were, at the least, questionable.
In 1998, Congress passed legislation declaring that it is the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration relaxed restrictions on rendition as part of its more aggressive counter-terrorism posture after 9/11. Then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, argued that rendition, in appropriate cases, was justified in order to provide the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against American civilians.
This practice is now coming in for increased criticism from both within and outside the US government. Several Members of Congress have called on the Bush administration to sharply curtail this practice. Congressman Ed Markey (D) Massachusetts recently introduced legislation that would prohibit direct or indirect use of the rendition technique by the United States. But, while CIA Director Porter Goss has come in for some sharp questioning about the practice, Congress still appears to want to stay away from confronting the administration on this issue. « Close It
Another terrorist "goes down"
By Mike Chandler
Saajid Badat, a fellow shoe-bomber accomplice of Richard Reid was sentenced today at London's Old Bailey to 13 years in jail having been found guilty of plotting to blow-up a transatlantic airliner. Once again the message to the terrorists is that " terrorism does not pay!"
From across "the pond"
By Mike Chandler
The trial that has started in Spain of a number of individuals suspected of being members of al-Qaida and/or an al-Qaida cell, highlights the amount of time and effort that is necessary in attempting to achieve a soundly based conviction against terrorists and/or would be terrorists and their sympathisers. The length and painstaking aspects of this process were also emphasised last week with the conviction and sentencing of Kamel Bourgass in London "...for plotting to spread ricin (poison)... on the UK's streets."
Even though four individuals suspected of involvement in the same conspiracy were found not guilty by the jury in the case, others in UK and certain European countries are under investigation for terrorist related activities. Some will eventually go to trial, some will possibly be released without going to trial. The important point is that at the first level, the tactical level, it is crucial to maintain the pressure on the terrorist groups. Terrorists and would-be terrorists need to clearly understand that "terrorism does not pay". Similarly, the terrorists' supporters, sympathisers and financiers need to know that "paying for terrorism also does not pay!"
Disrupting the terrorists efforts and plans, whilst not a guarantee against further attacks, does nonetheless keep them 'on-the-hop' and goes some way to ensuring that they can only continue to operate with considerable difficulty. This is all the more important due to concerns that a number of jihadists fighting coalition forces and their allies in Iraq, might carry-out terrorist attacks after they return to the European country of their 'adopted' citizenship. Some individuals have been identified, suspected of having links to groups connected with Iraq, e.g. al-Tawhid . Hence the threat posed by trans-national terrorism, rather than al-Qaida per se has to be seen for what it is and treated accordingly. We saw what happened after the Soviet departure from Afghanistan, with mujahidin taking their jihad to Bosnia and Chechnya and, more recently the movements after the over throw of the Taliban regime. Many of the Afghan-Arabs who had been in Afghanistan came to Europe where they either joined existing al-Qaida cells or formed new ones, be they of an operational or supporting nature.
U.S. Shuts Off "Dirty" Latvian Banks & Regulators Issue Important Bank Secrecy Act Letter
By Andrew Cochran
The Treasury Department and other federal financial regulators effectively shut off access to the U.S. financial system for two banks in Latvia today. By applying Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, called "the smart bomb of terrorist financing" by a former Treasury Department General Counsel, the U.S. government is ordering U.S. financial institutions to cease doing business with to Multibanka and VTF Bank, the two named banks, for their alleged enabling of financial fraud and money laundering. Personally, I hope the regulators apply Section 311 sanctions more often against those banks which enable the easy transmission of terrorist funds, and the regulators and law enforcement already know of candidates. Near the end of the above-linked press release, you'll note that Section 311 has been seldom applied. The Senate Banking Committee is holding a Bank Secrecy Act oversight hearing next Tuesday, and I hope the Senators use the opportunity to ask the regulators to clearly state the criteria upon which a Section 311 sanctions decision is made and why it hasn't been applied more often.
The regulators also issued an important letter this week, available on the internet for the first time here, to the banks and their state regulators about the consistency of banking examinations. They replied to concerns in a letter sent on January 10 by the banks (represented by the American Banking Association) and all state banking regulators (and which was also available for the first time here)
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In that letter, the ABA and state regulators requested clarity and more consistency in federal BSA examination procedures. They wrote, "(T)he lack of consistency in examination oversight and compliance guidance is a major theme of regulatory complaints received by ABA and the state banking associations." While pledging to work with the industry to avoid confusion and defensive filing of BSA-required disclosures, the FBAs (federal banking regulators) has something interesting to add about another federal agency which did not sign the letter:
"It is also important to consider the role of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in BSA-related enforcement matters. The FBAs and FinCEN believe that the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) process is a valuable tool in the civil regulatory and criminal enforcement scheme. Currently, we are working with our colleagues at DOJ to attempt to better define the value and appropriate uses of SARs as well as the appropriate role for criminal prosecutions of banks under the BSA. We are hopeful that this effort will result in a clear and consistent approach that will alleviate some of the concerns that have led to defensive SAR filings."
This is another tacit admission of what has been obvious in public conferences this year - that the Justice Department does not think that it should be held responsible for any confusion. The industry became very upset when a U.S. Attorney in Mississippi prosecuted AmSouth last year without a prior regulatory action or DOJ headquarters review. As I posted on April 13, that led to an effort to take the prosecutorial discretion for BSA bank prosecutions away from the U.S. Attorneys in the field and centralize it at DOJ headquarters. Although that effort has support in Washington, the industry shouldn't think that DOJ will just step out of BSA prosecutions. As far as DOJ prosecutors are concerned, the industry had many years after the BSA was passed to prepare their systems to avoid criminal prosecutions, and the banks and the FBAs ought to do their job and let DOJ do theirs.
Moreover, DOJ is not the only player in the field. The DHS Office of Immigrations & Customs Enforcement (ICE) has begun a vigorous nationwide task force to investigate money service businesses, with big cases in Philadelphia this weekend and the Rahim Bariek indictment in northern Virginia last week. I can't expect that new DHS Secretary Chertoff, a former federal prosecutor who was instrumental in the pursuing the corporate fraud prosecutions, will tell his ICE agents to back off and let the regulators and banks work things out. « Close It
Larry Johnson: "The Demise of Counterterrorism" (UPDATED for wire story)
By Andrew Cochran
Larry Johnson, currently on travel, asked me to post this update on the terrorism report controversy, with information about terrorism in Kashmir and a recommendation for the top State Department counterterrorism job:
The recent furor generated by the State Department's decision to cease publishing a glossy report on international terrorism and let the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) handle the statistics and questions by themselves is symptomatic of a much deeper problem--lack of leadership on the counterterrorism issue. (UPDATE: Rep. Henry Waxman asked the State Department Inspector General to investigate the decision on the report.) Since the departure of Cofer Black in December 2004 the Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism has been vacant. While career foreign service officers have been tabbed to fill the role in an "acting" capability, the fact remains that there is no one with the clout or mandate to do the job of coordinating the foreign policy communities response to international terrorism.
This is not, as some might argue, a battle over turf. Although the National Counter Terrorism Center has received a legislative mandate to coordinate terrorist issues, managing policy within the bowels of State Department requires someone who is in the building and has the ear of the Secretary of State.
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A State Department official commenting on the decision to not publish the statistics on international terrorism said they would let NCTC worry about the statistics and State would do the "policy". Really? How can you formulate a coherent policy if you don't know what the numbers are? Who is doing the killing? In which countries are there attacks where terrorists are killing and wounding scores of people? One of the uncomfortable answers buried in the data concerns the attacks in Kashmir. The groups responsible for these attacks--e.g., the Lashkar Tayibba, the Harakat ul-Ansar--have received funding and support from elements of Pakistan's intelligence service. In the past these groups were training in Afghanistan alongside Al Qaida. In other words one of our key allies in the war on terrorism has been a sponsor of terrorism.
This is but one example of the unpleasant, difficult policy issues that lurk behind the so-called meaningless statistics. Until you have someone at the State Department in a leadership position who understands that the numbers matter you will not have an effective policy to combat terrorism. For now the policy is adrift.
What should Condi do? For starters she might want to consider naming her buddy Phil Zelikow as the new Coordinator for Counter Terrorism. He is the right man for the job--he has access to Condi and knows the issues. However, I fear Zelikow would view this as a step down from his current perch. That, my friends, speaks volumes about the gulf between the lip service being provided to fighting the war on terrorism and the actual commitment to put some bodies on the line that can make a difference.
So, as State Department continues to tap dance about justifying not putting out a public report that provides specific data on the level of international terrorism around the world, perhaps Secretary Rice could better spend her time by naming a new Coordinator that has the clout to get something done, including putting out reports with good analysis and accurate numbers. « Close It
R.P. Eddy: "Look for Nuclear Weapons in the RDD Haystack"
By Andrew Cochran
Contributing Expert R.P. Eddy, former senior U.N. and N.S.C. counterterrorism official, asked me to post this for him:
From a story by Bill Gertz in yesterday's Washington Times: Recurrent intelligence reports say al Qaeda terrorist Abu Musab Zarqawi has obtained a nuclear device or is preparing a radiological explosive -- or dirty bomb -- for an attack.. The classified reports say Zarqawi, al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, has stored the nuclear device or dirty bomb in Afghanistan.
While reports of terrorists possessing either an RDD or a nuclear weapon are bad news, credible intelligence of terrorists overseas possessing the latter would be cause for defensive measures approaching a lock-down of our borders and a massive increase in federal and policing activity.
On the other hand, credible intelligence of terrorists with an RDD overseas should cause nothing near the same level of response. It is quite likely a terrorist can assemble an RDD in nearly any industrialized city - here or abroad. Radioactive waste is a by-product of mining, medicine, even dentistry. For this reason, to learn that they have created an RDD overseas would make me think the intended target is overseas as well - why go to the trouble to transport it to the US when they can make one here? (An exception would be if they came upon stores of some of the most highly toxic radioactive materials that are better protected in the US.)
So in a resource constrained environment, how to prioritize and act on information that mentions radioactive material? Is the threat nearly a show-stopper or is it simply newsworthy?
New Videos from Zarqawi/Al-Qaida in Iraq
By Evan Kohlmann
Al-Qaida's Committee in Iraq--led by wanted Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi--has released the following video footage since April 16 of artillery launches, roadside bombs, and suicide car bombings on U.S. military forces stationed in Iraq. In at least one suicide bombing, the "martyr" was identified as Abu Shaheed al-Lubnani, indicating that he was a foreign fighter from Lebanon.
Click to view video c/o |