Counterterrorism Blog

by
Larry C. Johnson

The unfortunate impression left by the recent report on intelligence failures submitted by the Robb/Silbermann commission suggests that the CIA in general failed. Yet, as noted in a previous post on this site, we need to go beyond the generalities and look for the specifics of who failed. We need to look at the chain of command from the top down at CIA and ask who, if anyone, has been held accountable. The short answer is, not many. Keep on reading for specifc names.

For starters we have George "Slam Dunk" Tenet. Tenet had the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that all intelligence provided to the President was thoroughly vetted and challenged. Tenet sent mixed messages. He did intervene in the fall of 2002 to stop the White House from misusing bogus intellligence about Iraq's alleged effort to acquire uranium from Niger. Then, did a complete reversal in January and February of 2003, and allowed this info to stay in the President's State of the Union Address. Tenet is gone but got the medal of freedom for his "excellent" work. Message to analysts, if you screw up but are a loyal team player you will be rewarded.

The Deputy Director for Intelligence until December 2004 was Jamie Miscik. Jamie is a nice lady and would be a good neighbor. But she too failed to do her job and did not aggressively probe analysts writing on WMD issues about the strength and veracity of their sources. She got the top job in the analytical community thanks to making a favorable impression on Tenet while assigned to the NSC in the mid-1990s. How much blame should Miscik shoulder for the debacle in Iraq? Some, particularly to the extent that she failed to insist that analysis based on faulty sources should have been subjected to greater scrutiny. Nonetheless she does not deserve a lot of blame because the much maligned October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate was generated in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) by old hands who were not under her control.

It is astonishing at this juncture that there has not been a major shake up at the NIC. In fact, those responsible for the sections with the most errors are still on the job and, in one instance, given more authority. The principal drafters of the October 2002 NIE were Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation; Lawrence K. Gershwin, the National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology; retired Army Maj. Gen. John R. Landry, National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Military Issues, and Paul R. Pillar, NIO for the Near East and South Asia. Walpole oversaw the entire effort but had specific responsibility for nuclear issues. Gershwin handled issues related to biological weapons, Gordon focused on chemical weapons, and Pillar dealt with the issues pertaining to international terrorism.

Of the four, the one who got it right in the estimate was Paul Pillar. Yet, both President Bush and Vice President Cheney have continued to insist that Pillar's judgments on terrorism were wrong. Fortunately for Pillar his judgments have been endorsed by the Senate Intelligence Committee and the 9-11 Commission, among others. But Pillar is not out of danger. Only he has been attacked by reporters who are perceived as mouthpieces for the Bush Administration (Robert Novak and John Roberts). He has been called disloyal for the simple act of providing an assessment of what was happening in Iraq that did not square with the wishful thinking and rosy scenarios emanating from the West Wing of the White House. Message to analysts, be careful about telling the truth to the President because you will be accused of being disloyal.

What has been the fate of Walpole, Gershwin, and Landry? Even though they presided over a sloppy NIE that was used in part to justify the war in Iraq, they are still on the job. In fact, Gershwin and Landry were given the task in the fall of 2003 of doing the review of their respective parts about what went wrong in the 2002 October estimate. Not bad, when you screw up you get to do the post-mortem to find out what went wrong. Gershwin now has the job of National Intelligence Officer for Intelligence Assurance. Message to analysts, even if you write a bad estimate you will get a promotion.

The President, regardless of political affiliation, needs an intelligence community that will tell him or her uncomfortable truths. If President Bush is serious about fixing the problems in the intelligence community he needs to start with a house cleaning at the NIC. Messrs. Walpole, Gershwin and Landry should be fired. That would send a clear message to the analysts that sloppy work based on questionable sources and weak assumptions will be punished. At this point, however, no one of any consequence has been called on the carpet.

I am afraid, however, that those guys will skate and that Paul Pillar will be fingered for blame. Firing Pillar would send the wrong message, namely, if you tell the President truths that go against the Administration's policy goals you will be punished. Analysts still on the job are watching carefully how this plays out. Fixing the problems at throughout the intelligence community starts with insisting officers be held accountable and that accountablility starts at the top.