Sectarian Conflict and Terrorism in Indonesia

By Zachary Abuza

In early April 2005, Indonesian police announced that they had captured a letter written by a Sumatran-based JI cell to one of the organization�s leader�s and top bomb-maker, Dr. Azahari bin Husin. The author of the 7-page letter written in a mix of Bahasa and pidgin Arabic, not only mentioned that bomb-making materiel was being stockpiled, but that there was a 12-man cell preparing to become shaheeds (martyrs). The letter explained to the leader that in both materiel and mental preparation the �plans were well advanced.� JI is down, but it certainly is not out. Though they aspire to increase their rate of attack, which now occur on a roughly one-year timetable, there is little evidence to suggest that they are capable of speeding up that timetable in the near future.

While they attempt to build more bombs, they need to also focus on regrouping and recruiting new members to fill their depleted ranks. JI�s primary strategy to do this is to foment sectarian conflict. Unfortunately further evidence has emerged in the past few days.

In October 2004, 123 IEDs were discovered in a cache hidden in a Muslim cemetery outside of Poso. On 28 March 2005, Indonesian police raided safe houses used by Islamic militants in Ambon, seizing a cache of some 95 IEDs and ammunition.

Then, on 24 April, another sectarian conflict flared in Mamasa Regency in Central Sulawesi. A gang of Muslim �Kommandos� torched houses in a Christian community, killing six. The first suspect arrested in conjunction with the attacks admitted his �plans to carry out terror attacks and bombings across the country.� His arrests were followed by two bombings in April in Poso.

On 2 May 2005, Indonesian police arrested three suspects wanted in conjunction with the August 2003 bombing of the JW Marriott in Jakarta. [12 people have already been sentenced in conjunction with the attack]. Alarmingly, the arrest took place in a small village outside of Poso, Sulawesi. The three were in possession of detonators, two IEDs, two handguns, rifles and ammo, 16 VCDs about Osama bin Laden, five instruction books on jihad, a book on the sectarian conflict in Ambon, and several bomb-making manuals.

All three, as well as a fourth who escaped, were involved in not only the sectarian bloodletting in Ambon in 1999-2000, but also the 24 April attacks in Mamasa. We have a clear connection between the same people engaged in both �international jihad� and sectarian conflict. The three were not disaffected locals, but educated individuals all in their mid-thirties. While one was a religious teacher, one was had an engineering background and had studied in Australia, wile the third was a computer expert.

Clearly militant seek to spoil the fragile peace in the Malukus and Sulawesi, and provoke a heavy-handed government response, affirming to the moderate majority that the government is corrupt and anti-Muslim.

With sectarian conflict also on the rise in both Mindanao, Philippines and Southern Thailand, where over 600 people have been killed since fighting commenced in January 2004, it is clear JI seeks to create a broader conflict, to instill their Manichean world view, and create a new generation of recruits who are ready to wage jihad in defense of their religion.

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