Edgy in Jakaarta

By Zachary Abuza

"The embassy has learned that as of June 1, 2005, there were plans by extremists to conduct bomb attacks targeting the lobbies of hotels frequented by Westerners in Jakarta. The attacks were to occur circa noon on an unspecified date," the US embassy announced in a media statement. The Australian government announced a similar warning on the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade�s website. Neither government provided details regarding their warnings. But the Indonesian National Police chief Gen. Dai Bachtiar provided slightly more details in his own warning: "Their [Jemaah Islamiyah�s] communications show they are intensively planning to launch more attacks." He continued, "We think Azahari [JI�s most notorious bomb maker] and his people are just outside Jakarta," Today, the Indonesian press reported that security forces are searching for five suspect vehicles � all with Jakarta license plates - in or coming from the city of Indramayu (along the northern coast of Java, 175 kilometers east of Jakarta). All this builds upon concerns raised several months ago when Indonesian security forces seized a letter from a Sumatra-based JI cell that informed the leadership that the 12 members were prepared to be martyrs and that the bomb materiel had been procured.

What to make of these statements and reports?

First, it is clear that JI is poised to strike, and to strike against a perceived Western target in the capital of Jakarta. Despite being on the run, JI still has the ability to recruit new members, including willing shaheeds, and procure the bomb-making components.

Second, it supports the testimony of a JI member captured after the September 2004 bombing that the leaders of JI seek to increase the tempo of bombings to once every 6 months. To date they have been able to only launch attacks on a roughly annual basis. While the 6th month goal came and went, it is understandable, in the context of the intense counter-terror operations that are being waged against JI. The leaders are determined to up the tempo in order to destabilize the Indonesian government and economy.

Third, this has all taken place at the same time, there has been a spike in JI-led sectarian violence in Central Sulawesi and the Malukus, including the capture of more than 200 IEDs, several bombings, arson attacks that killed six, and a bomb in Tentana, Central Sulawesi, that killed 22, on 28 May 2005. The 2 May 2005, arrests of three suspects wanted in conjunction with the August 2003 bombing of the JW Marriott in Jakarta, in a small village outside of Poso, Sulawesi, were also responsible for some of the sectarian bloodletting in Ambon in 1999-2000, but also the 24 April attacks in Mamasa. Thus, we have a clear connection between the same people engaged in both �international jihad� and sectarian conflict.

Fourth, and on a positive note, the fact that security forces are making these intercepts is very important. Intelligence on JI has improved dramatically; and from an outside perspective, it seems that the responsible governments are cooperating at an unprecedented level.

In short, while JI prepares to bomb its way back into the headlines, their primary focus of attention will remain on fomenting sectarian conflicts in order to rebuild their depleted ranks. While the intelligence has improved, JI remains one of the most lethal affiliates of Al Qaeda, poised to strike for the fourth time since October 2002.

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