"Old Wine in New Bottles" - Latest Al-Qaida Sanctions resolution lacks real bite!

By Mike Chandler

Despite the spin, those states, organisations and individuals that had, perhaps optimistically, anticipated a new, tougher and more comprehensive Security Council resolution against al-Qaida, will be disappointed. Resolution 1617 (2005), adopted on Friday morning, 29th July 2005 in New York, really has very little new to offer. There are some new guidelines for designating al Qaeda and Taliban associates, and there is much �encouraging� and �urging� in the resolution, but there are no new obligations or enforcement measures. And even the new urgings are based largely on recommendations dating back to 2002 and 2003 and the work of the previous Monitoring Group.

In the preamble for example, �1617� ��Expresses [the Council's] concern over the possible use by Al-Qaida�of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)�� (a misnomer in this context seeing that the terrorists usually use them offensively, to attack unarmed civilian aircraft). The Council was alerted to such a problem requiring its attention in December 2003 (see para. 200) of report S/2003/1070 here Similarly, the new resolution �Requests relevant States to inform�individuals and entities included in the Consolidate List of the measures imposed on them�� This request, again not obligatory, was recommended in December 2003 (see paragraph 192) of report S/2003/1070. But if the sanctions regime is to be effective member states should at least undertake to know, or try to find out, where their UN Designated citizens are located. They should attune themselves also to the location and circumstances of designated entities operating in their jurisdiction, and they should be obliged to take the appropriate steps to ensure the measures are fully implemented against them. Even longer �in the pipeline� have been suggestions that the UN Security Council incorporate the Financial Action Task Force�s (FATF) Nine Recommendations on Terrorist Financing here . Recommendations to this effect feature in the Monitoring Group�s reports as far back as September 2002 (see para. 138) here and were repeated again in its last report in December 2003 (see para.180), S.2003/1070.

It remains to be seen if the new, more expansive definition of �...individuals...or entities associated with al-Qaida..." and the Taliban will result in any significant additions to the UN list of designated individuals and entities. The new terms appear to be intended to �clarify� those entities and individuals that require to be designated for their association with, or support for, al-Qaida. The Consolidated List continues to represent but a small sub-set of the al-Qaida network as a whole and many of its supporters and sympathisers remain subject to none of the required measures. Instead of spreading the net, the wording may only encourage those states reluctant to designate to be even more specific and pedantic in their approach, thus enabling those who finance, recruit and/or train to continue with impunity.

Two paragraphs in the latest resolution make reference to Interpol. In the preamble states are encouraged ��to work in the framework of Interpol�" in regards to that organisation's database of stolen and lost travel documents. The requirement would seem to be such a basic adjunct to good police work, especially when dealing with a trans-national terrorist threat, that one questions why it is not happening already, that is if it is not?

But, perhaps the greatest lacuna in �1617� is that there is still no return to the accountability or 'name and shame� authority as was contained in earlier resolutions that empowered an independent monitoring to group to oversee and report on what countries were actually doing to carry out the Security Council directed measures. Full compliance has always been a touchy subject in the UN system. Past experience has shown that when a state has been named in an open report to the Security Council for failing to fully implement sanctions related to Al-Qaida and its associates, even though they might try and explain the charges away, they do, quite often, take steps to remedy ��any incomplete implementation of the [required] measures�� Unfortunately the current Monitoring Team�s mandate precludes such intrusive activity, especially as its guidelines require it to clear any aspect of a report with the State concerned before the report is submitted to the �1267� Committee.

Coming as it does on the heels of the London Bombings, and an almost daily round of horrendous terrorist atrocities in Iraq linked through Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to al-Qaida, we had the right to expect a much tougher resolution.

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