Counterterrorism Blog

The July 7, 2005 London mass transit bombings gave a fresh jolt to the international community and underscored the continuing need to beef up the international response to terrorism. British, European and other world leaders expressed anew their determination to broaden and increase the effectiveness of international counter-terrorism effort. This included a call for a more stringent application of current measures as well as new steps to hold all countries accountable (See Gordon Brown July 12th EU Statements). EU Justice/Interior Ministers meeting in Brussels also pledged to accelerate their own counter-terrorism efforts. So, what should we now expect from the United Nations? First, and foremost, that the United Nations General Assembly will quickly lay before the international community a new comprehensive anti-terrorism convention containing a clear and unequivocal definition of terrorism. A draft new resolution is also circulating among Security Council members to further strengthen the application of measures against al Qaeda and the Taliban. And additional steps are also being considered to re-invigorate the UN’s Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC). But the outcome of these proposals remain in doubt and, taken together, these new steps may continue to fall short when it comes to holding laggard countries accountable. The Chairmen of both the CTC and the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions today reported to the Security Council on the progress being made under their current mandates.

The General Assembly's Sixth Committee has been studying adoption of such a convention for years. And it has continually been hung up the issue of a terrorism definition. But, there is new impetus now for such a definition and comprehensive convention. And Secretary General Kofi Annan, has strongly urged that the group “unite behind the clear definition of terrorism” proposed earlier this year by the UN’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. That panel called for a definition that would make it clear that “any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.” This language is supported by the United States and other G-8 members, but questioned by several Middle East and other governments that continue to support so called “freedom fighters” even though they continue to employ terrorism tactics.

The Security Council also has an important role to play in beefing up its response to international terrorism. The mission of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its new Executive Directorate (CTED) continues to languish, suffering from a lack of direction and qualified staff. The CTC was originally intended to serve as a platform for mutual assistance and international cooperation in tracking down and prosecuting terrorists. It was also charged with assisting member countries in drafting new laws and regulations to combat terrorism. But, its efforts were dissipated by an inability to engage countries in any meaningful dialogue concerning their counter-terrorism activities. The Security Council sought to revitalize the CTC with a new mandate in resolution 1566 (2004), but the group still remains short-staffed and its work continues to lack clear direction.

The Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee continues to play an important role in maintaining and deseminating a list of identified al Qaeda and Taliban members and associated individuals and entities. This list provides the basis for State action against these individuals and entities, which according to Security Council Resolutions includes imposing and policing specific sanctions measures aimed at freezing their assets, curbing their mobility and cutting off their access to weapons and explosives. The United States is now circulating a new draft resolution to beef up this operation. According to press reports, the draft resolution proposes new language to “more precisely” define the criteria for designating individuals or entities on this UN list. But, one must be careful that such additional criteria does not just make it more time consuming and difficult to place known al Qaeda operatives or supporters on the UN list.

The draft resolution also requests that Interpol integrate the UN list into its own look-out data base. Absent from the draft, however, are any new provisions that would expand or tighten further the measures now applied to al Qaeda and Taliban members and associates. An earlier draft sought to strengthen the role of the Committee’s monitoring team by charging it with identifying countries which failed to implement the measures. This provision was apparently dropped in the face of Committee opposition. The result is that the draft now circulating continues to retain close Committee control over the monitoring team reducing any likelihood that it might play an effective “name and shame” role. These control measures include requirements that the Monitoring Team submit a comprehensive programme of work to the Committee for its review and approval, consult with States prior to traveling to their country, consult with such states again following their trip and "take into account" their comments with regard to any references made concerning them in their report. In addition the Monitoring teams final reports are subject to debate, review and approval by the committee before issuance and release. (See resolution 1526 (2004) and annex thereto). This writer, for one, believes these extensive "political controls" can only impede the important task of the Monitoring Team to monitor and report on the actual implementation by States of the measures against al Qaeda. They must be relaxed if the Monitoring Team is truly to carry out its important mandate in an objective and transparent manner.