Counterterrorism Blog

There has been a lot of press in the past few weeks about the growing terrorist threat in Southeast Asia. The region is clearly jittery. In May Philippine authorities seized a cache of more ton of ammonium nitrate in a Manila warehouse. Earlier this month, two bombs wounded 30 people in Zamboanga city. On 28 August the ASG detonated another bomb on a ferry that had 300 passengers. Last year a similar bomb killed 116 people, the most lethal attack in Southeast Asia since the Bali blast. Though no one was killed in last Sunday’s bombing, more than 30 were wounded and inter-island transport, the impoverished archipelago's prime means of transit, slowed. The situation is as tense in Indonesia, where President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has recently warned that terrorist attacks are imminent. Earlier this week, a bomb-scare shut down the British Embassy in Jakarta. Indeed, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), though degraded, has the capability to execute one major attack a year (Bali October 2002, JW Mariott August 2003, and the Australian embassy September 2004). As the last bombing was one year ago, we are due for a major attack. Indonesian police recently intercepted a letter from one cell leader to the JI leadership that they are ready and able: Explosives had been procured and 12 martyrs (shaheeds) readied.

But the real reason for concern is that there is a significant degree of technology transfer going on. Simply put, more people have more sophisticated and lethal bomb technology.

The Abu Sayyaf is a case in point. Training, conducted by JI members in MILF camps (including two of JI’s top bomb-makers, Dulmatin and Umar Patek), have substantially improved the lethality and sophistication of their bombs. Throughout the 1990s, their primary means of attack were with hand-grenades and rocket-propelled grenades. More recently, they have learnt from the MILF how to improvise bombs from mortar shells. In this year’s triple bombings on Valentines Day, they used 105mm howitzer shells. JI-designed bombs that have been used in Indonesian, triggered by circuit boards and mobile phone are now routinely used. On two occasions Philippine security forces have intercepted/seized blueprints for a Bali-style truck bomb; once in an ASG safe house, and once on a JI member entering the country with an ASG escort. A small car bomb was employed in an attack on an airport in Mindanao in February 2003. In last weekend’s attack, the bomb was a mixture of ammonium nitrate and black gunpowder, designed to cause a fire rather than create a large powerful explosion; a very different bomb than the 11lb TNT bomb used in the February 2004 bombing of the SuperFerry. Earlier this year, Philippine security forces raided an ASG safehouse and found C4 explosives melted down and injected into toothpaste tubes and shampoo bottles. They concluded that these small bombs were intended for use on planes. The Associated Press reports that Philippine intelligence officials had concluded that JI had passed on the formulas for eight different types of bombs to the ASG and MILF.

Learning is also evident in the case of the Thai militants. The average size of bombs in the first half of 2004, was around 2-3 kilograms. By the end of the year, the average was closer to 5 kilogram, and the triggering devices had become far more sophisticated. Mobile phone detonators have become the norm. There has been considerable variation in bomb composition, including, Ammonium nitrate, C4, etc. In the summer of 2004, insurgents attempted to employ accelerants, such as tanks of cooking propane to their bombs. Insurgents have used time-delayed bombs to target security services; and in one case, a bomb was rigged to the victim’s car door. Learning comes from all quarters: at the height of the Iraqi insurgency, Thai militants began to employ roadside IEDs beginning in August 2004. Al Qaeda manuals down-loaded from the internet have been recovered in Thai madrassas. Militants are now able to manufacture bombs up to 10K on a regular basis. In February 2005, they detonated their first car bomb.

In short, while Al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan no longer exist, technological transfer by personal instruction and the internet is transforming terrorism. In Southeast Asia, we can see a range of size, composition and detonating devices, allowing the terrorists to tailor-make bombs for certain situations and to avoid detection.