The GSPC cell arrested in France was onto major acts of terror

By Olivier Guitta

On Monday, French authorities arrested an Islamist cell in the suburbs of Paris and in Normandy that was planning attacks on the Paris metro, airport and the DST- rough equivalent of the FBI- HQ. Among those arrested is a well-known Algerian terrorist, Safe Bourada. Indeed, Bourada was sentenced in 1998 to a ten-year jail term because of its active involvement in the 1995 terrorist attacks in Paris. He had recruited one of the main actors of the GIA terrorist wave Khaled Kelkal. He also has been in contact with Rachid Ramda, the financier of the 1995 attacks jailed in London and that Britain has refused to extradite so far. Coming out of jail in 2003, he was right away watched by the police.After receiving tips from Algeria at the beginning of this month, French police acted because of the potential imminent threats. In fact, one of the arrested members of the cell confirmed the three targets and added that his group was planning attacks against other European countries. Also, some of the members of this group traveled to Lebanon to gain explosives expertise. And they even thought about launching a chemical or biological attack, using ricin but gave up because of the complexity of the technical aspect. France has been considering the GSPC -an offshoot of the GIA- as its biggest threat especially after July when the US informed the French about the alliance between Zarqawi and the GSPC. And also after the recent GSPC message qualifying France as number one enemy of the Algerian terror group.

The implication of a recidivist demonstrates the importance of more severe jail sentences in terrorism cases. And fortunately that�s what the new French law is envisioning: in this case instead of ten years, Bourada would get 20.

Advice to NYFD: Scrub Your "Islamic Society" Before Picking Your Next Muslim Chaplain

By Andrew Cochran

"The fire department's new Muslim chaplain abruptly resigned Friday after saying in a published interview that a broader conspiracy, not 19 al-Qaida hijackers, may have been responsible for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks." Well, that was a wise and honorable thing for the chap to do, after he embarrassed the fine men and women of the NYFD with his ridiculous comments. But the first fault lies with the NYFD for its lack of oversight of its own Islamic Society, which recommended Intikab Habib and several other imams for the job. The NYFD suffers from the same problem as the Federal Bureau of Prisons - they didn't determine how the imams were being educated, what they were reading, and what they were learing on their overseas trips to Saudi Arabia. So I recommend that the NYFD start the search by asking outside experts to do a top-to-bottom audit of the NYFD Islamic Society and tell them whether Wahabbism has infected it to the point of no return. I can recommend a number of such experts on the left sidebar of this site.

Abu Azzam al-Iraqi: In His Own Words

By Evan Kohlmann

Given the controversy that has erupted--and in an attempt to shed more light on the precise role of Abu Azzam al-Iraqi within Al-Qaida's Committee in Iraq--I am now making available a transcript of comments that Abu Azzam made during an Al-Qaida video recording released in December 2004.  Ironically, the hooded Abu Azzam was featured in the video discussing the life and death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's former top deputy in Iraq, Jordanian Abu Anas al-Shami (a.k.a. Omar Yousef Jumah), who was killed in a U.S. airstrike near Abu Ghraib prison on September 16, 2004.  Certainly, given the context of Abu Azzam's remarks and his mere presence on the film, he was an important Al-Qaida commander with an established pedigree and a direct relationship with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  However, Abu Azzam is described in the video merely as an Al-Qaida "commander" and veteran of the year-long battle for Fallujah in 2004.  At least as of December 2004, he is ascribed no specific importance in Zarqawi's chain-of-command--other than that Zarqawi preferred that he remain in a non-combat role.

In the future, if the Pentagon and White House want to avoid this silly numbers controversy, they should take the sage advice of my colleague Doug Farah and simply steer clear of misleading and irrelevant hierarchical representations of non-hierarchical terrorist groups.  I admit that I'm a bit baffled as to why it has taken them this long to recognize that for themselves.

Whitewashing Saudi Arabia time and again

By Olivier Guitta

After Andy�s post re the fundraising on Saudi TV for terrorists, one should or should not be surprised by Karen Hughes� statement while visiting Saudi King Abdullah.
She stated:
I salute the Kingdom�s efforts to work with us to combat terrorism. I am proud of the excellent relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States and the exceptional cooperation between the two countries. Despite occasional disagreements, we have much in common.
This echoed the memo from President Bush to Condi Rice indicating, �I attest to that Saudi Arabia is cooperating in the global war on terrorism.�
This stance is a major return to that sixty-year old policy of collusion with the royal family.

If that was not enough, the recent deal the US negotiated with Saudi Arabia regarding this country�s access to the WTO did not include two major clauses:
- Saudi Arabia would accept to stop the boycott of Israel
- Saudi Arabia would implement additionnal measures to fight terrorism and would stop all financial support to terrorism.

Why Individuals Do and Do Not Matter in the Insurgency

By Douglas Farah

The debate over whether the recently-killed Abu Azzam is really the second in command to Zarqawi in Iraq or an important figure in the insurgency, reminds me of how little we know of the internal structures of the enemy there, and, in a broader sense, of the al Qaeda network. Newsweek, along with my colleague Evan Kohlmann, are correctly pointing out that Azzam may not have been all he was portrayed to be by President Bush and U.S. military commanders.

Having covered conflicts and the war on drugs for two decades now, it is clear how unhelpful it is to repeatedly trumpet the supposed damage to an organization when one person is taken out of action. The closest parallel I find is in the drug wars, when first Pablo Escobar then other leaders of the Medellin cocaine cartel were taken down. Then the the leaders of the Cali cartel were killed or arrested, then the Northern Valley gangs were decapitated. At every step, the DEA and U.S. government would hail the actions as a major triumph, destined to end or greatly diminish drug trafficking. Yet, after each major killing or arrest the amount of cocaine entering the United States remained unchanged. New people would simply step into the breach. While each generation of traffickers was able to individually control less of the market, and each succeeding organization was small and less vertical in its structure, the aggregate amount of drugs they are able to produce and export did not diminish, and ultimately grew.

It seems to me there is a lesson here we have not learned in Iraq and with al Qaeda. In largely non-hierarchical structures, where highly-trained individuals are running small cells with interchangeable responsibilities and tasks, the loss of an individual is likely to matter less. The same is true in U.S. Special Forces and other elite units. What would damage the organization more than taking out a field commander would be to eliminate someone with a specific skill set, such as bomb-making, communications and internet expertise or document forgery, that would be hard and time consuming to replace. Go here to read complete blog.

Newsweek's speedy conclusions lead to analytical crash

By Walid Phares

Walid Phares

An interesting Newsweek story this week -that references CT Blog among its sources- claim scoring a point against what it paints as a �questionable Bush administration portrayal of Abu Azzam.� In short, the authors of the article, Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball claim the Administration�s leaders aggrandized the real importance of the killed al Qaida commander basing their conclusion on a number of �non identified� US counter Terrorism officials and a report posted by our colleague Evan Kohlman on the blog. The �charge� by Newsweek is about the hierarchy of the man. Was he or was he not the �number two� of abu Mus�aab? In fact, the article�s real problem is in semantics. Was Abu Azzam number two, deputy commander, a top lieutenant, the second most powerful man, or even a future heir for the organization? What seems to be journalistically a one status are in fact multiple functions with various consequences on the War in Iraq, and different statements made by different people. Isikoff and Hoseball are right to �investigate� the matter, as all experts should do, but their fast conclusion missed crucial nuances, crashing analytically.

U.S. Congressional Hearing Will Analyze Status and Future of Counterterrorism Strategy

By Andrew Cochran

The U.S. House International Relations Terrorism Subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), will explore the status and future of US counterterrorism strategy at a hearing today. The press statement offers some of the chairman's concerns: "Some observers suggest that insufficient attention has been paid to countering the ideology fueling Islamist terrorism. Others lament the lack of a sharp, well-formed strategy along the lines of the "containment" doctrine that guided the United States during the Cold War." Witnesses will include terrorism expert Dr. Bruce Hoffman of RAND; Arnaud de Borchgrave of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Tim Roemer, former member of the 9/11 Commission; and Major Dana Dillon, USAR (Ret.) of The Heritage Foundation.

"Newsweek" Confirms Evan Kohlmann's Post: Abu Azzam Was Not Al-Zarqawi's "#2"

By Andrew Cochran

This week's "Terror Watch" column at "Newsweek" has confirmed what Evan Kohlman reported yesterday on The Counterterrorism Blog - that Abu Azzam was not truly al-Zarqawi's "#2" in Iraq. Reporters Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball dug deeper and interviewed senior counterterrorism officials. They quoted Evan: "�If I had a nickel for every No. 2 and No. 3 they�ve arrested or killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, I�d be a millionaire...this guy was not the deputy commander of Al Qaeda.� And they confirmed his conclusions through their interviews:

"Three U.S. counterterrorism officials, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject, also told NEWSWEEK today that U.S. agencies did not really consider Abu Azzam to be Zarqawi�s �deputy� even if he did play a relatively high-ranking role in the insurgency.

The characterization of Abu Azzam as No. 2 to Zarqawi is �not quite accurate,� said one of the officials. According to this official, it would be more correct to describe Abu Azzam as a �top lieutenant� to Zarqawi who was involved in �running� terrorist operations in Baghdad�not all of Iraq. Other top lieutenants operate in other parts of the country, the official indicated.

Two other officials agreed that Abu Azzam was a senior figure, perhaps the emir (leader), of Al Qaeda operations in Baghdad, and that he was of critical importance in moving funds to insurgent operatives in the Iraqi capital area. �He�s a money guy,� one official said. �He is significant but not No. 2 [to Zarqawi],� said another official."

Congratulations to Evan for being willing to report the facts, which is our mission here on The Counterterrorism Blog. And congrats to Messrs. Isikoff and Hosenball for following up with an important story. When the Iraqis or Americans nail al-Zarqawi's #2 (and he will get nailed), we will celebrate it here, but not until it actually happens.

Top U.S. Military Intel Officer: Zarqawi "Hijacked" Insurgency

By Evan Kohlmann

Today's Washington Post carries a long overdue concession from U.S. military intelligence: that "Saddamists" and former regime officials play little--if any--role in the ongoing Sunni insurgency in central Iraq.  In fact, according to Army Major General Richard Zahner:

"I think what you really have here is an insurgency that's been hijacked by a terrorist campaign... In part, by Zarqawi becoming the face of this thing, he has certainly gotten the funding, the media and, frankly, has allowed other folks to work along in his draft... You'll see some of the old regime elements on [the list of most-wanted insurgents in Iraq], mainly just to maintain pressure and, frankly, accountability.  But when you look at those individuals central to the inflicting of huge amounts of violence, it really is not those folks."

One would hope that the media pays close attention to Zahner's remarks.  There is an unfortunate and inexplicable reluctance among some analysts to accept the weighty role that Zarqawi and his foreign fighters have taken in the Iraqi insurgency--take, for instance, a Christian Science Monitor piece from last weekend with the presumptuous headline, "The 'myth' of Iraq's foreign fighters."  The real myth about the "resistance" in Iraq is that somehow it is the exclusive domain of ex-Saddamists and Iraqi nationalists. 

Our New Reports on Terrorist Threats to Italy and the Muslim Brotherhood in France

By Steven Emerson

Senior analysts at The Investigative Project on Terrorism have produced two new studies of importance. Lorenzo Vidino's "Is Italy Next In Line After London?," published by The Jamestown Foundation, discusses the potential targeting of Italy by al-Qaeda and other Islamic militant groups operating in Europe. As Lorenzo points out, the number of hardcore militants operating in Italy number in the hundreds; suicide bombers recruited in Italy have carried out attacks outside Italy; and Italy, like the UK, was unable until recently to pass effective anti-terrorism legislation or effectively enforce immigration and terrorism laws. Lorenzo names numerous groups which might strike within Italy, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's in Iraq - an arrestee there stored satellite pictures of locations in Rome on his laptop, and he told interrogators that he attended a meeting where attacks in Italy had been discussed.

Glen Feder's "The Muslim Brotherhood in France," published by "In the National Interest," discusses how the Muslim Brotherhood "has taken hold of the most powerful Muslim organization in France today, and is quickly penetrating into the political and social fabric of secular France." It is a detailed and excellent account of the history of the Brotherhood in France; how Brotherhood leaders outwitted French governments; took over the leadership of key French Muslim groups; and support Hamas and numerous Islamic terrorist spokesmen such as Tariq Ramadan (see my April 1 post on him), the late Sheik Ahmed Yassin, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi. The current French government now knows of its problem - to quote Interior Minister Villepin: �Today, out of the 1,200 imams who practice in our country, 75% are not French and one third don�t speak our language. This is unacceptable.� But Glen concludes that, "At present, the French government�s efforts to encourage moderation and Muslim toleration of non-Muslims have backfired." As I've discussed here and elsewhere, the Muslim Brotherhood is the ideological precursor to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Al-Qaeda and continues to pursue its focused agenda.

Castorena Crime Family: Intersection of Immigration Fraud, Identity Theft, & Terrorism

By Michael Cutler

I recently received an article about the Castorena Family Criminal Organization that appeared in an Arizona Newspaper. In checking through ICE press releases I came upon the fact sheet that was published by ICE about this organization. Undoubtedly ICE is targeting an organization that is worthy of scrutiny. The article in the Newspaper and the press release from ICE show just how insidious this organization is and how it threatens our nation's security.

Identity theft is identified as America's fastest growing white collar crime. The production of false identity documents is of concern in other areas as well. The most basic question we ask someone who we meet is, "Who are you?" To the law enforcement officer, this most basic of questions takes on an additional dimension. The identity of an individual may cause a law enforcement officer to take the person in question into custody because of an outstanding warrant. When a criminal is able to conceal his true identity, he may escape arrest by concealing his identity and criminal history. Name-based watch lists and no-fly lists help security officers to determine whether or not an individual should be permitted to board an airplane, or a train or enter a secure building or facility. Finally, the determination of an individual's identity also has a bearing on whether or not that person should be permitted to work in the United States. The 19 terrorists who did so much damage to our nation and to so many families around the country who lost loved ones, friends and business associates understood the need to conceal their true identities. According to the 911 Commission Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, the 19 terrorists used, in the aggregate, some 364 aliases.

Jihad from Jail: Kevin James Pleads Not Guilty

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

My recent Weekly Standard article analyzing radical Islamic literature in America's prison system discusses the recent indictment of four California men on charges of conspiring to attack military and Jewish targets in the Los Angeles area.  Their targets allegedly included military bases and recruitment centers, synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, and El Al airline facilities.  This case is significant for many reasons, not least of which is the fact that it's the first alleged terrorist plot since 9/11 to be hatched in a U.S. prison cell.

There was a development in the case Monday when Kevin James, one of the four defendants, entered a not guilty plea.  His indignant lawyer, Robert Carlin, called the indictment "pretty worthless," described statements by the U.S. Attorney's Office linking James to a domestic jihad as inflammatory, and said that James was "shocked" by the allegations against him.

The indictment paints Kevin James as the ringleader in this terrorist plot.  It states that James founded Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), a covert prison organization devoted to his radical interpretation of Islam, in 1997.  The indictment then provides a snapshot of how JIS functioned:

2.  Defendant JAMES preached the duty of JIS members to target for violent attack any enemies of Islam or "infidels," including the United States Government and Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of Israel.

3.  Defendant JAMES actively recruited his fellow prison inmates to join JIS by clandestinely distributing a document or "protocol," which set forth defendant JAMES' religious teachings about Islam, including his justification for killing infidels or non-believers, and guidelines to be followed by JIS members ("JIS Protocol").

4.  Defendant JAMES required prospective JIS members to take an oath of obedience to him and swear not to disclose the existence of JIS.  Defendant JAMES also required prospective JIS members to swear that they would obey a ninety day contact rule, wherein they would communicate with defendant JAMES at least once during every ninety day period.

5.  In addition to his recruitment efforts inside prison, defendant JAMES also sought to establish groups or "cells" of JIS members outside of prison which would carry out violent attacks against perceived infidels, including the United States Government, the Government of Israel, and Jewish persons.

The indictment states that another defendant, Levar Washington, joined JIS in November 2004.  It also claims that James "provide[d] instructions [and] spiritual and tactical guidance" to all of the plotters.

It's worth following the criminal case as it moves forward following James's not guilty plea.  The case can provide us with important insight into the dangers posed by radical Islam in the prison system.  Two questions that deserve scrutiny are what Islamic sect James and the other plotters belonged to, and how Kevin James came to embrace such a radical interpretation of his religion (i.e. where and how he received his education in Islam).

The indictment claims that James clandestinely distributed a document setting forth his "religious teachings about Islam, including the justification for killing infidels or non-believers."  If this document is made public, it would be invaluable in helping us to understand James's violent theology.  If we're to make the prisons less of a hotbed for potential terrorists, we need to understand how California state prisoners became so steeped in Islamic radicalism that they were prepared to take up arms against their own country.

Walid Phares: "Al Qaida's TV" won't replace al Jazeera, it is the official archives

By Walid Phares

The piece was first posted on FDD blog at link

Writing in the Washington Post (article), Daniel Williams announced that al Qaida has launched its own news bulletins via Internet. He referred it to an Italian news agency called Adnkonois, reporting from Dubai. He mentioned that the entire 16 minutes was available on an Italian web site. At first, one would be impressed by the news value of the "story." And indeed, in our current world of Global War on Terror, sensational pieces such as this one make headlines, inflame talking heads, and put writers on TV screens. If we agree that Terrorism and counter terrorism have produced an industry and consumers a headline such as "al Qaida has its own newscast now" will open ears and eyes and drag mouses to click on links. But let's examine where is the real meat in this story, with a comparative analysis..

A New TSA Program Looks Good?Should Other DHS Agencies Pay Attention?

By Bill West

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has just issued new regulations allowing limited general aviation (GA) flight traffic in and out of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) near Washington, DC. The new rules should become effective and operational by the end of the year. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, general aviation flights have been restricted from DCA due to the special security concerns around the Nation�s capital.

The new TSA regulations require all such GA flights to have on board what will be called an Armed Security Officer (ASO). Uniquely, ASO personnel will not be Federal Air Marshals, but will be private security officers employed by either the general aviation air carrier or the Fixed Base Operator servicing one of the designated gateway airports allowed to fly GA flights into DCA. Essentially, these ASOs will be private Air Marshals.

"Abu Azzam": Is He Really Al-Qaida's No. 2 in Iraq?

By Evan Kohlmann

Yesterday, U.S. military officials made statements to the press reporting the death of Abu Azzam al-Iraqi (a.k.a. Abdullah Najim Abdullah Mohamed Al-Jawari), whom they described as the "No. 2 official" in Al-Qaida's Committee in Iraq and the "top deputy" to Al-Qaida commander Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  While there is no doubt that Abu Azzam is a relatively influential figure within Al-Qaida's local Baghdad network, there are several cogent reasons to question his purported title as "Number 2."

1.) Al-Qaida's top level infrastructure has already been publicly identified in recent statements and audio recordings issued by the group.  Though little has been heard from him lately, Al-Qaida's de-facto "Deputy Commander" is reputed to be an unidentified Iraqi national who goes by the combat name "Abu Abdelrahman al-Iraqi."  Allegedly, sitting beneath Abu Abdelrahman in Al-Qaida's chain of command is the official commander of Al-Qaida's Military Wing: another Iraqi national known as "Abu Usaid al-Iraqi" (see here and here).  Neither of these individuals has been reported as killed or captured--neither by Al-Qaida nor by coalition military forces in Iraq.

2.) Al-Qaida's Committee in Iraq has already angrily issued its own statement acknowledging the likely death of its lieutenant Abu Azzam in a coalition military assault in Baghdad, but nonetheless insisting: "[these are merely] endless fruitless efforts to raise the morale of their soldiers... The Mujahid Abu Azzam al-Iraqi is one of many soldiers from Al-Qaida's Committee and serves as a commander of [just] one of our Brigades operating in Baghdad."  [English translation provided by Globalterroralert.com]  While it is always smart to keep a healthy dose of cynicism when analyzing raw Al-Qaida propaganda, Zarqawi's group is surprisingly candid when it comes to admitting the passing of significant figures within its movement, such as Abu Anas al-Shami (a.k.a. Omar Yousef Jumah), Omar Hadeed, and Abul-Harith al-Iraqi (Mohammed Jassim al-Issawi).  In fact, following the death of the legendary Abu Anas al-Shami a year ago, Zarqawi released a video on the Internet in which he confessed to being "in tears" upon learning the (sad) news.

3.) Even some statements previously issued by the Pentagon and the MNF in Iraq seem to raise questions about the notion of Abu Azzam al-Iraqi being legitimately described as Al-Qaida's "Number 2" most important official--even if we limit ourselves merely to the confines of the Iraqi capital.  On July 20, 2005, the MNF in Iraq issued a statement asking for help in locating Abu Thar al-Iraqi (a.k.a. Muhammad Rabi Hadi Jassir al-Dulaymi), described as "Al-Qaida's chief bombing coordinator for Baghdad."  There have been no subsequent reports from either the MNF or Al-Qaida suggesting that Abu Thar has since been killed or captured.  One is left to wonder then, who is the real chief of Al-Qaida in Baghdad?

Treasury Department's FinCEN Unit Recovering From "Cyberjacked" E-Mail System

By Andrew Cochran

We were the first site to report the "cyberjacking" last Friday of the subscriber-based e-mail service used by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, which administers the Bank Secrecy Act (as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act) and shares financial intelligence gathered from financial institutions with law enforcement and the intel community. Yesterday, FinCEN issued an update which further explained the steps that they are taking to rebuild their systems. The release also states that, "Since FinCEN did not collect personal information from subscribers to this service, no information, other than e-mail addresses, was compromised." Considering that numerous senior compliance officials at major financial institutions subscribed to the service, I will be looking for any news of spamming or identity theft involving the stolen e-mail addresses, as well as the results of the criminal investigation into the cyberjacking.

The most important impact of the cyberjacking has been to shut down the automated system whereby FinCEN and law enforcement request and receive information from financial institutions for use in terrorism and money laundering cases.

Hamas HQ Office in Saudi Arabia

By Matthew Levitt

Israeli authorities announced today the arrest of an Israeli-Arab Hamas activist who played central militant, political and financing roles for the group in coordination with a "Hamas command in Saudi Arabia."

Until he was arrested last month, Yakub Muhamad Yakub Abu Etzev was in contact with senior Hamas officials in Saudi Arabia via e-mail. According to Israeli authorities, "Abu Etzev confessed that he received hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Hamas HQ in Saudi Arabia as well as instructions that he passed on to Hamas field operatives." These funds entered the West Bank through human couriers and money changers.

The Hamas office in Saudi Arabia reportedly instructed Abu Etzev to open a "communications office" to report on developments on the ground to Hamas operatives abroad. The Hamas leaders in Saudi Arabia provided the funding for this venture, as well as funding for the families of suicide terrorists and imprisoned terrorists and a variety of Hamas institutions. Monies were often transfered under the cover of charity work.

Abu Etzev informed that Hamas' decision to participate in Palestinian elections came only after the group canvassed field operatives. This input was then forwarded to Hamas operatives in Saudi Arabia. Abu Etzev himself was personally involved in the logistical preparations leading up to elections, and funded the creation of local Hamas committees in towns and villages with funds from Hamas' Saudi office.

Lebanon asks for US and French help re terrorism

By Olivier Guitta

An FBI team, requested by Lebanese PM Fuad Siniora, just arrived in Beirut today to help solve the latest string of terrorist attacks, since Rafik Al Hariri's murder on February 14. In fact, after the attempted murder of the popular journalist May Chidiac, the Lebanese authorities have had enough. They recognize their incapacity to fight effectively terror at home and that's why on top of the FBI they requested major logistical and technical help from France. France's mission will be to strengthen the Lebanese security forces to better deal future acts of terror.
Also, interestingly Elias Murr, the Vice Prime Minister who barely escaped a few months ago a car bomb attack, revealed that Syrian general Ghazale, the de facto ruler of Lebanon before Syria's forced pullout, physically threatened him.
A few weeks ago, French president Chirac contacted major Lebanese leaders and told them that he had specific intel that their life was in danger. He then offered to fly them to Paris and protect them with French Secret Service agents. Most of the Lebanese in question including Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt accepted and stayed in Paris for about a week.

Was Abu Azzam Really "#2" in Al-Zarqawi's Network? And How Serious Are Recent Threats to Attack France?

By Andrew Cochran

Abdullah Abu Azzam, the Al-Zarqawi lieutenant killed in Iraq on Sunday, is being labeled "the #2 Al Qaeda in Iraq" by the Pentagon and in media reports. Counterterrorism experts and students have learned, often the hard way, to never take claims of important tactical victories or defeats without skepticism and objective review. Evan Kohlmann is checking his sources and internet sites and will discuss Abu Azzam's place in the AZ network in a post later today or tomorrow. In the meantime, we invite you to review the AZ leadership chart that he prepared months ago (Acrobat file), which is always available in the "Counterterrorism Library" in the left sidebar and also on Evan's site. You'll notice that at the time that Evan prepared the chart, Abu Azzam held an important place in the network, but not in the innermost circle. Evan will also update his important post from September 24 on the status of the fight against the AZ network, the first time that Evan has expressed some optimism on this site about the battle.

Evan will also discuss the arrest of GSPC suspects in France and the potential threats to the Paris metro and airport. He posted about threats of attacks by "Al-Qaida in Northern Europe" on September 15, and about threats by the GSPC, with one message addressed to "our brothers in France," on September 6.

UPDATE: Steven Emerson was on Fox News this morning to discuss the Abu Azzam killing.

Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf

By Zachary Abuza

On 27 February 2004, a bomb detonated on SuperFerry 14 after departing Manila, killing 194 people. Although the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) initially dismissed the claim of responsibility by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), evidence emerged that confirmed the group�s immediate claim of responsibility. It was the second most lethal terrorist attack in Asia after the Bali bombing perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah on 12 October 2002, and the single most deadly terrorist attack in the Philippines. Since then, Philippine security officials arrested several other Abu Sayyaf members in metro-Manila who were in the final stages of preparation for bombings. Between October and January 2005, there were three aborted bombings, including a planned attack on the US Embassy. On 14 February 2005, the ASG claimed responsibility for three near simultaneous bombings in Manila, Davao and General Santos that left 11 people dead and 136 wounded. In May 2005, Philippine officials uncovered a cache of bomb-making chemicals in a Manila warehouse.

In short, the ASG has re-entered the arena of terrorism. Although the group is thought to have only 200-300 members, Philippine National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales named the Abu Sayyaf as the �most dangerous� of all rebel groups in the country. �Compared with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the New People�s Army, the Abu Sayyaf is the most dangerous because these terrorists even volunteer to conduct attacks to win the recognition of international terrorist groups, including al-Qaida,� Gonzales said. This is hyperbole, directed at the United States government, as the primary internal security threat remains the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People�s Army. But the ASG and their ties to JI have the potential to cause instability and negative economic impacts.

Why has this brutal kidnap-for-ransom gang re-entered the fray and abandoned its 8-9 year reign of deadly, though hardly political, kidnapping? What are the endogenous and exogenous factors in explaining the Abu Sayyaf�s reinvention? What are the implications for both Philippine and regional security?

For more on the Abu Sayyaf's history, goals, and their relationship with the MILF and Jemaah Islamiyah, please see the author's report here link.

Al-Qaeda's Hurricane Lesson: Target the Oil Supply

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

There can be no doubt that our terrorist enemies have keenly watched both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita.  One thing they will surely seize on (as noted by Bill West, among others) is the complete inadequacy of the governmental response to Katrina -- which suggests that we are not prepared to handle the effects of a major terrorist attack.  Another clear lesson is the U.S. economy's vulnerability to high oil prices.

Christopher Dickey has an excellent article in Newsweek demonstrating that our foes are cognizant that an attack on Saudi Arabia's oil and gas facilities could significantly damage the U.S. economy.  He notes a shoot-out that occurred on September 6 in the Saudi Arabian city of Ad Dammam, which at the time was well below the media's radar because of Katrina's tragic aftermath.  The shoot-out lasted almost 48 hours, and Saudi forces were only able to end it when they brought in light artillery; afterward, the police found "enough weapons for a couple of platoons of guerrilla fighters."  But on top of that, Saudi police found documents showing that the terrorist cell "had planned major attacks on some of Saudi Arabia's key oil and gas facilities."

Dickey points out that, with the current hurricane-induced oil shortages, Saudi Arabia is "more important than ever to world oil supplies" -- and al-Qaeda knows it:

"They're watching Katrina. They're watching Rita.  They're watching what it's doing to the United States," says former CIA agent Robert Baer, who has written extensively on Saudi Arabia's vulnerabilities.  A few ruptured pipes could be repaired quickly, says Baer, but a concerted attack at several points could bring on the kind of nightmare scenario that U.S. officials have been dreading since the Reagan years, pushing oil prices up from their current prices in the range of $60 to $70 a barrel to well over $100 for weeks or even months.

Such an attack would have a tremendous effect on the U.S. economy.  This situation deserves our attention in the coming months -- and highlights one of the many reasons we should be working to reduce our dependence on oil.

EU?s New Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Strategy Not All That Its Cracked Up To Be!

By Victor Comras

Last week the EU Commission proposed four new measures to strengthen the EU�s counter-terrorism program. The Commission cast their proposals as a new �comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.� But, the measures they proposed certainly lack sufficient substance to justify such billing. They include a $7 million Euro pilot project for terrorism prevention, preparedness and response; a proposal that the Commission engage all EU members as parties to the Council of Europe�s latest Convention for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, and a �Communication� (ie Statement of EU Programs) for combating violent radicalism and terrorist recruitment. Most notable in the new package is the Commission�s proposal to require the retention of electronic communication traffic data. Europe� telecom companies and other service providers had strongly opposed such measures. They were joined by several human rights groups concerned by the inroads such requirements would make on rights of privacy and other civil liberties. The proposal would require all providers of publicly available electronic communications, or a public telecommunications network, to retain data related to mobile and fixed telephony for one year and all internet communications for six months. However, the requirement does not extend to the actual content of the communications. There is also provision for reimbursing service providers for any demonstrated additional costs they may incur. This proposal still requires the agreement of the European Parliament and the Council.

Counter-terrorism authorities in a number of EU countries had pushed for even more stringent electronic communication retention rules. They argue that such measures would be of great assistance to tracking terrorists and preventing terrorist attacks. The EU Council reportedly may decide to trump the EU Commission�s proposals by adopting stronger requirements that would extend data retention for both telephonic and internet communications for up to three years. This possibility was vetted publicly at several Council meetings. See reports of the European Council of 16/17 June and, the special meeting following the July 7 London attacks.