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The GSPC cell arrested in France was onto major acts of terror
By Olivier Guitta
On Monday, French authorities arrested an Islamist cell in the suburbs of Paris and in Normandy that was planning attacks on the Paris metro, airport and the DST- rough equivalent of the FBI- HQ. Among those arrested is a well-known Algerian terrorist, Safe Bourada. Indeed, Bourada was sentenced in 1998 to a ten-year jail term because of its active involvement in the 1995 terrorist attacks in Paris. He had recruited one of the main actors of the GIA terrorist wave Khaled Kelkal. He also has been in contact with Rachid Ramda, the financier of the 1995 attacks jailed in London and that Britain has refused to extradite so far. Coming out of jail in 2003, he was right away watched by the police.After receiving tips from Algeria at the beginning of this month, French police acted because of the potential imminent threats. In fact, one of the arrested members of the cell confirmed the three targets and added that his group was planning attacks against other European countries. Also, some of the members of this group traveled to Lebanon to gain explosives expertise. And they even thought about launching a chemical or biological attack, using ricin but gave up because of the complexity of the technical aspect. France has been considering the GSPC -an offshoot of the GIA- as its biggest threat especially after July when the US informed the French about the alliance between Zarqawi and the GSPC. And also after the recent GSPC message qualifying France as number one enemy of the Algerian terror group.
The implication of a recidivist demonstrates the importance of more severe jail sentences in terrorism cases. And fortunately thats what the new French law is envisioning: in this case instead of ten years, Bourada would get 20.
Advice to NYFD: Scrub Your "Islamic Society" Before Picking Your Next Muslim Chaplain
By Andrew Cochran
"The fire department's new Muslim chaplain abruptly resigned Friday after saying in a published interview that a broader conspiracy, not 19 al-Qaida hijackers, may have been responsible for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks." Well, that was a wise and honorable thing for the chap to do, after he embarrassed the fine men and women of the NYFD with his ridiculous comments. But the first fault lies with the NYFD for its lack of oversight of its own Islamic Society, which recommended Intikab Habib and several other imams for the job. The NYFD suffers from the same problem as the Federal Bureau of Prisons - they didn't determine how the imams were being educated, what they were reading, and what they were learing on their overseas trips to Saudi Arabia. So I recommend that the NYFD start the search by asking outside experts to do a top-to-bottom audit of the NYFD Islamic Society and tell them whether Wahabbism has infected it to the point of no return. I can recommend a number of such experts on the left sidebar of this site.
Abu Azzam al-Iraqi: In His Own Words
By Evan Kohlmann
Given the controversy that has erupted--and in an attempt to shed more light on the precise role of Abu Azzam al-Iraqi within Al-Qaida's Committee in Iraq--I am now making available a transcript of comments that Abu Azzam made during an Al-Qaida video recording released in December 2004. Ironically, the hooded Abu Azzam was featured in the video discussing the life and death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's former top deputy in Iraq, Jordanian Abu Anas al-Shami (a.k.a. Omar Yousef Jumah), who was killed in a U.S. airstrike near Abu Ghraib prison on September 16, 2004. Certainly, given the context of Abu Azzam's remarks and his mere presence on the film, he was an important Al-Qaida commander with an established pedigree and a direct relationship with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. However, Abu Azzam is described in the video merely as an Al-Qaida "commander" and veteran of the year-long battle for Fallujah in 2004. At least as of December 2004, he is ascribed no specific importance in Zarqawi's chain-of-command--other than that Zarqawi preferred that he remain in a non-combat role.
In the future, if the Pentagon and White House want to avoid this silly numbers controversy, they should take the sage advice of my colleague Doug Farah and simply steer clear of misleading and irrelevant hierarchical representations of non-hierarchical terrorist groups. I admit that I'm a bit baffled as to why it has taken them this long to recognize that for themselves.
Whitewashing Saudi Arabia time and again
By Olivier Guitta
After Andys post re the fundraising on Saudi TV for terrorists, one should or should not be surprised by Karen Hughes statement while visiting Saudi King Abdullah.
She stated:
I salute the Kingdoms efforts to work with us to combat terrorism. I am proud of the excellent relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States and the exceptional cooperation between the two countries. Despite occasional disagreements, we have much in common.
This echoed the memo from President Bush to Condi Rice indicating, I attest to that Saudi Arabia is cooperating in the global war on terrorism.
This stance is a major return to that sixty-year old policy of collusion with the royal family.
If that was not enough, the recent deal the US negotiated with Saudi Arabia regarding this countrys access to the WTO did not include two major clauses:
- Saudi Arabia would accept to stop the boycott of Israel
- Saudi Arabia would implement additionnal measures to fight terrorism and would stop all financial support to terrorism.
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So, there you have it, Saudi Arabia got a free pass to continue its support of terrorism through its diverse charities. For instance, it is no coincidence that the hardliner Abdullah bin Saleh al-Obaid, ex-head of the Muslim World League, the largest Saudi quasi-governmental charity organization, was appointed Minister of Education back in February.
Also, to show Saudi Arabias friendship, here is what the Saudi daily Al Watan, very close to the Royal family, published as an editorial on September 11, 2005:
The September 11 attacks triggered a ruthless war against what the US calls terrorism. This word has been generalized to include in particular all Arabs but also all Muslims, thereby refusing to distinguish between Al Qaeda -which counts in its ranks Americans, Europeans and Asians- and Arab countries (including Saudi Arabia) where some citizens belong to Al Qaeda. Washington justifies this generalization by stating that most terrorists were Saudis, thereby forgetting that Saudi Arabia is working hard to eradicate Al Qaeda.
Our British allies are also quite good at whitewashing the Saudi regime. Writing on Saudi national day, Sir Shepard Cowper-Coles, British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia published an op-ed in Asharq Al Awsat where he wrote:
The Saudi government has shown great wisdom, investing the oil income with a prudent eye on the future, while confidently mounting successful campaigns against the men of violence and to equip young Saudis for the demands of the new century. As one of Saudi Arabia's oldest and closest friends, Britain will accompany Saudi Arabia on that journey to the future. We will be with you in the tough times as well as the good times, in the knowledge that true friendship means sticking together through thick and thin.
At the same time this widespread white washing is going on, some in Congress have kept their sanity. For instance, the Senate Judiciary Committee is going to start hearings at the end of October re the Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2005. « Close It
Why Individuals Do and Do Not Matter in the Insurgency
By Douglas Farah
The debate over whether the recently-killed Abu Azzam is really the second in command to Zarqawi in Iraq or an important figure in the insurgency, reminds me of how little we know of the internal structures of the enemy there, and, in a broader sense, of the al Qaeda network. Newsweek, along with my colleague Evan Kohlmann, are correctly pointing out that Azzam may not have been all he was portrayed to be by President Bush and U.S. military commanders.
Having covered conflicts and the war on drugs for two decades now, it is clear how unhelpful it is to repeatedly trumpet the supposed damage to an organization when one person is taken out of action. The closest parallel I find is in the drug wars, when first Pablo Escobar then other leaders of the Medellin cocaine cartel were taken down. Then the the leaders of the Cali cartel were killed or arrested, then the Northern Valley gangs were decapitated. At every step, the DEA and U.S. government would hail the actions as a major triumph, destined to end or greatly diminish drug trafficking. Yet, after each major killing or arrest the amount of cocaine entering the United States remained unchanged. New people would simply step into the breach. While each generation of traffickers was able to individually control less of the market, and each succeeding organization was small and less vertical in its structure, the aggregate amount of drugs they are able to produce and export did not diminish, and ultimately grew.
It seems to me there is a lesson here we have not learned in Iraq and with al Qaeda. In largely non-hierarchical structures, where highly-trained individuals are running small cells with interchangeable responsibilities and tasks, the loss of an individual is likely to matter less. The same is true in U.S. Special Forces and other elite units. What would damage the organization more than taking out a field commander would be to eliminate someone with a specific skill set, such as bomb-making, communications and internet expertise or document forgery, that would be hard and time consuming to replace. Go here to read complete blog.
Newsweek's speedy conclusions lead to analytical crash
By Walid Phares
Walid Phares
An interesting Newsweek story this week -that references CT Blog among its sources- claim scoring a point against what it paints as a questionable Bush administration portrayal of Abu Azzam. In short, the authors of the article, Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball claim the Administrations leaders aggrandized the real importance of the killed al Qaida commander basing their conclusion on a number of non identified US counter Terrorism officials and a report posted by our colleague Evan Kohlman on the blog. The charge by Newsweek is about the hierarchy of the man. Was he or was he not the number two of abu Musaab? In fact, the articles real problem is in semantics. Was Abu Azzam number two, deputy commander, a top lieutenant, the second most powerful man, or even a future heir for the organization? What seems to be journalistically a one status are in fact multiple functions with various consequences on the War in Iraq, and different statements made by different people. Isikoff and Hoseball are right to investigate the matter, as all experts should do, but their fast conclusion missed crucial nuances, crashing analytically.
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In their hurry to score a point against Bushs War in Iraq the level of analysis was mixed up ultimately playing in the hands of the Jihadists propaganda as one would forecast in the last paragraph.
The article's real proposition is embodied by this sentence: Bush seized on the killing of Abu Azzam by joint U.S-Iraqi forces in a shootout last Sunday as fresh evidence that the United States is turning the tide against the Iraqi insurgency. Lets not argue with the political goal, for if indeed Isikoff and Hoseball can establish that the Bush Administration knew that abu Azzam wasnt someone important and used the killing to prove the turning tide then Newsweeks point is made. Even if the article would prove that the Presidents team wasnt able to evaluate the Jihadi commander in his real weight, a point will nevertheless be made. But in this case, and until further analysis is developed no one has made a final point, neither the Administration nor Newsweek. Here is why:
The President, according to Newsweek said this guy was a brutal killer. He added that abu Azzam was one of [Abu Mussab al-]Zarqawis top lieutenants. And furthermore Bush said he was told the man was top operational commander of Al Qaeda in Baghdad. He didnt say deputy commander.
Now, Newsweeks article says .that U.S. intelligence officials and counterterrorism analysts are questioning whether a slain terroristdescribed by President Bush today as the second-most-wanted Al Qaeda leader in Iraqwas as significant a figure as the Bush administration is claiming
Then the authors write: Gen. Richard Myers, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters at the Pentagon that the U.S. military considered Abu Azzam the No. 2 Al Qaeda operative in Iraq, next to Zarqawi.
Newsweeks article adds: Three U.S. counterterrorism officials, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject, also told NEWSWEEK today that U.S. agencies did not really consider Abu Azzam to be Zarqawis deputy even if he did play a relatively high-ranking role in the insurgency.
Lets stop here:
According to Newsweek
1) The President said about abu Azzam a. Brutal killer b. One of Zarqawis top lieutenants c. A top operational commander of Al Qaeda in Baghdad. d. Second-most-wanted Al Qaeda leader in Iraq
2) General Myers said about abu Azzam: No. 2 Al Qaeda operative in Iraq, next to Zarqawi.
3) Per Newsweek, three US counter Terrorism officials (no names were provided) said of abu Azzam:
a. He is not as significant a figure as the Bush administration is claiming.
b. That U.S. agencies did not really consider Abu Azzam to be Zarqawis deputy
An easy comparative analysis shows that both the President and General Myers didnt say nor describe the al Qaida commander as M.M. Isikoff and Hosenball blamed them for. Bush used the terms of brutal killer; one of Zarqawis lieutenants; top operational commander in Baghdad; second most wanted al Qaida leader in Iraq. Ironically the so-called secret US counter terrorism officials (which statements cant be verified) produced only judgments not an identification. Newsweek attributed to the secret sources that the guy was not a significant figure nor did the agencies consider him as deputy. In synchronic analysis the President said the man is a big shot, and the article quoted sources who said abu Azzam wasnt the official deputy. Hence, what Newsweek attempted to portray as a misrepresentation by the President of a Terrorist leader, against the so-called expertise of agencies is not even an issue: In a sum, I havent read yet an official release by the White House stating that the mans official title was deputy commander of Zarqawi (naib al Qaid). And the sources didnt know better.
Yes, General Meyers described him as No. 2 Al Qaeda operative in Iraq, next to Zarqawi: Which doesnt either tell us if he is or not the deputy commander, the vice president, the second emir in command, or so. So, what Newsweek raised was a faux probleme, an irrelevant hypothesis. That abu Azzam was or not an important cadre is the real issue. But that he was specifically (or not) the actual organic deputy commander under Zarqawi, neither the Administration can establish that nor the article was able to establish how al Qaida function in Iraq.
The only open source Newsweek was able to use, to build its case (next to the unrevealed sources) was the accurate research by our colleague Evan Kohlmann. He concluded that there are ample reasons to question whether Abu Azzam was really the No. 2 figure in the Iraqi insurgency. And he stated that according to his research this guy was not the deputy commander of Al Qaeda. Our colleague explained that many other commanders have been described as number two or deputies in the past. And he rightly added that those who have been branded as deputies by the Jihadists havent been captured or killed yet. Bottom line: The US didnt get the official deputy commander of Zarqawi yet. This is very possible but here are questions to address in the game of analysis:
1) No one in al Qaida Iraq has issued an official statement yet, declaring the Bayia, a necessary Jihadi formality to render one particular commander as the deputy, or Naib. So, even as many web sites and other sources talk about this or other mujahid as the man who comes after Zarqawi, it is only talk. We dont have a name yet: its that simple
2) However, intelligence services both US or Iraqis can obviously determine if one of these emirs is acting as the second most influential man after Zarqawi. But that is only assessment. Therefore, if a man with that profile is eliminated, it is normal to state that upon intelligence assessment, such a person has the profile of the second most powerful man. And to rebut this executive assessment not impossible- one would have to present stronger evidence. Not a game of words about what the President said or unofficial releases by Jihadi online: we need hard evidence.
3) But beyond this Byzantine debate, lets consider few al Qaida complicated mechanisms:
a. The organizations pyramid has more than one deputy and more than one second in command. Strange but efficient.
b. The second most powerful man in the organization is not necessarily the second in command or the number two.
c. The next to take over is often hidden and not always chosen from the immediate entourage.
d. The head of the military committee or tanzeem is not always the head of the organization nationwide. Hence the military chief of staff is not necessarily the deputy chief on the political level, but could be as well.
e. The real hierarchy is imariya, meaning based on emirship. So far, there is not enough information about the emirship not only in Iraq but throughout al Qaida worldwide. f. Last but not least, if and when Zarqawi goes there would be a legal process to name the heir. It involves clerics, commanders, and other procedures and details.
So was the man killed by the Coalition the man? He certainly is one who deserves commenting and a story. But instead of thorough investigation of the emir place and value in the real world of Jihadism, the story was diverted towards the politics of the War on Terror not the actual war. Regardless of good analysis of who is really abu Azzam, how does al Qaida functions and will this episode weaken or not the organization, the investigative effort targeted the misreading of the President. In fact the article didnt provide with neither a better reading nor another reading of the equation. For both the Administration and the secret sources of Newsweek agreed that the man was high up. No one was able to determine his file number within the organization.
Another interesting argument made by the article was the criticism of US authorities for announcing several times since the war in Iraq began that key al Qaida commanders were terminated, although leaders are still in place. I dont understand the logic of the argument: For it is evident that al Qaida replaces its vanishing emirs and commanders as the conflict is evolving. I thought this was standard procedure. Unless some experts believe that al Qaida has only ten cadres, and by their vanishing the war would be over
It would be nave to think that if a number two is eliminated, his post will remain empty (?). Hence it is obvious that the possibility of announcing the departure of several number 2s over the span of a conflict is very high.
The real deal in the article is this paragraph: The real question is whether taking any one figure out will really have an appreciable impact on an insurgency that seems to have shown a remarkable resiliency. For nearly two years now, U.S. officials have touted previous arrests or captures, most notably that of toppled leader Saddam Hussein in December 2003, as developments that would cripple the insurgency.
That is a real question: is the elimination of the Organizations head(s) the equivalent of total victory? Obviously not; no need to elaborate. Will it have an impact on the so-called insurgency? Not by itself. Would that mean that military action alone wouldnt defeat the Jihadists? True. But who said that the elimination of al Qaida field commanders and military action alone is the road to victory? I havent seen such policy declaration anywhere yet. And may I add, even if some in the Administration would like to portray it as such, or if its detractors want to portray the Administration as thinking that way, the concept is wrong. In the War on Terror, we need to think complex.
There are multiple tracks, and one influences the other: military, intelligence, political, ideological, psychological and regional: For example, as I analyzed for BBC TV last night, the killing of abu Azzam is strategically less important than the dismantling of Tal Afar networks few weeks ago. Even better, perhaps the victory on the Syrian-Iraqi border was one of the reasons for finding the al Qaida cadre. Besides, had the Iraqi Government been ready politically, these two operations could have been invested immensely in further defeating the Salafists. You dont rely on the elimination of Terror leader as the sole factor in a War on Terror but you factor it in and make sure the other pincers are moving simultaneously. .
This is why I do not recommend the evaluation of the War in Iraq in simple equations: One cadre is gone, lets look if the insurgency has weakened. It is too simplistic. Besides, the Jihadists are railing us.
For in its conclusion, Newsweek relied on al Qaidas statement on Abu Azzam! By translating what the organization posted on the groups Web site, the article echoed that Abu Azzam al-Iraqi was a soldier in the Iraqi Al Qaeda organization. It quoted them ridiculing allegations by U.S. officials that Abu Azzam was the second man in Iraqi Al Qaeda. Citing the SITE Institutes translation Newsweek quoted the Terrorists stating that the US should stop saying that because it will not do any good. A minimal understanding of the propaganda machine of the Jihadists would have realized that they dont want to give any psychological victory to the infidels. From at least a significant leader in the structure, his companions reduced him to a simple soldier among others. Just to deny Iraqis and Coalition any political victory.
Understanding the mind of the Jihadis is crucial in the analysis of the War on Terror. As with the flushing affair few months ago, it is advisable to keep the big picture around when one is zooming on a point to be scored.
Walid Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington « Close It
U.S. Congressional Hearing Will Analyze Status and Future of Counterterrorism Strategy
By Andrew Cochran
The U.S. House International Relations Terrorism Subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), will explore the status and future of US counterterrorism strategy at a hearing today. The press statement offers some of the chairman's concerns: "Some observers suggest that insufficient attention has been paid to countering the ideology fueling Islamist terrorism. Others lament the lack of a sharp, well-formed strategy along the lines of the "containment" doctrine that guided the United States during the Cold War." Witnesses will include terrorism expert Dr. Bruce Hoffman of RAND; Arnaud de Borchgrave of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Tim Roemer, former member of the 9/11 Commission; and Major Dana Dillon, USAR (Ret.) of The Heritage Foundation.
"Newsweek" Confirms Evan Kohlmann's Post: Abu Azzam Was Not Al-Zarqawi's "#2"
By Andrew Cochran
This week's "Terror Watch" column at "Newsweek" has confirmed what Evan Kohlman reported yesterday on The Counterterrorism Blog - that Abu Azzam was not truly al-Zarqawi's "#2" in Iraq. Reporters Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball dug deeper and interviewed senior counterterrorism officials. They quoted Evan: "If I had a nickel for every No. 2 and No. 3 theyve arrested or killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Id be a millionaire...this guy was not the deputy commander of Al Qaeda. And they confirmed his conclusions through their interviews:
"Three U.S. counterterrorism officials, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject, also told NEWSWEEK today that U.S. agencies did not really consider Abu Azzam to be Zarqawis deputy even if he did play a relatively high-ranking role in the insurgency.
The characterization of Abu Azzam as No. 2 to Zarqawi is not quite accurate, said one of the officials. According to this official, it would be more correct to describe Abu Azzam as a top lieutenant to Zarqawi who was involved in running terrorist operations in Baghdadnot all of Iraq. Other top lieutenants operate in other parts of the country, the official indicated.
Two other officials agreed that Abu Azzam was a senior figure, perhaps the emir (leader), of Al Qaeda operations in Baghdad, and that he was of critical importance in moving funds to insurgent operatives in the Iraqi capital area. Hes a money guy, one official said. He is significant but not No. 2 [to Zarqawi], said another official."
Congratulations to Evan for being willing to report the facts, which is our mission here on The Counterterrorism Blog. And congrats to Messrs. Isikoff and Hosenball for following up with an important story. When the Iraqis or Americans nail al-Zarqawi's #2 (and he will get nailed), we will celebrate it here, but not until it actually happens.
Top U.S. Military Intel Officer: Zarqawi "Hijacked" Insurgency
By Evan Kohlmann
Today's Washington Post carries a long overdue concession from U.S. military intelligence: that "Saddamists" and former regime officials play little--if any--role in the ongoing Sunni insurgency in central Iraq. In fact, according to Army Major General Richard Zahner: "I think what you really have here is an insurgency that's been hijacked by a terrorist campaign... In part, by Zarqawi becoming the face of this thing, he has certainly gotten the funding, the media and, frankly, has allowed other folks to work along in his draft... You'll see some of the old regime elements on [the list of most-wanted insurgents in Iraq], mainly just to maintain pressure and, frankly, accountability. But when you look at those individuals central to the inflicting of huge amounts of violence, it really is not those folks."
One would hope that the media pays close attention to Zahner's remarks. There is an unfortunate and inexplicable reluctance among some analysts to accept the weighty role that Zarqawi and his foreign fighters have taken in the Iraqi insurgency--take, for instance, a Christian Science Monitor piece from last weekend with the presumptuous headline, "The 'myth' of Iraq's foreign fighters." The real myth about the "resistance" in Iraq is that somehow it is the exclusive domain of ex-Saddamists and Iraqi nationalists.
Our New Reports on Terrorist Threats to Italy and the Muslim Brotherhood in France
By Steven Emerson
Senior analysts at The Investigative Project on Terrorism have produced two new studies of importance. Lorenzo Vidino's "Is Italy Next In Line After London?," published by The Jamestown Foundation, discusses the potential targeting of Italy by al-Qaeda and other Islamic militant groups operating in Europe. As Lorenzo points out, the number of hardcore militants operating in Italy number in the hundreds; suicide bombers recruited in Italy have carried out attacks outside Italy; and Italy, like the UK, was unable until recently to pass effective anti-terrorism legislation or effectively enforce immigration and terrorism laws. Lorenzo names numerous groups which might strike within Italy, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's in Iraq - an arrestee there stored satellite pictures of locations in Rome on his laptop, and he told interrogators that he attended a meeting where attacks in Italy had been discussed.
Glen Feder's "The Muslim Brotherhood in France," published by "In the National Interest," discusses how the Muslim Brotherhood "has taken hold of the most powerful Muslim organization in France today, and is quickly penetrating into the political and social fabric of secular France." It is a detailed and excellent account of the history of the Brotherhood in France; how Brotherhood leaders outwitted French governments; took over the leadership of key French Muslim groups; and support Hamas and numerous Islamic terrorist spokesmen such as Tariq Ramadan (see my April 1 post on him), the late Sheik Ahmed Yassin, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi. The current French government now knows of its problem - to quote Interior Minister Villepin: Today, out of the 1,200 imams who practice in our country, 75% are not French and one third dont speak our language. This is unacceptable. But Glen concludes that, "At present, the French governments efforts to encourage moderation and Muslim toleration of non-Muslims have backfired." As I've discussed here and elsewhere, the Muslim Brotherhood is the ideological precursor to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Al-Qaeda and continues to pursue its focused agenda.
Castorena Crime Family: Intersection of Immigration Fraud, Identity Theft, & Terrorism
By Michael Cutler
I recently received an article about the Castorena Family Criminal Organization that appeared in an Arizona Newspaper. In checking through ICE press releases I came upon the fact sheet that was published by ICE about this organization. Undoubtedly ICE is targeting an organization that is worthy of scrutiny. The article in the Newspaper and the press release from ICE show just how insidious this organization is and how it threatens our nation's security.
Identity theft is identified as America's fastest growing white collar crime. The production of false identity documents is of concern in other areas as well. The most basic question we ask someone who we meet is, "Who are you?" To the law enforcement officer, this most basic of questions takes on an additional dimension. The identity of an individual may cause a law enforcement officer to take the person in question into custody because of an outstanding warrant. When a criminal is able to conceal his true identity, he may escape arrest by concealing his identity and criminal history. Name-based watch lists and no-fly lists help security officers to determine whether or not an individual should be permitted to board an airplane, or a train or enter a secure building or facility. Finally, the determination of an individual's identity also has a bearing on whether or not that person should be permitted to work in the United States. The 19 terrorists who did so much damage to our nation and to so many families around the country who lost loved ones, friends and business associates understood the need to conceal their true identities. According to the 911 Commission Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, the 19 terrorists used, in the aggregate, some 364 aliases.
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The success in identifying, investigating, and subsequently arresting and successfully prosecuting members of this organization is truly a worthwhile accomplishment. However (and you know, there usually is a "however" ) with so few special agents available to conduct these critical investigations, how many other organizations are "out there" as we speak, furnishing false identity documents to those who pose a threat to our nation and our people? As members of this criminal organization are arrested, how many new "employees" will succeed in making their way into the United States to replace those who have been arrested?
Additionally, fraud schemes are equally troubling and dangerous. As I have testified before Congress, if it is the prospect of employment that draws the majority of illegal aliens across our nation's borders, it is by immigration benefit fraud that they are able to remain here and "hide in plain sight." Indeed, through immigration benefit fraud they are able to gain free access to not only to nation's borders, but to borders of many other countries around the world. Again, to refer to the Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, the terrorists needed to travel often and extensively as they prepared to attack our nation. While we focus on our porous borders, our nation has also failed to focus on the lack of integrity of the immigration benefits program which according to a GAO report that was published in January 2002, fraud was a pervasive problem that permeated the process by which applications for various immigration benefits are adjudicated. These benefits range from granting a nonimmigrant student authorization to change schools, to aliens applying for lawful residency in the United States to the conferring of United States citizenship upon an alien.
The fact that the organization was also able to furnish a complete document "package" including utility bills is especially troubling because this enables an individual, especially a terrorist, drug trafficker or gang member to create a whole new identify for himself. This is virtually the same way that the "Witness Protection Program" works except the Witness Protection Program uses authentic documents whereas the criminals use apparently high-quality counterfeit documents. If our nation is foolish enough to create another amnesty program, even if it called a "Guest Worker" program, document vendors and their parent organizations, such as the one described in these articles will be working overtime to crank out new identities for aliens seeking to prove they meet the requirements to be eligible to participate in such a program, such as evidence that they have been physically present in the United States for the requisite period of time. Lacking the investigative resources, such aliens will have a high probability of succeeding in defrauding our government. This is yet another reason to not only provide better training to ICE, CBP and USCIS officials to identify fraudulent documents, but to require that any alien who wishes to remain in the United States under the auspices of any such guest worker program, should Congress approve it, must first return to his/her country of citizenship and return with a valid passport from that country with an appropriate visa issued by the United States.
The linked article and fact sheet shows just how sophisticated the bad guys can be. It is time that our government committed the resources to successfully battle these criminals to improve the security of our nation. Our government needs to hire many new special agents, provide them with proper funding, training and leadership so they can go after this insidious threat to our well-being and survival. « Close It
Jihad from Jail: Kevin James Pleads Not Guilty
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
My recent Weekly Standard article analyzing radical Islamic literature in America's prison system discusses the recent indictment of four California men on charges of conspiring to attack military and Jewish targets in the Los Angeles area. Their targets allegedly included military bases and recruitment centers, synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, and El Al airline facilities. This case is significant for many reasons, not least of which is the fact that it's the first alleged terrorist plot since 9/11 to be hatched in a U.S. prison cell.
There was a development in the case Monday when Kevin James, one of the four defendants, entered a not guilty plea. His indignant lawyer, Robert Carlin, called the indictment "pretty worthless," described statements by the U.S. Attorney's Office linking James to a domestic jihad as inflammatory, and said that James was "shocked" by the allegations against him.
The indictment paints Kevin James as the ringleader in this terrorist plot. It states that James founded Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), a covert prison organization devoted to his radical interpretation of Islam, in 1997. The indictment then provides a snapshot of how JIS functioned: 2. Defendant JAMES preached the duty of JIS members to target for violent attack any enemies of Islam or "infidels," including the United States Government and Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of Israel.
3. Defendant JAMES actively recruited his fellow prison inmates to join JIS by clandestinely distributing a document or "protocol," which set forth defendant JAMES' religious teachings about Islam, including his justification for killing infidels or non-believers, and guidelines to be followed by JIS members ("JIS Protocol").
4. Defendant JAMES required prospective JIS members to take an oath of obedience to him and swear not to disclose the existence of JIS. Defendant JAMES also required prospective JIS members to swear that they would obey a ninety day contact rule, wherein they would communicate with defendant JAMES at least once during every ninety day period.
5. In addition to his recruitment efforts inside prison, defendant JAMES also sought to establish groups or "cells" of JIS members outside of prison which would carry out violent attacks against perceived infidels, including the United States Government, the Government of Israel, and Jewish persons.
The indictment states that another defendant, Levar Washington, joined JIS in November 2004. It also claims that James "provide[d] instructions [and] spiritual and tactical guidance" to all of the plotters.
It's worth following the criminal case as it moves forward following James's not guilty plea. The case can provide us with important insight into the dangers posed by radical Islam in the prison system. Two questions that deserve scrutiny are what Islamic sect James and the other plotters belonged to, and how Kevin James came to embrace such a radical interpretation of his religion (i.e. where and how he received his education in Islam).
The indictment claims that James clandestinely distributed a document setting forth his "religious teachings about Islam, including the justification for killing infidels or non-believers." If this document is made public, it would be invaluable in helping us to understand James's violent theology. If we're to make the prisons less of a hotbed for potential terrorists, we need to understand how California state prisoners became so steeped in Islamic radicalism that they were prepared to take up arms against their own country.
Walid Phares: "Al Qaida's TV" won't replace al Jazeera, it is the official archives
By Walid Phares
The piece was first posted on FDD blog at link
Writing in the Washington Post (article), Daniel Williams announced that al Qaida has launched its own news bulletins via Internet. He referred it to an Italian news agency called Adnkonois, reporting from Dubai. He mentioned that the entire 16 minutes was available on an Italian web site. At first, one would be impressed by the news value of the "story." And indeed, in our current world of Global War on Terror, sensational pieces such as this one make headlines, inflame talking heads, and put writers on TV screens. If we agree that Terrorism and counter terrorism have produced an industry and consumers a headline such as "al Qaida has its own newscast now" will open ears and eyes and drag mouses to click on links. But let's examine where is the real meat in this story, with a comparative analysis..
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The Washington Post article says: "if the program was indeed an al Qaida production, it would mark a change in how the group uses Internet to spread its messages and propaganda." The "if it was al Qaida" caution is an understandable journalistic reservation, escorting any investigation. But sometimes it becomes intellectually obsolete. For no one has so far explained where and what is the official al Qaida. Most research indicate today, that whatever calls itself al Qaida is in fact al Qaida, unless you're joking or it is an implant of some intelligence service. The real caution should be nowadays, "if indeed it is not a fake," rather than questioning the Jihadism of the Jihadists online. In short, if a material is signed by al Qaida appears on a Jihadi web, one would assume it is al Qaida, either part of the core organization, or willing to associate with it. But that is only a little academic note. The meat is elsewhere.
People are excited to follow al Qaida's activities and to discover its new trends and fashions. But sometimes, if we're not attentive to the Jihadi world, there could be pitfalls. In this case for example, al Qaida is not really marking a dramatic substance-change, but has organized what it had been producing for years. The Bin laden's network has been producing these footage and documentaries in pieces and posting them as they were produced. What wasn't there was the weekly address via video in one form by one production. Comments on issues such as Gaza, Iraq, hurricanes hitting the US, and Shiia-bashing were available even before 9/11, and certainly multiplied afterward. Better, al Qaida's non-video bulletins were regularly broadcast on al ansar, ahl al sunna, al khilafa, and many other web outlets. Over the past three years I listened to them almost on a daily basis. In a sum, the material "discovered" by the Italian news service existed ages ago. It was simply not reported enough in the West. The only news meat in the Washington Post story is the fact that al Qaida's PR teams decided to consolidate this material in one "broadcast" and air it on a weekly basis. That's all. But behind the story, one can see two serious issues.
First, the Washington Post attempt to explain why is al Qaida creating its own broadcast. The author writes: "Direct dissemination would avoid editing or censorship by television networks, many of which air only excerpts of the group statements and avoid showing gruesome images of killings." In other words, and straight to the point, the article considers al Jazeera's airing of al Qaida's video not acceptable to Bin Laden, and therefore mainstream by Western standards. It seems that this sentence is the real conclusion of the whole article. Let's rephrase: al Qaida had to find its own media because Arab media, particularly al Jazeera (although not cited but assumed) are acting in the mainstream. Well that is not the case.
When an al Qaida videotape is obtained (no one knows how, but that is another issue) by al Jazeera the "treatment" of the material is maximized but within the boundaries of the professional format. Al Jazeera didn't declare itself as the official media of al Qaida. Therefore, it will not show signs that it is the spokes-outlet of Bin Laden. But the Qatar-based network has millions of viewers. By showing 30% of a video tape, and the most important segment, that is the political message, it would be more efficient than showing the rest of the tape, which is usually either dry and boring or repetitive. I myself had opportunities to see the "core" before being able to see the "rest." Showing that essence many times a day, bringing in panels to discuss it is by far more efficient and globally impacting than the rigid airing of the whole al Qaida made package once a week. Al Jazeera's art work with fragments of al Qaida's tapes is by far more influential than a web-based group-ran broadcast. So, why would al Qaida even spend time on the weekly address?
Precisely because of organizational needs. The "official" statements have to be posted somewhere for the organic membership to gather around and watch. While satellite networks inflame the millions with embellished fragments from al Qaida's production, the proper organization's web cast would air the entire raw material to the membership directly. Besides, the Jihadists understands the geopolitics of the War on Terror. They know that eventually even radical Arab media could fall into problems. It is ironic that the article on al Qaida's newscast came out one day after Taysir Alluni, al Jazeera corespondent in Spain, was sentenced to seven years in prison for what the court found as a connection to al Qaida. The sentence obviously linked an al Jazeera cadre to al Qaida (an accusation immediately rejected by the channel). But the Washington Post article hinted otherwise. Coincidental, the article was telling its readers that al Qaida didn't like al Jazeera's handling of its videos, therefore decided to create its own news service. Let's call this the politics of Jihadism and its complications. For the most important item in the whole story, at least from my perspective as a reader of Jihadi political history is the name of the new al Qaida weekly bulletin.
"Sawt Al Khilafa" or the "Voice of the Caliphate." This name alone is deeply meaningful. Researchers in Jihadi studies can click immediately at the sight or hearing of the name: While the article -and other media shows delved in the news worthiness of a weekly address by al Qaida, experts in the real depth of the Jihadist movement will stop there. Are we getting closer to what many analysts have been waiting for, looking for and expecting to appear? If you review carefully the videotapes of Usama, Ayman and abu Mus'ab, as they appeared at least since 2001 you'd see the ideological trajectory of the central message: The Caliphate is not far away in time. The preparations are underway. It is an exciting time for the Jihadists. In my forthcoming book, (November) I try to examine the ballistics of the upcoming events, or what is on the minds of the Jihadists globally. The highest moments of al Qaida are still ahead, not in terms of winning or losing the War, but in terms of revealing itself to the world in more stunning ways.
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Dr Walid Phares, Senior Fellow, FDD, Professor of Middle East Studies. www.walidphares.com « Close It
A New TSA Program Looks Good?Should Other DHS Agencies Pay Attention?
By Bill West
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has just issued new regulations allowing limited general aviation (GA) flight traffic in and out of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) near Washington, DC. The new rules should become effective and operational by the end of the year. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, general aviation flights have been restricted from DCA due to the special security concerns around the Nations capital.
The new TSA regulations require all such GA flights to have on board what will be called an Armed Security Officer (ASO). Uniquely, ASO personnel will not be Federal Air Marshals, but will be private security officers employed by either the general aviation air carrier or the Fixed Base Operator servicing one of the designated gateway airports allowed to fly GA flights into DCA. Essentially, these ASOs will be private Air Marshals.
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A review of the ASO program information, which is available on the TSA Web site at http://www.tsa.gov/public/, indicates this may be one of the potential success stories of the TSA. The qualification requirements for Armed Security Officers are substantial. Among others, they include the requirement that applicants be either active duty law enforcement officers, qualified retired law enforcement officers (retired in good standing) or former law enforcement officers who served at least four years and left under honorable conditions, completed a certified basic law enforcement training course, submit to and pass a TSA background/fingerprint check and FAA medical exam, and pass, at their own expense, a training course provided by the Federal Air Marshals Service.
This will be a limited program employing well-screened, experienced and trained security personnel working aboard general aviation aircraft flying into and out of DCA. It should cost the taxpayers little, since application and training expenses are covered by the applicants and their general aviation employers. The ASO personnel will, in fact, be experienced law enforcement officers, even though they will be acting as private security officers in their ASO capacities. The positions are likely to attract many retired officers wanting to do the work on a part-time or temporary basis, or active duty officers working off-duty assignments. Either way, the ASO cadre should be a solid, competent group of professionals and not low-paid, low-skilled and quickly hired security guards with guns aboard the private airplanes. In this regard, the public should feel secure, and it appears TSA has worked this one correctly.
And that brings to mind the ever-festering issue of border security and now, in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal Governments disaster response capabilities. How might all this be related? TSA, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security (at least still for now), has just demonstrated that it can put together a common sense plan for incorporating professional private sector security resources, at little expense to the Government, for a significant security sensitive program involving the Nations capital. That program, admittedly, is just beginning; but it looks good so far.
The utilization of retired law enforcement officers as a reserve or auxiliary Homeland Security Force is a concept that has been proposed by several sources since 9/11. There are several variations of such plans, and while there is some interest in Congress, none so far have received serious consideration by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The Administration has noted its aversion to private border surveillance groups such as The Minutemen, even though that organization has arguably succeeded in reducing illegal border traffic where it set up operations. Would not a Government sponsored and controlled Border Patrol Auxiliary composed of experienced volunteer law enforcement retirees work well to augment the understaffed active duty Patrol with such duties as fixed observation, detention work and administrative duties? And do so with minimal taxpayer expense? Shouldnt such a program at least be explored?
And what about a similar Homeland Security Reserve Force that could be deployed in the event of large-scale disasters? Such Reserve Officers could conduct activities as static security and detention control duties and free regular active officers for more aggressive patrol and investigation duties. Again, shouldnt there at least be some thinking outside the box on such matters?
The much-maligned TSA has actually displayed some forward thinking with its ASO program. Hopefully it works as well as it sounds. Perhaps other branches of DHS should take heed. « Close It
"Abu Azzam": Is He Really Al-Qaida's No. 2 in Iraq?
By Evan Kohlmann
Yesterday, U.S. military officials made statements to the press reporting the death of Abu Azzam al-Iraqi (a.k.a. Abdullah Najim Abdullah Mohamed Al-Jawari), whom they described as the "No. 2 official" in Al-Qaida's Committee in Iraq and the "top deputy" to Al-Qaida commander Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. While there is no doubt that Abu Azzam is a relatively influential figure within Al-Qaida's local Baghdad network, there are several cogent reasons to question his purported title as "Number 2."
1.) Al-Qaida's top level infrastructure has already been publicly identified in recent statements and audio recordings issued by the group. Though little has been heard from him lately, Al-Qaida's de-facto "Deputy Commander" is reputed to be an unidentified Iraqi national who goes by the combat name "Abu Abdelrahman al-Iraqi." Allegedly, sitting beneath Abu Abdelrahman in Al-Qaida's chain of command is the official commander of Al-Qaida's Military Wing: another Iraqi national known as "Abu Usaid al-Iraqi" (see here and here). Neither of these individuals has been reported as killed or captured--neither by Al-Qaida nor by coalition military forces in Iraq.
2.) Al-Qaida's Committee in Iraq has already angrily issued its own statement acknowledging the likely death of its lieutenant Abu Azzam in a coalition military assault in Baghdad, but nonetheless insisting: "[these are merely] endless fruitless efforts to raise the morale of their soldiers... The Mujahid Abu Azzam al-Iraqi is one of many soldiers from Al-Qaida's Committee and serves as a commander of [just] one of our Brigades operating in Baghdad." [English translation provided by Globalterroralert.com] While it is always smart to keep a healthy dose of cynicism when analyzing raw Al-Qaida propaganda, Zarqawi's group is surprisingly candid when it comes to admitting the passing of significant figures within its movement, such as Abu Anas al-Shami (a.k.a. Omar Yousef Jumah), Omar Hadeed, and Abul-Harith al-Iraqi (Mohammed Jassim al-Issawi). In fact, following the death of the legendary Abu Anas al-Shami a year ago, Zarqawi released a video on the Internet in which he confessed to being "in tears" upon learning the (sad) news.
3.) Even some statements previously issued by the Pentagon and the MNF in Iraq seem to raise questions about the notion of Abu Azzam al-Iraqi being legitimately described as Al-Qaida's "Number 2" most important official--even if we limit ourselves merely to the confines of the Iraqi capital. On July 20, 2005, the MNF in Iraq issued a statement asking for help in locating Abu Thar al-Iraqi (a.k.a. Muhammad Rabi Hadi Jassir al-Dulaymi), described as "Al-Qaida's chief bombing coordinator for Baghdad." There have been no subsequent reports from either the MNF or Al-Qaida suggesting that Abu Thar has since been killed or captured. One is left to wonder then, who is the real chief of Al-Qaida in Baghdad?
Treasury Department's FinCEN Unit Recovering From "Cyberjacked" E-Mail System
By Andrew Cochran
We were the first site to report the "cyberjacking" last Friday of the subscriber-based e-mail service used by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, which administers the Bank Secrecy Act (as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act) and shares financial intelligence gathered from financial institutions with law enforcement and the intel community. Yesterday, FinCEN issued an update which further explained the steps that they are taking to rebuild their systems. The release also states that, "Since FinCEN did not collect personal information from subscribers to this service, no information, other than e-mail addresses, was compromised." Considering that numerous senior compliance officials at major financial institutions subscribed to the service, I will be looking for any news of spamming or identity theft involving the stolen e-mail addresses, as well as the results of the criminal investigation into the cyberjacking.
The most important impact of the cyberjacking has been to shut down the automated system whereby FinCEN and law enforcement request and receive information from financial institutions for use in terrorism and money laundering cases.
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The system, enacted under section 314(a) of the PATRIOT Act, took several years and numerous hiccups to implement, but it's operated quite smoothly for over a year. Starting in March, FinCEN posted 314(a) requests for information on a secure website for review and response by over 24,000 financial institutions. FinCEN periodically issues results of the 314(a) requests, with the most recent out on September 13 (I had posted discussions of 314(a) request reports earlier this year here and here). According to this report, the requests for information issued since the 314(a) request system began in February 2003 have resulted 157 cases involving terrorism or terrorist financing and 272 cases involving money laundering. The results of the cases thus far are, quoting from the September 13 report:
1091 Grand Jury Subpoenas
13 Search Warrants
154 Administrative Subpoenas/Summons/Other
77 Arrests
72 Indictments
10 Convictions
$14,405,053.64 Total Dollar Amount Located
In my opinion, that's a good track record which merits a "congrats" to FinCEN, law enforcement, and the participating financial institutions. Although there was no compromise in the 314(a) system itself, FinCEN was wise to shut it down while they run security tests. They plan to transmit 314(a) requests in another manner until they can restore the automated system. « Close It
Hamas HQ Office in Saudi Arabia
By Matthew Levitt
Israeli authorities announced today the arrest of an Israeli-Arab Hamas activist who played central militant, political and financing roles for the group in coordination with a "Hamas command in Saudi Arabia."
Until he was arrested last month, Yakub Muhamad Yakub Abu Etzev was in contact with senior Hamas officials in Saudi Arabia via e-mail. According to Israeli authorities, "Abu Etzev confessed that he received hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Hamas HQ in Saudi Arabia as well as instructions that he passed on to Hamas field operatives." These funds entered the West Bank through human couriers and money changers.
The Hamas office in Saudi Arabia reportedly instructed Abu Etzev to open a "communications office" to report on developments on the ground to Hamas operatives abroad. The Hamas leaders in Saudi Arabia provided the funding for this venture, as well as funding for the families of suicide terrorists and imprisoned terrorists and a variety of Hamas institutions. Monies were often transfered under the cover of charity work.
Abu Etzev informed that Hamas' decision to participate in Palestinian elections came only after the group canvassed field operatives. This input was then forwarded to Hamas operatives in Saudi Arabia. Abu Etzev himself was personally involved in the logistical preparations leading up to elections, and funded the creation of local Hamas committees in towns and villages with funds from Hamas' Saudi office.
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The revelation that Hamas operates a command center in Saudi Arabia with close ties to Hamas militants executing attacks as well as the movement's political and social-welfare (dawa) operations is remarkable. But neither the fact that Hamas operatives are active in the kingdom nor the fact that Hamas receives significant amounts of funding from within the kingdom is news.
As early as 1994, Palestinian sources noted that "the widespread belief is that Hamas has received money [from] the governments of Saudi Arabia and some Gulf states," adding that such support is believed to have continued after the Persian Gulf War "as a way of punishing the PLO for its support of Iraq during the Gulf crisis." In 1997, Italian press reports cited unnamed Palestinian officials who complained, "Riyadh's help to Hamas has grown with the opening of new [financial] channels," and revealed that "over 140 billion lire has been collected in Saudi Arabia and the other oil monarchies." In September 2003, U.S. officials noted in congressional testimony that despite some success in curbing terror financing, "by no means have we cross[ed] the bridge of the issue of terrorist financing emanating from Saudi Arabia." In testimony on efforts to target Hamas financing, a senior Treasury official noted that not only is it "not a crime to give to Hamas in Saudi Arabia," but also that "Hamas during the Hajj alone raises enormous amounts of money and send their political director there."
Individuals, charities and banks tied to the ruling class in Saudi Arabia are among the most prolific supporters of Islamist extremism, both Palestinian and global. The al-Raji family has been tied to Hamas funding, as have other members of the Saudi elite, such as Khari al Agha and Abd Al Rahim Nasrallah, who is believed to have laundered and transferred funds through charitable organizations fronting for Hamas in Europe. Nasrallah was reportedly in direct contact with Zayd Mahmoud Abd al-Rahim Salameh Zakarneh, the head of the Jenin charity committee--a central node in the Hamas dawa in the northern West Bank. Together, Zakarna and Nasrallah may have arranged for the transfer of hundreds of thousands of dollars to Hamas. Individual contributions from Saudi Arabia were instrumental in Hamas' development of the Qassam rockets it routinely shoots into Israel from Gaza. In December 2001, Israeli authorities arrested Hamas operative Osama Zohadi Hamed Karika as he attempted to cross the Rafah border crossing at Gaza. On his person were documents detailing the development of the Qassam rockets. Under questioning, he admitted that he was on his way to Saudi Arabia to brief unidentified persons on the development of the rockets and to obtain their continued funding for the project. Karika also told his Israeli interrogators that it was in Saudi Arabia where he had personally secured initial funding for the rocket program.
Much of the above research is drawn from sections of my forthcoming book, "Exposing Hamas: Funding Terror Under the Cover of Charity" (Yale University Press, 2006). « Close It
Lebanon asks for US and French help re terrorism
By Olivier Guitta
An FBI team, requested by Lebanese PM Fuad Siniora, just arrived in Beirut today to help solve the latest string of terrorist attacks, since Rafik Al Hariri's murder on February 14. In fact, after the attempted murder of the popular journalist May Chidiac, the Lebanese authorities have had enough. They recognize their incapacity to fight effectively terror at home and that's why on top of the FBI they requested major logistical and technical help from France. France's mission will be to strengthen the Lebanese security forces to better deal future acts of terror.
Also, interestingly Elias Murr, the Vice Prime Minister who barely escaped a few months ago a car bomb attack, revealed that Syrian general Ghazale, the de facto ruler of Lebanon before Syria's forced pullout, physically threatened him.
A few weeks ago, French president Chirac contacted major Lebanese leaders and told them that he had specific intel that their life was in danger. He then offered to fly them to Paris and protect them with French Secret Service agents. Most of the Lebanese in question including Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt accepted and stayed in Paris for about a week.
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The situation in Lebanon is explosive between the bombings against Christian targets and the assassinations of political leaders and journalists alike. And most leads point towards Syria. Syrian officials had even declared way before the pullout of troops that: "We destroyed the country once and we can do it again -- we will never allow ourselves to be pushed out." In such an environment, the US-French alliance in keeping the pressure on Assad is having concrete results. The findings of the UN commission on Hariri's murder could prove to be the smoking gun. « Close It
Was Abu Azzam Really "#2" in Al-Zarqawi's Network? And How Serious Are Recent Threats to Attack France?
By Andrew Cochran
Abdullah Abu Azzam, the Al-Zarqawi lieutenant killed in Iraq on Sunday, is being labeled "the #2 Al Qaeda in Iraq" by the Pentagon and in media reports. Counterterrorism experts and students have learned, often the hard way, to never take claims of important tactical victories or defeats without skepticism and objective review. Evan Kohlmann is checking his sources and internet sites and will discuss Abu Azzam's place in the AZ network in a post later today or tomorrow. In the meantime, we invite you to review the AZ leadership chart that he prepared months ago (Acrobat file), which is always available in the "Counterterrorism Library" in the left sidebar and also on Evan's site. You'll notice that at the time that Evan prepared the chart, Abu Azzam held an important place in the network, but not in the innermost circle. Evan will also update his important post from September 24 on the status of the fight against the AZ network, the first time that Evan has expressed some optimism on this site about the battle.
Evan will also discuss the arrest of GSPC suspects in France and the potential threats to the Paris metro and airport. He posted about threats of attacks by "Al-Qaida in Northern Europe" on September 15, and about threats by the GSPC, with one message addressed to "our brothers in France," on September 6.
UPDATE: Steven Emerson was on Fox News this morning to discuss the Abu Azzam killing.
Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf
By Zachary Abuza
On 27 February 2004, a bomb detonated on SuperFerry 14 after departing Manila, killing 194 people. Although the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) initially dismissed the claim of responsibility by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), evidence emerged that confirmed the groups immediate claim of responsibility. It was the second most lethal terrorist attack in Asia after the Bali bombing perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah on 12 October 2002, and the single most deadly terrorist attack in the Philippines. Since then, Philippine security officials arrested several other Abu Sayyaf members in metro-Manila who were in the final stages of preparation for bombings. Between October and January 2005, there were three aborted bombings, including a planned attack on the US Embassy. On 14 February 2005, the ASG claimed responsibility for three near simultaneous bombings in Manila, Davao and General Santos that left 11 people dead and 136 wounded. In May 2005, Philippine officials uncovered a cache of bomb-making chemicals in a Manila warehouse.
In short, the ASG has re-entered the arena of terrorism. Although the group is thought to have only 200-300 members, Philippine National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales named the Abu Sayyaf as the most dangerous of all rebel groups in the country. Compared with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the New Peoples Army, the Abu Sayyaf is the most dangerous because these terrorists even volunteer to conduct attacks to win the recognition of international terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, Gonzales said. This is hyperbole, directed at the United States government, as the primary internal security threat remains the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army. But the ASG and their ties to JI have the potential to cause instability and negative economic impacts.
Why has this brutal kidnap-for-ransom gang re-entered the fray and abandoned its 8-9 year reign of deadly, though hardly political, kidnapping? What are the endogenous and exogenous factors in explaining the Abu Sayyafs reinvention? What are the implications for both Philippine and regional security?
For more on the Abu Sayyaf's history, goals, and their relationship with the MILF and Jemaah Islamiyah, please see the author's report here link.
Al-Qaeda's Hurricane Lesson: Target the Oil Supply
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
There can be no doubt that our terrorist enemies have keenly watched both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. One thing they will surely seize on (as noted by Bill West, among others) is the complete inadequacy of the governmental response to Katrina -- which suggests that we are not prepared to handle the effects of a major terrorist attack. Another clear lesson is the U.S. economy's vulnerability to high oil prices.
Christopher Dickey has an excellent article in Newsweek demonstrating that our foes are cognizant that an attack on Saudi Arabia's oil and gas facilities could significantly damage the U.S. economy. He notes a shoot-out that occurred on September 6 in the Saudi Arabian city of Ad Dammam, which at the time was well below the media's radar because of Katrina's tragic aftermath. The shoot-out lasted almost 48 hours, and Saudi forces were only able to end it when they brought in light artillery; afterward, the police found "enough weapons for a couple of platoons of guerrilla fighters." But on top of that, Saudi police found documents showing that the terrorist cell "had planned major attacks on some of Saudi Arabia's key oil and gas facilities."
Dickey points out that, with the current hurricane-induced oil shortages, Saudi Arabia is "more important than ever to world oil supplies" -- and al-Qaeda knows it: "They're watching Katrina. They're watching Rita. They're watching what it's doing to the United States," says former CIA agent Robert Baer, who has written extensively on Saudi Arabia's vulnerabilities. A few ruptured pipes could be repaired quickly, says Baer, but a concerted attack at several points could bring on the kind of nightmare scenario that U.S. officials have been dreading since the Reagan years, pushing oil prices up from their current prices in the range of $60 to $70 a barrel to well over $100 for weeks or even months.
Such an attack would have a tremendous effect on the U.S. economy. This situation deserves our attention in the coming months -- and highlights one of the many reasons we should be working to reduce our dependence on oil.
EU?s New Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Strategy Not All That Its Cracked Up To Be!
By Victor Comras
Last week the EU Commission proposed four new measures to strengthen the EUs counter-terrorism program. The Commission cast their proposals as a new comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. But, the measures they proposed certainly lack sufficient substance to justify such billing. They include a $7 million Euro pilot project for terrorism prevention, preparedness and response; a proposal that the Commission engage all EU members as parties to the Council of Europes latest Convention for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, and a Communication (ie Statement of EU Programs) for combating violent radicalism and terrorist recruitment. Most notable in the new package is the Commissions proposal to require the retention of electronic communication traffic data. Europe telecom companies and other service providers had strongly opposed such measures. They were joined by several human rights groups concerned by the inroads such requirements would make on rights of privacy and other civil liberties. The proposal would require all providers of publicly available electronic communications, or a public telecommunications network, to retain data related to mobile and fixed telephony for one year and all internet communications for six months. However, the requirement does not extend to the actual content of the communications. There is also provision for reimbursing service providers for any demonstrated additional costs they may incur. This proposal still requires the agreement of the European Parliament and the Council.
Counter-terrorism authorities in a number of EU countries had pushed for even more stringent electronic communication retention rules. They argue that such measures would be of great assistance to tracking terrorists and preventing terrorist attacks. The EU Council reportedly may decide to trump the EU Commissions proposals by adopting stronger requirements that would extend data retention for both telephonic and internet communications for up to three years. This possibility was vetted publicly at several Council meetings. See reports of the European Council of 16/17 June and, the special meeting following the July 7 London attacks.
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The Commissions new program provides only a very modest 7 million Euro for what it deems a pilot project on prevention, preparedness and response to terrorism These funds will be directed at implementing at least some of the programs announced by the Commission last October. Some two thirds 5.4 million Euro - will go for preparation of a future European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection. One million Euros is being allocated for projects to enhance European expertise on terrorism. This will include funding studies on violent radicalisation and on the financing of terrorism. The Commission also proposes to create two new European networks of experts: one in the field of violent radicalization, and the other on the economics of security. Much of the remainder will also be used to support a civic and democratic debate on fighting terrorism, securing freedom. The Commission promises to consider further funding for these projects next year.
The Council of Europes new Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and o |