Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf
By Zachary Abuza
On 27 February 2004, a bomb detonated on SuperFerry 14 after departing Manila, killing 194 people. Although the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) initially dismissed the claim of responsibility by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), evidence emerged that confirmed the group’s immediate claim of responsibility. It was the second most lethal terrorist attack in Asia after the Bali bombing perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah on 12 October 2002, and the single most deadly terrorist attack in the Philippines. Since then, Philippine security officials arrested several other Abu Sayyaf members in metro-Manila who were in the final stages of preparation for bombings. Between October and January 2005, there were three aborted bombings, including a planned attack on the US Embassy. On 14 February 2005, the ASG claimed responsibility for three near simultaneous bombings in Manila, Davao and General Santos that left 11 people dead and 136 wounded. In May 2005, Philippine officials uncovered a cache of bomb-making chemicals in a Manila warehouse.
In short, the ASG has re-entered the arena of terrorism. Although the group is thought to have only 200-300 members, Philippine National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales named the Abu Sayyaf as the “most dangerous” of all rebel groups in the country. “Compared with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the New People’s Army, the Abu Sayyaf is the most dangerous because these terrorists even volunteer to conduct attacks to win the recognition of international terrorist groups, including al-Qaida,” Gonzales said. This is hyperbole, directed at the United States government, as the primary internal security threat remains the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army. But the ASG and their ties to JI have the potential to cause instability and negative economic impacts.
Why has this brutal kidnap-for-ransom gang re-entered the fray and abandoned its 8-9 year reign of deadly, though hardly political, kidnapping? What are the endogenous and exogenous factors in explaining the Abu Sayyaf’s reinvention? What are the implications for both Philippine and regional security?
For more on the Abu Sayyaf's history, goals, and their relationship with the MILF and Jemaah Islamiyah, please see the author's report here link.