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Walid Phares: "Al Qaida's TV" won't replace al Jazeera, it is the official archivesBy Walid Phares
The piece was first posted on FDD blog at link Writing in the Washington Post (article), Daniel Williams announced that al Qaida has launched its own news bulletins via Internet. He referred it to an Italian news agency called Adnkonois, reporting from Dubai. He mentioned that the entire 16 minutes was available on an Italian web site. At first, one would be impressed by the news value of the "story." And indeed, in our current world of Global War on Terror, sensational pieces such as this one make headlines, inflame talking heads, and put writers on TV screens. If we agree that Terrorism and counter terrorism have produced an industry and consumers a headline such as "al Qaida has its own newscast now" will open ears and eyes and drag mouses to click on links. But let's examine where is the real meat in this story, with a comparative analysis.. The Washington Post article says: "if the program was indeed an al Qaida production, it would mark a change in how the group uses Internet to spread its messages and propaganda." The "if it was al Qaida" caution is an understandable journalistic reservation, escorting any investigation. But sometimes it becomes intellectually obsolete. For no one has so far explained where and what is the official al Qaida. Most research indicate today, that whatever calls itself al Qaida is in fact al Qaida, unless you're joking or it is an implant of some intelligence service. The real caution should be nowadays, "if indeed it is not a fake," rather than questioning the Jihadism of the Jihadists online. In short, if a material is signed by al Qaida appears on a Jihadi web, one would assume it is al Qaida, either part of the core organization, or willing to associate with it. But that is only a little academic note. The meat is elsewhere. People are excited to follow al Qaida's activities and to discover its new trends and fashions. But sometimes, if we're not attentive to the Jihadi world, there could be pitfalls. In this case for example, al Qaida is not really marking a dramatic substance-change, but has organized what it had been producing for years. The Bin laden's network has been producing these footage and documentaries in pieces and posting them as they were produced. What wasn't there was the weekly address via video in one form by one production. Comments on issues such as Gaza, Iraq, hurricanes hitting the US, and Shiia-bashing were available even before 9/11, and certainly multiplied afterward. Better, al Qaida's non-video bulletins were regularly broadcast on al ansar, ahl al sunna, al khilafa, and many other web outlets. Over the past three years I listened to them almost on a daily basis. In a sum, the material "discovered" by the Italian news service existed ages ago. It was simply not reported enough in the West. The only news meat in the Washington Post story is the fact that al Qaida's PR teams decided to consolidate this material in one "broadcast" and air it on a weekly basis. That's all. But behind the story, one can see two serious issues. First, the Washington Post attempt to explain why is al Qaida creating its own broadcast. The author writes: "Direct dissemination would avoid editing or censorship by television networks, many of which air only excerpts of the group statements and avoid showing gruesome images of killings." In other words, and straight to the point, the article considers al Jazeera's airing of al Qaida's video not acceptable to Bin Laden, and therefore mainstream by Western standards. It seems that this sentence is the real conclusion of the whole article. Let's rephrase: al Qaida had to find its own media because Arab media, particularly al Jazeera (although not cited but assumed) are acting in the mainstream. Well that is not the case. When an al Qaida videotape is obtained (no one knows how, but that is another issue) by al Jazeera the "treatment" of the material is maximized but within the boundaries of the professional format. Al Jazeera didn't declare itself as the official media of al Qaida. Therefore, it will not show signs that it is the spokes-outlet of Bin Laden. But the Qatar-based network has millions of viewers. By showing 30% of a video tape, and the most important segment, that is the political message, it would be more efficient than showing the rest of the tape, which is usually either dry and boring or repetitive. I myself had opportunities to see the "core" before being able to see the "rest." Showing that essence many times a day, bringing in panels to discuss it is by far more efficient and globally impacting than the rigid airing of the whole al Qaida made package once a week. Al Jazeera's art work with fragments of al Qaida's tapes is by far more influential than a web-based group-ran broadcast. So, why would al Qaida even spend time on the weekly address? Precisely because of organizational needs. The "official" statements have to be posted somewhere for the organic membership to gather around and watch. While satellite networks inflame the millions with embellished fragments from al Qaida's production, the proper organization's web cast would air the entire raw material to the membership directly. Besides, the Jihadists understands the geopolitics of the War on Terror. They know that eventually even radical Arab media could fall into problems. It is ironic that the article on al Qaida's newscast came out one day after Taysir Alluni, al Jazeera corespondent in Spain, was sentenced to seven years in prison for what the court found as a connection to al Qaida. The sentence obviously linked an al Jazeera cadre to al Qaida (an accusation immediately rejected by the channel). But the Washington Post article hinted otherwise. Coincidental, the article was telling its readers that al Qaida didn't like al Jazeera's handling of its videos, therefore decided to create its own news service. Let's call this the politics of Jihadism and its complications. For the most important item in the whole story, at least from my perspective as a reader of Jihadi political history is the name of the new al Qaida weekly bulletin. "Sawt Al Khilafa" or the "Voice of the Caliphate." This name alone is deeply meaningful. Researchers in Jihadi studies can click immediately at the sight or hearing of the name: While the article -and other media shows delved in the news worthiness of a weekly address by al Qaida, experts in the real depth of the Jihadist movement will stop there. Are we getting closer to what many analysts have been waiting for, looking for and expecting to appear? If you review carefully the videotapes of Usama, Ayman and abu Mus'ab, as they appeared at least since 2001 you'd see the ideological trajectory of the central message: The Caliphate is not far away in time. The preparations are underway. It is an exciting time for the Jihadists. In my forthcoming book, (November) I try to examine the ballistics of the upcoming events, or what is on the minds of the Jihadists globally. The highest moments of al Qaida are still ahead, not in terms of winning or losing the War, but in terms of revealing itself to the world in more stunning ways. ************ Dr Walid Phares, Senior Fellow, FDD, Professor of Middle East Studies. www.walidphares.com
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