NY Subway Threat: The Terrorists options

By Walid Phares

Walid Phares

The first question that comes to mind is about the discrepancy between Washington and New York. Is it about analysis of the information, or is it disagreement on translations, context and credibility? Is it a conflict of expert opinions, and in this case, are the decision makers relying on the Government's experts for their disagreement with each other? Certainly this is an interesting track, in view of past experiences on both sides of the Atlantic.

But assuming that the discrepancy in assessment between NY security authorities and the Homeland Security is resolved, and that a "one reading" of the information is reached, and assuming that -in general terms- a threat somewhat "exist" or "existed" let's explore the other side's reaction.

If indeed, a solid  information was obtained from captured Terrorists or documents, overseas or at home, we have two possibilities: One, the device(s) has already been deployed; in this case only a massive search, or coincidence may stop the potential use.

Two, the device(s) -either bombs or human-bombs- haven't been deployed yet at the time of security mobilization. In this case, what would the Jihadi Terrorists (al Qaida or not) do?

A) They would go ahead and perform the mission at the same location

B) They would perform the attack at another location

C) They would call off the operation, and select another date and or another location

The logic of selection between the three option is not entirely security-driven, but factors in political, media, and psychological elements. An al Qaida decision maker (either home grown or overseas) would

1. Assess the psychological (and therefore economic and political) damage caused by the actual "threat," and US response to it.

2. Decide:

     a. Either use the "Khaliya" (cell) nevertheless to strike amidst "enemy" mobilization.

     b. Restrain the cell, continue to monitor the developments, and launch the attack when several   factors are regathered.

In the final analysis, the decision by the Jihad Terrorists to strike (assuming that the original threat assessment is credible) is a product of the initial plan, the US response, and the recalibration by the Terrorists: A lethal chess game.

Walid Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a CTB contributor 

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