Counterterrorism Blog

Walid Phares

Several indicators, including exchanges on the chat rooms (on the ansar among others) over the past days, show a strategic intention, or let's call it an intense focus on "recidivism." What was portrayed as "the success of the second strike of Bali," was used by chatters to call for "second" and more strikes on ex-attacked targets. One sentence was very indicative: "kama duribat Bali marratein, satudrab mudunun kafira ukhra." Translation: "As how Bali was hit twice, so will other infidel cities be hit as well." The term "twice" is indicative of the high Jihadi excitement to strike two times: the thrill of psychological effect based on what some Jihadi have called "abathiyat al tassaddi lil mujahidin."  Translation: "The impossibility to stop the Jihadists." In simple English, if they decide to hit the same city twice, they will, with no obstruction. Hence psychologically, a recidivist strike on New York is high on the Jihadists agenda. Moreover..

After the July subway attacks in London, the same chat rooms boomed with discussions about "ghazwat London" (London's raid). Among the many arguments made then by the room-moderators, usually al Qaida or other Salafi cadres, the "operation" uncovered what they called a "Thaghara da'ima" (a permanent breach) in the infidel cities. One commentator said: "the only thing they (the infidels) can do is to stop their trains." He explained that the London "model" can't be stopped.

Hence, one would project theoretically that a combination of striking twice (after Bali) and with a successful model (London's subways) would converge to a New York "try." Evidently, this is only an analytical construction of intent and identification of the Jihadi agenda. In short: Is the New York subway system a strategic target in the mind of al Qaida or its satellites? After London, it's attractive; and after Bali, it's exciting. So much for the mind wishes and political projections of the Terrorists. But the main answer remains in the hand of US and Western intelligence agencies. So far, we're all awaiting for the evidence, or shreds of it.

I haven't seen or heard a transcript of the Government(s) tips, information or set of both. Having access to such material may increase or decrease the analytical conclusion. But the politico-psychological environment is there: the bad guys have the big apple on their minds. Is there an attempt underway? Possible. Would warnings and action by authorities and the public stop it, deter it or postpone it: very possible.

And let's note that, in the war on Terror, never underestimate the impact of Government warnings, mobilization of the public, and media attention. The men of Jihad watches TV too..

Walid Phares is a senior fellow with FDD and contributor to CTB.