Counterterrorism Blog

Today marks the third anniversary of the 2002 bombings in Bali that left some 202 people dead. It remains the single most lethal terrorist incident after 9/11. Although most of the people were killed following the detonation of a large truck bomb, Southeast Asia�s first suicide bomber was employed in Paddy�s Bar moments before in an attempt to get people into the blast zone of the larger explosion.

JI remains alive and well. . Despite the arrests of more than 300 members across the region, including much of its leadership, JI remains the single-most lethal Al Qaeda affiliated group in the world. It is launched a major attack every year since then, in roughly one-year intervals, including the recent triple suicide blasts in Bali.

While the nature of JI�s current relationship to Al Qaeda is not clear at this time, due to the arrests of key figures in the respective organizations, JI remains committed to the Al Qaeda line. Money is still likely flowing from Al Qaeda coffers to JI, though through smaller and informal channels.

JI remains resilient for eight key reasons:

1. A core of first-generation leaders, several with Afghan experience, remains at large. There are roughly 20 JI leaders on the US Rewards for Justice most wanted list who remain at large. They are charismatic and able recruiters. Moreover, they come from all social and educational classes, giving JI a broad-base of recruits.
2. JI continues to have access to MILF training camps/base areas in the southern Philippines. Moreover, they have forged closer relations with groups such as the Abu Sayyaf.
3. JI continues to perpetrate sectarian conflicts in the outer islands of Indonesia, an important recruiting ground. Sectarian conflict not only gives new recruits a taste of defending their religion, a sense of jihad, and an us vs. them mentality, but it reinforces the notion that the Indonesian government does not defend the interests of its Muslim constituency.
4. JI has been focusing on spiritual purification � advanced religious training for its members � which they are doing overtly.
5. They have been able to take advantage of the fact that JI as an organization remains un-proscribed. Mere membership is not illegal in Indonesia.
6. They continue to operate trans-nationally in Southeast Asia and South Asia (Pakistan and Bangladesh), and take advantage of improved yet imperfect inter-state cooperation.
7. They take advantage of conflicts in Iraq and southern Thailand, and identify with the plight of persecuted Muslims.
8. They are patient. JI�s own documents speak of a 30 year time frame to achieve their initial goal: an Islamic state in Indonesia, the nucleus of a pan-Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia. If the Prophet Mohammad himself had to make a strategic retreat, there is no face lost: it is theologically ordained. They will focus on dawah activities.

While it is important not to overstate the threat posed by JI, or over-react by passing rash counter-terror legislation that can be used to erode the democratic gains in the region, we should not become complacent either. JI remains the most immediate security threat in the region and demands the attention and cooperation of those states and the American, Australian and European partners.