Counterterrorism Blog

Three suicide bombs went off in crowded restaurants and cafes in Bali on 1 October. To date, there have been no arrests and there is only tentative news that one of the three bombers has been identified (but only by his nom de guerre), but there has been progress in the investigation that has shed light on the complexity of the organization. In particular, Indonesian police seem to be focusing on two different cells that may have played a role.

Indonesian police believe that Zulkarnaen, JI�s chief of military operations, ordered the attack. Dr. Azahari bin Hussin and Noordin Mohammad Top, both Malaysians, are believed to have been the chief planners, bomb-makers and recruiters. Indonesian police announced that Noordin, whom they came within two hours of capturing in the middle of the night on 26 September in a central Javanese village, was in Bali to plan the attack, but left before it was executed.

To execute three simultaneous suicide bombings requires a large cell and careful planning. Immediately police identified five members of a Benten cell that was involved in the October 20002 Bali bombing; all were sentenced and jailed for two years for storing 8kg of explosives for the attacks that left 202 people dead. All five men, who had been under surveillance since their release, had recently disappeared.

The other cell that has been identified as being part of these attacks is a central Javanese cell that had a very important role in sending members to the Philippines for training. This cell first came to light in December 2004, when three Indonesians and their ASG escort were arrested entering Zamboanga, in the southern Philippines. The group was caught with US$7,000, 10 terrorist manuals, Al Qaeda VCDs and other materials. The four were on their way to MILF camps in Mindanao to conduct training. They also had blueprints for truck bombs on their possession.

One of the three, Abdullah Faiz, told his Philippine interrogators that the three had been sent to Mindanao for training by two people in the Central Java cell: Abdullah Sunata and Encen Kurnia, the main figures in getting people to Mindanao and were the liaisons for two of the top JI leaders at large in the southern Philippines, Dulmatin and Umar Patek. [Yesterday the US government raised the bounty for Dulmatin to $10 million]. A second group of suicide bombers was arrested in Sabah, Malaysia in June 2005. A third group of bombers made it into the Philippines, Kurnia would later tell his captors.

With this information, in June 2005, Indonesians moved in on the Central Java cell. In total 17 people were arrested in June and July; 11 in Solo and the remaining 6 in Jakarta. This cell, which included Sunata and Kurnia, was thought to be planning an attack on Indonesian police headquarters amongst others. Members of this cell, especially Sunata, were also thought to be involved in the September 2004 Australian Embassy attack. Members of this cell were known to have helped Azahari and Noordin.

In the safe houses raided, Indonesian police found many of the materials that were used in the 1 October suicide attacks in Bali, including TNT, detonating cord, ball bearings, etc. So there were plenty of clues as early as June and July to suggest that JI was going to shift to smaller suicide bombers, rather than truck bombs. Also found was potassium chlorate, electrical bomb circuits, bullets, four pistols.

The most important items that were captured at the time of the raid, however, were communications between Abdullah Sunata and Umar Patek, in Mindanao. In his interrogation, Sunata admitted, �he was tasked by Patek to solicit funds for terror arracks in the Philippines and recruit suicide bombers in Indonesia to be sent to central Mindanao.�

Though it is premature to conclude that the cell responsible for 1 October bombs had any direct links, it is clear that the Mindanao connection remains a very important one for JI. Indonesian police have refused to comment on whether there is any indication that the three suicide bombers trained in the Southern Philippines, but that a cell that is most immediately connected with the Bali blasts was also the cell in charge of liaising with Mindanao does raise some eyebrows.

Second, Indonesian police keep saying that this cell is a �new group.� �A new generation means that they are not known by the old group.� Yet, this is not a new group, a distinct organization, with its own command system, hierarchy, and goals. JI is just a very horizontal and exceptionally compartmentalized organization. It has a very rigid cell structure that places paramount importance on operational security. Moreover, these cell members often form their own organizations (Kompak in Ambon, for example). But that does not mean that they are completely autonomous. They simply have a more local geographical range of operations and activities.