DEBUNKING THE PARADIGM OF INEXPENSIVE TERRORISM
By Matthew Levitt
An increasingly accepted argument holds that terrorism has become a cheap enterprise. Louise Richardson, executive dean of the Radcliff Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University, made just that case while testifying before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in 2003. "The crucial point to bear in mind about terrorism, of course, is that it is cheap," Richardson said. She went on to argue that although the September 11 attacks cost $500,000, "It takes a great deal less to buy some fertilizer, rent a truck, and use them to bring down a building." If terrorism is cheap, as Richardson contends, then logic follows that financial counterterrorism measures are largely powerless to prevent terrorist attacks.
Regardless of the actual cost of terrorist attacks, a certain amount of money will always be necessary to fund attacks. Whether an attack costs $10,000 or $500,000, terrorists still need money, and will therefore leave a financial trail behind them. And unlike human sources, which can intentionally deceive, Levey notes "The simple fact remains that the money trail generally does not lie." Stemming the flow of funds can delay or prevent attacks -- even when the costs of bullets and explosives remain relatively low.
Clich here to read the full text of Joshua Prober's "ACCOUNTING FOR TERROR: DEBUNKING THE PARADIGM OF INEXPENSIVE TERRORISM."