Washington Post Misses the Mark on Foreign Fighters in Iraq

By Evan Kohlmann

In yesterday's Washington Post, Jonathan Finer authored an article examining the role of foreign fighters in ongoing military operations in western Iraq.  Throughout the piece, Finer implies that few foreign fighters have been actually involved in the Iraqi conflict, and that their existence is merely a propaganda smokescreen to cover a bloody war that is growing increasingly unpopular with the American public.  His conclusions are buttressed by comments from Anthony Cordesman of CSIS:

"'Both Iraqis and coalition people often exaggerate the role of foreign infiltrators and downplay the role of Iraqi resentment in the insurgency,'" said Anthony H. Cordesman... 'It makes the government's counterinsurgency efforts seem more legitimate, and it links what's going on in Iraq to the war on terrorism.  When people go out into battle, they often characterize enemies in the most negative way possible.  Obviously there are all kinds of interacting political prejudices they can bring out by blaming outsiders.'"

Cordesman neglects to mention that -- rather than rely on sources in the U.S. or Iraqi government -- he bases his own research largely on intelligence reports from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  Needless to say, it is a sad day when a former U.S. Defense Department official finds the Saudis more trustworthy than his own government, not to mention our new Iraqi allies.  Indeed, according to Iraq's National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie, there is not "the least doubt that nine out of 10 of the suicide bombers who carry out suicide bombing operations among Iraqi citizens ... are Arabs who have crossed the border with Syria... Most of those that blow themselves up in Iraq are Saudi nationals."  Well-placed sources have scoffed to me at Finer's conclusions and went on to compare those who claim that the U.S. government has manufactured evidence of foreign fighters in Iraq to UFO conspiracy theorists. 

Note that this would-be "debate" has absolutely nothing to do with politics, whether from the left or the right.  President Bush and his advisors made a colossal strategic error in attempting to remove Saddam Hussein without an appropriate and credible replacement.  Beyond a tiny Kurdish enclave in far northern Iraq, there was no significant Al-Qaida presence within Iraq prior to 2003.  However--and this should be doubted by no one--the fall of Saddam and the resulting regional power vacuum allowed Al-Qaida operatives to infiltrate Iraq and establish a hardcore faction of mixed insurgents dedicated to fighting America at any cost.  If we withdraw from Iraq without first destroying Zarqawi's prolific Al-Qaida network, that failure will dog America for many years to come.

What is the percentage of foreign fighters out of the total number of insurgents?  What are the major bases of foreign fighter activity?  How well integrated are foreign fighters and native Iraqi insurgents?  These are all questions with indefinite answers at the moment -- nobody can say for sure.  Estimates range wildly and are, at best, (un)educated guesses.  However, what *can* stated with absolute certainty is that foreign fighters have dramatically changed the face of the Iraqi insurgency and have escalated it to a level that is far beyond the control of the nascent Iraqi government.  The most destructive terrorist attacks in central Iraq have been almost entirely the work of outsiders.  Both suicide car bombing attacks on the United Nations compound in Baghdad during 2003 were the work of North Africans in the employ of Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  Scores of Saudis have blown themselves up in a horrific crescendo of attacks, including targeting Shiite mosques, foreign embassies, civilian hotels, and schools.  In fact, Al-Qaida's Committee in Iraq--led by Zarqawi--claims responsibility for all but a handful of the suicide bombing attacks carried out in Iraq.  While there is no doubt that it is native Iraqi insurgents who are behind the lionshare of more traditional roadside bombings and artillery attacks, they generally stray from the catastrophic "soft target" operations favored by foreign fighters under Zarqawi's command.  Clearly, U.S. troops would not be quite as susceptible to IEDs and basic insurgent warfare if they were not forced to continuously hunt for networks of Al-Qaida suicide bombers and arms smugglers hiding in the restive western Al-Anbar province.  Just as in previous Muslim conflict zones such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Caucasus, Al-Qaida fighters in Iraq serve as the insurgent spearhead -- a ruthless mafia of religious fanatics willing to carry out dangerous, high-value missions aimed at terrifying a superior adversary and forcing it on the defensive.

It is appropriate here to look to the prior "Afghan" model for the purposes of comparative analysis.  During the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, foreign fighters comprised only a diminutive portion of the total Afghan mujahideen battling the Soviet Union.  Until 1987--nearly eight years after the Russians first landed their paratroopers in Kabul--Arab emigres did not even have their own exclusive military training camp.  Nonetheless, a small, elite cadre of these foreign fighters persisted on and succeeded in founding the world's most deadly terrorist organization, Al-Qaida.  This historical pattern alone should demonstrate that underestimating the prodigal expansion of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his followers in Iraq -- whether native or foreign -- is a deadly mistake.

Meanwhile, despite the wave of disinformation in the media, foreign fighters nonetheless continue to arrive in Iraq and die there as insurgents and suicide bombers.  On November 17, the Beirut Daily Star--hardly a mouthpiece of the American government--published an interview with an official from a prominent Al-Qaida faction based in Lebanon known as Asbat al-Ansar:

"Abu Sharif, the spokesperson of Esbat al-Ansar group based in Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp, told The Daily Star that 'a group of very well-trained mujahideen from Esbat al-Ansar managed to enter Iraq and carried out several attacks against the Crusaders' forces and did very well.'  The 'martyrs,' Ahmad Yassin and Saleh Shayeb, were killed one week ago.  Nidal Mustafa, the brother of an official from the Esbat al-Ansar, along with Mohammad al-Kurdi, the only Lebanese among them, were killed on Tuesday.  'Our only comfort in the martyrs is that they killed and wounded the enemies of God,' said the father of Mustafa.  Abu Sharif said that 'it is our duty to help any Muslim in the world.'  He said Muslim scholars agree that when an Islamic country is attacked or invaded by 'the enemies of our religion,' jihad becomes a responsibility.  'This is a duty that has been fulfilled by the members of the Islamic Esbat al-Ansar group in response to the words of the Holy Koran that calls for fighting enemies and being rewarded,' Abu Sharif said.  'This is a duty for the rescue of those who are inside prisons and in defense of our holy lands, our Holy book (Koran) that they have desecrated by tearing them and stamping on them, and in defense of our mosques that they have destroyed,' said Abu Sharif  'For all those reasons, a group of mujahideen from the Esbat al-Ansar group went to wage jihad in Iraq after they were unable to do so in Palestine,' he said.  Abu Sharif refused to estimate how many members left Lebanon for Iraq, nor would he suggest how they made their way.  He only said that 'they arrived in Iraq, carried out the attacks and some were killed.'  He also affirmed 'they were killed in Iraq.'  When asked whether Esbat al-Ansar fears any U.S. operation in Lebanon, Abu Sharif said: 'We don't fear them.'"

In the coming days, I will publish photos and short biographies of Saleh Shayeb, Ahmad Yassin, and other Palestinians from the Ain el-Hilweh Refugee camp who have recently been reported killed fighting U.S. forces in central Iraq.

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