Police Training Tightrope in Iraq - Watch Out

By Robert Charles

An objective review of police training in Iraq shows a remarkable flight path, and real gains. But watch out. Weather ahead. Even after a good flight, absence of a landing plan will spoil your day ... The premier training center for Iraqi police was established in Jordan in November 2003, by the State Department's Bureau on International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). Designed to support General Petreaus' effort to build security forces in Iraq, the Jordan-based school, located outside Amman, has been the unheralded "salt mine at the bottom of the sea." As of December 1, 2005, this school - led by an American civilian but boasting 17 nations' participation - has trained 24,742 police and deployed them back on to Iraqi streets. But there is rough water ahead ...

Are we prepared for the rough water ahead?

Built on a Western model curriculum, designed and refined by State/INL, the Jordan-based Police Academy offers the best chance of: (1) training a professional police force that is "service" oriented, respects human rights, is able to sustain itself against an insurgency, and will become the progenitor of a democracy premised on "rule of law," (2) creating an "overwhelming presence" -- to borrow from Colin Powell -- on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis across Sunni, Shiite and Kurd "hot spots," long after US troops begin coming home, and (3) offering a land-based "island hopping" campaign to restore zones or stability one after another and linked to one another, that is rule of law and "absolutely-no-insurgency" zones.

So far, so good. That strategy is sound but time consuming. To date, police recruiting remains solid and numbers high (at more than 1,500 a month). Patriotism is strong among recruits. Deployments are improving in cohesion, monitoring and overall effectiveness. But storm clouds loom. It is time for someone to take the rudder.

If this civilian-led training is the beginning of wisdom -- and it is -- there are major obstacles ahead. On the plus side, this effort parallels successes in Kosovo, Colombia, and in the distant past by General MacArthur in Japan (under pressure from a communist insurgency), when he turned over the civilian police function to chiefs of police from two populous US states.

The legacy in such places is a democratic order, not a militarized civilian law enforcement component, that unceremoniously slides toward military control of society, as happened in places like Noriega's Panama, earlier Indonesia, and a dozen other failed post-conflict almost-were democracies.

Three threats to Iraq's civilian law enforcement component loom. As the strategy gradually frees up intelligence in area after area, snuffs out insurgents, and restores order, there is an operational tight rope to be walked.

The first threat is Iraqi nationalism itself. The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior seems increasingly disinclined to look on the powerful engine of civilian police training in Jordan as -- positive. The descendents of Hamarabi, Babylon, Mesopotamia and "civilization's birthplace" don't like getting lessons on how to keep order in a civilizaed way in what was once Transjordan, home of nomads. As aresult, despite the school's success, the Iraqi MOI appears to be cutting salaries for cadets who volunteer for training in Jordan, dropping all danger pay (read: 50 percent of Iraqi police salaries), re-opening a less rigorous ("train who and how you like") police academy in Iraq, placing recruits in areas where less trained officers dominate (and may follow some 'old world' practices), emphasizing the need for "a mechanized division" (for police?) and relying on roving SWAT squads with little accountability. Where does such an emphasis lead? If not corrected, toward a militarized police force that has little chance of sustaining anything like Western-style democracy and rule of law.

Threat two. Somewhat accidentally, we may be allowing this shift to occur, raising the potential for a sudden shut-down or re-routing of this critical, unsung and successful, civilian-led police academy in Jordan for all the Iraqi police. According to those close to resource managers in State (DoS) and Defense (DoD), there is no money presently being sought or proposed in regular order for FY07 to support or sustain this gemstone police academy in Jordan.

Down the tubes would go the only real source of civilian law enforcement training for Iraqi's non-military security forces, gone the emphasis on rule of law by a professional police force, gone the strongest engine for a democracy-sustaining law enforcement cadre in Iraq. Obviously, the president's budget for FY07 has not been finalized by OMB, much less advanced on the Hill, but if these rumors are true, we will saw off one of strongest limbs supporting the transition to democracy - perhaps by accident.

Third. We may shoot ourselves in the foot if we seek to sweep this civilian-led, internationally manned, law enforcement-focused school into the back pocket of DOD, through CENTCOM, EUCOM or any other avenue. DOD is not the right avenue for civilian training to start with, unless in direct combat environments. There are both decades-old policies and long-standing laws that reinforce this view. Douglas MacArthur, a Soldier's Soldier, knew this. So did the successful and thoughtful former top security force trainer in Iraq, General Dave Petreaus. Interagency coordination may be hard, but it has its benefits - one is keeping mil-to-mil and cop-to-cop lines clear and clean.

That said, DOD may be vital to the Jordan training school's success in both resource support and assistance with properly managed deployments back in Iraq. Someone will have to come down on the MOI too, if they seek to militarize or withdraw from the Jordan civilian training effort.

That said, an effort to quietly shift civilian training responsibilities over to DOD, even for later contracting, top level transfer of functions to others, or use of the Economy Act would be foolish. Penny wise, pound foolish. Economies of scale and resourcing only work if calculated out into the future, beyond the 90 day window.

Smart thinkers will swiftly see that DOD does not want to either abandon the civilian training efforts (that is ignore, pull support from, or un-fund them, since they do not run them) that will one day sustain and replace them in such civilian functions in Iraq, or assume these larger training responsibilities (we are in the draw down, not draw up frame of mind).

The right way to answer all three threats is for someone to step forward - at the NSC, DOD and/or State/INL - and say: This needs to be funded at proper levels, this is critical to democracy's future in Iraq, and DOD does not want to run this - because it is a civilian function and requires manning we do not want to do and are not qualified to do.

The answer is: Fund the school properly in FY07 to protect and expand the American investment in Iraqi civilian police, get the Iraqi MOI in line on pay and principles, drive more vetted recruits through the school each month, get them back fast into deployed billets, press a land-based "island hopping campaign" for civilian-led stability in Iraq, solidify long-term commitments to make this an Arab-focused, EU and US sponsored training center for decades ahead, and make a real future - an Arab-EU-American "Quantico Training Academy for Police on the Desert" - for law enforcement, rule of law and democracy across the Middle East.

That is a tightrope to walk, but we have the right motivation, know-how, and position to do it. Moreover, letting things drift the way they are headed - against a backdrop of near-term success, but with the promise of mid-and long-term fraying at both ends - would be to miss the chance for institutionalizing rule of law and democracy, that is, assuring safe passage across the rope.

The circus was there. We decided to join, do the high-wire, and lead change. It is now time to get across that wire, and back home. The three threats must each be addressed, and then we can look back with satisfaction and pull chalks, at last.

By Robert B. Charles, President of the DC-Based Charles Group @ (301) 922-3796; former Assistant Secretary of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, 2003- 2005, to Secretaries Powell and Rice; former Staff Director and Counsel to Chairman, now House Speaker, J. Dennis Hastert; author of Narcotics and Terrorism (2004).

TrackBack