Steven Emerson: Pakistan Strike Was Opportunity That Could Not Be Missed

By Andrew Cochran

Steven Emerson appeared on NBC's "Today" Show this morning to discuss the attempt to kill Ayman al-Zawahiri. Here is the transcript of the interview, and you see the video here:

Matt Lauer: NBC News analyst Steve Emerson is a terrorism expert. Steve, good morning to you.

Steve Emerson: Good morning, Matt.

Matt Lauer: We don�t know for sure, yet, but it appears it�s possible that we swung for the fences with Zawahiri and missed. If that�s the case, did the CIA get unlucky or did they rely on faulty intelligence?

Steve Emerson: We don�t really know that as well. It is possible that Mr. Zawahiri sent out bad information in order to test the U.S. or in fact he basically decided not to go at the last moment. Remember, though, Matt, at the last 9-11 Commission report there were three decisions not to take out Osama bin Laden when he was in the gun sight of the predator missile and that decision was criticized because of the fear of collateral damage.

Matt Lauer: So you are saying that may have influenced the decision this time?

Steve Emerson: Right. The opportunity to take out the number two to Osama bin Laden was a decision they decided could not be missed even though the possibility certainly existed that there would be civilians killed in the strike.

Matt Lauer: And let�s remember that if Zawahiri had been in that town and killed in this attack the CIA would be praised right now for their actions even if there had been some collateral damage like these 17 civilians. But the risk-reward quotient is something that has to be considered. Does the U.S. now have to reconsider or rethink that quotient in dealing in places like Pakistan?

Steve Emerson: Well, certainly if you thought about the quotient even before this strike, because the strikes that have been used in the predator missile in Pakistan are very rare. As Andrea just pointed out, it was only used once before in the last year or so. Obviously the CIA and the Defense Department together with the Administration, the executive branch, decided very carefully when to use it knowing that there will be a political consequence. Certainly they had very precise intelligence that Zawahiri was going to be in that building and they knew that that building was previously used by top terrorist leaders. Look, if Pakistan itself was policing the border itself with Afghanistan there wouldn�t be a need for the United States to go in independently.

Matt Lauer: Right. Let�s talk about the risk, here. You talk about the political risk, here, but we also have the risk as you go for a big fish and if you miss that big fish and kill 17 civilians- we talk about the winning of the hearts and minds- you have to assume that all the family members of those 17 civilians now are among the group of U.S. haters. So do we go for a big fish and create hundreds of small fish?

Steve Emerson: Potentially, but, look, war is hell and that�s the bottom line here. This is a long war. And the reality is that collateral damage occurs. It occurred in World War II and it occurred in post-9/11, in going into Afghanistan. And if we took out Ayman al-Zawahiri, then there wouldn�t be any more need to go in and to carry out these types of attacks that in fact kill civilians. So in the end result, Matt, the idea here is to kill out the big fish so there won't be any little fish created.

Matt Lauer: Let�s go back to what Ambassador Oakley had to say and you�ve referred to already, that we have Pakistan here, that they need to do more along that border. He said that they are cooperating, but is this a case of them having it both ways? They publicly say they are support us and yet privately they are not going in and taking the chances and putting their military into that zone where they could be effective?

Steve Emerson: It is a very complex relationship. In fact, the relationship is really with one man, [Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf, who has been really an ally to the U.S. But it doesn�t translate into an effective relationship with the intelligence services, which is why the U.S. did not give advance notification to Musharraf for fear that it would have leaked out to the intelligence services and compromise our ability. And perhaps that may have actually occurred. So in the end, the United States can't really rely on the entire Pakistan apparatus to police the border, which is why we have had to act independently.

Matt Lauer: And in ending, now that you miss, if you did, Zawahiri, he goes way under-ground, he rethinks who he communicates with and how he communicates with those people. How much harder does it make to catch him or kill him or kill a guy like Osama bin Laden?

Steve Emerson: Unfortunately, he probably does his own operational security review, his own damage assessment to decide where the leak was, how he managed almost to get penetrated and now it becomes unfortunately a lot more difficult to penetrate his organization. So it�s back to the drawing board again, Matt.

Matt Lauer: Steve Emerson. Steve, thanks very much.

Steve Emerson: You are very welcome.

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