The Thai Insurgency Two Years On

By Zachary Abuza

The Islamist insurgency in southern Thailand is now two years old. Despite, 190 arrests there is no end in sight. The technical capacity of bombers has improved and they continue to be able to attack at will. There is still an alarming paucity of intelligence about the insurgency. Below please find my talk to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Thailand about the current situation.

The Thai Insurgency Two Years On
Foreign Correspondents� Club
Bangkok, Thailand
11 January 2006

1) While the media has just celebrated the 2nd anniversary of the insurgency�s start, the dating is a misnomer. The violence was happening several years ahead of 4 January 2004 raids. The same groups were active and operating but at a level low enough that it also blended into the overall criminality that is so endemic in the region. The dating of the insurgency�s start is, like most things, in part politically motivated and journalistically convenient.

2) While the government has claimed to have arrested 190 insurgents responsible for conducting or planning operations, there are still glaring shortages of information. Very few if any of the leaders of the insurgency have been arrested. There are still some 247 �red zones,� villages controlled by insurgents.

3) The government has claimed credit for a sharp down tick in attacks in December � but that was clearly more a factor of the rains than any good police work. A lull in attacks does not portend an end to the insurgency. I find recent government pronouncements to be overly optimistic. More than 1,000 people have been killed, and several thousands more have been wounded. In 2006 alone, 19 people have been killed, 7 in one day. Five of these were policemen. There have been three beheadings in 2006, bringing the total to 24. There is little reason to share the government�s optimism.

4) There are four overarching questions or facts that trouble me when I look at this insurgency.

a. This is not an insurgency about physical space, it is an insurgency about mental space. I am somewhat alone in that I do see this as a religious conflict � but one more within the Muslim community itself. Since March of 2005, militants have killed more of their co-religionists than they have Buddhists. To a degree there has been defacto ethnic cleansing; large numbers of Buddhists have already fled. But the fact that the insurgents are targeting their own communities is interesting.

According to The Nation, �Ninth Police Region records show that more than half of the non-security personnel assassinated over the two years are Muslims. In Pattani, Muslim casualties number 330 against 141 Buddhists; in Yala it is 222 to 99; and in Narathiwat the figures are 1,406 to 237.�

Very simply the militants are ideologically and religiously motivated; they are trying to impose a very austere and intolerant form of Islam on their society and they countenance no opposition to this. They are going after not just collaborators, or individuals who receive a government salary, but also Muslim clerics who perform funeral rites for murtad � or apostates; or teachers who work in schools that have mixed curriculums.

Amongst radical Islamists there is a belief that Islam can never triumph over its enemies, as long as the religion has been corrupted by impurities and bastard interpretations of Islam that include beliefs of secular rule. This is the heart of Salafism: removing all innovations � or rather impurities that entered into the religion after the death of the Prophet Mohammed. The goal is to Islamize society, to inculcate it with Salafi values and norms that will strengthen the movement.
Look at the militant�s threats to the community:

� Warnings to people not to work on Friday, and to observe it as a day of prayer, or risk death or the amputation of ears.
� Warnings to imams not to conduct funeral rites for Muslim security forces, guards at state-schools, government employees, or �anyone who receive salaries from the state.�
� Warnings to people to not send their children to state-run schools.
� Warnings to anyone caught destroying the leaflets.
� They have killed imams.
� Before the militants would never have killed an entire family � but in that recent incident they did just that, killing all nine members of someone they deemed to be a collaborator.

These threats are being made from a perceived position of strength. The militants have introduced the Wahhabi culture of Takfiri � condemning fellow Muslims for their lax interpretation of Islam. They seemed undeterred that the threats are broadly unpopular amongst the Muslim population. The militants are not trying to create a mass-based movement, but rather impose a strict interpretation of Islam on society, which they believe will strengthen the Muslim community.

This will not happen quickly, nor do they expect it to. I have never met an Islamist radical in Southeast Asia who believed they would achieve their goal in their lifetime. Their fard ayn � obligation to god is to move the ball as far down the field as they can in their lifetime. And there is no face lost in making strategic retreats, biding one�s time and training. Remember the prophet Mohammed himself had to retreat to Medina where he engaged in Dakwah activities, proseltyzed, trained and built up enough strength to defeat the enemies of Islam and retake Mecca.

b. The historically unprecedented cooperation amongst the groups � what I call a conspiracy of silence. Thai groups are notoriously fractious and have been deeply divided over their goals. Former insurgent groups were ideologically divided from the Pan Arab Socialist movements allied with the Malayan Communist Party, to the secular ethno-nationalist PULO, to Islamist splinters. They proved absolutely incapable of working together which is a major factor in explaining why the insurgency dissipated in the 1990s.

That is not the case now. First of all, the groups that were active in the 1970s-90s are defunct. The new organizations, mainly the Gerakan Mujiheddin Islamiya Pattani (GMIP) and the outgrowth of the old �Barisan Revolusi Nasional� (BRN) organizations now known as BRN Coordinate (BRN-C), as well as two smaller fringe groups Jemaah Salafi and some elements of the 1990s splinter group, New PULO, are not at ideological war with one another, indeed they share a Islamist vision. No group has credibly claimed responsibility for the attacks or outlined a political platform that could serve as a basis for negotiations. That is troubling to me: there demands are absolutist. No organization is trying to discredit another to build up its power base at the expense of another. In short, there is no longer a zero-sum competition between the groups. There have been some recent media burst by PULO but they have absolutely no control over any of the cells that are perpetrating the violence. They have gone to the press and tried to outline a political platform, simply because that�s the only way that they have any influence in the south.

c. The third question and one that is on everyone�s mind is whether broader transnational groups are involved, namely JI. Both the Thai government and the NRC deny that there are links. As a Thai Foreign Ministry Spokesman said, �The causes of the situation (are) domestic. It�s not part of any international terrorist network but of course we are concerned about the introduction of extremist ideologies among the youths. We are concerned about the possibility of extremist groups in the region connecting together and this could become a serious problem [sic].�

Evidence pointing to JI links is limited, but there are still at least five reasons to be suspicious. First and foremost JI approached both the GMIP and Jemaah Salafi in 1999-2000 and invited them to a series of three meetings known as the Rabitatul Mujiheddin, but it is unknown how deep or strong a relationship was forged. Hambali, JI�s operational chief and a senior member of al-Qaeda, was of course captured in Thailand, along with his two lieutenants, Zubair Mohamad and Bashir bin Lap (Lillie) who were charged with perpetrating a major terrorist attack in Bangkok. Lillie was arrested along with a local Thai mujihid, Awang Ibrahim. Secondly a Singaporean JI member, Arifin bin Ali, was captured in Thailand where he was allegedly plotting to hijack an Aeroflot jetliner to crash it into Singapore. Thirdly several southern Thai militants were arrested in conjunction with a JI cell in Cambodia that was implicated in laundering money for al-Qaeda through the Om Al Qura Foundation. Fourthly one of JI�s leaders and a key planner of the October 2002 Bali bombing, Ali Ghufron (Mukhlas) was given refuge by Thailand�s leading Wahhabi cleric, Ismail Lutfi. Moreover other JI members have sought refuge in southern Thailand. Thai security officials have acknowledged to me that the social links are there, but they were unable to detect anything more than passive support for JI. Fifthly two Indonesians were killed in the April 2004 siege at the Krue Se mosque and an Indonesian employee of the charity Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MER-C), which was implicated in JI and support of JI-linked paramilitaries in the Malukus and Poso, Indonesia, was arrested and deported. Recent reports of an Indonesian leader, Mudeh are sketchy but it is more clear that there has been more training in Indonesia than was previously thought. Likewise, a Syrian is now wanted by the Thai authorities in connection with the Hat Yai bombings.

In short, there is smoke but not a lot of fire. But let me make a few points about JI: First, it is a group whose orientation has always been first and foremost Indonesia. Second, it is in a regrouping mode; simply it cannot survive with the rate of arrests. Third, why should it get involved? JI is not an organization it is a network based on shared ideological beliefs. From their point of view, there is nothing they could do to add to the southern insurgency, other than a bit more training and support. Everything is going along swimmingly, they share similar goals and values, and there is little they would stand to gain by becoming more involved. The technological proficiency of the militant�s bomb makers is such that they do not need JI. In short, JI doesn�t have to be involved.

I am concerned about other transitional organizations such as Bangladesh�s HuJI and the Rohinga Solidarity Organization that are actively supporting the militants. We also have to understand that the transnational organizations support base of the movement.

d. The recruitment is going to be very hard to stop. It takes place in a number of pondoks, amongst troubled and very aggressive young males. Many had petty criminal pasts and used drugs. The government jumps on this point to assert that the movement really is criminal in nature. What the government misunderstands is that their entry into the pondok was an opportunity to ritually cleanse themselves, devotion allowed them to atone for past sins. The intense and secluded nature of the pondoks, created bonds between unquestioning students and their infallible masters, who which became father figures. The students become willing to do anything to prove their loyalty and devotion. Much of the real radicalization is done in private Dakwah sessions, and any attempt to engage in curriculum reform will be seen as attempts to assimilate and engage in ideological engineering and will backfire.

5) So where is this going? Let me conclude by reviewing what I perceive to be the three possible options:

a. A broader insurgency: This is the most unlikely scenario. Simply they do not have enough personnel, guns or a steady supply of ammunition to make this work. Moreover, I think they probably understand that of all the options, this is the one that the Royal Thai Army is the best equipped to counter. A decent insurgency would require 1-2,000 men and a lot more material resources.

Moreover, the training and quality of the insurgency to date has really wavered. There are some groups that have really improved their hit and run tactics. Attacks seem disjointed because the cell structure is so compartmentalized and autonomous from the leadership. Some groups have figured out how to use a road-side IED with a small arms assault. But this hasn�t happened on a regular basis? What gives?

I think the reason is that the militants are organized into such compartmentalized cells on the ground that there is no training or way for �best practices� to be transmitted from cell to cell. The fact is that the militants are large enough and there is a sufficient command and control to launch 30 attacks across three provinces in a single night. But a more sophisticated form of education does not yet exist.

b. Taking it to the next level: Terrorism in Bangkok or Phuket: This is obviously the nightmare scenario for the government, though one that it vehemently denies is a possibility. The economy, so heavily dependent on tourism, has made such a spectacular recovery since the Boxing Day tsunami. Now to date, the militants have shown an unwillingness to engage in this type of operation. They clearly have the technical capability to do this, but are obviously alarmed at the government�s reaction to such an attack. I am concerned about this for a number of reasons. First, government officials always ask what the militants would stand to gain by doing that? But there are insurgent leaders who precisely want to provoke a harsh government response � a much harsher reaction that what has transpired in the past two years. That will legitimize them in the eyes of their constituents. Moreover, if the current rate of arrests keeps up, they may engage in terrorism out of desperation.

Second, there have been a number of arrests � including three in November - suggesting that an attack on an out of area soft target is being considered as an option. They have not ruled it out.

Third, I am concerned that maybe the militants themselves will not get involved, but that outsiders will act on their behalf. Islamists have an obligation to come to the defense of their co-religionists anywhere where Islam is under attack. Bangkok is a very legitimate target in their eyes: from the video footage of Thak Bai, to one of the only countries in the region with a visible Israeli presence, to Thailand�s role in the war on terror and its alleged willingness to serve as an American �Salt Pit,� makes Thailand fair game. JI has always seen Bangkok as a target of choice. But the Thai spurned Hambali�s entreaties, I hear people say. Well yes and no: People like Ismail Lutfi did put the kabash on Hambali�s plans. But that was tactical, he simply saw it as counter productive. But there were groups such as Jemaah Salafi that supported Hambali and gave him assistance and personnel. Second, Hambali was doing this before the insurgency began. The circumstances have changed as Bangkok is sticking it to the Muslim community. What Hambali was doing in 2001-02 has little bearing considering how much the circumstance has changed since January 2004. And it is well within the realm of possibilities for an ammonium nitrate truck bomb to be assembled in Cambodia and driven to down town Bangkok.

c. Status quo: The most plausible option is the status quo: a low level insurgency coupled with intensified Dakwah. Based on interviews, I believe that this is the path that the insurgents have settled on. First, it has been very successful in their eyes. The insurgency is much further along than anyone, probably including themselves, expected a year ago. Second, it is within their current range of material and human resources and technical know-how. Third, they need this type of violence within their community to enforce their values.

But this strategy also makes them vulnerable in a number of ways. First, there is the �shark hypothesis,� that is, if you are not always moving forward you die. If they cannot raise the violence to the next level, then it becomes a menace in the region, but one that can be contained and that people learn to live with. Second, it gives the government time to really improve their intelligence operations. I think to a degree that we have already seen this. There is more actionable intelligence leading to more arrests and a better understanding of the organizational dynamics. Moreover, it gives the government ways to come up with additional counter-insurgent plans, such as the cell phones. That has had a dramatic impact already in the number of bombings. There are plenty of other means to detonate bombs (pressure, command controlled, even remote controlled using everyday items, garage door openers, motion sensors on outdoor lights, etc.). But this requires a rapid transmission of knowledge � which I have already started that they have proven unable to do. At the end of the day, these groups are risk adverse.

The militants can easily retreat back to the mosques and pondoks where they can recruit and proselytize anew. The government would declare victory while the insurgency would simply incubate as it did over the past decade.

So I see things improving on the surface, but I caution that this problem might dissipate in the coming months, but cancers in remission often metastasize.

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