IRAN: What can Congress do?

By Michael Kraft

Iran is already in a war against the United States, an unconventional conflict that is largely overlooked or unacknowledged amid the growing friction over Tehran�s efforts to obtain nuclear weapons.

This is becoming increasingly clear as a result of recent developments.

Iran warned the United States it would feel �pain� if tough measures were imposed by the U.N. Security Council program against Tehran because of its nuclear program. The warning was issued at an International Atomic Energy Committee meeting in Vienna yesterday in advance of next week�s Security Council meeting.

But Iran already is imposing pain.

At a news conference Tuesday, General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff acknowledged that troops in Iraq are finding some improvised explosive devices that are traceable back to Iran�an ominous development reported by the British six months ago. These explosives have been described as powerful shaped charges, far more lethal in destroying armored vehicles than earlier explosives.

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told the same news conference that Iranian revolutionary guards have been infiltrating into Iraq. These men apparently are helping some Shiia militia groups in the escalating fighting against the Sunnis. The growing sectarian violence, already being called a civil war by some observers, is making it more difficult for the new Iranian army and police to stabilize the county and clear the way for the U.S. to withdraw its forces.

Iran is supplying manpower and trainers to fuel the Iraqi conflict and is smuggling in explosives used to directly attack American and British troops. This follows a long history of Iranian-backed terrorist attacks against the United States, including the embassy and Marine bombings in Lebanon during the 1980�s to the Kobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996.

If this is not a war against the United States, it is a pretty good imitation.

Therefore we should not feel obliged to play nicely nicely when considering measures aimed against Iran�s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. And we should strongly make this point that Iran is at war with us when we deal with the Russians. The Russians seem to be reverting to their old games of providing fuel to the Middle East fires by trying to protect Iran from UN Security Council sanctions. Moscow also recently hosted visit by leaders from Hamas, a terrorist organization that enjoys Iranian financial support and won the recent Palestinian elections.

The United States and Russia are currently maneuvering for position in advance of next year�s UN Security Council meeting next week. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters late yesterday that he opposed economic sanctions against Iran and did not think they would be effective.

Of course he did not acknowledge that the refusal by Russia and China and even some Western European countries to join in past sanctions against Iran and other terrorist states had undermined previous sanctions efforts.

In advance of the UN Security Council meeting and a tentatively planned House International Relations Committee next week to consider an Iran sanctions bill, I was asked to participate in a Heritage Foundation panel yesterday on Iran and discuss what Congress might do to counter Iranian terrorism.

The following is a modified version of my remarks, written from the perspective of one who had worked as a foreign policy specialist in Congress and counterterrorism specialist in the State Department.

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Iran is not an �ordinary� terrorism state like Syria or Sudan. It is the most active of the terrorist-supporting states.

Iran�s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, the threats by its President to wipe another country�Israel �off the map and Tehran�s frictions with its Arab neighbors, have merged the terrorism issue into a major nuclear proliferation problem. The two issues, terrorism and non-proliferation, have become intertwined in Iran�s case. So has Congressional legislation.

Over the past three decades, Congress has played a leading role, even more assertive than the Executive Branch, in developing economic and other sanctions against terrorist states. Most of the initiatives emerged from Congress, sometimes in reaction to perceived lapses by the Executive Branch.

SANCTIONS

In dealing with Iran, the main question should not be whether sanctions or other measures should be applied to bring pressure on Tehran but which ones are potentially most effective. What are the pressure points? Are there useful carrots?

Economic sanctions against terrorist states are not new. The first major step toward their use began with the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 which imposed export controls on the sale of dual use equipment or services to governments of countries that the Secretary of State determined have �repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.� The designations under this export control measure became known as the terrorism list.

The provision, as modified in 1989, requires that Congress be notified 30 days before an export license is issued for goods or services for a designated terrorist state if the Secretary determines that �the export of such goods or technology could make a significant contribution to the military potential of such country, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance the ability of such country to support acts of international terrorism��

The advance Congressional notification procedure was intended to make sure that high levels of the State Department scrutinized the licenses for terrorism and policy implications at a high level instead of allowing them to go through with routine lower-level handling. The provision (Sec 6(j) of the 1979 Export Administration Act (EAA) was introduced by Rep. Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ), a feisty member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in reaction to the Commerce Department�s approval of the sale to Libya of 400 heavy duty off-road trucks that could be used for tank transports and six civilian models of C-130 transports to Syria. I was a young foreign policy legislative assistant to Mrs. Fenwick at the time. In drafting the amendment and getting it through the committee, I recall that a State Department official encouraged us because of concerns that Libya might use the tank transporters in military actions against neighboring Egypt.

In subsequent years, Congress added half a dozen more sanctions for countries designated under the EAA. They included bans on economic and military assistance, denial of tax credits for income earned in terrorism states and bans on financial transactions with terrorist states unless licensed by the Treasury Department.

A foreign aid appropriations provision attempts to prod foreign countries to cut off arms sales to terrorist list countries by suspending U.S. foreign assistance to countries that provide lethal military equipment to terrorist list countries. This provision has been used by the State Department to jawbone some countries that wanted to sell tanks or other items to terrorist list countries.

The State Department put Iran on the terrorism list in 1984, after the bombings of US embassies and Marine Barracks in Lebanon and the hostage taking by Iranian-backed groups. For Iran, the specific list of controlled items includes such commodities as large outboard motors and zodiac boats because of its threats against shipping in Strait of Hormuz.

IRAN-SPECIFIC LEGISLATION

While Iran is covered by all by the existing terrorism-related statutes, Congress also passed several Iranian-specific bills, partly because Iran was the most active terrorisms state but primarily because of Iran�s interest in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

A feature of the Iranian specific legislation is the use of sanctions against countries or companies that assist Libya�s energy sector or efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

For example, the Iran- Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) enacted in 1996, requires the President to impose sanctions against foreign companies that invest more than $20 million in one year in Iran�s energy industry. (A waiver provision is included.) The measure expires this August unless renewed.

The Iran Non-Proliferation act of 2000 authorizes sanctions against foreign countries that transfer destabilizing conventional weapons or WMD technology to Iran.

Another provision that attempts to prod foreign countries to cut off arms sales to terrorist list countries is a provision of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill that suspends foreign assistance to countries that provide lethal military equipment to terrorist list countries. This provision has been used by the State Department to jawboning some countries that wanted to sell tanks or other items to terrorist list countries Syria, for example.

This list is illustrative and for fuller details and to give credit where it is due, I recommend to those with access the excellent Congressional Research Service issue brief �Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses� by Kenneth Katzman who also took part in yesterday�s panel.

In short, there are many laws already on the books imposing various economic sanctions against Iran.

NEW LEGISLATION?

When there is a perceived problem, there is a natural tendency in Congress to respond by introducing another bill or resolution. This is part of the system. But to be effective, Congress should first take a comprehensive look at the existing sanctions and consolidate rather than just add more layers. It would be worth the effort to codify all the existing Iranian-related sanctions laws into one measure to make them more consistent and clear. Such a measure potentially could be used as a model for other countries.

There may be a need to tweak existing laws, and Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) chairperson of the House International Relations Middle East Subcommittee, has a bill pending (HR282 that would modify and make permanent the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA.) Among other things, it would impose sanctions on the transfer of WMD technology to Iran.

(The Administration has problems with HR 282�s potential impact on relations with friendly companies. Under Secretary William Burns testified on this yesterday before the full House International Relations Committee (Acrobat file). A committee staffer told me the full committee was scheduled to markup HR 282 on March 16. This could slip however in view of the Administration�s problems with the current draft.)

Senator Santorum (R-PA) has a companion bill, S. 333, that has more than 40 co-sponsors but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not yet scheduled a hearing, perhaps reflecting a desire to consider the Administration�s concerns.

While Congress is considering legislation, it should also streamline the reporting requirements. There are repetitive and overlapping reporting requirements for the CIA and State Department. It is easy for Congress to demand another report but there is a price �the extensive time needed to draft and clear the reports diverts the State Department and other agency officers from actually dealing with the problem.

IMPLEMENTATION

But the main difficulties in using sanctions against Iran are not lack of existing authorities but:

1. Lack of cooperation: Russia and China appear more concerned about profits and trade than the prospect of Iran possessing nuclear missiles or bombs. Other countries and companies also want to make fast buck and conduct business as usual.

� One of greatest problems in fighting terrorism is greed�ranging from companies that want to export weapons and equipment regardless of whether they might be used for terrorism purposes to poorly paid border guards who are willing to accept bribes.

� Reluctance by the Executive Branch to break too much diplomatic china in disputes with allies over implementing measures against foreign companies or governments that supply key materials to Iran.

2. Enforcement: US agencies are stretched thin on resources to detect and block exports and international shipments. It takes intelligence resources to identify and track shipments of banned items and identify the real end users. Good customs agencies and investigators are in short supply due to budget and manpower restraints. It is hard enough to examine shipments that come into our ports, let alone exports that leave U.S. ports or are shipped from foreign ports to Iran.

Our efforts, and those of willing allies, should focus on key items�not marginal equipment, such as heavy duty trucks or outboard motors that can be obtained from a variety of sources but the relatively few items needed for developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including machine tools and testing equipment.

WHAT CONGRESS CAN DO

Aside from possibly reviewing and enacting legislation, key Congressional committees could exercise oversight by pressing the Administration to engage in a comprehensive survey of potential pressure points against Iran if it has not done so already.

If classified briefings have not been held already they could be useful in pressing the Administration to prioritize its potential pressure points on Iran and develop a better picture of where to concentrate resources. This cannot be done in open session. A good give and take in a classified briefing would be more mutually beneficial than additional public hearings in examining the real options, such as they exist.

There are at least two areas of the Iranian problem in which Congress can play a major role: supporting the offense against terrorism overseas and the defense �homeland security -- with adequate funding.

We need to strengthen our offensives to deal with threats to our citizens and facilities abroad as well as to bolster our security defenses at home.

PROVIDE THE RESOURCES

The White House repeatedly tells us that it is necessary to fight the terrorists overseas so they don�t hit us at home. Yet major programs to do that are short changed. The State Department�s budget request for the Anti-training Assistance (ATA program to train civilian counterterrorism personnel of friendly countries has been repeatedly cut by the Office Management and Budget (OMB) even before it goes to Congress. And then, even last year, it was cut by Congressional appropriations committees. For 2007 the Administration�s request submitted by OMB is $135.6 million, less than even the $150 million submitted (with caveats) for the Palestinian Authority.

The Treasury Department�s counterterrorism operations also are strained for resources. The Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC), which is charged with freezing assets and blocking financial transactions, has been strapped for manpower for years. The Treasury, Justice and State Department interagency program to help other countries improve their laws and ability to stop terrorist finding are short of manpower and even travel funds needed to provide the overseas training. Many countries do not have strong export control laws or regulations governing the possession and transshipment of material that can be used for biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. Proposals that State and DOJ do more to assist other countries in drafting stronger legislation have stalled because of lack of manpower and funding resources.

The very least Congress could do is fully fund the ATA and the related counterterrorism programs. The total amount of funding is not large but the potential payoff in preventing future terrorist attacks can be great.

On the homeland security side, at a Senate hearing on the homeland security budget last week, Sen. Judd Gregg, R-New Hampshire, reportedly told Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, "It's a hollow budget and I can't understand it. I've watched the press conferences where the administration says it is committed to border security and domestic defense, and this budget isn't going to get there." One offshoot of the dispute over a Dubai company operating U.S. ports is the greater awareness of the shortfalls in checking cargo containers and providing physical security for the ports.

In short, legislating new laws or resolutions against Iran may be fine, but tighter enforcement of existing laws and adequate funding for existing programs is more essential step. Congress has a legislative function but also an appropriations responsibility. The way to counter Iran is not just with speeches and resolutions but with serious steps to back up the rhetoric by providing the financial and personnel resources needed for the nuts and bolts work of countering terrorism and WMD.

OTHER STEPS

We also need to encourage the Iranians to take more seriously the potential consequences of their current path toward nuclear weapons and possible conflict. And we must also help make the officials and public in other countries understand that the dispute with Iran is not a US-Muslim countries issue but a serious problem that has a potential fallout in the Gulf and even European cities that are within the range of Iran�s� improving missiles.

At the moment the Iranian �street� seems to cheer on the Tehran government�s nuclear program and anti west rhetoric.

Iranians need to realize the consequences of going this route, that nationalism is fine but when it threatens regional peace, there are negative consequences. Threats to wipe Israel off the face of the earth or bully neighbors in the Gulf, or even put European countries within missile range could result in massive countermeasures that could impose hardships on Iranians or perhaps even cost many Iranian lives.

To reinforce a realization of the consequences, steps could be taken �with Congressional encouragement-- to help Iranians citizens understand that they can not just cheer and pretend they are innocent bystanders if their government goes ahead with nuclear weapons programs:

We can do more to isolate Iran if necessary, for example, impose restrictions on travel by Iranian officials and freeze their assets

We can also suspend airline service. I suggest exploring putting pressure on countries that have connecting flights from Iran �by imposing extra security measures on those flights and passing on the costs to airlines from the connecting country.

According to their web site, Iranian Airways has eight 8 Boeing long range aircraft in their fleet of 35. We should make a greater effort to cut off spare parts and ground them. Years ago when Boeing sought and obtained licenses to sell to Iran, they told Hill staffers that they would cut spare parts if relations soured. However, enough spare parts seem to get through, apparently through the black market. Some officials have expressed concerns about airline safety if the planes are not properly maintained. The answer to this is that those planes should be kept from flying in the first place. And Fokker, which leases passenger aircraft to Iran, should be told, preferably by the German government, to forgo its leasing and maintenance profits as part of the effort to head off a much more costly scenario if Iran goes nuclear.

Iran should also be suspended from international soccer matches and other international sporting events. It doesn�t hurt the ordinary Iranians but it will sure get their attention and help bring home the consequences of going for the nuclear bomb

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The Administration�s proposals for $75 million for broadcasting and other public diplomacy efforts toward at Iran should be fully supported. But it is also important that the VOA not cut back its English radio broadcasts. We should be trying to reach not only Iranians about the nuclear weapons problem, but also officials and citizens in neighboring Middle East countries and Europe. Radio is still the most effective media.

Also, members of Congress can also use their connections and meetings with other Parliamentarians, for example through the NATO parliamentarians group, to reinforce the need for their countries to crack down on Iran.

Finally, it is interesting that tens of thousands of people demonstrated against cartoons, sometime violently, but nobody is demonstrating against Iran�s nuclear weapons threat. There are no reports of public demonstrations, even in the Gulf countries that are likely to be victims of diplomatic and economic pressures from a nuclear-armed Iran that still controls some islands it seized from the UAE years ago.

Where are the ban-the-bomb demonstrators when we need them?

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