The State of Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia, Connections to Zarqawi in Iraq

By Evan Kohlmann

After over six months of deafening silence, Al-Qaida's lurking cells in Saudi Arabia have once again managed to resurrect themselves in a failed bid to unleash suicide car bombs on a major oil refinery in eastern Saudi Arabia.  Virtually all of the men involved in the latest attack on Abqaiq were most wanted terrorism suspects already on the run from Saudi authorities.  They managed to conceal themselves in an urban setting, including at locations in affluent sections of the Saudi capital Riyadh.  Now, Iraqi border guards claim to have captured Saudi national Abdullah Salah al-Harbi in the desert between the two countries--al-Harbi reportedly told interrogators, "the last operation I took part in was last week's attack on [the] oil facility in Abqaiq."  Al-Harbi also claimed that at least five other Saudi fugitives had crossed the border with him but disappeared in the Iraqi desert.

What is the current state of Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia, and what exactly is the connection to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq?  On a recent trip to London, I asked these and other questions to Dr. Saad al-Faqih, a well-known Saudi Islamist accused by the U.S. government of being the onetime representative of Usama Bin Laden in the United Kingdom...

According to Dr. al-Faqih, "not less than 80%" of Al-Qaida's feared suicide bombers in Iraq are of Saudi origin.  Other mujahideen from the Kingdom, like 25-year old former Riyadh resident Khaled al-Mani (a.k.a. Khallad al-Najdi), have emerged as promising commanders within Zarqawi's military organization.  These men "joined the jihad in Iraq [in order] to prepare for jihad at home."  Al-Faqih emphasized that losing talented young Saudi minds as "martyrs" in the jihad is "part of the calculation."  He also affirmed to me that "hundreds" of Saudi mujahideen recruits who fought alongside Zarqawi in Iraq have already returned home safely after receiving ideological and military training.  Al-Faqih explained that Al-Qaida's strategy in Iraq was always to deploy several hundred foreign fighters in the region between Mosul and Baghdad and then to utilize the U.S. invasion of Iraq to the maximum--recruiting as many people as possible.  In the meantime, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi would slowly push local Sunni insurgents and politicians over the edge into a sectarian war with majority Shiites and their American allies.  As al-Faqih triumphantly concluded, "Al-Qaida wins no matter what." 

According to Dr. al-Faqih, despite the recent influx of trained, veteran operatives from Iraq, Al-Qaida's network in Saudi Arabia is currently in a state of disrepair because of the "stupid strategy" it has adopted.  Communication between Al-Qaida commanders in Saudi Arabia and Usama Bin Laden has grown "poor."  Thus, the network of cells loyal to Bin Laden began operating on a semi-autonomous basis.  Al-Faqih argues that beginning with the reign of Abdelaziz al-Muqrin (a.k.a. Abu Hajer al-Najdi) in late 2003, Al-Qaida's Committee in the Arabian Peninsula began to slide radically off course--resulting in a series of bumbled and unpopular terrorist operations.

Coincidentally, only three weeks before the Abqaiq attack, I also asked Dr. al-Faqih about Al-Qaida's possible interest in attacking petroleum-related industries in Saudi Arabia.  He acknowledged this was a possibility, but stressed that Bin Laden is not interested in the strategic destruction of oilfields because of the potential catastrophic economic and ecological impact on the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula.  However, as al-Faqih pointed out, Al-Qaida does have an ongoing interest in causing temporary halts in oil output, shifting the world market and causing perceived economic damage to the United States and other major global economies.  In a 63-page booklet published on the Internet a day after the Abqaiq attack, Al-Qaida's Committee in Saudi Arabia explained:

"Oil is a vital resource for the modern industrial world, and a resource that is fundamental for the economies of the industrialized infidels countries... The countries that are hurt the most by rising oil prices are the industrialized superpowers... There are many reasons why jihad operations cause a rise in oil prices... [including] a substantial increase in oil supplies and drilling activities."

Though Al-Qaida has taken pains to insist that the Abqaiq operation was carried out under the direction of Usama Bin Laden himself, even the lengthy new booklet from Al-Qaida on oil-related targets acknowledges that Bin Laden had previously discouraged such attacks in order to "spare these riches and keep them out of the battle, as they are a priceless Islamic resource, and an important source of economic power for the future Islamic state to be established."  Nonetheless, the booklet suggests, "we must take into account the date in which this statement was made... before the fiery eruption of the jihad and before many developments pertaining to the conflict took place.  Since this statement was initially made, attacks against oil-related interests, such as the attack on the French oil tanker [Limburg], have been claimed by Al-Qaida."  This sort of evolutionary analysis may lend added support to Dr. al-Faqih's view that Al-Qaida commanders in Saudi Arabia are now forging ahead based on their own varying interpretations of a general set of operational guidelines issued by Al-Qaida's remaining senior leadership in Afghanistan.

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