Counterterrorism Blog

As my colleagues have indicated, the USG’s engagement of individuals and groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is highly-controversial—and rightfully so. However, in the process of weighing the merits of this engagement, we should be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater: enlisting the help of individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood might provide strategic openings that we should not overlook if we are serious about winning the war of ideas

There are myriad reasons why the USG should not engage the MB as a counter-weight to al-Qa’ida’s brand of jihadism. For one, ideologues associated with the MB were instrumental to laying the theoretical groundwork for today’s global jihadi movement, especially the jihadi groups that splintered from the MB’s Egyptian milieu. Of course, the Palestinian Abdullah Azzam—considered by some to be the “godfather” of bin Laden, who “revived the jihad in the twentieth century”—was also a member of the MB. Further, it is very clear that Hamas—one of the few self-declared phalanges of the MB actively fighting jihad—uses the tactic of terrorism as a mode of political adjustment. Finally, it is not uncommon to hear MB-linked personalities voice support for the insurgency in Iraq. From a normative and patriotic (not to mention policy) perspective, these factors mitigate against enlisting the assistance of individuals associated with the MB in this fight.

However, if one looks closely at the complex history of the MB, its ideology and the many nuanced streams that comprise Islamist thought writ large, one sees unambiguously that the MB is not “al-Qa’ida.” Perhaps our fight against the narrative of global jihadism—unquestionably a greater evil—could be bolstered if we enlist the help of the MB. After all, it shares elements of AQ’s exclusive worldview, but its cadres pursue a different path towards establishing Islam.

Consider how the Muslim Brotherhood stacks up against al-Qa’ida on just a few important issues:

The Islamic State:
• The MB historically works through education, grass-roots reform and political contention to build an Islamic state. Violent jihad is the exception, particularly outside of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Conversely, AQ (and those sharing its worldview) believe in top-down, violent revolution against ‘secular’ Muslim regimes and their Western allies.

Jihad:
• Jihad is historically legitimized and prescribed by the MB where Muslim lands are invaded or occupied, hence its support for Hamas. This was the model articulated by Abdullah Azzam. However, ‘defensive’ jihad in al-Qai’da’s case is global; it also includes fighting other Muslims upon whom takfir (excommunication from Islam) is pronounced. Both of these are at odds with MB doctrine. In fact, the MB has come under heavy criticism from Salafi-Jihadi factions for its “renunciation” of violent jihad, especially since Hamas’ election.

Democracy:
•The MB uses democratic elections to facilitate its strategy of building an Islamic state. On the other hand, jihadis like bin Laden or al-Zarqawi view democracy as a direct threat to tawhid (here, the ‘oneness’ of God’s rule) as it replaces Allah’s rule with man-made law.

Fighting Against the West:
•The MB’s jihadi activities are confined to the Middle East against the Israeli and the Syrian regimes (the latter viewed as wholly secular by the MB). According to historical patterns of action and my interviews with MB leaders, fighting against Western nations (even in Iraq, according to one leader) is neither justifiable theologically nor in the interest of the Ummah. Obviously this view is anathema to Salafi-Jihadis.

Organizational Models:
•The MB is highly-organized; it preaches cohesion, organization and vigilant self-improvement to establish the Islamic state. Conversely, the global jihadi movement is utterly fragmented.

While the above are generalizations and exceptions certainly exist, they bolster my argument: there is room for cooperation with the MB against the global jihad movement, and this cooperation could be effective. As I wrote in a recent publication for the Danish Institute for International Studies, we could harness these differences to:
1. Undermine the global jihadi movement’s takfiri ideology;
2. Develop a legitimate counter-narrative peddled by moderate Islamists;
3. Counter the social processes that lead to jihadi violence in the West through dialogue initiates, such as those proposed by Dr. Kemal Helbawy, a prominent MB member living in the UK; and
4. Highlight the hypocrisy within the ‘culture’ of global jihad, which appears so attractive to some.

The publication, which includes many further suggestions, is available here.

Without question, the MB has dabbled in terrorism; many in the movement are also anti-Semitic and advocate the destruction of Israel. These positions are, of course, despicable. However, pragmatism is the essence of international politics. Exploiting the common ground that exists between American policy and the Muslim Brotherhood for use against a more threatening, arguably common enemy is no different than enlisting the assistance of nefarious state actors like Syria in the same fight.