Counterterrorism Blog

New York, April 25, 2006

Zarqawi's new videotape comes one day after the Sinai's attacks and two days after Bin Laden's "state of the world Jihad" audiotape aired on al Jazeera. Many questions are fusing: Why now and is there a connection between the three events? What is the essence of Abu Mus'ab's message and why is he risking so high? Are there troubles behind the release of the video? In fact there are many levels of analysis and multiple dimensions. Here are some early points of reflection some of which were made on MSNBC this afternoon:

1. According to Zarqawi -on the video- the message was made on April 21, 2006, which means two days before al Jazeera airs Usama Bin Laden's audiotape. First, should we believe Zarqawi on the date? Why did he emphasize the date on tape? Why was it posted today, i.e., after the "Sheikh" of al Qaida's tape was aired on al Jazeera? If we refine the questioning we'd wonder if Zarqawi knew of Bin Laden's tape airing? If so, does he know when al Jazeera "decides" to air a tape? In short, the time connection between the two tapes opens a door for a new analysis of the relationship between al Qaida's tapes in general and the decision by al Jazeera to air them directly on its airwaves, or to air them after they are posted on some web site.

2. The first assertion by Zarqawi in this message is his "wala'" (faithful affiliation) to Usama Bin Laden, the "supreme Emir" of al Qaida: This is a dual message: Bin Laden will decide what Jihad to conduct in Iraq because he is the supreme leader. And his representative, hence Zarqawi. will execute. This is a message to all other Jihadists and Salafi activists in Iraq: There is a chain of command out there.

3. Second assertion in the message is about "humility." Zarqawi confirmed that he indeed is the "emir" of al Qaida's organization in Iraq, but at the same time, he is honored to be accepted as a member of the Shura Council in Iraq, the supreme Jihadi instance. This may sound complicated to lay people in the West, but in al Qaida's language, this means that al Qaida is an executive branch of a movement which the "Council" is the supreme and legislative body of. In other words, Zarqawi is asserting that he is not alone, and that there are plenty of clerics and ulemas around him, helping out in shaping the policy.

4. A third assertion is to blast the Sunni politicians who "ventured" into supporting the current Parliament, Government and Armed forces. Those "Sunnis" are the internal enemies of Zarqawi, for they have shifted the community into the Iraqi political process by accepting to integrate the various layers of Government. In his eyes, these politicians, including the speaker of the assembly, a Sunni, are obstructing his plans, and therefore his leadership.

5. A fourth assertion is about the other "insurgents." Few weeks ago, the chat rooms aired a number of releases from the "al Qiyada al Muwahhada lil Muwqawama." The "Unified Leadership of the Resistance" is a federation of other Jihadists and insurgents. They have rejected the extreme behavior of Zarqawi, especially the violence against Shiites and Iraqi civilians. At the time, observers in the West thought this was a rejection of Zarqawi as a leader of al Qaida. In fact this was a move by other Jihadists to distance themselves from the misdeeds of al Qaida-Iraq. The "Leadership" didn't criticize Bin Laden per se, but said Zarqawi is deflecting energies by waging an indiscriminate religious war (takfiri) against the Shiites.

6. A fifth assertion is the use of ideological terms such as "Crusader occupation and aggression," identical to Bin Laden's speech. An indirect way to warn the other insurgents from narrowing the struggle to "Iraq's military occupation." He is using the same Ben Ladin rhetoric to assert the orthodoxy of the ideology and therefore of his leadership.

7. A seventh assertion in his video is of course the "live show" under the sun. Zarqawi finally produced a piece showing his military side. He is emulating Usama's early videos. In fact, he is showing his face to increase his popularity among his supporters, recruit more of them, and corner his competitors. In short, he is daring them to do the same.

More to come later.

Walid Phares, Senior Fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Author of Future Jihad