May 2006 Archives

NSA Eavesdropping Cases Now Being Fought Out in the Courts

By Victor Comras

Press revelations last December that the NSA was engaged in limited domestic eavesdropping set off a landslide of protests and congressional concerns over the legality of such activities. These issues are now also well entangled in our courts. Numerous legal challenges are underway, including to criminal cases where information collected by the NSA might have been used to help convict those alleged to have engaged in, or supported, terrorism. A number of class actions have also been filed against the phone companies for allegedly providing telephone logs for government data mining and surveillance use.

The Justice Department filed responses May 26th to two major cases brought on behalf of a variety of clients by the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights which directly challenged the NSA’s right to continue with such activities. They argued that defending these cases would require disclosure of state secrets and that this would be contrary to national security interests. Key to their argument is the Supreme Court Ruling in the 1953 case, United States v. Reynolds. In that case the court recognized the so-called “States Secrets Privilege.” This “privilege” was invoked quite sparingly prior to 9/11. But since then, it has been successfully invoked more than 23 times, including to block a recent case against the CIA involving the “rendition” of Khalid El-Masri

In another lawsuit brought back in 2002 by Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf of several Muslims clients who were rounded up, detained and deported following the 9/11 attack, US Magistrate Steven Gold entered an order May 30th requiring the government to indicate whether they were aware of the government monitoring conversations between the Sept. 11 detainees and their attorneys. The government is expected to appeal this ruling. The Justice Department maintains that its lawyers had not seen any such communications, but they could not rule out that others at the Justice Department were aware of such communications. They indicated that such information would be classified and not available for presentation to the court.

One of the more serious court challenges arising from the NSA program was launched earlier this year by Oregon attorney Thomas Nelson who represented Soliman al-Buthe and the Ashland Oregon branch of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation. The now defunct charity was linked to the Saudi Al Haramain Foundation which was designated by the US Treasury Department and the UN for its support of al Qaeda, and its assets were frozen.

According to legal papers filed by Nelson, the case against his clients was based on information derived from illegal NSA eavesdropping andt evidence derived therefrom should be surpressed. Nelson claims he has physical evidence to prove that these conversations were tapped as part of the NSA program. This includes allegations that the government used logs of conversations between Soliman al Buthe and other Haramain personnel and their lawyers. The logs were allegedly obtained without a warrant. It appears that the FBI inadvertently released these classified documents to Buthi and his attorneys. While the lawyers subsequently returned the documents to the FBI, Al Buthi who now resides overseas, retained his copy. The Government has asked the court to turn back to the government any classified material associated with Nelson's complaint.

Several lawsuits have also been filed to bar AT&T, Verizon, Bell South and other phone companies from turning over customer phone records for government scrutiny in the absence of any court oversight. The Justice Department has argued that all of these cases should also be dismissed.

It is said that "bad cases can make bad law." And the outcome of these cases are not likely to advance our sense of justice or our security. Let's hope that the jurisprudence that results from these cases just doesn't do too much damage to either.

Two days after the Kabul riot

By Bill Roggio

Kabul, Afghanistan: The city of Kabul has settled down after Monday's violent outbreak that followed a traffic accident involving a runaway U.S. military vehicle and Afghan civilians. The riots were suppressed in eight hours, and the Karzai government instituted an overnight curfew, which has been extended for Wednesday night. While many businesses were closed on Tuesday (I ventured out to pick up a cell phone on Tuesday but the business was closed), there was plenty of traffic and Afghan police and army on the streets. Several long-time residents of Kabul stated today it was business as usual, and the level of security on the streets was not out of the ordinary. Today I saw the streets filled with taxis, civilian cars and bicycles, businesses and markets were open, and the entrepreneurial street vendors selling phone cards, newspapers and other items were everywhere.

The preliminary investigation shows the accident was caused by "a mechanical failure of the vehicle’s brakes." The convoy was traveling down a steep hill and the vehicle was described as "a heavy cargo truck." From one to six Afghanis were killed in the accident, and up to a dozen were killed and over a hundred wounded in the waves of demonstrations and riots that followed. There are accusations the U.S. Army and Afghan police fired into crowds, but this is still under investigation.

The rioting occurred one of the more socially liberal and less secure neighborhoods in the city. The neighborhood includes Western expatriots, Non-Government Organizations, numerous businesses, restaurants, bars (yes, they exist in Afghanistan) and even a brothel. The Afghan Attorney General resides in the neighborhood. Rioters attacked several Afghan businesses and restaurants, and looted and torched the NGOs CARE Afghanistan and ACTED. The brothel was also set ablaze, and the owner died later that day of a heart attack.

The violence was not Taliban-inspired, but composed mainly of Hazaris. The Haziris are an ethnic group that fought the Taliban under the banner of the Northern Alliance and followers of Ahmad Shah Masood , who was killed by al-Qaeda two days prior to 9-11. Masood's image is prevalent in Kabul. The Hazaris have recently been marginalized by the Karzai administration after they lost their last cabinet post. The rioters were largely young, unemployed males, and there was a significant criminal element involved.

I spoke to several aid workers, contractors and Afghanis about the violence, and their conclusion was the demonstrations were organized, and the traffic accident was merely a catalyst. While there is frustration with driving habits of Western contractors and the military (particularly with the aggressive driving of some security company employees), the subsequent violence was primarily directed at the Karzai administration The neighborhood was targeted because of its relatively light security and the high-profile institutions that are housed there. There is concern among the community about the current security situation in Afghanistan, particularly with the increase in violence in southeastern Iraq and the murder of eight aid workers.

I also spoke to an American woman who lives in the neighborhood where the riots broke out. She was present during the riots and her home was right behind the brothel that was torched. She described how the mobs came in waves. She witnessed three waves before being evacuated, and each successive wave included a progression of violence. The first wave consisted of angry protesters banging on gates and shouting, the second included gunshots, and the third included detonated hand grenades and overturned cars.

There have been questions about the performance of the police during the riots. Jawed Ludin, President Hamid Karzai's Chief of Staff, described the police's performance as "shameful" and stated "we have to strengthen our police." There have been reports that some police joined in the violence. But their performance was not a complete failure. Subduing a violent riot within eight hours is no small feat (see the past and current riots in France), particularly for a relatively new police and military. There has been no follow-on violence two days after the accident. And the American woman who escaped the riots in her neighborhood grudgingly gave credit to the police, which she is critical of for being heavy handed at times.

When her Afghan friend took her out of the home, he put her in the back of a truck and covered her so she would not be seen by the angry crowds. Afghan police nearby noticed this, stopped her friend, questioned them both, and even called over a policeman who spoke English (even though she spoke Farsi) to ensure she was not in danger. The police then provided them an escort out of the danger area. That certainly demonstrates a level of awareness of the situation, organization and an ability to act. Riots by definition are chaotic by nature, and the best of police forces have difficulty containing them.

Radio Programming Note:

I will be on the radio Friday night at 10:30 Eastern / 8:30 Mountain with Rob Breakenridge, host of The World Tonight on AM 770, Calgary, Alberta. To listen online visit AM 770 CHQR and click LISTEN LIVE.

Germany and Jihad

By Jeffrey Imm

With the World Cup opening June 9 in Munich, Germany is having an increasing problem with the growth of radical Islamism. German Federal Prosecutor Kay Nehm has recently stated that the country is sitting on a "powder keg" of radical Islamist migrants who could be plotting an terror attack in Germany. Today - Der Spiegel has reported on a foiled suicide bomb plot by three German women. German intelligence sources prevented three German Muslim women from traveling to Iraq; one of the German women planned to blow herself up with her child in Iraq. At least one of the women was a convert to Islam and sources state that all the German women were sympathizers of Ansar al Islam. Ansar al Islam has a history of smuggling suicide bombers from Germany to Iraq. Germany's domestic security agency, the Verfassungsschutz, has also reported recent growth of Islamists in Germany - 32,100 as of 2005, including representation in Hamas, Hezbollah, Muslim Brotherhood, Milli Gorus (Turkish group). Islamists are also angry over the recent death of Amir Cheema, a Pakistani who died in Berlin, while in custody as a suspect in a plot to kill Die Welt's editor-in-chief over publication of Muhammed cartoons. Moreover, the goals of radical Islamism's growing ranks are supported by a growing Neo-Nazism which plans to use the World Cup event to defend Iran's Holocaust Denial and denying Israel's right to exist. Germany is anxious to avoid a repeat of the 1972 Munich Olympics where 11 Israeli athletes were killed by a Palestinian terror group. Some experts believe that Germany is not sufficiently prepared in terms of security for the World Cup and that security plans are relying too much on emergency forces.

EU Court Annuls US-EU Agreement On Airline Passenger Data

By Victor Comras

The European Court of Justice acted May 30th to annul a US – EU agreement under which passenger information was provided to US Homeland Security authorities in advance of boarding on all transatlantic flights from EU countries to the United States. Under the agreement airlines are required to supply the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) more than 34 items of information about each passenger, including name, address and ID numbers and credit card details, all within 15 minutes of departure for the US. The agreement also covers special meal requests, which can indicate a passenger's religion or ethnicity. This info has been provided since March 2003 under an interim accord. That accord was formalized in May 2004, provoking a challenge from the EU Parliament which asked the European Court of Justice to rule on the legality of the arrangement (see my earlier blog).

The EU Court ruled that the provision of such information violated EU privacy rights legislation. The Court also held that there was no legal basis on which the EU Commission or Council could base such action.

The Court judgment will only take effect after September 30th, at the end of the expected busy summer travel period. This will allow time for both sides to develop new basis and criteria for furnishing and protecting such information. Nevertheless, this new development threatens to significantly complicate future air travel from Europe to the United States as US Homeland Security authorities are likely to continue to insist that such information be provided before EU origin air passengers are landed in the United States.

Public Support Vital in Iraq, Afghanistan

By Douglas Farah

During the Central American wars, perhaps because of the nearness to the Vietnam experience, there as a broad understanding that, to neutralize a highly-motivated enemy it was vital to have the population in the enemy's theater of operation at worst neutral and at best cooperative.

Civilian populations caught in conflict zones often make their calculations on who to support based on who they think can inflict the most pain if they do not cooperate. This is true up to a point, but when repression becomes unbearable, civilians will also join the side they believe will help eliminate the oppressor.

This lesson seems to be lost in much of what is going on in Iraq, looking at Anbar province, and Afghanistan, with the rioting in Kabul. The Washington Post has an interesting article quoting the Sunni leaders of Anbar province on their reality:

"We hope to get rid of al-Qaeda, which is a huge burden on the city. Unfortunately, Zarqawi's fist is stronger than the Americans'," said one Sunni sheik, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of insurgent retaliation. My full blog is here.

Militants in Indonesia

By Kenneth Conboy

Though not terrorism in the strictest sense, Indonesia-watchers have been noting with concern that hard-line, often violent, Islamic militant groups are growing more aggressive around the country. This comes after several years when they had largely receded into the background, save for annual bursts of activity when they would raid nightspots in and around Jakarta during the Islamic holy month.

Returning with a vengeance, these militants got a major boost earlier this year during the furor over the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad. Reaction in Jakarta was especially pronounced, culminating in an unruly 19 February protest outside of the U.S. embassy by several hundred members of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, or FPI). Given the robust improvements made in that embassy's perimeter since 2000, the demonstrators could do little more than throw objects at the street-side guard house. Still, the U.S. ambassador deplored the protest as an act of thuggery.

Since February, militant activity has continued to rise. The FPI, whose members are easily recognizable in their white robes, now boasts chapters in most major cities. Often they are joined by a second group calling itself the Betawi Brotherhood Forum (known by the initials FBR), ostensibly a secular organization based in Jakarta that, suspiciously, only seems to take on religious causes.

The size of these groups is difficult to determine. This is because both the FPI and FBR more often then not act—literally—as crowds for hire. During major events, for example, militant leaders can reportedly troll among the unemployed masses in Jakarta and quickly hire hundreds of demonstrators, who for a small stipend will outfit themselves in FPI/FBR uniforms and rant at a designated rallying point for a specific amount of time; violence is optional. Who bankrolls FPI has not been fully apparent, though there is speculation that FPI’s nightclub raids during the fasting month help fund their activities during the rest of the year.

Among the issues they have championed as of late:

• The anti-pornography bill. An anti-pornography bill is currently being debated in the Indonesian national assembly. The name of this bill is a misnomer: it is actually a clever end-run by conservative Islamic political parties to implement elements of Islamic law, even though this would go directly against Indonesia’s secular constitution. (Example: public kissing is deemed “pornography” under the current version of the bill.) Not surprisingly, militant groups in several Indonesian cities have participated in massive rallies calling for its passage into law. They have also resorted to violence: after one rally in mid-May, FPI members raided several entertainment venues in the outskirts of Jakarta which they accused of degrading moral values.

• Foreign Investment. In recent months, militant groups have been trying to find ways of appealing to a wider audience. One way has been to latch themselves onto to issues that have little to do with religion, but resonate among the masses. Once such issue has been foreign investment, more specifically the major role played by U.S. mining/oil and gas firms. During several major demonstrations against mining companies like Freeport and ExxonMobil in April, militants played a prominent role in condemning American “economic imperialism.”

• Middle East. During May, militants staged large demonstrations in several cities over U.S. policy vis-à-vis Hamas. In this, they have been joined by the hard-line grassroots organization Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.

• Playboy. FPI militants took a lead role in condemning the publication of the Indonesian version of Playboy in April. Several hundred hard-liners raided the Playboy editorial office in Jakarta, forcing the magazine to suspend publication after one issue. Ironically, the magazine had no nudity, and was deemed far less risqué than many other men’s magazines already in the Indonesian market.

• Opposition to former President Gus Dur. Militants have long been at odds with former President Gus Dur, who is renowned for his tolerance and moderation. When attempting to give a speech in West Java last week, Gus Dur was forced from the stage by FPI members. FPI and FBR conducted further anti-Gus Dur protests this past week; during these rallies, many they openly marched with clubs and other crude weapons.

Although this increase in militant activity has been noted with concern, the Indonesian government has been reluctant to implement a crackdown. This is true for several reasons. First, the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is supported by a fragile coalition of political parties, including key support from several small, hard-line Muslim parties. The president, therefore, could not move to stamp out the militants without alienating his coalition partners.

Second, with Indonesia’s democratic reforms has come reluctance on the part of the security forces to respond forcefully against activists for fear of being accused of human rights abuses.

Third, it has long been rumored that groups like FPI traditionally had patrons within elements of the security forces—with whom they shared the spoils of their raids on night spots. This nexus remains unproven, but has the ring of truth.

For whatever reason, there is no denying that violent militant groups have grown more aggressive in recent months. And with the government looking unwilling or unable to check this growth, it is likely that their attacks will grow more brazen in the coming weeks and months.

Combat in Southeastern Afghanistan; Mullah Dadullah not captured

By Bill Roggio

The fighting in southeastern Afghanistan continues as Coalition and Afghan forces press into previously unpatroled Taliban strongholds. Over the weekend clashes occurred in Kandahar, Helmand and Ghazni provinces. These provinces have been the scene of the majority of the fighting over the past few months.

Five "key senior Taliban leaders"
(as of yet unnamed) were killed during Coalition air strikes "on an isolated insurgent training facility" near the town of Qal’a Sak, which is on the Pakistani border in the south of Helmand province. Coalition forces followed up the air strikes with a raid, confirmed the targets were destroyed, and discovered an IED factory. Up to fifty Taliban are estimated to have been killed in a seperate air strike in the Kajaki district of Helmand. The BBC's Alastair Leithead provides an update on last week's fighting in Musa Qala, where an Afghan police patrol was ambushed by a large Taliban force, and beaten back after Afghan and British reinforcements were called as reinforcements.

The Afghan police continues to be a target of the Taliban, as their training and equipment is lacking compared to that of the Afghan Army and Coalition forces. Another Afghan police patrol was ambushed in Ghazni province, with one policeman killed and six wounded. The police fought back, killing three Taliban in the counterattack.

Kandahar's Panjwai district remains a focus of joint Afghan and Coalition operations. Canadian Press' Bob Weber describes the fighting as the "Battle of Panjwai," and describes how the Canadians of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the Afghan police and army conducted a cordon and search operation in the town of Banzya, and reacted to a Taliban ambush. Ten Taliban were captured during the operation. Contact with the Taliban was also made in the village of Pashmul.

Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban military commander, has appeared on Al Jazeera, and claimed the Taliban is now in control of southeastern Afghanistan and is specifically targeting NATO forces (the Daily Times report states Dadullah claims to control southwestern Afghanistan, but the bulk of the NATO deployment is in southeastern Afghanistan). This confirms prior reports the Taliban is looking to fracture the NATO mission in Afghanistan as the Taliban believes the various NATO governments and their citizens do not have the will to fight a protracted insurgency in Afghanistan. Dadullah was thought to have been captured over a week ago, but his arrest was never confirmed by Coalition or Afghan authorities.

A Shocking Memorial Day Weekend

By Bill Roggio

A quick note: My Memorial Day weekend will consist of numerous flights. I'll be in Afghanistan by the beginning of the week and look forward to getting out into the field.

Michael Yon's photo and post on the child killed in Mosul. Click to view.

On this Memorial Day weekend, we should take the time to honor the sacrifices of our servicemen and women. They fight hard for our freedom, under very difficult circumstances and at great personal risk and hardship. Unfortunately, the HFM media conglomerate has chosen this weekend to launch "Shock" magazine, and the lead story is dedicated to shocking the audience by showing photographs of our wounded soldiers and drawing parallels between Iraq and Vietnam.

As if that is not offensive enough, the publishers have stolen Michael Yon's photograph of Major Mark Bieger cradling an Iraqi child murdered by a suicide bomber in Mosul, and have placed this image on the cover of the magazine. Michael is a friend, fellow traveler and Veteran. He has taken risks himself to cover the fight against al-Qaeda and the insurgency in Iraq, and has recently traveled to Afghanistan as well.

Register your displeasure with HFM for dishonoring our troops on their weekend, and for their blatant theft and misuse of Michael's work. Blackfive has the details.

Bin Laden's May 2006 Statement: Not "Competition" or a "Bid for Status"

By Jeffrey Cozzens

Many expert commentaries on bin Laden’s recent spate of talkativeness assert matter-of-factly that he is seeking to regain standing lost to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, or is seeking to re-assert his personal relevance to the global jihad. However, both of these theories are, of course, highly speculative. Evidence to the contrary suggests that bin Laden and other ‘core’ al-Qa’ida (AQ) figures, such as Saif al-Adel and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are generally supportive of al-Zarqawi’s overall efforts to “raise the banner of jihad” and consider him a dear, if more extreme and overly eager, brother-in-arms and/or protégé. Many first-hand accounts of bin Laden also paint a picture of anything but an egotistical leader who insists on being the centerpiece of the jihadi movement.

Al-Zarqawi’s alleged competition with bin Laden and other AQ figures does not square with the “father-son” relationship evidenced by recent AQ documents, even if there is a difference on some points of ideology and resulting tactics (differences that are historically noted and primarily concern Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s doctrine of “loyalty and renunciation”). The tenor of this relationship was quite apparent in the letter written by al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, which was seized in 2005 and published by the U.S. intelligence community. We must not confuse examples of al-Zawahiri’s (ergo bin Laden’s) “fatherly” guidance to al-Zarqawi with competition, especially when considering that the former’s suggestions were apparently followed by al-Zarqawi, evidenced by his subsequent rhetorical and operational pattern shifts. Several examples of al-Zarqawi’s concessionary decision-making surfaced in his recent video, including his re-affirmation of loyalty to bin Laden and the prominent picture of al-Zawahiri playing on the television behind him. Moreover, al-Zarqawi’s decision to operate within the framework of the Mujahideen Shura Council (ostensible to paint a greater Iraqi “face” on his operations) appears to be in direct response to al-Zawahiri’s counsel. Al-Zarqawi would not demonstrate this level of deference and might even publicly respond to al-Zawahiri’s letter (much as he did to al-Maqdisi’s 2005 criticism) if there was actual competition.

In terms of the AQ core’s ideological differences with al-Zarqawi, as al-Adel wrote in a 2005 biography of the al-Qa’ida in Iraq leader, these should be largely overlooked in the interest of fostering unity amongst the mujahideen and cooperating against a clear and present threat: coalition forces. This is an outstanding example of the AQ core’s relative pragmatism; it views the present struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan with such importance that it is willing to tolerate much wider ideological variance under its banner than it did in the late 1990’s, when bin Laden withdrew his support of the GIA for some of the same reasons noted in al-Zawahiri’s letter. For bin Laden et al, the perpetuity of the global jihad is far more important than highly doctrinaire positions—a point echoed in the recent works of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri.

That bin Laden might be “jealous” of al-Zarqawi, or seek personal aggrandizement through releasing videotapes, however plausible, is unlikely given the accounts of journalists who have met bin Laden, such as Hamid Mir and Abdel Bari Atwan. Outside of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and a few other jihadi egoists, humility over arrogance, a commitment to asceticism over love for the world, brotherhood over individualism, and a consistent preference for fighting the adversary over inaction (or merely “calling” others to follow the path of the Salaf) appear the surest ways to win loyalty and affection inside the “culture” of global jihad. Most personal accounts of interaction with bin Laden suggest that he embodies these characteristics, all of which are glorified throughout the jihadi literature.

From another vantage, al-Qa’ida’s leadership has long fostered a self-conception that it is the catalytic “spark” that will kindle “fires” of jihad throughout the Muslim world—fires (such as the "al-Zarqawi generation”) that will burn long after their demise. This is why bin Laden is sometimes described as a mujaddid—one who would “revive the true spirit of Islamic faith and (help) the Muslims see the authentic teachings of their religion”—who would rally the ummah to its destiny through jihad. It is also why the rising AQ was so careful to document every step of its infancy through its video archive; they saw themselves as vanguards of a new era that will eventually bring about the end of time and salvation for the few. Therefore, while it makes sense for senior AQ leaders to provide direction to al-Zarqawi, it seems strange that they would envy their conceptual offspring, which they have so publicly venerated. The longer one is in this business, the more one realizes that jihadi ideologues are typically sincere in their pronouncements and writings. We are not witnessing Western corporate competition or politics, however often these analogies are employed.

Instead of seeing bin Laden’s latest message as “proof” of a popularity contest between him and al-Zarqawi (in fact, the latter has sworn a binding oath of allegiance to the former), or as a continual effort to demonstrate his relevance to a new generation of jihadis, perhaps we should look at what he is actually saying. In so doing, his latest speech is another clear attempt to fight war at its “moral” level. In this case, he quite rationally insinuates that the U.S. government purposely overlooked key facts in the Moussaoui case and willfully dismisses “clear” evidence about Guantanamo inmates in order to “create justifications for the massive spending of hundreds of billions of dollars on the Defense Department and on other agencies in their war against the Mujahideen.” Bin Laden’s latest statement is intended to justify and inspire further attacks against American interests and divide the American public, not compete with al-Zarqawi.

Iran and its neighbors are preparing for war

By Olivier Guitta

Military activity in the Gulf has been increasing tremendously in the past few months. According to British sources, the stock of weapons, missiles and combat planes in the six neighboring countries to Iran is now three times what it was at the onset of the Iraq war in 2003.
This arsenal is also composed of submarines, destroyers belonging to Iran and also to the international community in the Sea of Oman. An impressive number of offensive and defensive weapons are also deployed in the region. For instance, since March ,Gulf refineries and vital oil installations are protected by batteries of Patriot missiles. Furthermore, according to the Kuwaiti daily Al Seyassah, the US has built a massive stock of oil and could ask the temporary stop of Gulf refineries in order to prevent heavy damage in case of an Iranian attack. Iran has indeed warned Gulf monarchies that their oil facilities would be the first target in case of a US operation on Iranian nuclear facilities.

The Emerging Shape of the Coming Jihad

By Douglas Farah

The coming shape of the Islamist jihad war is becoming clear: self-starting groups that are increasingly decentralized structure, linked by shifting networks and communicating almost exclusively through the Internet.

The chief architect of this strategy is the Spanish-Syrian strategist Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, the subject of a very nice piece in The Washington Post, whose 1,600 page treastise, "The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance," has been circulating on Web sites for 18 months.

Written under the pen name Abu Musab al-Suri, the document espouses the concept of "nizam, la tanzim," or ‘System, not organisation.’ Jihadist groups should develop a template that allows them to create structures wherever they are, and carry out recruitment, fund-raising and attacks.

The leadership, as traditionally understood in hierarchical structures, would be limited solely to general guidence of the true believers. This would essentially do away with the role of the traditional al Qaeda leadership in directing attacks or plotting a grand military strategy. My full blog is here.

Iraqi Government Forms; Recent Counterterrorism Ops

By Bill Roggio

The establishment of the Iraqi government, after five long months of contentious negotiations, has dealt Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq's efforts to derail the political process. As Zarqawi stated in his 2004 letter to Osama bin Laden, once the Iraqi people begin to take control of the political and and security responsibilities, al-Qaeda's foothold in Iraq will become tenuous. In Zarqawi's own words, "If we fight them [the Iraqi government], that will be difficult because there will be a schism between us and the people of the region. How can we kill their cousins and sons, and under what pretext, after the Americans start withdrawing? The Americans will continue to control from their bases, but the sons of this land will be the authority. This is the democracy, we will have to pretext [to continue to fight]."

The Iraqi government is not yet fully formed, as the crucial ministries of Defense and Interior, and the National Security posting remain unfilled. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki plans to submit nominations by week's end, and has committed to applying "maximum force" to subdue the insurgency and bring the militias under control. Baghdad and Ramadi remain two major areas of strength for the insurgency, and there is talk of conducting major operations to reestablish order in the cities.

As the Iraqi government takes shape, Coalition and Iraqi forces work to disrupt al-Qaeda and insurgent cells and operations. Jordanian intelligence recently arrested Ziad al-Karbouli (a.k.a. Abu Houthiyfah), who was complicit in the kidnappings and murders of Arab diplomats last summer. al-Karbouli also was "a customs employee on the Iraqi border," which would allow him to facilitate al-Qaeda movement to and from Iraq. His confession was carried on Jordanian television.

Task Force 145 conducted several raids in Baghdad, Ramadi and Yusifiyah over the past week, resulting in over a dozen al-Qaeda operatives killed or captured. The Ramadi strike resulted in six killed and three captured. The main target was an al-Qaeda commander known as the “Prince of IEDs,” who is described as "a financier, an IED maker and a bomb facilitator for al-Qaida in Iraq in Ramadi." An assortment of car and roadside bomb equipment was discovered in the safe house. Raids in Baghdad targeted Abu Ahad, who "managed foreign fighter facilitation and also provided a modicum of command and control between several terrorist cells operating throughout the vicinity of Fallujah, Baghdad , Yusifiyah, Taji and Mahmudiyah," as well as an unnamed associate of Ahad. Yet another strike was carried out in Yusifiyah. Three al-Qaeda were killed, and one was wearing a suicide vest. Yusifiyah has been an area of interest for Task Force 145 over the past few months, and numerous strikes have been carried out in the city.

Muthanna Complex. Click to Enlarge.

Conventional U.S. and Iraqi forces struck at an insurgent training camp in the Jazeera desert region during Operation Iron Triangle and dismantled an insurgent cell in Muqdadiyah. A company of U.S. soldiers from 101st Airborne Division and and a company of Iraqi soldiers from the 4th Division conducted an air assault on the Muthanna State Establishment, a chemical weapons production facility under Saddam Hussien's regime.

The Muthanna complex was identified as an insurgent training and staging facility. Over 200 suspected insurgents were detained, including ten members of Zarqawi's Tawhid and Jihad terrorist organization. Last evening, in a follow on raid (likely by TAsk Force 145), two suspects were captured, and four killed, including a Yemeni. "The forces found Yemeni, Saudi Arabian, Tunisian, Sudanese and several Iraqi passports," according to the Multinational Forces - Iraq press release. The Lake Thar Thar region where the Muthanna complex is located in a region where Baathists have settled, and numerous weapons caches were prepositioned in anticipation of the current insurgency. This is an ideal location as it is strategically located near Baghdad, Samarra, Balad, Ramadi and Fallujah. The Jazeera desert region has been the focus of numerous Coalition and Iraqi Army operations over the past half year, and the Iraqi Army has begun to conduct independent operations in this area.

Finally, Some Truth on Bogus Saudi Claims"

By Douglas Farah

The Washington Post Outlook Section finally called the Saudi Royals, and current U.S. ambassador, Prince Turki al-Faisal, on the lies of their intolerance. It is about time someone did in a consistant manner. The myth the Saudi royals perpetrate about removing hate speech against everyone who does not believe as they do is important to the narrative of its own progress the kingdom hopes to develop.

The problem is, it is simply not true, as the piece documents. Ambassador Turki and others want to believe that repeating a lie often enough makes it true. That is what they are paid to do, and they pay millions to get others to repeat the lies.

It seems that is the plan with the repetition of many things related to the kingdom that are not true, and yet are repeated day after day, month after month: the Financial Investigative Unit is functioning; designated individuals are being punished; efforts to curb terror finance are proceeding.

In fact, none of these are true. My entire blog is here.

Afghanistan, Embed Updates

By Bill Roggio

A quick update on the embed status: I ran into a problem with the travel arrangements and will be headed to Afghanistan late this week if all goes well. I worked hard to leave last weekend but it was not possible. The delay will not effect my time spent in country, I am pushing back the dates to accommodate the delay in travel. Afghanistan has been quite active of late, particularly in the Kandahar region where I will be embedding. I plan on posting daily while in Afghanistan, and have set up podcasts and radio interviews. Please support this embed by donating to the Counterterrorism Foundation. We can use your support in funding this embed as well as planned embeds in the future. And a big thank you to everyone who has contributed and supported this endeavor. We could not do this without your help and I am truly grateful for your generosity.

Now, an Afghanistan update:

Recent activity in Southeastern Afghanistan. Click to Enlarge.

Coalition forces continue to maintain the offensive against the Taliban in Southeast Afghanistan. A joint task force of Afghan and Coalition security forces encountered "organized armed opposition" from the Taliban during a joint operation near the town of Azizi in Uruzgan province. Twenty Taliban were confirmed killed, with up to 80 suspected killed after a combined ground and air assault on Taliban positions. This would put the number of Taliban killed in action over the past week between 220 to 280. In a separate raid, Mullah Mohibullah, the Taliban commander for Helmand province, was captured in a bazaar in Uruzgan province.

The engagement in Azizi follows a week of combat in the southeastern provinces of Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand and Ghazni. The majority of the fighting has been initiated by joint Afghan-Coalition operations designed to root out Taliban strongholds and safe havens in the region. Independent journalist Michael Yon recently traveled this region, and detailed the security problems and pervasiveness of the poppy crops. Afghan and Coalition forces are pushing into relatively uncharted territory and are now encountering resistance from the Taliban and their allies.

By Bill Roggio

Recent activity on the Afghan-Pakistan border. Click to Enlarge.

The latest estimate of Taliban casualties during the fighting over the past few days is approaching 200, with 25 Coalition, Afghan security forces and civilians killed. The Daily Times of Pakistan reports the fighting around Kandahar City, which was initiated by two separate Coalition operations, resulted in an estimated 100 Taliban killed. The U.S. military reported up to 60 Taliban were killed in the fighting at Musa Qala, where the Afghan security forces thwarted a major Taliban assault.

Agence France-Presse reports two French commandos were killed and one wounded in an "engagement against the Taliban in the region of Kandahar" - during offensive operations. A U.S. soldier was also killed in Uruzgan. Fighting continued in Helmand through Saturday, as the Taliban ambushed an Afghan convoy. At least 15 Taliban and 4 Afghan soldiers were killed, and 13 Afghan soldiers are missing. the Afghan Army called for reinforcements and air support, and beat back the attack. The reporting continues to conflate Coalition and Taliban operations.

Assadullah Khalid, the governor of Kandahar reiterated the claim that three Taliban commanders were captured, and described them as "high-ranking Taliban, members of their leadership council." The arrest of Mullah Dadullah has not been confirmed, however a one legged man fitting Dadullah description is said to be in custody. A man claiming to be Dadullah phoned a Pakistani newspaper and refuted the claims.

The violence in Afghanistan cannot be viewed in a vacuum. The Taliban has established safe havens in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) agencies of North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Tank, Khyber and Dera Ismail Khan - a region now being referred to as Talibanistan.

Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas

Pakistani forces conducted a strike against "militants" in Miranshah, the capital of North Waziristan after a paramilitary officer was killed and three wounded in a Taliban attack on a police station. Eighteen 'miscreants' were killed, and "three of them were said to be Uzbek." The Pakistani Army called in helicopter strikes to support the operation. In a separate incident, yet another "senior pro-government tribal chief" was assassinated by the Taliban, who continue the campaign to eliminate their opposition in the tribal areas.

Accusations of the Taliban operating from Pakistan continue to surface. The most recent charge was issued by Colonel Chris Vernon, the Chief of Staff for southern Afghanistan. “The thinking piece of the Taliban is out of Quetta in Pakistan. It’s the major headquarters,” Colonel Vernon said in an interview with the Guardian. “They use it to run a series of networks in Afghanistan.”

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf continues to walk a fine line in dealing with the overt insurgency in the tribal regions and the problem with 'foreigners and miscreants'. In a television interview on Friday, Musharraf continues to make distinctions between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and views the Taliban as a political problem and al-Qaeda as a military problem.

Musharraf said the government had drawn up a wide-ranging strategy to combat extremism by strengthening the political set-up in the tribal region. “A military operation is not the answer to extremism. It has to be done through political administration,” he said.
He said that the entire political setup in the Federally Administered Areas (FATA) was being strengthened to achieve the desired objectives. He said the government would appoint competent political agents in tribal agencies. Musharraf said the government would spend Rs 10 billion every year on the development of FATA and had a roadmap on it. He said the government planned to have 12 more wings of the Frontier Corps while the Frontier Constabulary, that was working in various parts of the country, would be brought back.

Musharraf said the government had successfully countered Al Qaeda terrorists in cities and mountains, adding that the terrorists were now hiding in mountains in small groups and were being targeted by the military. Musharraf said Taliban were involved in spreading extremism in the tribal region. “Extremism was being practiced by Taliban. I think they have no single leadership. May be it is Mulla Omar who I think is in Afghanistan and they may have linkages here but there is no common leader here,” the president said.

This fails to recognize the core of the Taliban leadership share al-Qaeda's views on waging jihad and religious purity, and cannot be wooed by political incentives. The attempts to separate al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the NWFP ignore the reality of the situation on the ground, as the Taliban and al-Qaeda continue to recruit, train, arm and sorty fighters in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In April, the Daily Times reported "Pro-Taliban tribes in North Waziristan have buried ancient feuds and joined forces to fight the army... Up to 5,000 tribesmen are launching near-daily rocket and bomb attacks on military bases and convoys in the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan, while the headless bodies of alleged US spies are dumped on the streets..." Some estimates place the Taliban strength as high as 27,000 in North Waziristan and 13,000 in South Waziristan.

The U.S. Department of State's 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism classifies the Afghan-Pakistan border as a "Terrorist Safe Haven," and described the region as such:

For decades, the mountainous and sparsely populated Afghan-Pakistani border has been an autonomous area, with little control by Islamabad or Kabul. The Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan have been a safe haven for AQ fighters since the fall of the Taliban in December 2001. The FATA also includes Islamist groups and local tribesmen who continue to resist the government’s efforts to improve governance and administrative control at the expense of longstanding local autonomy. Bringing government services to this region, and turning an AQ safe haven into a regularly administered province of Pakistan, remains an important objective in the global war on terror.
Through substantial efforts since 2004, the Government of Pakistan has deployed more than 80,000 security forces into the FATA and made some improvements in health care, education, and social services. These operations have disrupted the terrorists but also affected tribal institutions in the area, requiring efforts to build new political and economic institutions. Meanwhile, the Afghan Government, in concert with U.S. forces and the international community, continues efforts to build security on the Afghan side of the border. The border areas remain a contested region, however, with ongoing insurgent and terrorist attacks and AQ-linked propaganda activity.

Ayman al-Zawahiri's most recent videotape specifically addressed the Pakistani people and the Army, calling for them to rise against the government. Zawahiri's grievances against the Pakistani government are legion, and include Musharraf's "combating Islam", assisting the "crusaders" in the deposing of Taliban, placing nuclear weapons under U.S. safeguards, directing the military against Islamists in NWFP and FATA, abandoning the Indian front, abandoning Kashmir and recognizing Israel. Zawahiri and al-Qaeda are relying on the Taliban and other Islamists groups within Pakistan to answer the call to jihad. In Pakistan's tribal belt, the call has been answered, and the people of Afghanistan are paying the price.

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The Patchwork Insurgent Network Behind Recent Clashes in Ramadi

By Evan Kohlmann

Yesterday, the U.S. military conceded that the deteriorating situation in the restive Sunni Iraqi town of Ramadi required a "significant number" of additional coalition troops to be dispatched as reinforcements. According to the military, there has been intense, nearly constant fighting in the region surrounding Ramadi since at least May 7. Interestingly, a variety of different insurgent and extremist groups are boasting of their roles in waging these "battles" in Ramadi with U.S. and Iraqi government forces--among them:

- The Al-Fatihin Army--a breakaway faction of the influential Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI)--has claimed credit for IED detonations targeting two U.S. Humvees, nearly half a dozen sniper attacks on American soldiers, and a series of armed assaults on Iraqi goverment checkpoints in Ramadi.
- The Ansar al-Sunnah Army--a pro-Bin Laden movement based in northeastern Iraq believed to have been formed from the remnants of the terrorist group Ansar al-Islam--has claimed responsibility for two IED attacks on U.S. minesweepers in the region and an additional ambush with RPGs and machine guns on a U.S. Humvee.
- The Mujahideen Army--a Sunni Iraqi insurgent group that has waffled between, at times, threatening to kill Danish cartoonists and then later openly condemning "ethnic separatism and extremism"--has claimed a handful of sniper attacks on U.S. forces and the "destruction" of a U.S. Humvee in Ramadi.
- The Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC)--the militant umbrella network formed in Iraq by Al-Qaida and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi--has issued a new statement announcing "victories" in clashes with U.S. and Iraqi forces in Ramadi:

"Your brothers from the Military Wing of the Mujahideen Shura Council... on Wednesday May 17, 2006, began a new battle... Your brothers initiated clashes with the crusader enemy and its pagan guard stooges with rocket launchers and light weapons near the intelligence complex... in Ramadi, and many of them were either killed or wounded. After that, your brothers laid down cover fire in order to enable their martyr brother Abu Dujana al-Muhajir to enter one of the buildings [in the complex] used as an enemy barracks with his GMC Suburban vehicle. In front of the building, there were three Humvees carrying passengers from the pagan guard and the crusader army. Your brother detonated his vehicle packed with explosives in the midst of them. Their bodies were scattered into pieces, their vehicles were set ablaze, and the building collapsed on the heads of the crusaders and the apostates... killing at least thirty five enemies and destroying three vehicles. Finally, the mujahideen were able to safely withdraw while chanting, 'Allahu Akhbar!'"

How Will State Department Personnel Changes Impact Counterterrorism Policy?

By Andrew Cochran

Personnel selections can signal important shifts in policy and also have unforeseen impacts. Secretary of State Rice announced numerous personnel changes in personnel this week which will hopefully change recent one State Department trend in counterterrorism policy. Many of the senior officials at the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the focal point for foreign policy formulation, are changing chairs or leaving. Liz Cheney, the Vice President's daughter, is leaving after three years, and Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, former Deputy Chief of Mission in Baghdad and current Coordinator for Iraq, and Scott Carpenter, another top official there, will assume more duties. Other officials at NEA are also moving. We will be interested in the impact these changes will have on recent and counterproductive State Department accommodations with the Muslim Brotherhood, as discussed by Lorenzo Vidino and Doug Farah.

Secretary Rice also named Dr. Gregg Rickman as Special Envoy for Monitoring and Combating Anti-Semitism, pursuant to the Global Anti-Semitism Review Act of 2004. Gregg has been chief counsel for the U.S. House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, and was lead counsel for the committee's critical work in exposing the Oil-for-Food scandal. He also was lead counsel for hearings on terrorism issues, such as "Visa Overstays: Can We Bar the Terrorist Door?" with Michael Cutler testifying (read his testimony here) and "Offshore Banking, Corruption, and the War on Terrorism", which focused on UBS's currency violations which enabled Iran and Cuba to obtain U.S. currency. Recently, he began a review of the Saddam Hussein intel docs, which I hope the subcommittee will continue to pursue. He is a friend and big CT Blog fan whose work enabled us to post several scoops (here and here). I know Gregg will bring energy, intellect, and experience to the new position, and his appointment is a positive development.

The Inaccurate Taliban Offensive; Taliban military commander Mullah Dadullah reported captured

By Bill Roggio

Mullah Dadullah may have been captured during recent fighting in Afghanistan.

The news reports of a major Taliban offensive in southeastern Afghanistan are inaccurate, as Coalition offensives and Taliban attacks have been lumped together to give the impression of a coordinated Taliban assault in multiple provinces. A reading of the various reports indicates that while the Taliban has launched a major strike on a police station and government center in Helmand province and a small scale attack on a police patrol in Ghazni, as well as two suicide attacks against U.S. contractors in Herat and an Afghan army base in Ghazni, the fighting in Kandahar was initiated by Afghan and Coalition security forces during planned operations. Over 100 have been reported killed during the fighting, with 87 being Taliban. Well over half of those killed were killed during the Coalition offensives in Kandahar.

There were two separate major engagements in Kandahar province, and both were initiated by the Coalition. Coalition forces conducted a raid and subsequent air strikes against a Taliban safe haven in the village of Azizi. As many as 27 Taliban are believed to have been killed during the operation. A joint Canadian and Afghan security force conducted a sweep in the Panjwai district of Kandahar, and killed 18 Taliban and captured 26 in the process. One Canadian officer was killed and three Afghan police were wounded during the operation.

The fighting in Musa Qala in Helmand province is a bonafide major Taliban attack. The Associated Press reports an "estimated 300-400 militants with assault rifles and machine guns attacked a police and government headquarters" in Musa Qala. The Afghan police provided reinforcements to the beleaguered police station, fought off the Taliban force, reestablished control over the region, and killed 40 Taliban and took thirteen casualties of their own. Two police patrols were ambushed in Ghazni, and resulted in the death of two policemen. There is no evidence the attacks were coordinated. And they certainly weren't coordinated to occur in conjunction with Coalition operations.

It is important to understand how the fighting was initiated, as the current reporting is giving the impression of a coordinated Taliban uprising. This provides the Taliban with a propaganda victory, as their power is perceived as far greater than it actually is, which can negatively influence the government and peoples of the Coalition forces serving in Afghanistan. The narrow passage of the extension of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan (by a 149-145 vote in Parliament) illustrates the fragile nature of the support for the mission in some Western nations.

During the fighting of the past few days, the Coalition may have scored a major victory. The BBC's Alastair Leithead reports Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban's most senior commander, has been captured, however the military has yet to confirm this report. The Jamestown Foundation describes Mullah Dadullah as "The Military Mastermind of the Taliban Insurgency" as well as "a member of the 10-man leading council of Taliban insurgents." Dadullah reportedly escaped the U.S. and Northern Alliance onslaught of the Taliban regime in the winter of 2002 and surfaced in South Waziristan, Pakistan, where he raised funds and organized the Taliban insurgency. Dadullah would be a treasure trove of information on the Taliban's operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Qari Naeem, the Taliban commander of Ghazni province, was also killed.

Podcast:

Richard Fernandez of The Belmont Club and I conduct a interview on the recent riot in Kabul and the current situation in Afghanistan. Pajamas Media has the audio.

Return of Euro-Jihadis a Threat to America

By Bill West

Today, the Washington Times ran a report that publicizes a threat known for some time to Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This is the threat posed by radical Islamic Jihadis from Europe who infiltrated into Iraq to fight with al-Qaeda forces there who are now beginning to return to their Euro-homelands. These combat experienced and battle-hardened terrorist veterans, estimated to be at least in the high hundreds, who not only possess violent extremist Islamic radicalization but European citizenship, will prove to be a major challenge to the security forces of Europe. There is surely no reason to believe these hardened Jihadi fighters will leave their violent ways behind in Iraq.

By Douglas Farah

My European contacts say Iran's Shi'ite regime is gearing up to rescue the Hamas-led, bankrupt Palestinian Authority with significant amounts of cash.

This move would serve two purposes: deeply embarrass and humiliate the Sunni-led regimes in the Gulf, who so far have failed to come up with a way to help Hamas despite repeated vows to do so; expand Iran's influence at a time when the threat of isolation from the West is growing. Swelling oil revenues have given the Iranian regime the revue they need to be able to pull this off.

While Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other government struggle to overcome the banking obstacles they would face in funding Hamas, the Iranan leaders appear willing to take significant risks to win the race and claim the mantle of protectors and defenders of the Palestinians. It would also expand Iranian influence in a region where it already controls Hezbollah, giving it two military factions that could be called on internationally should there be military action against Iran. My full blog is here.

The Canadian Mission in Kandahar

By Bill Roggio

Map of ISAF Mission in Afghanistan. Click to Enlarge.

Almost five years after the liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban, the American public is largely unaware of the scope of NATO's commitment to providing stability for the Afghan people and combating al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO plans to increase its personnel in Afghanistan to approximately 15,000, and will expand the mission into the southeastern provinces of Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul. These provinces are areas of increased Taliban and al-Qaeda activity, and suicide bombings, roadside bombings and small scale assaults against Afghan and NATO security forces have risen dramatically over the past year.

Canada is playing a crucial role by securing Kandahar province, which is the birthplace and former seat of power of the Taliban within Afghanistan. The Canadian government has committed over 2,300 Canadian troops to Task Force Afghanistan, which is commanded by Brigadier-General David Fraser. BGen Frazer also commands the Multi National Brigade for Regional Command South.

Task Force Afghanistan is comprised of a headquarters and communications team, various support elements, an engineer squadron, an artillery battery, an armored reconnaissance troop, a Provincial Reconstruction Team, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle team, medical personnel, and an assortment of advisers to the Afghan government and security forces. Task Force Afghanistan's main punch is provided by over 1,000 troops from 1st Battalion of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Regiment (1 PPCLI), which is augmented by a company from the 2 PPCLI.

The 1 PPCLI is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ian Hope, and is based out of Edmonton, Alberta. The fist of the battalion is comprised of four rifle companies. The companies are supported by reconnaissance, mortar, anti-armor, assault pioneers (engineers), signals, logistics and headquarters platoons. The combat vehicles include LAV IIIs (Light Armored Vehicles), M-113A1, the Grizzly armored personnel carrier, and newly purchased RG-31 Nyalas. The battalion arrived in Kandahar in February of this year and their deployment ends in August.

NSA Eavesdropping Cases Now Being Fought Out in the Courts

By Victor Comras

More Stories of Fallen Al-Qaida Fighters in Iraq

By Evan Kohlmann

Two days after the Kabul riot

By Bill Roggio

Germany and Jihad

By Jeffrey Imm

EU Court Annuls US-EU Agreement On Airline Passenger Data

By Victor Comras

Public Support Vital in Iraq, Afghanistan

By Douglas Farah

Militants in Indonesia

By Kenneth Conboy

Combat in Southeastern Afghanistan; Mullah Dadullah not captured

By Bill Roggio

A Shocking Memorial Day Weekend

By Bill Roggio

Bin Laden's May 2006 Statement: Not "Competition" or a "Bid for Status"

By Jeffrey Cozzens

Iran and its neighbors are preparing for war

By Olivier Guitta

The Emerging Shape of the Coming Jihad

By Douglas Farah

Iraqi Government Forms; Recent Counterterrorism Ops

By Bill Roggio

Finally, Some Truth on Bogus Saudi Claims"

By Douglas Farah

Afghanistan, Embed Updates

By Bill Roggio

Fighting in Afghanistan, Talibanistan

By Bill Roggio

The Patchwork Insurgent Network Behind Recent Clashes in Ramadi

By Evan Kohlmann

How Will State Department Personnel Changes Impact Counterterrorism Policy?

By Andrew Cochran

The Inaccurate Taliban Offensive; Taliban military commander Mullah Dadullah reported captured

By Bill Roggio

Return of Euro-Jihadis a Threat to America

By Bill West

Iran Could Rescue the Palestinian Authority

By Douglas Farah

The Canadian Mission in Kandahar

By Bill Roggio