Bin Laden's May 2006 Statement: Not "Competition" or a "Bid for Status"

By Jeffrey Cozzens

Many expert commentaries on bin Laden’s recent spate of talkativeness assert matter-of-factly that he is seeking to regain standing lost to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, or is seeking to re-assert his personal relevance to the global jihad. However, both of these theories are, of course, highly speculative. Evidence to the contrary suggests that bin Laden and other ‘core’ al-Qa’ida (AQ) figures, such as Saif al-Adel and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are generally supportive of al-Zarqawi’s overall efforts to “raise the banner of jihad” and consider him a dear, if more extreme and overly eager, brother-in-arms and/or protégé. Many first-hand accounts of bin Laden also paint a picture of anything but an egotistical leader who insists on being the centerpiece of the jihadi movement.

Al-Zarqawi’s alleged competition with bin Laden and other AQ figures does not square with the “father-son” relationship evidenced by recent AQ documents, even if there is a difference on some points of ideology and resulting tactics (differences that are historically noted and primarily concern Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s doctrine of “loyalty and renunciation”). The tenor of this relationship was quite apparent in the letter written by al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, which was seized in 2005 and published by the U.S. intelligence community. We must not confuse examples of al-Zawahiri’s (ergo bin Laden’s) “fatherly” guidance to al-Zarqawi with competition, especially when considering that the former’s suggestions were apparently followed by al-Zarqawi, evidenced by his subsequent rhetorical and operational pattern shifts. Several examples of al-Zarqawi’s concessionary decision-making surfaced in his recent video, including his re-affirmation of loyalty to bin Laden and the prominent picture of al-Zawahiri playing on the television behind him. Moreover, al-Zarqawi’s decision to operate within the framework of the Mujahideen Shura Council (ostensible to paint a greater Iraqi “face” on his operations) appears to be in direct response to al-Zawahiri’s counsel. Al-Zarqawi would not demonstrate this level of deference and might even publicly respond to al-Zawahiri’s letter (much as he did to al-Maqdisi’s 2005 criticism) if there was actual competition.

In terms of the AQ core’s ideological differences with al-Zarqawi, as al-Adel wrote in a 2005 biography of the al-Qa’ida in Iraq leader, these should be largely overlooked in the interest of fostering unity amongst the mujahideen and cooperating against a clear and present threat: coalition forces. This is an outstanding example of the AQ core’s relative pragmatism; it views the present struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan with such importance that it is willing to tolerate much wider ideological variance under its banner than it did in the late 1990’s, when bin Laden withdrew his support of the GIA for some of the same reasons noted in al-Zawahiri’s letter. For bin Laden et al, the perpetuity of the global jihad is far more important than highly doctrinaire positions—a point echoed in the recent works of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri.

That bin Laden might be “jealous” of al-Zarqawi, or seek personal aggrandizement through releasing videotapes, however plausible, is unlikely given the accounts of journalists who have met bin Laden, such as Hamid Mir and Abdel Bari Atwan. Outside of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and a few other jihadi egoists, humility over arrogance, a commitment to asceticism over love for the world, brotherhood over individualism, and a consistent preference for fighting the adversary over inaction (or merely “calling” others to follow the path of the Salaf) appear the surest ways to win loyalty and affection inside the “culture” of global jihad. Most personal accounts of interaction with bin Laden suggest that he embodies these characteristics, all of which are glorified throughout the jihadi literature.

From another vantage, al-Qa’ida’s leadership has long fostered a self-conception that it is the catalytic “spark” that will kindle “fires” of jihad throughout the Muslim world—fires (such as the "al-Zarqawi generation”) that will burn long after their demise. This is why bin Laden is sometimes described as a mujaddid—one who would “revive the true spirit of Islamic faith and (help) the Muslims see the authentic teachings of their religion”—who would rally the ummah to its destiny through jihad. It is also why the rising AQ was so careful to document every step of its infancy through its video archive; they saw themselves as vanguards of a new era that will eventually bring about the end of time and salvation for the few. Therefore, while it makes sense for senior AQ leaders to provide direction to al-Zarqawi, it seems strange that they would envy their conceptual offspring, which they have so publicly venerated. The longer one is in this business, the more one realizes that jihadi ideologues are typically sincere in their pronouncements and writings. We are not witnessing Western corporate competition or politics, however often these analogies are employed.

Instead of seeing bin Laden’s latest message as “proof” of a popularity contest between him and al-Zarqawi (in fact, the latter has sworn a binding oath of allegiance to the former), or as a continual effort to demonstrate his relevance to a new generation of jihadis, perhaps we should look at what he is actually saying. In so doing, his latest speech is another clear attempt to fight war at its “moral” level. In this case, he quite rationally insinuates that the U.S. government purposely overlooked key facts in the Moussaoui case and willfully dismisses “clear” evidence about Guantanamo inmates in order to “create justifications for the massive spending of hundreds of billions of dollars on the Defense Department and on other agencies in their war against the Mujahideen.” Bin Laden’s latest statement is intended to justify and inspire further attacks against American interests and divide the American public, not compete with al-Zarqawi.

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