Fighting Jihad in the West

By Jeffrey Cozzens

In the wake of the release of the 7/7 inquiry reports, American analysts should take stock of how well they are applying the lessons learned by Her Majesty’s Government (and other European regimes) in dealing with our own homegrown jihadi threat, even if the nonlinear development and specific contexts of these threats make comparisons appear problematic.

One way to overcome this methodological impediment is to expand our analytical framework and consider what differentiates jihadi radicalization processes and fighting in the West—even in two liberal democracies as demographically, politically and socially distinct as the U.S. and the U.K.— from the Muslim world. We must compare apples to apples to allow useful parallels to emerge.

Some prominent characteristics separating jihad in the West from jihad in Muslim world are as follows:

•The development of unique Western jihadi cultures that are defined and reinforced both ideologically and operationally by the “cyber ummah”—the online jihadi “community,” consisting of radical chat rooms, message boards, websites, etc—and its antithesis, the Western culture in which the militants live
•Common ideas concerning the legitimacy of striking one’s Western “refuge.” These ideas, which are compelling enough to mitigate against fighting jihad overseas, are generally grounded in the concept that the Western militants’ nations of residence are waging war against Muslims at home and abroad (especially in Iraq). As a result, “defensive jihad” in their country of residence is prescribed as legitimate.
•The use of both converts and formerly “secular” Muslims (often the children or grand children of immigrants) in Western operations and jihadi logistical networks who bring personal experiences and social (sometimes criminal) connections atypical of jihadis in the Muslim world
•The legal back drop of liberal democracies, and domestic intelligence agencies with limited experience dealing with militant Islam whose powers are generally restrained

The poignancy of these qualities, specific to “homegrown” Western jihadis and their operating environments, was seen retrospectively in the development of the 7/7 plot. These points will also likely emerge during the upcoming trial of the Islamic converts accused of plotting attacks in Los Angeles in 2005.

Understanding why Western citizens or residents choose to fight jihad in the West, and how they go about doing so, is becoming increasingly important to our national security as the narrative of global jihad takes root in increasingly disparate sectors of Islamic communities in the West. Let’s hope that we are comparing notes effectively with our allies overseas, and that this information-sharing has strategic, as well as tactical, effect.

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