Update on the Insurgency in Southern Thailand

By Zachary Abuza

By April 2006, as the commander of Thailand’s 4th Army, Lt-Gen Ongkorn, was asserting that “The situation in the three southern border provinces should improve since the militant network has been weakened by the arrest of its top members,” the insurgency was spiking back to the levels reached in May-July 2005. To date, more than 1,200 people have been killed, and several thousands more have been wounded.

In reality there has been little progress in Thailand’s own counter-insurgent operations. Police assert that they have now detained 123 individual and have concrete evidence that at least 105 of the 123 are linked to the insurgency, yet few have been in leadership positions. Their intelligence is still weak, coordination of the 80,000 government personnel from at least a dozen offices and agencies is spasmodic, and several heavy-handed counter-insurgent policies have backfired. By most estimates there are some 1,000 insurgents, 247 “red zones,” or villages controlled by insurgents, and the government still has only a rudimentary understanding of the organizations infrastructure involved. The government claimed credit for a sharp down tick in attacks in December 2005 and January 2006 – but that was clearly more a factor of the rains than any good police work. A lull in attacks did not portend an end to the insurgency and government pronouncements were overly optimistic. In 2006 alone, over 150 people have been killed, 7 in one day. Three soldiers, 17 police and 130 civilians were among those dead, with 36 soldiers wounded, 34 police wounded and 174 civilians wounded.

The number and efficacy of bombings has decreased because of the blocking of unregistered prepaid cell phones. This did have an immediate impact. In the fortnight before the 15 November blockage, there were 11 bombings, in the fortnight afterwards, there were three. Insurgents have stepped up theft of cell phones and can use Malaysian SIM cards near the border. They have also been experimenting with other triggering mechanisms, such as infrared and other command-detonation systems.

There have been three beheadings in 2006, bringing the total to 24. There is little reason to share the government’s optimism. Drive by assassinations are up, as are arson attacks- especially on cell phone towers (in apparent retaliation of the government’s blockage of pre-paid cell phones). Their raids are increasingly bold and employing larger numbers of militants. They have also taken on a more ominous sectarian tone.

The head of the Thai Army has recently acknowledged the existence of “blacklists.” Though he denied that individuals on these lists were being targeted by government hit squads, a large number of individuals have been killed in questionable manner, reinforcing public acrimony over the security force’s culture of impunity. With the Thai government still mired in a political deadlock and the former architect of security policy in the south now serving as caretaker PM, it is unlikely that there will be any change in policy.

Bombings are down, but the militants have adapted well and employed tactics to circumvent government counter insurgent operations. The violence is climbing back to the record levels set a year ago, with no end in sight.

TrackBack