Counterterrorism Blog

Lebanon: Shooting the Katyusha wad

By Michael Kraft

The Lebanese Hezbollah use of Iranian missiles to damage an Israeli navy boat and sank a Cambodian-registered ship with Egyptian crewmembers is the latest and most dangerous chapter of an unholy linkage between hostage taking and missiles that was born during the American hostage crisis in Lebanon two decades ago.

During the 1980’s, Hezbollah terrorists seized over 30 American and other hostages in Lebanon. The terrorists’ primary goal was in an effort to get the United States and other countries to pressure Kuwait into releasing the two Lebanese members of the 17- member Dawa group who were captured after the 1983 attacks on the American and French embassies and other targets. The Iran-backed Dawa group of Shiites attacked Iraq because Kuwait supported Iraq during the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war.

One of the Lebanese was Mustafa Youssef Badreddin, a brother-in-law of Imad Mughniya, a senior Hezbollah official. It was widely rumored in Beirut that Mughniya’s wife refused to sleep with him until her brother was freed from prison.
(See Bill Roggio’s excellent July 12 blog entry on Mughniya’s role in masterminding the capturing of the Israeli prisoners.)

Journalists, Christian missionaries and other American citizens were being kidnapped and in some cases murdered by terrorists in Lebanon. The CIA station Chief, William Buckley, was brutally tortured before he died. The longest-held hostage, Terry Anderson of the Associated Press, was held for six years and 9 months.

Pressure from family and friends ultimately resulted in the Reagan administration’s scheme engineered by Ollie North, then the key National Security Council (NSC) officer dealing with terrorism, to trade TOW anti-tank missiles to Iran in exchange for the hostages. Iran was and is the main backer of Hezbollah. These missiles-for-hostage deals were in violation of long standing U.S. policy not to give in to terrorist demands; because of concern that it would encourage more hostage taking.

That is exactly what happened in Lebanon. Shortly after shipments were made and the Lebanese Hezbollah released one or two hostages, the Lebanese terrorists would grab another hostage. They maintained what one of my colleagues in the State Department counterterrorism office at the time called a “hostage bank.”

The kidnappings in Lebanon finally stopped after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and in the confusion the two Lebanese prisoners escaped or were released from jail.

But the damaging pattern was set. The “tough” Reagan administration caved in.
The Reagan administration’s deals, combined with the pullout of American peace keeping forces after the Marine barracks and the U.S. embassy were blown up, only emboldened Hezbollah and increased its stature among other Arabs.

In later hostage episodes, the Israelis swapped their prisoners for a businessman who had been lured into a trap and for the bodies of several Israeli soldiers killed by the Hezbollah. Kidnappings to obtain the release of prisoners, the withdrawal of troops, or old fashioned ransom later became common after the Bush Administration led the invasion into Iraq.

And in 2004, radical Islamist terrorists in Saudi Arabia killed an American engineer, Marshall Johnson, Jr. from New Jersey in an unsuccessful effort to force Saudi officials to release their imprisoned colleagues. Saudi government spokesman Adel Al-Jubeir was quoted by wire services today as saying "Our position over the past 30 years has been the same, we don't negotiate with terrorists and we don't negotiate with hostage takers because then you open the door up to more hostage taking and more terrorism." It is a policy that the government of Israel is publicly following, so far.

Now, once again, even though Israel withdrew from Gaza last year and Lebanon in 2006, hostage taking and missiles are linked in a new crisis.

First it was Hamas taking an Israeli soldier hostage June 25 after tunneling under the Gaza border with Israel and firing of home made Quasam missiles at Israeli towns near Gaza. Then under the cover of a diversionary rocket attack, Hezbollah staged a raid from Lebanon into Israel and seized Israeli hostages. The professed reason was an effort to trade them for Arab prisoners held by Israel although Hezbollah leaders may also have been motivated be efforts to efforts to enhance their Islamic fundamentalist political influence and their role in the Lebanese government.

Israel says that this time it will refuse to trade prisoners, many of whom it contends were have blood on their hands from terrorist attacks.

This time the missiles are not being supplied to Iran but by Iran, in the thousands.

The estimated 10,000 to 12,000 Katyusha rockets and other missiles that Hezbollah stockpiled in Lebanon are far more than the number that could be smuggled in by mule or in the trunks of automobiles. Most were flown in from Iran via Damascus airport and then trucked into Lebanon. The Iranians sometimes used American-built Boeing airliners bought many years ago. The U.S. Government and Boeing were unable or unwilling to completely shut off the spare parts needed to keep the planes operating.

The hostage taking and rocket launchings have led Israel to attack Gazan and Lebanese bridges in order to block the movement of the prisoners, and cut off military supplies and put pressure on Hamas and Hezbollah to release the captives.

In turn, the Hezbollah attacks have taken an even more ominous turn with the launching of missiles against ships off the Lebanese coast. Israeli military sources are quoted by the press as saying the missile that hit their boat was an Iranian-built C-802 missile with a range of about 60 miles. They also say that Iran has about 100 sailors assigned to Hezbollah and was involved in the launch. Whether or not that proves to be the case, the attack was a demonstration that the Iranian missiles, originally developed by China, can hit tankers and other shipping in the Persian Gulf, enhancing Iran’s already existing missile and naval assets. Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries must certainly take notice.

Although it is far too early to tell how this latest crisis will be resolved or burn itself out, there may a consequence that the Iranian backer of Hezbollah did not intend, the weakening of a potential deterrent against possible air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

There has been considerable speculation about a possible U.S. or Israeli air strike to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities before the Tehran regime develops nuclear weapons if the Iranians do not agree to the international community’s efforts to work out an agreement. One of the downsides sides discussed by the “speculating class” been a concern that Iran might retaliate by unleashing against Israel the thousands of rockets that it shipped to Lebanon.

Yet to some extent, the Iranians have shot their wad with this particular possible deterrent. A threat hanging over one’s head is sometimes more of a deterrent than if it is actually used. The hundreds of rockets that have fired against Israel have caused some casualties and damage. The loss of life and damage has been relatively minor -- so far-- compared with the 1948, 1967 and 1973 Arab attacks against Israel when the conventional armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were heavily involved with their tanks, artillery and aircraft.

The Hezbollah may still be a long way from using up its stockpile of rockets and the Israelis may have a way to go before finding and destroying the rest. Meanwhile the Israeli Air Force’s cratering of the runways of Beirut airport and attacks on bridge spans will make it harder for Iran to send in new supplies.

True, Iran and the Hezbollah have other tricks up their sleeves, perhaps more powerful rockets or repeat operations of the bombings of the Israeli embassy in 1992 and Jewish Cultural Center in Argentina 1994. Terrorist attacks on Israeli and western targets in other countries have been all too common. And there could be a surge of successful suicide bombing attempts in Israel. However attacks of this sort are not going to advance the Hamas and Hezbollah dream of destroying Israel. The Israelis already have weathered two intifadahs, and the violence has not left the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank better off.

Basically however, the recent launching of large quantities of Iranian-supplied missiles against Israeli cities and towns, plus the use of a sophisticated missile against shipping has eroded that particular Iranian deterrent against possible Israeli or Western alliance action against nuclear facilities. The missiles are a problem for the Israelis but psychologically, the impact and surprise element is greatest when they are first used.

This does not mean Israel is interested in widening the current crisis. If down the road however, the West, or Israel decided they have to take military action against the Iranian nuclear threat, the Iranians will have to face the unintended consequences of having used and wasted this particular potential deterrent because their Hezbollah clients were so eager to make short term gains. Thus, while the Hezbollah operations may temporarily have strengthened the Hezbollah and Iranian positions in the Arabs street, the current hostage and missile crisis may turn into an over-reach that weakens Iran in the long rum.