The Israeli Incursion into Lebanon: Strategic Considerations

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

It is critical to understand the strategic implications of the Israeli incursion into Lebanon. Hizballah has proven to be a far more effective fighting machine than Israel anticipated, and the Israelis find themselves in a difficult situation: Continued military operations in Lebanon risk escalation and further destabilization, while a quick withdrawal would hand Hizballah a significant victory. This blog entry analyzes the most salient strategic considerations.

The key issue is Iran's involvement in Hizballah's campaign. Iran appears to be up to its eyeballs in the current conflict. It is no coincidence that Hizballah's July 12 incursion into Israel (in which eight IDF soldiers were killed and two were kidnapped) occurred on the same day that Iran was supposed to report to the IAEA about its nuclear program. Iran has given Hizballah tens of millions of dollars in training, weaponry and monetary support every year for decades, and was even involved in past Hizballah kidnapping campaigns: When Hizballah engaged in a massive hostage-taking campaign in the 1980s designed to drive Westerners out of Lebanon, a number of Hizballah's American hostages reported seeing their captors consort with uniformed Iranian officers. Moreover, as my colleague Bill Roggio has noted, the sophistication of Hizballah's simultaneous sea strikes suggests a level of sophistication Hizballah wouldn't attain without Iranian involvement -- as does the range, accuracy and destructiveness of the missile strikes into Israel.

A second consideration is that, while the Israelis appear to be winning the ground war, the current crisis could benefit Iran, Syria and Hizballah.

Iran. If Iran played a major role in the timing of Hizballah's cross-border raid into Israel, it had many strong reasons for doing so. The flare-up in Lebanon has clearly taken some of the pressure off of Iran concerning its nuclear program. It has also divided the Western coalition that was previously unified against Iranian nuclear development, since many of the U.S.'s partners have strongly differing views on the Israeli retaliation. Oil prices have hit an all-time high, which hurts the U.S. and helps oil-producing nations like Iran. And finally, the coverage of the war in Lebanon on al-Jazeera and other regional networks can fan the flames of fundamentalism. Right now Iran benefits from regional instability; that is one reason that it has been working so hard to bolster the insurgency in Iraq. And the Israeli incursion has clearly created instability and uncertainty.

Syria. Reports from military sources suggest that Bashar Assad would like to see Israel enter South Lebanon. For a long time, one of the key drivers of Syria's economy was its domination of Lebanon; after Syria was pushed out last year, its economy took a major hit. Reports suggest that the Lebanese government has essentially ceased being functional. If Israel enters South Lebanon, engages in major combat operations and then withdraws, it will likely leave a power vaccuum that the Lebanese government cannot fill. That will pave the way for Syria's return.

Hizballah. Hizballah has already shown that it's capable of taking on the Israeli military. This fact alone will help increase its prestige. Moreover, Lebanon's infrastructure has already been so damaged that Hizballah's social services network is bound to expand -- thus bolstering the terrorist group's standing.

A third consideration is what is likely to happen next. There appears to be little chance of a long-term Israeli engagement in Lebanon. If Israel were interested in a long-term occupation, it would have had to call up far more reserves than it did.

It's likely that Israel will begin a major ground engagement within the next two weeks designed to obliterate Hizballah's infrastructure and neutralize as much of its military wing as possible. Israel is likely to use a mobile combat force that can move into Lebanon, inflict maximum damage on the Hizballah terrorist network, and get out rapidly. As of Sunday, my military sources expected major engagements to begin within 72 hours. However, that estimate has been pushed back because Israeli intelligence now acknowledges that it initially underestimated Hizballah’s military capabilities.

A fourth and final consideration is the U.S.'s role moving forward. There have doubtless been many high-level communications between the U.S. and Israel. While the U.S. recognizes Israel's right to self-defense and the benefits of destroying Hizballah's infrastructure in Lebanon, it also wants the Israeli incursion to end as quickly as practicable.

The U.S.'s greatest interests right now are avoiding direct involvement in the clashes and avoiding escalation. Our ground troops are overstretched with our commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. military involvement in Lebanon only risks opening up another chaotic front in the Middle East. While there will probably be a military confrontation with Iran before the end of 2007, fighting Iran now amounts to engaging them on their terms rather than our own.

There have already been attempts at escalating this conflict. For example, there are reports that Hizballah fired rockets at the Golan Heights in an attempt to draw in Syria. Escalation and the uncertainty that accompanies it would benefit those who know the region best. And if the past several years have taught us nothing else, they should leave us no doubt that the U.S. is not the country that best understands the region.

(Thanks to counterterrorism consultant Dan Darling for providing some of the information that appears in this report.)

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