Counterterrorism Blog
The first multi-expert blog dedicated solely to counterterrorism issues, serving as a gateway to the community for policymakers and serious researchers. Designed to provide real-time information about terrorism cases and policy developments.

  March 11, 2011

The End of The Counterterrorism Blog

By Douglas Farah

To Our Readers:

Thank you for your faithful readership through the past five years. Over its short run, the Counterterrorism Blog served an important role both as a leading terrorism news and information aggregator and as a site where noted practitioner-experts presented commentary and analysis. This combined to make the site a regular “one-stop” bookmark for the interested public, media and policy community at a crucial time. CTB has had a remarkable run, and a tremendous impact – in addition to being visited over 8.2 million times, the CTB spurred news stories, held Congressional briefings, embedded reporters in war zones, and informed the policy debate – even earning a negative review from Al Qaeda!
As the world has changed and the terrorism community has evolved so has the ability of the volunteer contributing experts on the Counterterrorism Blog to dedicate their time and energy to this enterprise. In light of this, the Board has made the decision to discontinue publishing here. In addition to their other policy, professional, publishing, teaching and research responsibilities, many of the CTB’s former contributing experts will be posting on other blogs and can continue to be read.
Thanks again for all the support through the years in making the CTB a leading voice in the Counterterrorism community and for your support and interest.

The Counterterrorism Foundation Board, publishers

  March 10, 2011

Modeling Middle East Turmoil

By Aaron Mannes

The other day Slate posted a data visualization to help understand “Which Middle Eastern countries are most susceptible to revolution?”

The visualization was neat, because it cleverly brought in four different factors (unemployment, median age, GDP per capita, and oil exporter or not.) But it also did not provide much of an obvious pattern. Libya had, by far the highest unemployment while Tunisia and Egypt (although this seems low) were more towards the middle of the pack. Tunisia has one of the highest median ages, while Egypt and Libya are again in the middle. As for GDP per capita, Libya is a substantially higher then Egypt and Tunisia (although lower then Bahrain). In short, the graphic does not point to an obvious next domino, although it does indicate that almost everyone in the region is a possible candidate.

But knowing that the nations in the Middle East are ripe for turmoil is hardly news, but the critical questions are when, where, and why. To model that problem requires a lot more variables. In one of my own efforts to model terrorist group behavior I cited Tolstoy who stated:

Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.
The same goes for troubles nations (and is there any other kind.) Since I work on this sort of thing for my bread and butter, I thought I’d kick in some thoughts on the kinds of variables needed.

Read the full post here.

  March 6, 2011

How to Deal with Islamist Movements in Post-Revolutionary Regimes?

By Matthew Levitt

Initially slow to react to the string of Jasmine revolutions rocking the Middle East and North Africa, the Obama administration is now proactively engaged in policy and analytical reassessments to determine how to respond to various contingencies arising from the new political horizon rising across the region. One such internal assessment, completed in mid-February, focused on differences between various types of Islamist movements that promote Islamic law in government. Such a review is timely, commendable, and appears to be asking some of the right questions. That, however, is no guarantee it will reach the right conclusions.

To be sure, significant ideological differences separate al-Qaeda from the likes of the Muslim Brotherhood, not the least of which is the sharp contrast between al-Qaeda's distaste for national boundaries in it quest for an Islamic Caliphate and the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to mold its Islamist ideology to the specific nationalist contexts of each country in which it is present. And yet, the Brotherhood's Islamist, illiberal ideology includes tenets that raise significant questions about its qualifications as a partner in the democratic process. The threshold for partnership cannot simply be that a group is not quite as extreme or violent as al-Qaeda.

The full article is available here

Scams.info

  March 2, 2011

Asserting Liberal Values: The Future of British and U.S. Counterradicalization Strategies

By Matthew Levitt

Radicalization lies at the intersection of grievance and ideology. However, grievances are ever-present and very few individuals choose to act upon them. Ideology, on the other hand, offers a blueprint for action that mobilizes potential terrorists.

A key criticism of the British Prevent strategy has focused on its failure to recognize the importance of ideology in the radicalization process, as evidenced by partnerships with nonviolent Islamist organizations. Though many of these groups reject violence against the UK itself, they are either silent about or even supportive of attacks against Israel or coalition troops in Iraq. Counterradicalization efforts cannot be effective when partnerships are made with those who explicitly reject liberal values. And we must not forget that extremist ideology calling for violence in the name of Islam presents the most pressing terrorist threat to the West. Whether advocated by violent or nonviolent extremists, such radical ideology promotes a worldview at odds with the fundamental principles of Western society and must be contested.

American society has a fundamental discomfort with the government dictating acceptable versus unacceptable ideas. Freedom of speech and religion are arguably the most cherished values in the United States. This position stands in stark contrast with legal and societal norms in the UK or the Netherlands, where distribution of terrorist literature can be investigated and the drafters jailed for creating a threat to national social cohesion. Therefore, in keeping with American values, the United States must develop a strategy that confronts the ideology head-on. While the state cannot act as thought police, it can offer and amplify an abundance of voices, thereby dispelling the notion that Islamist ideology offers the only solution to one's problems and, in effect, limiting its appeal. Without banning extremist (but protected) speech, the government can and must take action to contest extremist ideas and undercut their attraction.

Lacking a version of Britain's Communities and Local Government Department, the United States must immediately develop a roadmap delineating the responsibilities of agencies and departments -- federal, state, and local -- in addressing local grievances, engaging immigrant communities, and contesting extremist ideologies. The last of these items remains the missing link in an otherwise robust effort by the United States to foster social cohesion and counter violent extremism.

For the full summary of this event, which also featured Mark Williams, first secretary for justice and home affairs at the British embassy in Washington, DC., and Mr. Seamus Hughes, a professional staff member on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee see here. The audio of the event is available here.

Pakistan and Blasphemy Law: Assassination of Liberal, Secular and Progressive Personalities Continues !

By Animesh Roul

Religious target Killings in Pakistan reached a new low on Wednesday (March 02) when Pakistani federal minister Shahbaz Bhatti was assassinated by pro Taliban elements in the capital city of Islamabad. The slain minister was in charge of minority affairs and a vocal critic of Pakistan's blasphemy law. The only Christian face of present PPP led coalition government Bhatti was known for his views against the blasphemy law.

Soon after the killing, Taliban spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan said that ‘Assassination of Bhatti is a message to all of those who are against the blasphemy laws." A letter found from the killing site claimed that Taliban killed the minister because he was leading a committee set up with the objective to change the blasphemy law.

On January 4 this year, the Punjab Governor Salman Taseer was killed in Islamabad by one of his guards identified as Malik Mumtaz Qadri, a radical extremist. Qadri confessed during interrogation that he killed the governor for his views against the blasphemy law. The largest body of the Barelvi group, the Jamaate Ahle Sunnat Pakistan (JASP) issued a statement that time saying that “No Muslim should attend the funeral or even try to pray for Salmaan Taseer or even express any kind of regret or sympathy over the incident.”

After Taseer's assassination, Bhatti vowed to fight against the law bringing some necessary amendments. Bhatti once said: "I am ready to sacrifice my life for the principled stand I have taken because the people of Pakistan are being victimized under the pretense of blasphemy law." Bhatti was very active in promoting the equal right of minority communities (Hindus and Christians) in Pakistan. Shahbaz Bhatti was the second high-ranking official killed by Islaimic radicals in the country due to the blasphemy law.

The blasphemy law, which is part of the constitution of Pakistan as the Criminal Code, (See esp. , Part XV: OFFENCES RELATING TO RELIGION) prohibits and punishes blasphemy against Islam and the Holy Prophet Muhammad. The Criminal Code provides penalties for blasphemy ranging from a fine to death.

See the video speech in which he said that Taliban could kill him for his stance on the Blasphemy law.

BBC NEWS: "Pakistan minister Bhatti predicts own assassination"

  February 22, 2011

What Cargo May Be Aboard Iranian Warships Transiting the Suez Canal?

By Victor Comras

Iran’s leaders are closely watching the progress of two of their navy warships, the 1500 ton frigate Alvand and the 33,000 ton refueling and supply ship Kharg, through the Suez Canal. They reportedly will arrive at a Syrian port in a few days. The passage of Iranian warships into the Mediterranean is rightfully viewed, in itself, as a provocative act by Israel and by NATO naval forces. Iranian warships haven't been seen in the Mediterranean since the 1970s. But, perhaps, there should also be great concern with the cargoes these warships may be carrying. What a better way could Iran have to circumvent UN and like-minded country sanctions.

UN Security Council Resolution 1749 ( March 2007) prohibits Iran from “supply(ing), sell(ing), or transfer(ing) directly or indirectly ... any arms or related material." All countries are obligated to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or to use their flag vessels or aircraft to transport such items. And, these prohibitions are further re-enforced by paragraph 8 of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (June 2010).

In November 2009, Israeli naval units interdicted the German-owned freighter Francorp in international waters near Cyprus. The ship had called in Iran prior to its transit to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. The Israeli navy seized 500 tons of Katyusha rockets, mortars, bullets, and grenades concealed aboard the ship in containers belonging to the Iranian shipping line. The ship’s manifest had indicated a much more benign cargo destined for Syria. This is believed to be only one of many occurences involving illicit shipments of Iranian origin arms in violation of UN sanctions.

Courtesy of WikiLeaks we can now read a series of State Department cables indicating that Sudan was also complicit in allowing Iranian arms to be passed to Hamas in Gaza. In March 2009, Jordan and Egypt were also warned by the State Department of imminent Iranian plans to ship a cargo of "lethal military equipment" to Syria for onward shipment to Hizbollah and Hamas in violation of UN Sanctions.

Canal authorities have indicated that they have obtained assurances from the Iranians that neither Iranian warship carries nuclear or chemical related cargoes, but, no attempt will be made to inspect either ship. And few should doubt that Iran wouldn’t use this opportunity to transport other proscribed cargo such as arms, rockets and other military items. Such items might well be destined for Syria, Hizbollah and Hamas, or elsewhere where it might do harm to US or Israeli interests. And, what cargo might such ships pick up in Syria to bring back to Iran on their return voyage. Iran is known, for example, to be in the market for numerous items to advance their uranium enrichment and ballistic missile development programs. And, Syria is a well known transit point for forwarding sanction contraband items to Iran. It has also served, in the past, as a transhipment point for North Korean contriband items into the region and to Iran.

UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (June 2010) spells out a maritime interdiction system which calls upon all countries to inspect suspect cargoes in their harbor or, with the flag states permission, on the high seas. But, it is highly doubtful that such an interdiction regime could or would be applied to these Iranian warships. This makes it all the more important that the movement of these ships and their presence in Mediterranean ports be closely monitored, and that Syria be held accountable with regard to its international obligations.

  February 11, 2011

Egypt and Emerging Trends

By Dennis Lormel

As we witness historic and heroic events unfolding in front of us and marvel about the resolve of Egyptian people tasting true freedom for perhaps the first time, we should start to think about the small group of Egyptians and outsiders who are salivating about the bountiful criminal opportunities that the new found freedom of democracy will present to them. The United States and , in fact, the world is rightfully concerned about what impact Mubarak’s departure will have on peace with Israel, stability in the Middle East, and other geo-political considerations.
In short order, the intelligence and law enforcement community had better assess the emerging criminal and organized crime threat that we will inevitably face. Instead of being reactive, we should be proactive. We need to get out in front and contain the opportunists who will undoubtedly establish the new organized crime apparatus emanating from Egypt. Before they have the opportunity to establish roots, as did Russian and Eastern European Organized Crime, someone should be assessing the scope of the emerging threat. Following that, we better take pre-emptive steps to diminish the new threat before it has the opportunity to overwhelm us. If we can diminish or irradiate this threat before it has a chance to metastasize we won’t have to deal with their costly criminal consequences in a few years.
This, unfortunately, is not likely to happen until we wake up one morning and realize that Egyptian Organized Crime has become a transnational threat. Wouldn’t it be nice to recognize and get in front of such a threat.

  February 3, 2011

The Middle East: Democracies or More Terrorism?

By Michael B. Kraft

The demonstrations shaking Arab governments raise questions not only about the political future of Tunisia, Egypt and possibly Jordan and Yemen but also the specter
of increased future terrorism that could trigger U.S. sanctions.

I describe the background and the possible impact on Lebanon, a potential Palestinian state and perhaps other governments, in this opinion piece on CNN’s web site today.

http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/02/03/kraft.palestine.lebanon/index.html


In Lebanon, Hezbollah, designated under U.S. law as a terrorist organization since 1997, apparently is in the process of taking over the government via a Hezbollah-backed Prime Minister. The “state within a state” fired large numbers of rockets against Israel in the 2006 conflict and, with Iran’s help, has built up a huge arsenal of thousands of missiles. Many are long range, capable of reaching Israel’s cities.

The group also has taken Americans hostages in the 1980’sand attacked targets as far as way as Argentina. Will a Hezbollah dominated government continue to engage in terrorist actions as well as giving sanctuary to other terrorists? If so, it runs the risk of being placed on the U.S. government’s terrorism list, which means cutting off foreign assistance and other sanctions.

Egypt has been the victim of terrorist attacks and the Mubarak government has tried, not entirely successfully, to prevent the smuggling of more missiles and weapons to Hamas which took control of Gaza after gun battles against the Palestinian Authority. It remains to be seen what kind of role the Muslim Brotherhood will play and whether the non-violence profile it adopted in recent years was a matter of pragmatism --because of the Mubarak regime’s police and prisons-- or principle.

Jordan, like Egypt has done a good job of keeping the peace and preventing terrorists from using its territory for attacks on Israel. It also has been a target of militant Islamic fundamentalists. King Abdullah is trying to stay ahead of the wave of public unrest by replacing his cabinet. But if he loses control, and Islamic fundamentalist militants take over, that country could join Lebanon and Gaza in becoming a terrorist base. That would be a real tragedy irony as Jordan has taken a strong stance against terrorism and has even been helping train security forces from Iraq.

  February 2, 2011

Two Scenarios on Egyptian Succession and One Vision of the Brotherhood

By Jonathan Winer

The similarities between the course of events in Egypt today, and in Iran thirty years ago are obvious: millions of ordinary people take to the street with the sole goal of removing a long-ruling local autocrat who has strong ties to Western powers but is seen as having been deaf the voices of his own people and democracy.

The US then, under Jimmy Carter, as now, under Barack Obama, supports democracy, freedom, and the right of local populations to determine their own destiny.

The autocrat's solid control of the country, backed by the military he commands, rapidly disintegrates. No half measures are accepted -- and suddenly, he is gone.

The question becomes -- what next?

Leaving aside wars for independence from foreign powers, popular revolutions have tended to run in either of two scenarios:

Scenario One: a transitional government proves to be weak, and after a series of violent twists and turns, coups, imprisonments, and executions, a replacement autocrat -- aristocratic, theocratic, or charismatic -- emerges. Come meet the new boss, same as the old boss. Examples include: France 1789 (Napoleon); Haiti 1804 (from Touissant to Aristide, in endless destructive cycle); Mexico 1910 (from Porforio Diaz to 75 years of one-party rule by the PRI); Russia 1917 (Stalin); Germany 1918 to 1933 (Weimer to Hitler); Cuba 1933 (against Machado) and 1956-1959 (Batista to Castro); Ethiopia 1974 (Mengistu); Iran 1979 (Khomeini/Khameini); Russia 1999 (Putin and Putinism); Kyrgyzstan 2005 (Bakiev).

Scenario Two: following mob protests destabilizing the entrenched autocrat, a transitional government steadies the country long enough to allow for a move towards a genuinely democratic government, involving multiple popular interests, without permanent one-party rule by a small insider clique. There are, unfortunately, fewer cases of this, and several of them were in important respects wars for independence from perceived foreign control. Perhaps the best examples include: Turkey 1908 (Young Turk Revolution, which led to Ataturk, but evolved into democracy); Portugal 1974 (the Carnation Revolution, establishing a real democracy); Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 1979 (the Singing Revolution); Czechoslovakia 1979 (Velvet Revolution); Romania 1979; Indonesia 1998; Georgia 2003 (the Rose Revolution, but the extent to which a democracy has succeeded Shvardnadze is open to debate in light of Saakashvilli's use of the legal system to crack-down on dissent).

There are forces visible in Egypt which provide hope for scenario two, and legitimate anxiety about scenario one.

Read More »


  January 31, 2011

The Australian Take on the Terrorism Threat

By Michael B. Kraft


The theme that international cooperation is essential to combating international terrorism has been a mainstay of U.S. counterterrorism policy for decades. Usually this means sharing intelligence information, counterterrorism techniques, and sometimes providing training and equipment.

Australia is one of the many countries with which the U.S. enjoys a close relationship.

The Australian Ambassador for counterterrorism, Mr. Bill Paterson, was in Washington recently for meetings with U.S. State Department and other officials, including sessions with experts from other countries.

He also made a public appearance at a Jan 19 round table event of the Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) at George Washington University, which has held sessions with ambassadors from other countries that also are involved in the struggle against terrorism. Ambassador Paterson gave an excellent, comprehensive talk and I just received a copy of Mr. Paterson’s text from the Australian Embassy (delayed because the Ambassador had gone on to Yemen). I thought it worth sharing because of the wide ranging scope of his discussion of the terrorism situation as seen through the perspective of a close ally.

His remarks included a discussion of Afghanistan, saying “We share the view that failing to defend Afghanistan will almost certainly give AQ new momentum and greater freedom of action. It would also strengthen the hand of the Pakistan Taliban and the growing extremist alliance and capability in Pakistan. It would energise anti-western extremists elsewhere, posing a more complex security environment than we already face.

“Hence the commitment of Australia and others to this task… In the end, we are dealing with a globalised extremist movement, and if it is not addressed and neutralised at source, its credibility as well as operational capability will be sustained and potentially enhanced.”

The text of his speech, which also covers Indonesia and his perspective on threats elsewhere in the world, follows.

For further details, also see the HSPI website: http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/events/australiaART301.cfm

Read More »


  January 29, 2011

Terror and Politics: Lashkar-e-Taiba, HuJI and Assassinations in Bangladesh

By Animesh Roul

Very often western observers play down the existence and influence of Pakistan based Lashkar- e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami inside Bangladesh’s territory. Investigations into number of terror strikes in Bangladesh occurred between May 2004 and December 2005 have revealed, rather unearthed, a lethal nexus between these two Pakistan based terror groups and couple of mainstream political parties in Bangladesh. It also revealed how they teamed up to score a political point by assassinating rival political leaders.

The LeT had sent a cache of ‘Arges’ grenades to HuJI’s Bangladesh franchise which were used in at least seven major terror attacks, six of them targeting then opposition Awami League leaders including AL leader and present Prime Minster Sheikh Hasina, British High Commissioner in Dhaka Anwar Choudhury and Awami League legislator and a former finance minster Shah AMS Kibria. These deadly Austrian manufactured Arges grenades (allegedly counterfeited by Pakistan military/ISI) have been used by Pakistan based terrorists and more recently used in Mumbai 2008 attacks.

List of High Profile Assassination attempts with Arges Grenade:

May 21, 2004: British High Commissioner to Bangladesh Anwar Choudhury was wounded in a grenade attack. While Anwar miraculously escaped the attack with minor injuries, at least three people got killed in that attack and 70 others injured. The attempted assassination by HuJI terrorists came when Anwar was visiting the Shrine of Shah Jalal in Sylhet.

June 21, 2004: Similar grenade attacks took place at a rally of AL leader Suranjit Sengupta in Sunamganj (at Derai subdivision). One AL activist was killed and nearly 30 people were injured in that attack. Suranjit Sengupta escaped unhurt.

August 07, 2004: HuJI terrorists lobbed a grenade targeting an Awami League gathering that left one AL leader (AL publicity secretary Mohammad Ibrahim) killed and 25 others seriously injured. The attack took place moments after the City Mayor and AL’s Sylhet chief Badaruddin Ahmed Kamran left the venue after the meeting.

August 21, 2004: In an attempt to assassinate Sheikh Hasina, terrorists lobbed a series of grenades targeting Awami League (AL) leader Sheikh Hasina’s rally on Bangabandhu Avenue in Dhaka. Attacks left at least 24 people killed and hundreds including senior AL leaders Abdur Razzak, Amir Hossain Amu, Suranjit Sengupta, and Kazi Zafarullah critically injured. A lesser known Islamist outfit Hikmat-ul-Zihad claimed responsibility for the grenade attacks in Dhaka. A person named Hider Rob had e-mailed a message to a vernacular daily Prothom Alo issuing a threat to kill Sheikh Hasina. The message reads like this: “Don’t think that Sheikh Hasina is out of danger. We missed our previous chance but now we are very careful for our mission. Tell her to be prepared. We are coming and this time we will accomplish our target within seven days.”

January 27, 2005: AL leader and former finance minister, Shah AMS Kibria, and four other AL members were killed and at least 50 persons sustained injuries during a grenade attack on an AL rally at Boidder Bazaar in the Habiganj district, some 120 kilometers northeast of the capital Dhaka.

December 02, 2005: Sylhet city Mayor Badruddin Ahmed Kamran escaped similar grenade attack (a dud one) again during a local Badminton Competition at Tilagarh area of the city.

Investigating agencies in Bangladesh claimed that at least 32 Arges grenades sent by Lashkar e Taiba to Huji-B operatives and those were used in at least seven major terror attacks during that period: Six of them targeted AL leaders and the other was on Anwar Choudhury. Huji along with its political patrons aimed to eliminate AL leaders considered Anti Islam and Pro-India and used these imported Grenades with great effect.

Subsequent investigations into these terror acts unearthed how this cache of Grenades shipped into Bangladesh from Pakistan. Many of the accused including HuJi chief Mufti Abdul Hannan, are behind bars now. Now Bangladeshi agencies are probing to find out the extent of LeT and HuJi links that plagued the region.

Read More »


  January 28, 2011

Ozymandias in Egypt

By Jonathan Winer

Even as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak orders his government to resign, well-informed experts are concluding that the course of events in Egypt is not likely to result in a revolution. They argue that Egypt's military controls the country and understands that a revolution generally isn't good for business.

In the words of Brookings Institution expert Ken Pollack, "The history of revolutions is that they only succeed when the government loses the will or the capability to use violence and so far there is nothing that is happening in Egypt that suggests that either one is going to happen."

From this perspective, it doesn't matter that Egypt's government, like that of Iran under the Shah, faces resurgent Islamic fundamentalism attacking a government seen as corrupt and overly close to heretic governments in the west. It's insufficient that the government is unpopular, perpetuating and exploiting gross income inequality, and for ordinary Egyptians, fundamentally unjust. So long as the local military doesn't lose its will to retain power, the center will hold.

By this calculus, the Iranian Revolution was only possible because the Shah left town on January 16, 1979 after being unwilling to be sufficiently ruthless in using his secret police, the SAVAK, to crack enough heads.

Read More »


Institutional Weakness & Egypt's Future

By Aaron Mannes

Events in Egypt are developing quickly. Predictions are a dangerous business, but even if the Mubarak regime can ride out these protests, something profound has changed. In a region where l’etat c’est moi is the standard for the rulers, ripping down the giant posters of President Mubarak is a profound symbol of the public’s disaffection.

Facts about economic stagnation and reports of human rights abuses can tell the story of Egypt’s decay under Mubarak – but perhaps this newsbrief best encapsulates the situation:

Egyptian security forces detained a schoolboy for several hours after he wrote in an exam that President Hosni Mubarak was a tyrant who ruled over cowards, an Education Ministry official said on Monday. Safwat Hassan, 17, wrote in his end of high school exam in the southern city of Luxor that Mubarak was "a tyrannical leader" and Egyptians were "a cowardly people," the official in Luxor told AFP. The official said the boy wrote the answer in a maths exam because he was convinced that he was going to fail as he comes from a poor family that could not afford treating school staff to the customary meals during exam time. Egyptian teachers are notoriously badly paid and almost always have to take on private classes and accept gifts to make ends meet. Hassan was questioned for several hours by local security forces and "might be charged with defamation," the official said, without being able to say how security services found out about the boy's answer. The teenager has been barred from taking more exams this year and will have to retake them all next year, the official said.
I think this story speaks for itself, shedding light on the Egyptian government’s ability to provide services, the pervasive police state, and the economic prospects for most Egyptians. This revolt was long in coming. The United States should have been pressing for reform in Egypt for decades (as I discuss here in this article discussing the ideas of Egyptian liberal writer Tarek Heggy.) But, in fairness to policy-makers and implementers pressing for reform in other countries is not so easy to do (as I learned while researching the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.)

Predictions in a situation like this are impossible – but a few observations are in order.

First, there have been innumerable calls for the United States to support the protesters and align its policy with democracy in Egypt. This is probably the least bad course of action. But there should be no illusions on several points. For the vast majority of Egyptians, the United States is inextricably linked to the hated regime. Nothing the White House or Foggy Bottom does can change that in a few days, weeks or months. Also, the ability of the U.S. to influence events is limited. It does appear that Secretary of State Clinton’s call for the Egyptian government to not respond with violence did send a message to Egypt’s generals that the U.S. would not support a violent crackdown. (A not dissimilar message was sent to Iran’s generals as the Shah’s regime was falling.)

Second, it has been observed many times that the protests are secular and the Muslim Brotherhood is not the driver. This is probably true. But there are no institutional mechanisms for a power transfer. If the regime falls, there is no opposition in the wings to take power. Effective institutions and political parties are essential for democracies to function. One of the major failings of the post-war planning for Iraq was that Iraqi institutions were reasonably functional and that there would not be a massive governance vacuum. In that chaos, the Muslim Brotherhood might prove to be the best-organized player and be well positioned to take charge.

Read the complete entry here.

  January 25, 2011

Moscow Airport Attack: Suicide bombers in spotlight again

By Michael B. Kraft

The terrible suicide bombing of a Moscow Airport Monday that killed 35 persons and wounded more than 130, prompted the following analysis of the tactic by Joshua Sinai, a veteran counterterrorism analyst now at Virginia Tech University..

In an opinion piece that appeared on the CNN web site today, Professor Sinai, an old friend and colleague, wrote in part:

"Most suicide attacks are commissioned by organized groups directly or by "self-starter" cells, such as London's 7/7 bombers. This is one of the reasons why the Moscow bomber was likely aided by accomplices.

"It is easier for groups to transform susceptible individuals into becoming terrorists by radicalizing, recruiting, indoctrinating and training them to become suicide bombers, sometimes in a matter of days, and then videotaping their commitment to martyrdom. It will be interesting to see if the terrorist group behind the Moscow airport's bombing posts a martyrdom video of the suicide bomber.

"Such groups get their oxygen from extremist religions and societies that glorify martyrdom into an afterlife in "paradise" -- which is a concrete reality in the communities where these bombers are indoctrinated.

It is true that grievances, whether legitimate or perceived, against their adversaries drive terrorist violence. But the cult of death through martyrdom is reinforced through indoctrination and hate propaganda in extremist religious houses of worship, schools, media and even popular music."

For the full text, see
http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/01/25/sinai.suicide.terrorists/index.html?iref=allsearch


  January 4, 2011

Neutrality will not shield Sweden from terrorism

By Walid Phares

/Taymur-of-Sweden-2.jpg
"Taimur of Sweden"

Until Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly’s explosive belt went off prematurely in Stockholm last month, Sweden was the poster child for isolationism in the war on terror. While Abdulwahab’s bomb failed to achieve his desired result, it did obliterate the myth that nations can remain neutral to global terrorism.

Abdulwahab’s failed attack typifies the jihadis’ all-out war against “infidels.” He was a doctrinaire jihadist with ties to a local militant Islamist organization, and his attack didn’t spring up out of nowhere. There had already been warning signs that terrorists were mobilizing against the Scandinavian democracy. Militants had threatened Swedish artist Lars Vilks for his satirical cartoon portrayal of the prophet Mohammed, attacking his home and attempting to murder him with an axe. Others threatened Vilks.

The Iraq-born Abdulwahab was a member of the Facebook group “Islamic Caliphate State.” He lived in Luton in Bedfordshire, England, staging ground to four of the terrorists who killed 52 and injured more than 2,000 in the 7/7 train bombings.

Read More »


  December 27, 2010

A war of succession within AQIM

By Olivier Guitta

I just wrote an article for The National on the growing dissent within al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
You can read the full article here.
Here is an excerpt:

Al Qa'eda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, has recently sought to raise its public profile with a series of successful kidnapping operations of western nationals. Its efforts have garnered attention not only from international terrorism analysts, but from militants themselves. After a September operation in Niger where seven people were kidnapped - including five French citizens - Osama bin Laden himself claimed paternity of this success.

Bin Laden's attention is noteworthy, but not the most revealing aspect of these strikes. For that, one needs to examine what members of AQIM are saying about their own activities, and how these tactics are creating rifts within the broader organisation.

The real mastermind behind the fall operation was Abdelhamid Abu Zeid, the head of the Sahel region. That Abu Zeid is claiming credit suggests he is looking to usurp control of AQIM from Abdelmalek Droukdel, the group's historical leader. This new situation could actually result in a war of succession inside AQIM.

This is not an entirely new development. Interestingly, Droukdel's leadership was already questioned in 2007 after the Algerian terror group GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) changed its name to al Qa'eda in the Islamic Maghreb. In fact, according to Abu Mossaab, the former head of the south who surrendered to Algerian authorities in August 2007, the dissent started as soon as Droukdel and two of his close advisers decided to join al Qa'eda without consulting the leadership and the group's base.

  December 13, 2010

The Muslim Brotherhood in the MENA region

By Olivier Guitta

I wrote a paper on the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Egypt and Morocco for the Center for European Studies.

You can download the full paper in pdf here:

Please do keep in mind it was written back in February 2010.

Please find below an excerpt:

The end of the 1920s found the Muslim world in total disarray due to the expansion of European colonialism and, even more importantly, the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate and its replacement by a secular republic in Turkey in 1924. Al-Ikhwan al- muslimun, also known simply as the Ikhwan or the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded in 1928 by an unassuming Egyptian schoolteacher, Hassan al-Banna. The creation of the MB was to some extent a response to these two events, an attempt to fill the void and reunite the ummah (the Muslim nation).


Interestingly, the MB, a Sunni organisation, did not view itself as a political party but rather as a grassroots political movement engaged in mass mobilisation. Thus in order to gain access to the largest possible target audience, the MB created local branches and divisions for adults, youth and women. The MB also built schools, hospitals, factories and welfare societies, and distributed food so that it could attract a large following. This greatly helped al-Banna draw on the support of the small Egyptian bourgeoisie while enjoying very good relations with the Egyptian King Farouk, who saw the MB as a counterweight to Arab secular nationalists.2 The organisation gained in popularity by the day: indeed, from just six members at the start, the MB grew to 1,000 members in 1933, then 20,000 in 1937, 200,000 in 1943, 500,000 in 1945 and close to 2 million in 1951.
The MB is strongly hierarchical in structure, with numerous elaborate layers. At the top of the organisation sits the General Guide. The Arabic term, al-Murshid al-Aamm, indeed means ‘General Guide’, which differs considerably from ‘chairman’, the much more Western and neutral English translation used by the MB. This difference is itself sufficient to provide food for thought.
Amad Abdu Chaboune, the first Egyptian imam to be elected as a MB Member of Parliament, explained that if the government were to dismantle the first level of the organisation—that is, the level made up of leaders well known to the public—there would always be the second, third, fourth layers and so on, down to the last member of the Brotherhood. Indeed, from the beginning, the MB created numerous tiny cells— with no more than five members—and this made it almost impossible to dismantle.
The MB also had its own army and was the only effective resistance force against the British occupation of Egypt. Political violence started to increase in the late 1940s, and the MB paramilitary branch took part in it by perpetrating terrorist acts. In fact, this secret apparatus, which was approved by al-Banna, was behind the bombings of two Cairo movie theatres and the assassination of members of government, among other events. In 1949 al-Banna was murdered. Gamal Abdel Nasser seized power in a coup in 1952. Allies at first, Nasser and the MB later became competitors. Then, after an assassination attempt on Nasser in 1954, allegedly by a member of the MB, the regime first dissolved the MB and then imprisoned many of its leaders. Most of them were executed, including, in 1966, its most influential thinker, Saïd Qutb. Other MB leaders were able to flee. Most ended up in Saudi Arabia, but others found their way to Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Maghreb and Europe.

  December 4, 2010

Azam Cheema: Lashkar-e-Taiba's Other 'Professor' Terrorist

By Animesh Roul

I just published one in depth report in Jamestown Foundation's Militant Leadership Monitor on Azam Cheema, LeT's intelligence chief, explosive trainer, jihadi recruiter and strategist who headed India operation.

"A Portrait of Azam Cheema: LeT’s India Strategist," Militant Leadership Monitor, Vol. I (11), November 2010.


Excerpt

Mohammed Azam Cheema (a.k.a. Baba/Babaji) is widely regarded as the “number three” of Lashkar-e-Taiba’s (LeT) anti-Indian operations. Azam Cheema has masterminded several high-profile attacks against India over the years from his safe haven in the dusty city of Bahawalpur in Pakistan’s southern Punjab Province on the edge of the Cholistan Desert.
.....
A militant strategist with years of deadly experience under his belt, Azam Cheema’s finger prints can be found on the majority of the LeT’s attacks on Indian soil prior to the November 26, 2008, Mumbai attacks. The Mumbai commuter train blast, however, remains his biggest operation so far. He always wanted to perpetrate several spectacular terror attacks in India, especially targeting major establishments by imparting jihadi training and pumping arms and ammunitions into Indian territory. Cheema’s in-depth knowledge of India’s vital installations and terrain coupled with a keen eye to assess the country’s vulnerabilities makes him a grand asset for Lashkar-e-Taiba despite his temporary quiescence.

For Complete Article Visit Jamestown's Website

  December 3, 2010

PAKISTAN: US Treasury Designates LeJ and JeM Terror Masterminds

By Animesh Roul

The U.S. Treasury Department has designated three Pakistani terrorists on 02 December. They are anti-Shia and pro-taliban/AQ affiliate, Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ)'s senior leader Amanullah Afridi and chief operational commander Mati ur-Rehman and Abdul Rauf Azhar of Jaish-e Mohammed (JeM).

Excerpts from the Press Release:

Amanullah Afridi
The chief of LJ and one of Pakistan's most wanted terrorists, Amanullah Afridi has been a key figure in directing terrorist-related activities of LJ for several years. As of November 2009, Afridi was the leader of a Karachi-based LJ group and, as of June 2009, the chief of LJ. Afridi is involved in numerous terrorist activities in Pakistan. He has prepared and provided suicide jackets for al-Qa'ida operations, trained suicide bombers and trained the assassin of Pakistani cleric Allama Hassan Turabi.

Mati ur-Rehman
One of Pakistan's most wanted terrorists, Mati ur-Rehman is the chief operational commander of LJ and has also worked on behalf of al-Qa'ida. In September 2009 he was identified as a planning director for al-Qa'ida and was linked to the August 2006 plot to destroy U.S.-bound British aircraft. As a leader of LJ, Rehman has been involved in multiple terrorist activities. He has led militants seeking to carry out attacks in Pakistan and was involved with a militant training camp in Pakistan. Rehman has also been implicated in plots or attacks against a former Pakistani president, a former Pakistani prime minister, and the U.S. consulate in Karachi.

Abdul Rauf Azhar
Abdul Rauf Azhar is a senior leader of JEM. As a senior leader of this terrorist organization, Azhar has urged Pakistanis to engage in militant activities. He has served as JEM's acting leader in 2007, as one of JEM's most senior commanders in India, and as JEM's intelligence coordinator. In 2008 Azhar was assigned to organize suicide attacks in India. He was also involved with JEM's political wing and has served as a JEM official involved with training camps.

  November 19, 2010

Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism

By Matthew Levitt

On November 15, 2010, Victor Comras, Alistair Millar, and Brian Wilson addressed a special Policy Forum luncheon at The Washington Institute. Mr. Comras is author of the new book Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism (2010) and special counsel to the Eren law firm. Mr. Millar is director of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. Mr. Wilson is the legal expert for the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the UN's al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee.

Audio of this event can be found here . A rapporteur's summary of their remarks is available here.

  November 16, 2010

Finally, Wheels Up for Viktor Bout

By Douglas Farah

Well, it took a long time and the road was filled with twists and turns, but Viktor Bout, accused of selling weapons around the world and busted trying to close a multi-million dollar deal with people he thought represented a designated terrorist organization, is finally on his way to stand trial in the United States.

Bout was arrested in Thailand in March 2008 after being taken in by a DEA undercover operation, where the Russian thought he was selling sophisticated weapons to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia FARC), a designated terrorist organization by the United States and European Union, and one of the world's largest cocaine production cartels.

Among the things he offered the undercover operatives in the final meeting in Bangkok, believing them to be FARC commanders, were drones to attack U.S.-build radar stations, surface-to-air missiles, and the usual assortment of assault rifles and ammunition.

His arrest in the hotel, after taking more than an hour to regale the agents with promises of how he could help the FARC kill Americans, looked to be the end of the story. Thailand and the United States have an extradition treaty, the arrest was conducted jointly with Thai police, and the Thai foreign minister certified everything was in order. But legal wrangling, Russian state pressure and overall fear by the Thai government of crossing either the Americans or the Russians, led to a long and convoluted process.

However, the Thai cabinet on Tuesday swallowed hard and bravely approved the extradition, after more than two years of tussle, and Bout was put on a DEA plane, wheels up, and heading to the United States to stand trial in the Southern District of New York.

The arrest is more than symbolic in importance. It targeted one of the master facilitators who, through exploiting the rapidly changing world order, was able to be of use to multiple non-state armed groups, including often arming both sides of the same conflict. Many of these groups (the FARC, Taliban etc.) are terrorists, and almost all were criminal.

My full blog is here.

  November 15, 2010

We Must Challenge the Ideology Driving Terrorism

By Matthew Levitt

Last week I was visiting Australia for meetings and lectures on a variety of issues, including combating violent extremism. Following up on that trip, my colleague Scott Carpenter and I wrote an piece in The Australian on this issue:

The recently foiled parcel bomb plot, tied to al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, demonstrates today's persistent terror threat from abroad.

Yet Western democracies face an equally serious threat from home-grown terrorists. In the past two weeks, the US government unsealed charges against six men accused of funnelling money to al-Shabab, the Somali terrorist organisation responsible for the July 11 World Cup attacks in Kampala, Uganda. Three of the men are from San Diego, California, and three are Somali, one of whom lives in Missouri, one in Minnesota and one who is thought to be in Kenya or Somalia.

These indictments follow just three months after charges against 14 Americans for providing financial support and recruits to Shabab. Unsealing the indictments, US Attorney-General Eric Holder highlighted the sharp increase in home-grown radicalisation: "We are seeing an increasing number of individuals -- including US citizens -- who have become captivated by extremist ideology and have taken steps to carry out terrorist objectives, either at home or abroad."

Admirably, the Obama administration's May national security strategy explicitly lists as one of its goals "empowering communities to counter radicalisation." But without identifying the ideology driving radicalisation, it will be difficult to build community resilience against radicalisers.

The full article is available here.

  November 12, 2010

The Further Narco-Terrorist Ties of the Chávez Government

By Douglas Farah

The August arrest of major drug kingpin Walid Makled a Venezuelan financial stalwart of the Chávez government in Venezuela has not drawn a great deal of attention here. But it goes to the heart of the criminal-terrorist nexus and its deep corruption that has permeated the Chávez government.

Makled was no small fish. He was designated a major drug kingpin by the Obama administration in 2009. But perhaps more importantly he and his brothers, owners of an airline and a major port, had saved the Chávez government in 2002, when the state oil company PDVSA went on strike.

After his arrest by Colombian police and DEA, Makled, who the Chávez government had suddenly turned on, decided to go public. In a series of TV interviews broadcast in Colombia Makled discussed his corrupt relationships with senior generals, the minister of interior (security) and other major figures in Chávez's inner circle. And, he had kept the evidence, including deposit slips in the banks, video recordings, audio recordings, etc. etc. For those of you who read Spanish, Teodoro Petkoff's TalCual summary here is very good.
To read the entire post, go to

  November 8, 2010

The Ashburn jihadist signals a greater danger

By Walid Phares

Ashburn Farooq.jpg
Farooq Ahmed

The FBI's arrest of Farooque Ahmed of Ashburn, Va., for allegedly assisting al Qaeda in planning multiple bombings around the nation's capital paints a sobering picture of the threat we still face from jihadists.

The FBI charged the 34-year-old computer engineer, husband, father of one and naturalized U.S. citizen with "providing material support to terrorists and collecting information for a terrorist attack." Emphasizing the gravity of the case, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia Neil H. MacBride remarked that Mr. Ahmed was "accused of casing rail stations with the goal of killing as many Metro riders as possible through simultaneous bomb attacks."

Throughout the summer and fall, U.S. authorities witnessed a significant rise in jihadist activity, using increasingly sophisticated operational strategies. According to open-source reports, between 2001 and 2008, U.S. agencies stopped one or two terror attempts a year. However, from 2009 until today, the government has been uncovering one or two cases a month, a troubling growth in jihadi activities.

Read More »


CHICAGO BOMB PLOT: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS NOT COST FREE

By Michael B. Kraft


International cooperation is key in fighting international terrorism – this has been a theme of U.S. government counterterrorism statements and talking for decades.

This concept was underscored by the thwarting two weeks ago of a terrorist plot to ship two bomb-laden packages to the United States, with the apparent intention of blowing them up over an American city or upon delivery to Jewish institutions in Chicago.

(The plot prompted the US government today to impose a ban on cargo shipments from Yemen.)


Yet, future international cooperation could be undermined if the post-election political climate in Washington results in budget cuts for foreign aid programs that help strengthen friendly countries and international cooperation.

According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia officials had given the U.S. earlier warnings of a potential but unspecified attack and then later quickly passed on additional details when received from their inside source, reportedly a “turncoat.” Abu Dubai officials found one bomb device, hidden in a computer printer toner cartridge, before it was loaded onto an outbound plane. British authorities found the second after it already had been flown on one plane and was awaiting transshipment from a British airport to the U.S. It was a good example of international cooperation, described in detail by Canadian Press.


There have been numerous other incidents involving international cooperation, some publicized --including Jordan thwarting plots to blow up an American hotel in Amman and cooperation among the Europeans in countering the current reports of potential attacks. There also is good bi-lateral cooperation, such as between France and Spain to counter the Spanish ETA terrorist group whose members move across the border and others that have not been publicly disclosed. Good cooperation, some of which has not been made public, also exists between the U.S. and Asian and African countries.

As Tom Ridge, the first Secretary of Homeland Security said last week at the Homeland Security Policy Institute, even in cases where countries strongly disagreed with American policies, the security and intelligence agencies cooperated “hands in glove” with the United States.

Read More »


  November 5, 2010

Bin Laden and France

By Olivier Guitta

Last week Osama Bin Laden devoted an entire message addressed to the "French people".
Since it is a first, I wrote for The National about the actual threat that AQ poses on France.

Here is an excerpt:
France has been at an unusually high level of alert over the past few weeks. Multiple terror warnings derived from credible intelligence sources have convinced the French authorities to warn the public of an imminent threat. And, as if that were not enough, Osama bin Laden recently delivered a taped message that was devoted to France.

The French are now in rare company. Bin Laden had before only devoted the entirety of one of his diatribes to one other country, the United States. His recent message and the reasons behind the heightened state of alert in France raise the question whether France has become al Qa'eda's top priority, and if this is the case, why?

Al Qa'eda's leadership has mentioned France consistently since they began delivering audio and video messages. But usually France has been mentioned in passing and alongside a slate of other countries. Still, the organisation has been consistent in its justifications for animosity against France: the presence of French troops in Afghanistan, the passing of a law in 2004 banning religious symbols in French public schools, and the "colonial" attitude of France in North Africa.

You can read the rest here.

  October 26, 2010

Feds Nab Suspected Terror Traitor In the Making

By Bill West

Federal agents in Hawaii on Friday arrested an American born Muslim named Abdel Hameed Shehadeh based on a federal criminal complaint issued in Brooklyn, New York charging him with making false statements to federal officials in a matter involving international terrorism.

The complaint alleges the 21 year old Shehadeh lied to investigators on several occasions about the purpose of his travel to Pakistan, that he claimed he was going to attend a religious school when his real intention was to join the Taliban and fight U.S. military forces. When those efforts failed because he was denied entry into Pakistan, Shehadeh tried to join the U.S. Army with the intention of being deployed to Iraq and deserting and joining the Islamic insurgency there to fight against the American military. Shehadeh, according to the complaint, was denied enlistment into the U.S. military because he lied to the Army recruiter about his previous attempted entry into Pakistan.

The federal charges state Shehadeh constructed jihadist websites that contained postings by wanted American born al-Qaeda operative Anwar al-Awlaki and al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Those websites were linked, among others, to Revolution Muslim, described in the charging complaint as “a radical group based in New York that has expressed its agreement with the ideologies of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.”

The complaint identified an email address associated with Shehadeh as “mujahideen@civiljihad.com.” The complaint explained the term “mujahideen” as meaning “Muslim guerrilla warriors engaged in a jihad.” The term “jihad” is referenced numerous times in the complaint in the obvious context of terrorism, or the more commonly known definition of “holy war.” The affiant FBI Special Agent further stated that based on his training, experience and interviews of cooperating witnesses, he knew that fighters for al-Qaeda refer to themselves as “mujahideen.”

The explanation of the jihadist terminology contained within the criminal complaint is noteworthy, as it demonstrates an official recognition by Federal law enforcement engaged in counter-terrorism investigations the true nature of these terms as used and understood by the terrorist enemy, as opposed to the obfuscation of those terms espoused by many of the apologists for those same jihadists.

Investigative Project on Terrorism Rejects Allegations by Tennessean, CAIR

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

In an article in Sunday's Tennessean newspaper of Nashville, Tenn., reporter Bob Smietana made a series of unsupported claims about the nature of the Investigative Project on Terrorism and our work.

There's a price that comes with erroneous reporting and we're seeing it register already. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) issued a news release calling for an IRS investigation into our status as a non-profit organization. We believe we can withstand any scrutiny.

This isn't a surprise. Groups have been stung repeatedly by our ability to pierce their fog of deception and show their ties to radical Islam, including support for Hamas and other terrorist groups. That's especially true for CAIR. We broke the news that the FBI cut off contact with them because of court evidence tying the organization and its founders to a Hamas-support network. It's in CAIR's interest to deflect attention from that fact and the disclosures which led to it. Trying to discredit the IPT is a sure way to do that.

We won't let them silence us or make us go away. We also realize when you specialize in the work we do, you make enemies. We've earned them the hard way, through diligent research that relies on public documents and what the elements of radical Islam have said publicly. They have hated us for it for years and have found a naïve reporter willing to buy their line.

At issue in the Tennessean story is the relationship between the IPT Foundation, a tax-exempt charity, and SAE Productions, a for-profit company run by IPT Executive Director Steven Emerson. The foundation accepts private donations and contracts with SAE to manage operations. The Tennessean article pays only lip service to the legitimate security issues that dictated this structure and that the IRS has reviewed and approved it.

The article says the foundation's "tax-exempt status is facing questions," implying that someone other than the Tennessean and the paper's hand-picked analysts are raising those questions. This is presented as something that is already happening outside the realm of the newspaper and its talking heads. There is no indication the discussion goes any further.

We provided the newspaper with our 1023 application for tax-exempt status and with our 2008 tax return, most commonly called a form 990. The documents show that we told the IRS we were contracting out our management with a group that did not have tax-exempt status. That was approved. As for the for-profit nature of SAE Productions, the IRS is aware of that as well. That has not been questioned. We say IPTF contracts out with SAE Productions, which files tax returns with the IRS. All of that has been disclosed.

Our application was submitted with the assistance of attorneys and accountants, including one with 20 years of experience with the IRS in exempt organizations.

Smietana appears to have misunderstood one of the questions the IRS asked about our application. He writes:

In a letter dated Dec. 8, 2006, the IRS asked if there would be any ties between the subcontractor and the Investigative Project on Terrorism Foundation. On Dec. 29, 2006, Emerson wrote back: "There are and will be no financial/business transactions between officers, board members or relatives of the aforementioned and applicant organization."

That miscasts the IRS's question which can be seen on page 32 of the documents provided to the newspaper. The IRS asked whether there will be "any financial/business transactions between officers, board members, or relatives" of the foundation and its contractor. There is none. The IPT Foundation pays SAE Productions for management, which includes our rent, research expenses, salaries and benefits for our employees.

It may be confusing and it may be unusual, but there is nothing inappropriate about it.

"Charities certainly can pay for profit organizations for providing work for them as long as it's at fair market value and furtherance of the organization's exempt purposes," said Edward Coleman. Coleman spent 20 years working with the Internal Revenue Service working on exempt organizations, including five years as director of the Exempt Organizations Division at the IRS national office. He was among the accountants and lawyers who advised the IPT Foundation in its application for tax-exempt charitable status.

Read our full posting here.

  October 24, 2010

Financial Sanctions Targeting Iran

By Matthew Levitt

In October 2010, the United States Institute of Peace, in conjunction with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, published The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, a unique publication by fifty of the world's top scholars on Iran representing some twenty foreign policy think tanks, eight universities, and senior foreign policy officials from six U.S. administrations. With no single political agenda, the publication presents a wide range of perspectives on diverse aspects of Iran's politics, economy, military, nuclear program, and society. The volume probes Iran's foreign relations with a dozen nearby countries or regions, chronicles U.S.-Iran relations under six American presidents, and presents the West's options for dealing with Iran in the future.

My own chapter, on "Financial Sanctions" is available here, along with chapters penned by several of my Washington Institute colleagues.

Lashkar-e-Taiba's Strategic Positioning vis-a-vis India

By Animesh Roul

I published one report [Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Strategy of “Encircling” India”, Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), October 21, 2010] on the growing ambition and strategic positioning of Lashkar-e-Taiba vis-à-vis India, especially in the neighboring countries.

Here is an excerpt:

Within a span of six days, Bangladesh authorities arrested four high profile LeT operatives with smuggled exotic dutiable products and large amounts of explosives and other bomb making materials. The detainees included Khurram (a.k.a Mohammad Salem), LeT’s chief coordinator (Daily Star [Dhaka], Oct 05). The latest arrests revealed that LeT operatives use Bangladesh as a transit point for counterfeit currency and as a fertile ground for jihadi recruitment.

....
India’s Ministry of Home Affairs claimed earlier this month that hundreds of Naxalites (Maoists) from India were being trained in Nepal by Nepal’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and supervised by LeT operatives Latif Khan and Razzaq Ansari (Indian Express, October 11). Pushpa Kamal Dahal (a.k.a. Prachanda – “Fierce One”), chairman of Nepal’s Unified Maoists’ Party, suggested the claim was fabricated and formed part of an Indian attempt to disrupt the peace process initiated in 2006 to end a 10-year civil war and the drafting of a new Nepalese constitution. [...]. Earlier this year, a detained former LeT financier, Umer Madani, told interrogators that he had been asked to open ties with the Naxalites while based in Nepal but failed to establish any useful ties before his arrest in June 2009 (Indian Express, May 28).

....
In Sri Lanka, a recent accidental blast of two Chinese containers of dynamite that destroyed the police station they were stored beside raised eyebrows in regional intelligence and security circles (Colombopage.com, September 18; Lanka Daily News, September 18). Though the blast in Karadiyanaru (Eastern Province) had the appearance of an industrial accident (Chinese workers were attempting to move one of the containers at the time), there were unsubstantiated claims that the containers (belonging to a Chinese construction company doing development work in the Eastern Province) were actually scheduled to be transported through Oluvil port to Pakistan and ultimately into the hands of LeT (Lanka News Web, September 29).
......

If the confession of Sabahuddin Ahmed, accused in the Mumbai attacks (but acquitted for lack of evidence), is to be believed, a Maldivian named Ali Ahsham did the reconnaissance on targets in Bangalore before the December 2005 attack on the Indian Institute of Sciences (Times of India, February 4). In Maldives too, LeT’s charitable front, Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK), which operated in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami under the guise of providing humanitarian assistance, has successfully influenced youths to join the so-called jihadi struggle and turn Maldives into a jihadi recruiting ground (see Terrorism Monitor, February 14).

Read the complete article here.

  October 15, 2010

Obama's National Security Vision: Confronting Transnational Threats with Global Cooperation

By Matthew Levitt

The Obama administration's May 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) laid out a strategic vision that draws on interagency information sharing as well as active engagement with foreign partners to secure American interests. This multilateral approach is likely to succeed in the tactical areas of counterterrorism and counterproliferation. But given the emergence of several critical national security threats -- including Iran's nuclear program and the emerging danger of "homegrown" terror -- the long-term challenge remains considerable. Will the administration's national security vision translate into strategic success?

Obama's National Security Vision: Confronting Transnational Threats with Global Cooperation, the fourth compilation in the Stein Program's lecture series by senior counterterrorism officials, tracks the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism and counterproliferation policy during the Obama administration's first two years, with particular focus on the 2010 NSS and its implementation by various government bodies. As U.S. officials strive to keep up with the ever-changing tactics of adversaries, the administration's formidable goal of reshaping the current strategic environment demands the kind of timely analysis and creative ideas compiled in this volume.

Offering their unique insights and perspectives:

* Matthew Levitt (editor), Director of The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence
* John T. Morton, assistant secretary of Homeland Security for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
* Todd M. Rosenblum, deputy undersecretary of Homeland Security
* Daniel Benjamin, coordinator for counterterrorism, State Department
* David Cohen, assistant secretary for terrorist financing, Treasury Department
* Steven Pelak, national coordinator for export enforcement, Justice Department
* David T. Johnson, assistant secretary of state, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

The complete monograph is available here.

  October 11, 2010

Team Petraeus: Taliban 'Comfortable And Safe In Pakistan'

By

Where are the Taliban and their one-eyed leader Mullah Omar hiding out? Where is the Afghan Haqqani network now based?

The answer, of course, is Pakistan. It used to be a dirty little secret no one spoke about publicly. That changed in the past few years, but an apparent U.S. blunder involving an airstrike inside Pakistan that killed two of its border scouts could knock such overt criticism of our paradoxical ally off the table again.

The U.S. military once helped prop up Pakistan’s shaky regimes by refusing to publicly acknowledge its ally’s army and intelligence service had internal elements who collaborated with the enemy. After Army Gen. David Petraeus took over NATO forces in Afghanistan on July 4th, however, the diplomatic niceties eased after years of “See no evil,” and pressure mounted on Pakistan’s army to hit the Taliban like they meant it.

The Obama administration has leaned hard on Pakistan’s current government about Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries — or as hard as anyone can with a stubborn republic fretting over India’s expanding influence.

Petraeus’ staff has applied its own pressure on Pakistan in almost daily blunt public statements spotlighting the embarrassing fact that the Taliban’s base of operations and command and control are not even in their own country. The trend of calling out Pakistan has continued despite Petraeus’ near-apology on Wednesday for the Pakistani border guards’ accidental killings by a NATO chopper last month, which he said “we deeply regret.”

Click here to read my full post at the New York Daily News.

  October 8, 2010

Profile of Zakir Naik: Controversial Islamic Orator With Influence in the West

By Madeleine Gruen

3428240571_2f0a93ab93.jpg

The NEFA Foundation has released the fourth report in its series on extremist ideologues with influence in the West. This report profiles Zakir Naik, a Muslim orator from Mumbai, India, who has millions of fans around the world, including many in the U.S., that he reaches through live lectures and through his satellite television station, Peace TV.

His enormous popularity is due to his exceptional speaking and memorization skills. He is able to quote the Koran, the Bible, the Torah, and other religious texts, chapter and verse, and impresses audiences with his ability to cite numerous examples to support such claims as, apostates should be put to death, and it is acceptable for a man to beat his wife under certain circumstances and with specific techniques. Although Naik often makes such religious pronouncements he is not a formally trained religious scholar, and has been labeled “deviant” by some orthodox clerics.

While Naik is regarded as controversial by many observers and several government agencies (he has been banned from entering Canada and the UK), he does not publicly or overtly promote violent jihad. However, he bears observation because he insinuates that violence perpetrated against Americans is acceptable, and he has made statements that suggest he is in agreement with terrorist attacks that have taken place in the past. He was a source of inspiration to Najibullah Zazi, who plotted to attack the New York City subway system, several of the attackers and planners of the 2008 Mumbai massacre, and others charged with involvement in terrorism. He also promotes the theory that the 9/11 attacks were planned and coordinated by the U.S. government in order to gain control over oil-rich countries.

The full report can be read here.

  September 30, 2010

Getting a Better Handle On Terrorism Financing

By Victor Comras

On Tuesday (Sept 28th) the House Subcommittee on Financial Oversight and Investigations held hearings on Current and Evolving Trends in Terrorism Financing. The Subcommittee members were particularly interested in the effect of US efforts to combat terrorism financing. I had an opportunity to testify at these hearings and to describe some of the more serious shortcomings A copy of my testimony is contained below:

Read More »


  September 29, 2010

High Frequency Trading as a Cyber-War Weapon

By Roderick Jones

As the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission prepares to jointly produce its long-awaited report on the “flash crash” of May 6th it is worth considering some of the security risks that are attached to the practice of High Frequency Trading.

In the past I have used the CT Blog as a forum to discuss and present ideas on future security threats, from virtual worlds to hacking commercial airliners. These ideas have been presented because technological advance has produced a paradigm shift for national security authorities to manage. The introduction of algorithmic and high frequency trading has the potential to create security risks consistent with this theme. For now the most interesting security vector is how high frequency trading can be used as a kind of Denial of Service attack against financial exchanges. This is clearly of some interest to the cyber-warfare community in terms of offense and defense. Other lesser security themes have presented themselves around this topic and a blog/white paper is available on the topic here.

  September 25, 2010

In the Washington TImes on Reconsidering Aid to Pakistan

By Aaron Mannes

The Washington Times just ran a piece by my colleagues and I on reconsidering aid to Pakistan.

Black hole for foreign aid
As U.S. funds increase, so does terrorism
By V.S. Subrahmanian, Aaron Mannes and Amy Sliva -
The Washington Times7:00 p.m., Friday, September 24, 2010

As Pakistan approaches the international community for massive assistance for the third time in six years, donors face difficult choices. Three disasters, starting with the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, then the 2008 financial crisis, and now the massive flooding, were not Pakistan's fault. Nevertheless,

as violence and terrorism emanating from Pakistan increase, donors must ask if aid to Pakistan is improving international security.

According to aiddata.org, the international community (including international aid groups but excluding the United States) provided nearly $22 billion in international aid from 2004 through 2008 (nearly $2.5 billion in 2004, increasing to more than $7 billion in 2008). Since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has, according to the Congressional Research Service, provided more than $18.5 billion in aid to Pakistan. Of this aid, more than $12.5 billion was military. Supposedly this aid to Pakistan is essential for counterterrorism.

But based on the numbers, it is difficult to argue that international aid to Pakistan is reducing terrorism. According to the National Counterterrorism Center's World Incidents Tracking System, which monitors noncombatant casualties of terror attacks, there was an enormous jump in terror attacks by Pakistani perpetrators from 2004 through 2008. In 2004, 110 Pakistani noncombatants were killed in terror attacks. In 2008, nearly 900 were killed. Some of this can be explained by the civil war between the Pakistani Taliban and the government. Nonetheless, the recent spate of bombings in Pakistan, which have killed at least 75 members of Pakistan's Shia minority, show that despite substantial security aid, the government remains unable to protect its citizens.

There also has been a jump in attacks by Pakistani perpetrators outside of Pakistan, including the 2006 and 2008 attacks in Mumbai. Combined, these two incidents claimed nearly 400 lives. Beyond the immediate carnage, these attacks increased the possibility of open war between the nuclear-armed rivals Pakistan and India. Further, a number of international terror plots, such as the 2006 airplanes plot and the recent Times Square car-bombing attempt, have been linked to Pakistan.

Pakistan has played important roles in counterterror efforts, particularly protecting NATO supply lines to Afghanistan and its own operations against the Pakistani Taliban, which have claimed the lives of more than 2,000 Pakistani troops since Sept. 11. However, despite these losses, Pakistan's priority is not counterterrorism - it is India.

When India detonated a nuclear device in 1974, then-Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto stated, "Even if we have to eat grass, we will make nuclear bombs." Despite possessing the ultimate deterrent, Pakistan continues high levels of military spending in its impossible race for parity with larger and wealthier India. This has led to persistent fiscal deficits and low spending on social services. International aid is no substitute for sound domestic policies.

Read the complete post here.

  September 24, 2010

The Death of the FARC's Jorge Briceño Is a Blow to Latin American Terrorism

By Douglas Farah

The Colombian government just passed an historic milestone in its decades long fight against the FARC - a successful airstrike that killed Jorge Briceño, AKA Mono Jojoy, the group's most successful military commander ever. But he was more than that, and his death is a significant strike against terrorism in Latin America.

Briceño was the architect of the FARC's transition from Marxist insurgency to drug trafficking terrorist organization in the early 1990s as a method of survival. It was Briceño who moved his Southern Front (followed by the rest of the FARC) into kidnapping and an almost-total dependency on cocaine trafficking. He targeted Americans, along with the hundreds of Colombian hostages he plucked off. He was remorseless about the human suffering he caused, viewing it as a cost of war. He was the architect of the FARC becoming a true terrorist organization.

Briceño, who commanded great loyalty among the FARC rank and file, was born into the FARC, and has a brother, German, who is also a senior FARC commander. German, who kidnapped and murdered three Native American activists with the consent of Jorge, has been identified by Colombian authorities as one of the FARC commanders under the protection of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez in Venezuelan territory.

As a commander, Briceño pioneered the use bombs made of gas canisters that were used to incinerate rural villages, as well as inflict significant damage on the military. My full blog is here.

  September 22, 2010

Counter-Terrorism Offensive in Indonesia

By Kenneth Conboy

This past weekend, Indonesia's police counter-terrorism unit, Special Detachment 88, conducted a series of dramatic raids across North Sumatra province targeting a 33-strong band of terrorists who had perpetrated a series of bank robberies since mid-year. Thus far, 20 suspects have been caught and three shot dead. Of those captured, seven were trained at a paramilitary camp discovered in Aceh Besar district, Aceh province, last February. The others were apparently trained in the jungle near Mount Sinabung, a recently-active volcano in North Sumatra.

This terrorist group, which reportedly has ties to detained firebrand cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, has proven itself to be heavily armed with assault rifles. What's more, they have shown a level of aggression and coordination not normally associated with standard criminals. According to the police, the group had targeted more banks, money changers, and show rooms for the medium-term; apparently, they appear to be focusing on fund raising through criminal activities rather than attacking Western interests.

During the early morning hours of 22 September, an estimated 10-12 well-armed persons using 6-8 motorcycles attacked the Hamperan Perak police post in Deli Serdang district, North Sumatra province. Three police officers were killed and the building was destroyed by Molotov cocktails. This attack almost certainly was conducted by the remnants of the terrorist cell mentioned above as revenge for the capture/killing of their co-conspirators. It would appear to indicate that virtually all of those still being pursued by the police were in the Deli Serdang vicinity as of yesterday. It would also underscore the fact that this cell continues to concentrate on domestic targets rather than expatriates.

  September 19, 2010

Indian Mujahideen is Back to Threaten Commonwealth Games?

By Animesh Roul

Indian capital New Delhi had a major security scare on September 19, days ahead of scheduled Commonwealth Games when two bike-borne armed assailants fired indiscriminately at a bus carrying foreign tourists near the Gate No 3 of historic Jama Masjid (Mosque), located in the walled city. Two Taiwanese nationals have sustained injuries in the incident.

Hours after the incident, Indian Mujahideen terrorist group has issued a media statement threatening to sabotage the Commonwealth Games. The message however, made no direct reference to today’s firing incident. It threatened to sabotage the Games to avenge atrocity against Muslims in the country and the recent violence in Kashmir.

Excerpt of the statement (compiled from media reports):
The purported email is signed by one Al-Arbi and has been sent from the mail id al.arbi999123@gmail.com.

“Since July, the Paradise on earth, ‘Kashmir’ is being soaked with the blood of its sons. The Indian occupying forces have not spared the life of 8 years old boys to 80 years old elderly person or hapless Muslim women either. The death toll has already surpassed a hundred innocents…The Indian Mujahideen has finally decided to avenge the blood of each and every brother and sister as its topmost priority and duty towards the Ummah and Allah above all. Remember! As we bleed, so will you seep.”
“…We warn you to host the Commonwealth games if you have a grain of salt. We know that preparations for the games are at its peak; beware!! We too are preparing in full swing for a Great Surprise! The participants will be solely responsible for the outcome, as our bands of Mujahideen love death more than you love life. In Kashmir you have succeeded in usurping our Right of self-determination with all your Chanakya policies.”
“In the name of Allah we dedicate this attack of retribution to martyrs, Shaheed Atif Amin and Shaheed Muhammad Sajid.”

Both Atif Amin and Muhammad Sajid were killed during the Batla House encounter on 19 September 2008.

Meanwhile, Delhi police has indicated that firing incident was a criminal act, perhaps attempting to avoid concern over the security situation ahead of the CW games. It also downplayed the terror email sent to media houses purportedly by the IM.

Police though sounds little cautious and wants not to portray a panic picture for foreigners and visitors during the forthcoming CWGames, Sunday’s firing incident could be a handiwork of IM suspects who by attacking foreigners sent a clear message across the world that Delhi is not a safe place for them and the place is under terror radar.

In June 2010, Indian government proscribed Indian Mujahideen and all its formations and front organizations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. IM which is actually a shadow organization of Pakistan based Lashker-e-Taiba and Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) has perpetrated series of attacks in various urban centers of India in 2008.

The investigation is on and as usual it would take sometime for the Delhi police to unravel the case.

  September 17, 2010

Murder in London - Fire in Karachi

By Aaron Mannes

A murderous stabbing in London could have profound geopolitical consequences. Yesterday, Imran Farooq, one of the senior leaders of the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) was stabbed to death in London. MQM is a major Pakistani political party representing the Mohajirs (the Muslims who left India for Pakistan in the 1948 partition.) The MQM is particular strong in Karachi where the Mohajirs are a plurality of the population and the MQM dominates the city government.

Farooq, along with the MQM’s founder Altaf Hussein ran the party from a self-imposed exile in London. In 1992, in the wake of massive fighting between the Mohajirs and the Sindh the Army cracked down on the MQM and the party leaders decamped to London.

Karachi in recent times has been prone to large-scale outbreaks of violence. Now much of the fighting is between the growing Pashtun population and the Mohajirs.

Turmoil in Karachi matters – it is the great port and economic engine for Pakistan. Karachi has frequently burst into riots over the past several years. The city is clearly tense now. Turmoil in Karachi will complicate flood relief and long-term makes it difficult for Pakistan’s economy to right itself. Considering the precarious state of the entire country, this is no small matter.

Whodunnit?

Read the complete post here.