Meanings: Saad Bin Laden at the Lebanese Syrian borders?

By Walid Phares

In an MSNBC interview with Tucker Carlson yesterday, I commented on the report by a German publication that Iranian authorities have "released Saad Bin Laden from his house arrest in Iran to be assigned at the Lebanese Syrian borders." My comments, short and analytical, summarize as follow:

1) If this report is correct (we still need confirmation) it would be a very "exceptional" matter. For obviously the Khumeinist regime and the al Qaida Salafists are ideologically and politically very distant. Not only on doctrinal issues that separate Sunnis and Shias, but on the matters that pits Fundamentalists from both sides against each other. For Islamists, from both communities are more sensitive to the Shia-Sunni divide than the majority of ordinary people in the Muslim world.

2) For Iran to openly escort and "deploy" an al Qaeda figure to the "Lebanese battlefield," would damage the remaining credibility it pretends it has a broker of stabilization in Lebanon. It would also harm the attempts by their allies the Baathists of Syria to project themselves as potential mediators with Hezbollah. Many "lobbyists" for Bashar Assad in Washington and Brussels (European Parliament) are trying hard to rehabilitate the Syrian regime as power broker in Lebanon. But with the al Qaeda factor on its borders, this renewed attempt would be undermined significantly. Finally Hezbollah itself would be embarrassed among Lebanese, Arabs and Europeans if it is confirmed that their masters in Tehran have ordered them to cooperate with Bin Laden's son.

3) However (and the German report has to be confirmed for this paragraph to be validated) it would be precisely the "exceptional" character of that alleged Iranian decision which could change the above geopolitics and interests. Because Tehran may judge the strategic situation as "very exceptional," i.e. the threat against its main tool in the world, Hezbollah, then the "use" of an anti-Western threat on the Lebanese scene wouldn't be impossible. Syria has had a precedent in 2003 when it allowed (if not encouraged) the "passage" of Salafi Jihadists from Lebanon and the Arab World into Iraq through its borders. Hezbollah also has had precedents in coordination with Sunni Salafi Islamists in Lebanon against Israel, and most recently has pledged to work with Salafi Jihadists to fight the "US-backed Israeli aggression in Lebanon."

In short, indeed the gap between Salafists and Khumeinists is huge and yes, they are bound to fight each others when "times will come." But until these "future times" are here, the present struggle against a "common enemy," can produce emergency decisions, or at least theatrical but dangerous moves. We'll follow up on the development to see if a decision was made in Tehran and Damascus, and if indeed if such a decision was made, how strategic it is.

Walid Phares, Senior Fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a Visiting Fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy, author of Future Jihad

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