Recent Turkish Actions Shed Light on Agreement with U.S. Over PKK

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Turkish soldiers head toward the border.

I've written about how the U.S., Turkey and Iraq developed a joint strategy to combat the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) terrorist group's presence in Iraq. The strategy was developed in order to prevent Turkey from undertaking a unilateral incursion into Iraq, which would have risked accidental Turkish engagement with non-PKK Kurdish forces or even U.S. forces. In recent days, Turkey has undertaken a number of anti-PKK actions that shed some light on the agreement.

Most dramatically, Turkey has amassed a force along the border with Iraq that is reported to be 50,000 strong. It has been reported that "[h]undreds of tanks and military vehicles arrived in the southeastern town of Yuksekova in Hakkari province last week." There are also reports of commando units being deployed near the border. This is a considerable troop buildup -- even for Turkey, which boasts NATO's second largest military. There have also been a number of reported Turkish incursions into Iraq. Zaman Online reported that the Turkish military fired artillery at a PKK camp in northern Iraq on Aug. 7 and 8. Local villages described the artillery fire as "heavy." Also, beginning on Aug. 12, the Turkish army opened fire for several days on a PKK camp known as Hakurk, in an area where the Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi borders intersect.

Turkey's recent actions emphasize four key points about the U.S.-Turkish-Iraqi agreement on the PKK:

1. Although the agreement is said to be no more than a handshake deal (without the precise contours delineated in writing), Turkey's recent actions show that it gives Turkish forces considerable latitude to go into northern Iraq to root out the PKK. Although there are no reports thus far of Iraqi forces participating in this fight, Iraqi police shut down the PKK's contact office in Baghdad. The Ocalan Culture Center had previously been used "for political purposes, for international contacts with PKK terrorists and for monitoring the treatment of injured PKK members."

2. The agreement is helping to prevent accidental fighting, such as clashes between the Turkish military and non-PKK Kurdish forces or U.S. forces. Accidental fighting was one potential concern related to Turkish intervention in Iraq, and thus far it appears that the U.S.-Turkey agreement has diminished that possibility.

3. Local Kurdish forces don't seem to mind the Turkish interventions. As long as Turkey limits its incursions to combating the PKK and doesn't target Iraqi Kurds in general, the Kurdish forces appear supportive of Turkish efforts.

4. The agreement helps to prevent Iran from driving a wedge between the U.S. and Turkey. Although reports indicate that Turkish and Iranian forces are simultaneously bombing PKK targets, it appears that U.S. willingness to address the PKK problem has prevented Iran from using this issue to divide the U.S. and Turkey diplomatically. (The Turkish foreign ministry spokesman denies that there has been joint Turkey-Iran operations against the PKK, saying somewhat obscurely, "Turkey co-operates with Iran to assure the security of borders. Aside from this co-operation, no other joint operation has taken place.")

Overall, the agreement between the U.S., Turkey and Iraq over the PKK should be seen as a diplomatic victory at this stage.

UPDATE, AUG. 20, 2006: Turkish newspaper Zaman's discussion of my analysis can be found here.

Kyle Dabruzzi contributed research to this analysis.

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