Counterterrorism Blog

Although they're nominally independent of each other, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) have each launched a recent series of attacks in Turkey that serve the same purpose: inflicting damage on the Turkish economy. At the very least, the fact that the two groups' attacks serve a common purpose means that the Turkish economy is a matter of concern. Moreover, the common purpose of these groups' attacks raises the question of whether there is a hidden hand behind the scenes coordinating their actions.

The two groups' attacks have hit two different facets of the Turkish economy. As I wrote on Aug. 31, the TAK has targeted Turkey's tourist industry:

[J]ust after midnight, the Aegean Sea resort town of Marmaris experienced three blasts. According to the Turkish Daily News, the first of these bombs "ripped through a shuttle bus ferrying tourists along one of the resort's main streets" after being placed under one of its seats. Subsequently, two other bombs stashed in garbage bins exploded, causing no injuries, "though some reports suggested those had not detonated properly." Later on Monday, a bomb exploded in the coastal resort city of Antalya. Two people were killed in the explosion, and a third died later in the hospital. And another blast in the port city of Mersin injured a twenty-year-old woman. Although the PKK has been the main perpetrator of recent attacks against Turkey, these blasts have been claimed by another group, the Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK), also known as the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks or Kurdistan Freedom Falcons.

Attacks on Turkey's tourist industry are economically significant; the Washington Times describes the tourism industry as "one of the pillars of [Turkey's] economy."

Meanwhile, the PKK has launched a string of attacks on Turkish oil and gas pipelines. As Zaman Online reports, there have been six PKK-related pipeline sabotages in the past seven months.

At the very least, the combined effect of these and future attacks may do significant damage to the Turkish economy. They also give rise to the question of the degree of coordination between the PKK and TAK. The PKK has a motive to target the tourist industry in order to weaken Turkey's economy -- but it fears the political ramifications of targeting European tourists. This is where the TAK enters the picture. Although not much is clear about the TAK's origins, my sources in Turkey and the U.S. believe that the TAK is likely an outgrowth of the PKK that now may or may not operate independently of the PKK. If the TAK isn't wholly independent, there is at least enough of a question about how this shadowy terrorist group functions that it gives the PKK plausible deniability for lethal terror attacks against Europeans, while the PKK claims responsibility for non-lethal attacks on pipelines.

There are two further salient points. First, since the PKK and TAK have been hitting two different sectors of the Turkish economy, we should watch to see if they'll also bring Cyprus into play. A source writes:

The TAK and PKK are (so far) missing one "lever" on Turkey: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. If either group started targeting the TRNC, it would tie up even more Turkish military and police resources and mean the TRNC would be even more of a drain on Turkish economic resources. The Kurdish terrorists might then possibly find some sympathy and potential support from Greek militants.

And a second point is that the PKK issue could substantially damage U.S.-Turkey relations. A recent public opinion survey by the German Marshall Fund of the United States found that "Turks now question their ties to the United States and Europe, and have warmed to Iran, their neighbor to the east." This is compounded by recent allegations that the U.S. is supporting the PKK. Salih Zeki of the Dogan News Agency tells me that these allegations are currently the top news in Turkey following an interview three days ago with the brother of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan; Ocalan's brother stated that the PKK receives U.S. support. While support for the PKK isn't official U.S. policy, there are credible reports of some pro-PKK actors within the U.S. government. Moreover, so long as the U.S. fails to prioritize its relationship with Turkey and fails to aggressively pursue the PKK, it will only allow rumors and resentment to fester.

Kyle Dabruzzi contributed research to this analysis.