Counterterrorism Blog

I have previously written about the major blow inflicted on the U.S. by Pakistan's peace deal that cedes Waziristan to terrorist factions, and the Pakistani government's subsequent decision to release 2,500 foreign prisoners. Both of these are serious developments that do major damage to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Yet assistant secretary of state Richard Boucher endorsed the deal in a speech at the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.:

Noting that the [Pakistani] government had carved out a new strategy to deal with the cross-border activities of Taliban and Al Qaeda sympathisers, Mr Boucher said: “The agreement really has the potential to work.” He said he believed the deal created an opportunity for local leaders to get hold of the problem of terrorism and it could enable the government “to get a political handle on this and enlist its citizens in the fight against terror”. The US, he said, understood that to effectively control the Afghan border, Pakistan needed “cooperation from local tribes and they are really trying to get in.” Mr Boucher said the US hoped that the agreement would leave a positive impact on the situation in the regions that are run by local tribal chiefs since the British days. “Instead of challenging the tribal chiefs, Pakistan has signed an agreement with them and we believe that it is a good effort,” he said. The official said the agreement would allow the local administration and the tribal chiefs to play a positive role in the development of their areas and also in restoring peace and security to the region. The agreement, he said, would restrict the movement of Taliban and would not permit the presence of Al Qaeda and its sympathisers in the tribal belt. “Talibanisation will not be allowed, in the area or in the cities near the tribal region,” he said. Mr Boucher said the government had made the tribal chiefs accept all these conditions before signing the agreement.

All arguments that Boucher advanced in favor of the Pakistani deal are so weak that they border on disingenuous. Some will take this as another sign of the State Department's general cluelessness on terrorism -- a cluelessness that often cannot be denied.

But I have a somewhat different interpretation of Boucher's statements. I think he probably understands that recent developments in Pakistan spell nothing but danger for the U.S., but is more concerned about seriously embarrassing Musharraf and thus further undermining his grip on power. (This is the same reason that U.S. and British leaders immediately hailed Pakistan's contributions when they announced that the transatlantic air plot had been foiled on Aug. 10; these contributions were exaggerated, but politicians felt that it would be counterproductive if Pakistan came under fire for the plot's connection to that country.) The view of Boucher and other officials who refuse to publicly condemn the developments in Pakistan is that, bad as Musharraf has been of late, things would be far worse if he lost power. In a critical Muslim nation with nuclear weapons, it would be disastrous if a pro-Western military dictator were replaced by al-Qaeda-linked fundamentalists.