What the FBI Needs Now
By Andrew Cochran
Editor's Note: This is a guest post by Michael R. Fedarcyk, who recently retired from the FBI after 24 years of service. His last assignment was as the Special Assistant to the FBI's Deputy Director, where he was responsible for strategic planning and resource allocation. He is currently employed as Director, Intelligence Sector, at BearingPoint Consulting. The views and assertions in this post are Mr. Fedarcyk's.
It has been said that policy without resources is rhetoric. Five years removed from the worst terrorist incident on American soil, it is appropriate to ask whether improvements to our national security posture are rhetoric or real. As the former head of the FBI’s strategic planning office, I know the FBI is committed to real change by aligning its limited resources consistent with its national security priorities through a threat-based planning strategy. However, given the emergence of the terrorist homegrown threat, the additional national security responsibilities placed upon the FBI by Congress and the Office of the National Director of Intelligence (ODNI) and the impact of the shift in the management structure at FBI Headquarters, the question is whether the FBI has the necessary resources, personnel and funds, to address its national security responsibilities while maintaining its outstanding law enforcement capabilities.
Countering terrorism has become more difficult and now requires a broader investigative strategy because of changes in the nature and sources of the threat. Al-Qaeda, for example, has morphed from a loosely directed organization into an ideological movement which requires no membership but rather a common goal to direct violence against the United States. The FBI must adapt its highly successful enterprise-based investigative strategy designed to target the organization into a strategy which counters an ideological movement that lacks visible leadership, organizational structure, and sources of material support but is nonetheless self-motivated, extremely resourceful and equally dangerous. The impact of the homegrown terrorist threat for the FBI requires an increasing dedication of valuable, limited Agent and analytical resources to a much broader-based, resource-intensive investigative strategy of “casting nets” in order to successfully interdict the homegrown terrorists before they can carry out their acts of violence.
A classic example of the homegrown threat dilemma for the FBI can be found in the recent arrests in Miami of individuals who were planning acts of violence. While the arrests were characterized by FBI Deputy Director, John S. Pistole, as “more aspirational than operational” others in the media labeled the group, after the fact, as “the gang that couldn’t shoot straight” and derided the threat. The FBI (and the American public) can ill afford anything less than a zero tolerance when it comes to terrorism. Timely preemption, utilizing all the available means, is the most effective response to the homegrown threat albeit a costly one.
Yet another external factor which impacts the FBI’s limited resources is the significant expansion of the ODNI. From an originally perceived staffing level of 80 to its current staffing level of over 1,500 (and growing) personnel, the ODNI will fuel the demand on the FBI, which is the primary collector of foreign and counter intelligence within the United States, for more collection and dissemination. The added pressure of future ODNI tasks will severely test the limits of the FBI’s intelligence program and, if the FBI is unable to meet the challenge, it could revive previous discussion of a new domestic intelligence agency.
Internally, at the FBI, process changes put in place by the Director in the aftermath of 9/11 which had a substantial unintended consequence regarding Agent resources. The transition of the FBI from a decentralized, field office-centered operation to a nationally managed, headquarters-driven oversight of cases caused a major growth in the number of new Supervisory Special Agent vacancies at headquarters. To illustrate the point, there are fewer Agents “on the street” today than there were prior to 9/11 despite the overall growth in Agent resources. While the re-structuring of headquarters was necessary, the unintended impact upon field Agent resources requires corrective action from Congress.
The Congress and the FBI should partner in a three step strategy to address the resource gap in the following manner:
1. The Congress will provide additional Agent, analyst and funds to continue the development of the FBI’s National Security Branch. This will remedy the resource gap created by the external and internal pressures outlined above.
2. The FBI will ensure resources are aligned consistent with the Director’s Priorities and distributed among the field offices based upon the threat. This will hold the FBI accountable as to the effective utilization of its resources with its mission and efficiently deployed to where the threats are.
3. The Congress and the FBI will engage in a dialogue regarding the appropriate balance of resources between the criminal and national security mission of the FBI. This is critical to the FBI’s transition to a world class intelligence/law enforcement agency.
This clear-cut three step strategy will hold the principals accountable to the American people to ensure a real change in our national security posture.