Thailand's Coup and the Insurgency in the South

By Zachary Abuza

In the evening of 19 September, the Thai Army commander, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, seized power in a bloodless coup from caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. It was the first coup in Thailand since 1992, when General Suchinda Kaprayoon attempt was thwarted by massive street demonstrations by Bangkok’s emerging middle class. What are the implications for Thailand’s growing Islamist insurgency?

While some commentators have focused on the fact that the coup came days after insurgents staged six bombings in the southern Thai city of Hat Yai, beyond the three predominantly Muslim provinces that have seen the brunt of the fighting, the coup is firmly rooted in elite politics. There has always been criticism of Thaksin’s handling of the insurgency, but that alone was not what put the tanks on the streets of Bangkok.

The policies of Thaksin and his closest ally Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai as well as their constant political interference and personnel exacerbated the situation in the south. In June 2006, Thaksin gave army chief Sonthi Boonyaratglin full control over the south but in reality southern policy was still being very much controlled by Chidchai. Sonthi seemed to be the scapegoat for the failed policies. On paper, he had full control, and in reality he had limited power. He was the fall guy for Thaksin who has taken no responsibility at all for an insurgency that has left 1300 people dead, and unfolded during his tenure. By early September Sonthi and other officers had publicly lashed Thaksin and Chidchai for political meddling.

Will the coup lead to improvements in counter-insurgent operations? This is to be seen. The coup leaders have announced that they will soon turn over power to civilians. Hopefully they will, unlike Thaksin, implement the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Council. Though the NRC’s recommendations alone will not quell the insurgency, they will have an important impact in regaining the trust of the Muslim community. Yet, many in the military establishment, including Sonthi, himself a Muslim, have publicly refused to see the insurgency for what it is; denying it any religious overtones or secessionist goals. The generals should now have a freer hand in dealing with the south, but counter-insurgent operations are really going to have to improve, as is the collection of human intelligence.

Nor is the political situation likely to alter the campaign of the insurgents. If anything they may step up attacks in an attempt to provoke a heavy-handed government response. The Muslim provinces have been under martial law already for over two and a half years, with little to show for it, but an alienated and angry populace.

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