October 2006 Archives

Future Terrorism: Mutant Jihads

By Walid Phares

The Fall 2006 issue of the Journal of International Security Affairs published my article "Future Terrorism: Mutant Jihads." The JISA also published articles by esteemed collegues from the CTB. In this piece I attempted to provide a global assessment of the Jihadi threat five years after September 11, 2001. Following are the short introductory paragraphs:

The strategic decision to carry out 9/11 was made in the early 1990s, almost ten years before the barbaric attacks on New York and Washington took place. The decade-long preparations and the testing of America’s defenses and political tolerance to terrorism that took place before September 11th—were a stage in the much longer modern history of the jihadist movement that produced al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers.
Decades from now, historians will discover that the United States, the West and the international community were being targeted by a global ideological movement which emerged in the 1920s, survived World War II and the Cold War, and carefully chose the timing of its onslaught against democracy. Undoubtedly, the issue that policy planners and government leaders need to address with greatest urgency, and which the American public is most concerned about, is the future shape of the terrorist threat facing the United States and its allies. Yet developments since 2001, both at home and overseas, have shown that terror threats in general—and the jihadi menace in particular— remain at the same time resilient and poorly understood.

Defining the war

The jihadi war against the Soviet Union during the Cold War—and the struggle against the United States and some of its allies thereafter—are all part of a single continuum. Over time, jihadi Salafists and Khomeinist radicals alike have become proficient in selecting their objectives and infiltrating targets. Indeed, an analysis of the security failures that made 9/11 possible clearly demonstrates that the hijackers exploited systemic malfunctions at the national security level. Learning these lessons is essential for better counterterrorism planning in the future. But the jihadists are also learning, and the advantage will go to the side which can adapt most quickly. If the jihadists learn to understand and anticipate their opponents, their tactics and strategies will mutate.

Read the whole article here.

Indonesian JI Ties to Somali Gun Runners Arrested in Yemen

By Zachary Abuza

On 16 October 2006, Yemeni security forces arrested a group of eight foreigners who were involved in running guns to the Islamic Courts Union, the Islamist group that has taken control of the Somali capital of Mogadishu. [See the excellent posts onthis site by Douglas Farrah on the situation in Somalia]. The eight foreigners included a Yemeni and four Europeans - a Dane, Britain, German, an undisclosed European national - all converts to Islam. It also included three Australian nationals - though there are some reports that a fourth Australian was also detained. Two of the Australians are brothers, born to an Indonesian father. Australian security officials disclosed that all three Australian nationals were students at the al-Iman University in Sanaa, which was run by Abdul al-Majid al-Zindani, who has previously been cited by the US Government as having links to al Qaeda.

Australian security officials have expressed concern that the two brothers, Abdullah and Mohammed, have some connection to Jemaah Islamiyah. It is now reported that they are the children of Abdulrahim Ayub. Abdulrahim and his twin brother Abdulrahman were senior JI members who were in charge of establishing JI’s Mantiqi IV in Australia. Abdulrahman fought in Afghanistan with Al Qaeda in the 1980s.

The brothers arrested in Yemen were arrested with their mother Rabiah Hutchinson. Rabiah converted to Islam when she married her husband in 1984 in Indonesia. The Ayub twins were Australian residents, but Abdulrahman was forced out of the country in 1999. He has been tracked to Mindanao, in the southern Philippines where he is thought to be leading training for new JI recruits. Abdulrahim and his wife fled Australia immediately after the 12 October 2002 Bali bombings, which killed 202 people. They were thought to be hiding in the outskirts of Jakarta. It is not known whether Abdulrahim is with his family in Yemen, or if he is still hiding in Java.

The Ayub twins are some of the most senior dozen JI members at large.

Chicago Hamas Trial: Former Israeli Security Agent Takes the Stand

By Steven Emerson

The last three days of the Mohammed Salah and Abdelhaleem al-Asqar trial for their alleged support of Hamas has featured the direct examination by the government of a former Israeli Security Agent known only as “Nadav.” The Courtroom was cleared of spectators but the public and media were allowed to listen to the proceedings in an overflow courtroom. Assistant U.S. Attorney Reid J. Schar questioned the witness in detail concerning his interrogations of Defendant Mohammad Salah in January and February of 1993. Nadav spoke of the good rapport that the two men had and how Salah spoke freely with his interrogator. The government played a series of tapes of the interrogation for the jury.

For a comprehensive summary of Nadav's last three days on the witness stand, go here.

The prosecution is expected to conclude their direct examination of Nadav tomorrow, at which point the defense attorneys will begin their cross-examination. Judge Amy J. St. Eve believes that Nadav will probably remain on the witness stand for the rest of the week.

The first American Crisis in the Middle East

By Aaron Mannes

I was pleased to also contribute to the latest issue of the Journal of International Security Affairs, along with my co-CTbloggers Olivier Guitta (who wrote on trans-Atlantic relations) and Walid Phares (who wrote an excellent article entitled, "Future Terrorism: Mutant Jihads.")

My contribution was a review of Joshua London's Victory in Tripoli: How America’s War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Shaped a Nation. London's book describes this first U.S. engagement with the Middle East. Although the events took place two centuries ago, the many parallels between the war with the Barbary pirates and today's war on terror are uncanny.

Here's an excerpt:

Past as prologue
By Aaron Mannes

Joshua E. London, Victory in Tripoli: How America’s War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Shaped a Nation (Hobocken, NJ: J.W. Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2005), 276pp., $24.95.

Faced with a choice of appeasing hostage-taking Middle Eastern despots or overturning the international order, the United States hems and haws as its prestige wanes—until finally an outraged American public demands action. The European powers watch carefully, and maneuver to gain their own advantage. After marginal pinprick strikes, American forces mount a major campaign, receive rapid capitulation, and predictably fail to press their advantage.

The year was 1804.

Source: Zawahiri Likely Alive, Bajur Accords on Hold

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

I just spoke with a military intelligence source who confirmed that the Bajur airstrike (see Andy Cochran's post on it) was conducted by a U.S. Predator, adding that helicopters were also involved. The strike occurred around dawn, as people in the camp were preparing for their morning prayers. My source is skeptical of speculation that Zawahiri may have been killed in the strike, saying that Zawahiri sightings are a dime a dozen. He says it's possible that Matiur Rehman was killed, but is also skeptical of that.

The strike came just as the Bajur accords were supposed to take place (similar to the Waziristan accords that now prevent Pakistan's military from operating in that region). Officials within the Pakistani government were supposedly worried when early reports surfaced that Faqir Mohammed may have been killed. Faqir Mohammed is a Taliban leader in the region who would have been a major signatory to the accords: if he were killed, the Pakistanis wouldn't know who could enter into the accords with them (or, to put it cynically, with Faqir Mohammed dead they wouldn't know who they were supposed to surrender to). However, Mohammed survived. He apparently felt so confident in his safety that he gave an interview to NBC News at the scene near the blasted school, and also attended -- and spoke at -- the funeral for the 80 who died in the strike.

At this point, the Bajur Accords are on hold. While we will probably see some payback from al-Qaeda and the Taliban, my source noted that there's not a whole lot more they can do: these groups tried to kill Musharraf less than a month ago, and are already carrying out terrorist attacks in Pakistan.

It's worth noting that Faqir Mohammed also hosted Zarqawi when a U.S. strike missed him back in January, and left before that strike as well. It's unlikley that Mohammed had advance warning of either the Damadola strike or this one (too many high-value terrorists were killed at Damadola, and Mohammed almost certainly would have alerted them). Some guys are apparently just that lucky.

Civil Liability is Crucial in the War on Terrorism: A Response to the Wall Street Journal.

By Victor Comras

Ted Frank’s provocative Op-ed in Friday’s Wall Street Journal questions the rationale for allowing victims of terrorism to hold third-party institutions potentially liable for their own contributory actions. He wants Congress to enact new restrictions on attorneys and on the judicial system to lessen the risk that banks and other financial institutions might run if they provide financial and other services to those associated with terrorism. “Plaintiffs' attorneys,” he writes, “are weaving creative legal theories to hold legitimate third parties liable for the intentional acts of terrorists. This friendly fire could end up doing almost as much financial damage as the terrorists themselves, with the lawyers getting rich in the process.” But his conclusions are based on false premises and on his prejudging the facts and outcome of cases yet to be litigated. His proscription that civil lawyers stay clear of the war on terrorism, and leave it to criminal prosecutors and regulators may sound good; but it would truly constitute a major setback to holding terrorists, and those that finance and support them, accountable.

The fact is that most major terrorism’s financial abettors and supporters, whether for al Qaeda, Hamas, Hizbollah or other terrorist entities, have successfully avoided criminal prosecution. Witness Youssef Nada, Ahmed Nasreddin. Wael Hamza Julaidan, and Yasin Al Qadi, to name only a few internationally designated terrorism financiers. The record on closing down entities and institutions feeding terrorism is even more dismal. The failure of the international community to come to terms with a universal definition of terrorism shouldn’t provide an excuse, as it seems to be doing, for institutions here or abroad to do business with known terrorist groups. Yet, it is still business as usual in many countries with at least some of these terrorist groups. The fact that civil liability cases in US courts may now be able to reach out beyond our borders to individuals and entities associated with terrorism may constitute the best constraints we have against their activities and our best chances to hold them accountable.

Mr. Frank’s op-ed is keyed to recent Federal District Court decisions denying motions to dismiss lawsuits against NatWest and Credit Lyonnais. Those suits allege that both institutions provided banking services for charities and other entities known to fund Hamas. He also cites in justification of his thesis an earlier case involving the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. He derides NY Supreme Court Justice Nicholas Figueroa's instructions in that case which he characterizes as persuading the jury” …that the terrorists who planted a truck bomb in the World Trade Center garage in 1993 were only 32% responsible, while the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey was 68% responsible.” That statement is really off the mark given that the allegations against the Port Authority in that case dealt with their alleged negligence and not any complicity with terrorism.

Senior Federal District Court Judge Charles Sifton’s legal opinion and order in the NatWest case (mirrored subsequently in the Credit Lyonnais case) was solidly grounded on common law rules of procedure and tort law, and on US Anti-Terrorism legislation which provides civil remedies, including treble damages, for the victims of terrorism. The key questions for liability in these cases, the Judge held, was whether plaintiffs could ultimately show that the banks knowingly provided material support or resources to, or for the benefit of, a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) and/or whether they knowingly collected or provided funds to or for the benefit of an FTO. This preliminary ruling means only that plaintiffs will be allowed to present facts to the judge and jury on these points. But, Mr. Frank seems to view even this preliminary ruling as “baseless.” And he suggests that it’s a sign that the courts are now acting irresponsibly in carrying out their mandate under the Anti-terrorism legislation. It leads him to conclude that “Congress should amend {these laws} to make clear that civil liability is limited to those who commit criminal acts of international terrorism, and those who aid and abet with specific intent to commit terror.” This would equate the standard for civil cases to that for criminal conviction. And just how does Mr. Frank think that any civil lawyer could handle that subjective burden which has already defeated so many legitimate criminal prosecutions?

Mr. Frank also has problems with Judge Sifton’s rejection of NatWest’s contention that they are protected here by international comity. He buys-in completely to NatWest’s argument that since the accounts and transactions were both outside of the United States they should be governed exclusively by local rules in the banks home jurisdiction. In other words let’s leave it completely to foreign governments to set their own standards here on who is a terrorist and who isn’t. But, as Judge Sifton recognized, such an approach would give institutions around the world free passes to fund terrorist groups so long as their own governments had not designated the groups for what they are. Imagine leaving such a determination to the likes of Iran, Syria and other terrorism supporting countries. Judge Sifton’s reasoned that “Although British Law does not require that NatWest cease to provide banking services to Interpal {a British Charity linked with funding Hamas} or that it cease transactions with HLF, Al-Aqsa, the Jenin Committee and the Tulkarem Committee, it also does not mandate that NatWest {which also has a presence, and does business in the United States} continue providing such services. Accordingly, NatWest is free, and, indeed, obligated, to follow the more stringent American law. Principles of international comity do not demand otherwise.”

And, by the way, what does Mr. Frank think about British Courts and British libel laws being used to silence American and other investigative reporters and writers that are digging into terrorism and terrorism financing. Perhaps that should be the subject of another Wall Street Journal op-ed. (POSTSCRIPT: Subsequent to writing this blog I learned that Mr. Frank has, in fact, frequently criticized the use of British libel laws to quell free speech, and particularly with regard to those writing on terrorism. I include a link here to his most recent posting.

More Action on Weapons Trafficker Viktor Bout

By Douglas Farah

The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took the unusual step of redesignating arms trafficker Viktor Bout and some of his henchmen for their activities in arms trafficking in the troubled Democratic Republic of Congo. The move was authorized by an Executive Order signed Friday by President Bush.

The designations coincide with the publication (with Steve Braun) of this Foreign Policy piece on Bout's network, a preview of our upcoming book.

Bout and one of his close associates, Sanjivan Ruprah, were already "Specially Designated Individuals" by the U.S. and on similar lists in the United Nations, for their support of the Liberian regime of Charles Taylor. Today's announcement includes, for the first time, Douglas Mpano and Dimitri Popov. Both worked for the Bout-associated Great Lakes Business Company and Compagnie Aerienne des Grands Lacs. My full blog is here.

More Ceasefire Violations in Mindanao, Pressure Mounts as Deadline in Peace Talks Nears

By Zachary Abuza

The ongoing investigations and allegations that MILF Chairman Ebrahim el Haj Murad was involved in the mid-October bombings that rocked central Mindanao have led to a fraying of the peace process. Already under strain from a year and a half’s worth of deadlocked negotiations, 2006 has seen a number of breakdowns in the ceasefire that has held fairly well since 2004. On 26 October, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) helicopters violated the ceasefire by strafing MILF positions in Lanao del Sur province. Sunday saw yet another violation. According to the AFP, a group of MILF attacked an AFP unit in Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao. Eid Kabalu, the MILF spokesman, claims that pro government paramilitaries, known as civilian volunteers' organization (CVO) provoked the attack and were then joined by AFP mortar fire. The AFP initially claimed that four MILF were killed, though there was no confirmation of this by the rebels on their website. In a separate incident last Thursday, security forces raided a welding shop that the MILF used as an armaments factory that manufactured RPG-2s. The AFP claimed that the shop was “owned by a top-ranking” MILF leader, though without disclosing whom.

Why all the recent breakdowns in the ceasefire? In part it is a negotiating ploy by both sides who want to remind the other of the consequences of a deadlock in the peace talks. Following the breakdown of talks in Kuala Lumpur on 6-7 September, the GRP side requested until 31 October to present a new proposal on Ancestral Domain. The MILF, on their website this weekend, expressed doubt that the government was going to present a meaningful proposal with real concessions. Both sides are raising the specter of a renewed conflict.

The bombings in central Mindanao from 10-15 October were clearly the work of the ASG and JI; but it is also clear that there was some MILF hand in them. The ASG have no real presence in that part of the country and the operations could not have been executed without a degree of MILF complicity. There is no proof that Murad gave the order, though clearly the MILF may have wanted to send a not so subtle reminder to the government about the consequences of the stalled talks. Hardliners in the MILF may simply want to scuttle the talks. The criminal charges leveled at Murad, however, are going to prove to be a disastrous mistake on the part of the government.

The normally reticent, but powerful second in command of the MILF, Aleem Abdul Aziz S. Mimbantas, issued a rare public statement on 25 October. The statement characterizes the charges as “baseless” and “character assassination.” “In the light of the impasse at the peace talks, the latest move by the Philippine government is a clearly a ploy to pressure the MILF to return to the negotiating table and to use these trumped up charges as leverage and as a bargaining tool to impose its unacceptable conditions in the negotiations on the Front.” Mimbantas continued with a threat: “As Vice Chairman for Military Affairs of the Front… I am serving notice to the Philippine Government that we consider this latest affront… no less than an act of hostile provocation whose dire consequences will widen the cleavage between the MILF and the Philippine Government.” “The Philippine Government thus should ponder over the serious implications of this provocative act. For this will definitely and detrimentally affect the peace process and hinder its movement forward…”

The threat came as the Australian Ambassador for Counter Terrorism Mike Smith, came to Mindanao to inspect Philippine progress in CT operations amid growing concern that the Southern Philippines the soft underbelly for regional security.

In other news from Mindanao, the AFP announced that an additional 1,500 troops would be deployed in Jolo against the Abu Sayyaf and members of JI, bringing the total to 7,500.

Terror Down South: India Battles Terrorist Threats Beyond J & K

By Animesh Roul

At least two events have been haunting India’s security establishment at present: an email threat to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ahead of his visit to southern most State of Kerala scheduled on October 31, and the arrest of two suspected Pakistani nationals with alleged link to Al Badr terror outfit in the neighboring Mysore (In Karnataka).

Not long ago, Manmohan Singh observed terrorism as a hydra headed monster and the most dangerous threat.

The email threat could be a silly prank. However, security agencies should not be complacent looking at the content of the alleged email threat. It asks for the release of Afzal Guru, the man sentenced to death in the Dec 2001 Parliament attack case and Abdul Naseer Madhani, an accused in the 1998 Coimbatore serial bomb blast case.

Although Kerala has never witnessed a terrorist strike or even an arrest, it is suspected that the territory has been used as a hibernation place for active militants.

By Bill West

There was some justice given out the other day in Federal civil court in New York. Unfortunately, it received only a little notice in the media. It deserved a lot more attention. The case involved a civil lawsuit brought against Emmanuel “Toto” Constant, a Haitian who is under a deportation order but who continues to live in the US. Constant is the former head of something called the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti, or “FRAPH.” FRAPH, unlike its benign sounding name, was an organization composed of thugs, murderers, torturers and assassins that worked in league with the various paramilitary dictators who ran Haiti during the early 1990s.

The lawsuit, brought on behalf of several victim plaintiffs by the Center for Justice and Accountability and the Center for Constitutional Rights in 2004, resulted in a Court finding of culpability by Constant being issued on October 24. Constant, in this Federal civil case, has been established to be the human rights violator the US Government, at least the immigration law enforcement authorities within the US government, have contended he is for many years. In fact, his deportation order is in large part based upon those same findings.

Therein lies the ironic “rub” of Constant’s case and how it relates to the Government’s counter-terrorism efforts. After "fleeing" to the US, Constant came to the attention of the former US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in the 1990s as a potential human rights persecutor target. Constant, living in the Maryland/DC area at the time, was arrested on deportation charges, detained and ultimately ordered deported even though he fought the charges. Through a series of legal actions, including his own lawsuit against the US Government seeking to prevent his deportation wherein he claimed he had been a CIA operative, he was ultimately released from custody under an order of supervision by immigration authorities. The reality was, the State Department feared Constant’s return to Haiti would be a major destabilizing effect there and, in spite of the protest of INS authorities, it was decided to allow Constant to remain in the US indefinitely. Foreign policy concerns outweighed justice in this case.

Fast forward to the present. The US Government now is pursuing the removal (deportation) of a number of convicted terrorist-linked aliens. These include Palestinian Fawaz Damra, former Imam of the largest mosque in Cleveland, and Palestinian Sami Al-Arian, former professor at the University of South Florida. Both have been linked to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist organization. Both are “stateless” Palestinians. The issue of where to deport such persons becomes highly problematic for the Government, particularly in view of the highly tense situation in the Middle East and the areas under the “control” of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Will Palestinian terror-linked deportees also become nearly impossible to remove because of foreign policy issues?

And what of similarly situated Somali deportees? We have already witnessed a number of such cases within the past two years. The Supreme Court has ruled we can remove deportees to countries that do not have viable governments, but physically and safely doing so often makes that impossible, at least under current process. And if Somalia continues on the path, as it appears to be, of radical “Islamification,”these issues become even more difficult. And how does the Government manage with terrorist deportees to Iraq, Iran, Syria and Afghanistan?

What this means is that our Government will be forced to keep such terror-linked deportees detained within the United States, justifying their continued detention in periodic legal review hearings before the courts, or face releasing such persons from custody under some form of community control. Can the United States physically remove such deportees anyway? Of course it can. It is a matter of how much resolve and how much pressure and, perhaps, how much force the Government decides to use in effecting such removals. Curiously, returning to the tortured case of torturer Toto, one might wonder if the State Department’s theory of keeping him out of Haiti helping keep order there now makes anyone at State think twice about that decision, given the current debacle that is Haiti combined with the October 24th Court ruling in New York. America should not harbor foreign terrorists, torturers and human rights violators, period.

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Radical Australian Cleric Al-Hilali's Sermon in the Context of a Growing Fringe of Home-Grown Militants

By Zachary Abuza

[Author’s note: I do not like to comment on issues/events outside of Southeast Asia, but I would like to post this brief piece on the comments of Sheikh Taj Din al-Hilali of Australia, that are getting significant attention in the international media. They must be seen in the context of a growing threat of home grown Islamist militancy Down Under, that has not been addressed to the degree it should have been on the Counterterrorism Blog.]

This week a Ramadan sermon by the controversial Supreme Muslim Cleric, Sheik Taj Din al-Hilali aired in the national media has created a furor across Australia. The comments, in which the sheik blames women for rape, are only the latest in a string of incidences by radical Muslims who refuse to integrate and abide by Australia’s liberal-democratic and multi-ethnic core values. While the radicals comprise only a small number of Australia’s 300,000 Muslims (who come from some 20 countries), their vociferous and intolerant discourse is disturbing. It also adds increasing light to the problem of home-grown Islamist militancy in Australia.

Last year, the firebrand imam, Abdul Nacer Benbrika, originally from Algeria but who eventually became an Australian citizen, went on national television and stated unequivocally that he could not tolerate any religion but Islam: "According to my religion, here, I don't accept all other religion except the religion of Islam… I am telling you that my religion doesn't tolerate other religion. It doesn't tolerate. The only one law which needs to spread, it can be here or anywhere else, has to be Islam."

Benbrika, who described Osama bin Laden as “great man,” also caused a stir by inciting Australian Muslims to go to Iraq and fight coalition – including Australian – troops; stating that it was a religious obligation for Muslims to do so.

Benbrika was arrested last November for being the ringleader of a terrorist plot. According to police officials from the State of Victoria, though the plot was in its "developmental stages,” Benbrika and his followers (two cells, one in Sydney, the other in Melbourne), were clearly inspired by the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London and were planning a major attack. In a telephone conversation intercepted by the police, Abdulla Merhi, said he "could wait months but not years" to carry out jihad. "You shouldn't kill just one, two or three," Mr Benbrika allegedly responded. "Do a big thing." "Like Madrid?" Mr Merhi allegedly inquired, to which Mr Benbrika was said to have replied: "That's it." He continued, "If you kill, we kill here 1000, because if you get large numbers here, the government will listen." Members of the Melbourne cell were allegedly filming the Australian Stock Exchange and Flinders Street Station, the main commuter rail terminus in Melbourne.

The group was self-financed. Members of the Melbourne cell each donated $100 a month while several others were involved petty crime, credit-card fraud and selling stolen mobile phones to finance the plot. The Sydney cell members had amassed a number of firearms and a small cache of chemicals needed to produce TATP, the explosive used in the London bombings, lab equipment, over 150 detonators, over 130 digital timers, and al-Qaeda literature and bomb-making manuals. Cell members attended simple training sessions in remote areas in 2005, and allegedly Benbrika was given a demonstration of the explosives. Two of the 17 people arrested in November 2005 and March 2006 had received explosives training in Afghanistan. Currently there are 13 people standing trial in this case.

While Australia has done a superb job at assisting the governments of Southeast Asia investigate and break up Jemaah Islamiyah, Australian officials are now bracing for a rise in home grown militancy. Australian security officials from both Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) have recently commented that there are roughly 12 terrorist cells with some 60 members that are being investigated. The threat of home-grown militancy has never been greater in Australia.

And for that reason, al-Hilali's sermon, published in today’s The Australian http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20653032-601,00.html, deserves another look because it is exclusionary, inciting and is a direct challenge to Australian tolerence:

"But when it comes to adultery, it's 90 per cent the women's responsibility. Why? Because a woman possesses the weapon of seduction. It is she who takes off her clothes, shortens them, flirts, puts on make-up and powder and takes to the streets, God protect us, dallying. It's she who shortens, raises and lowers. Then it's a look, then a smile, then a conversation, a greeting, then a conversation, then a date, then a meeting, then a crime, then Long Bay jail.
…
"But when it comes to this disaster, who started it? In his literature, scholar al-Rafihi says: 'If I came across a rape crime – kidnap and violation of honour – I would discipline the man and order that the woman be arrested and jailed for life.' Why would you do this, Rafihi? He says because if she had not left the meat uncovered, the cat wouldn't have snatched it."

"If you take a kilo of meat, and you don't put it in the fridge or in the pot or in the kitchen but you leave it on a plate in the backyard, and then you have a fight with the neighbour because his cats eat the meat, you're crazy. Isn't this true?

"If you take uncovered meat and put it on the street, on the pavement, in a garden, in a park or in the backyard, without a cover and the cats eat it, is it the fault of the cat or the uncovered meat? The uncovered meat is the problem.

"If the meat was covered, the cats wouldn't roam around it. If the meat is inside the fridge, they won't get it.

"If the meat was in the fridge and it (the cat) smelled it, it can bang its head as much as it wants, but it's no use.

"If the woman is in her boudoir, in her house and if she's wearing the veil and if she shows modesty, disasters don't happen.

"That's why he said she owns the weapon of seduction.
…
"The woman was behind Satan playing a role when she disobeyed God and went out all dolled up and unveiled and made of herself palatable food that rakes and perverts would race for. She was the reason behind this sin taking place.

Al-Hilali has been in the news before. He was nearly deported several times before gaining citizenship owing to his radical preaching and tirades. He called the 9/11 attacks "God's work against oppressors" and continues to astound people with his virulent anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial. These statements got him expelled from the Prime Minister's Muslim Advisory Board.

Another radical cleric, Sheikh Mohammed Omran, a spiritual leader of Ahl as-Sunnah wal Jama’ah, a Salafi organization, has led the media campaign denying Muslim links to either the London or Madrid bombings, as well as to the 9/11 attacks. "I don’t believe that even 11 September… I don’t believe that it was done by any Muslim at all… I dispute any evil action linked to bin Laden," he said on national TV. Instead, he explained, they were "inside job" of the United States. Omran has encouraged followers to wage jihad against the west, glorified suicide bombers, and encouraged Madrid and London-style attacks in Australia.

Public pressure, in particular from Australia's moderate Muslim community (I.E. The Islamic Council of New South Wales called his comments “un-Islamic, un-Australian and unacceptable”), forced al-Halali to apologize for his remarks, and he has agreed to a 2-3 month suspension from preaching though the Lakemba Mosque refused to dismiss him. Yet, he refused to resign until “After we clean the world of the White House first.”

Australia, which has troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and whose government is closely allied with the Bush Administration, will continue to be vilified by Islamic militants, named in Al Qaeda and JI statements, will also see a rise in home grown militants, inspired by radical clerics such as Benbrika, al-Hilali, and Omran.

AMIA Background

By Aaron Mannes

I've also followed the AMIA bombing for some time. The Argentine request for Rafsanjani's arrest is an important symbolic step - although real justice will continue, unfortunately, to be delayed. Iran has a record of evading the consequences of supporting terrorism. Over two years ago I wrote an article on Britain's failure to fulfill an Argentine extradition request for Hadi Soleimanpour, who had been Iran's ambassador in Buenos Aires when the AMIA bombing occurred.

It is important to note that in Iran's last presidential election, Rafsanjani was considered the moderate.

The AMIA attack was a textbook Iranian-Hezbollah operation, meticulously planned and aimed at achieving both mass murder and political goals. Terror is part of Iran's diplomatic tool kit - a fact that ought to focus attention on Iran's ongoing efforts to obtain nuclear weapons.

Following is an excerpt from an article I wrote for National Review Online last July on the anniversary of the AMIA bombing that gives background on the AMIA bombing and places it in the context of Iran and Hezbollah's international operations.

Terror in Buenos Aires
A lesson in Hezbollah terror.

By Aaron Mannes

Last Tuesday morning, a siren sounded in Buenos Aires to mark the 12th anniversary of the bombing of the AMIA building, the chief offices of Argentina's Jewish community. The bombing killed 85 people and injured over 250. It was the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. It was the work of Hezbollah, working closely under Iranian sponsorship, and it perfectly illustrates Hezbollah's intentions, capabilities, and modus operandi. As the West hurtles into a confrontation with Iran, sparked by the current Israeli-Hezbollah conflagration, it is worth examining this deadly effective attack in Argentina over a decade ago.

To read the rest, visit my blog here.

Small Progress in Argentina

By Douglas Farah

After 12 years of dogged work hindered by corrupt judges and investigators in their own ranks, Argentine prosecutors have finally reached the point of asking a federal judge to order the arrest of senior Iranian and Hezbollah officials for the 1994 car bombing of a Jewish center in Buenos Aires.

This important step is unlikely to have any immediate impact on those seven people charged with having planned the attack, which killed 85 people and wounded 200 others. Former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani still holds an official position within the government, former intellignece chief Ali Fallahijan and former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati are protected, and the Hezbollah operatives who actually put it all together are not to be found.

Still, the statements of the prosecutors and their willingness to press forward are extremely important, as is the willingness to state clearly and concisely what the investigation has concluded:

"We deem it proven that the decision to carry out an attack July 18, 1994 on the AMIA (Argentine Jewish Mutual Association, a Jewish charities association headquarters in Buenos Aires) was made by the highest authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran which directed Hezbollah to carry out the attack," Argentine chief prosecutor Alberto Nisman said.
My full blog is here.

Two Terrorism Experts "Get Political" in Op-Eds

By Andrew Cochran

I'm amazed by the op-eds written by Peter Bergen in today's New York Times tiled, "What Osama Wants," and by Michael Scheuer in yesterday's Washington Times, titled, "Another bin Laden victory." Both men are luminaries in the counterterrorism community on the basis of their brave and objective work inside terrorist cases and events, and also due to their open criticism of numerous elements of current national security strategy. Mr. Bergen is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, known in Washington more for criticizing President Bush than for agreeing with him. But both men endorse the current strategy in Iraq, and Mr. Scheuer says the loss of GOP control of the U.S. Congress would be an outright victory for Al Qaeda and jihadists (edited to remove an inaccurate reference to Mr. Bergen's comments, with appreciation for his response). Frankly, I never would have imagined that either man would write this so close to the election. Given their backgrounds, their views should be taken seriously as a forecast by two world-reknowned and objective experts of probable jihadist reaction to the election.

Here's an excerpt from Mr. Bergen's op-ed: "But for the United States to pull entirely out of that country right now, as is being demanded by a growing chorus of critics, would be to snatch an unqualified disaster from the jaws of an enormous blunder... A total withdrawal from Iraq would play into the hands of the jihadist terrorists... Yes, there is little doubt that the botched American occupation of Iraq was the critical factor that fueled the Iraqi insurgency. But for the United States to wash its hands of the country now would give Al Qaeda’s leaders what they want."

And from Mr. Scheuer: "If Americans vote for what sounds like sweet reason from the Democrats, bin Laden and company will rejoice. What they will hear is the death knell for any prospect of effective U.S. military resistance to militant Islam. With the Republicans out, the Islamists will be confident that Democrats will deliver the best of both worlds: less emphasis on military force and a rigid maintenance of U.S. foreign policies that are hated with passion and near-unanimity by 1.3 billion Muslims."

Matthew Levitt, Treasury Official and Former CT Blog Expert, Testifies at Chicago Hamas Trial

By Steven Emerson

The first witness for the government in the Chicago trial of alleged Hamas operatives Mohammed Salah and Abdelhaleem al-Ashqar was Matthew Levitt, current Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Treasury Department, former Director of Terrorism Studies at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a former Contributing Expert to the CT Blog (see his archived posts). He is also the author of "Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad," considered a leading text on the terrorist group. He testified as an expert witness for the government on the history, structure, and activities of Hamas.

Dr. Levitt testified that Hamas was founded in 1987 in the Gaza Strip by Palestinians associated with the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. The Government asked him to explain how Hamas reacted to the Oslo Accords and the Movement’s views on the territories. Peace talks which would divide historic Palestine is in opposition to the views of Hamas, which considers the entire territory to be Muslim land. Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph Ferguson questioned Dr. Levitt in detail about the Hamas charter, with Arabic and English copies admitted into evidence. Two of the most important sections of the charter which pertain to this case read that “The Jihad (جهاد) for Palestine is an individual duty” and that “Whosoever mobilizes a fighter for the sake of Allah, he himself is a fighter.” William Moffitt, the lead defense lawyer for Abdelhaleem al-Ashqar, claimed in his opening statement that Ashqar merely sent books to poor Palestinians and voiced his dissent concerning the Oslo Accords. Dr. Levitt confirmed in his testimony that a person who sends books and preaches encouraging Jihad is a fighter for Hamas who “mobilizes a fighter for the sake of Allah….”

One term discussed in some detail is “Economic Jihad.” U.S. Attorney Ferguson asked Dr. Levitt if he was familiar with the term and he replied that he was, causing William Moffitt, Ashqar's lawyer, to raise an objection. Moffitt objected to the use of this term because according to Moffitt, “Economic Jihad” was a term invented by Dr. Levitt and Steven Emerson, and therefore was not a Hamas word. Dr. Levitt continued stating that actually “Economic Jihad” is an Arabic term “al-Jihad bil Mal” (الجهاد بالمال) and certainly was not invented by him or by me. In fact, testified Dr. Levitt, Hizballah’s leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah frequently uses the term. The terms concerns individuals who can’t physically engage in Jihad being able instead to engage in a financial Jihad with their money, contributing, for instance, towards the purchase of weapons.

Dr. Levitt then began to testify about the threefold structure of Hamas: Political, Social Welfare, and Terrorist. Although these divisions are somewhat independent they are work together where, for instance, the Political Wing will take credit for a suicide bombing committed by the Terrorist Wing, and the Social Welfare Wing will control the university which recruited the suicide bomber. Levitt even stated that some universities hand out free class schedules that students can fill on. The schedules contain pictures of Suicide Bombers as well as quotes about fighting the Jews.

The Social Welfare of Hamas is known as Da’wa (دعوة) and is made up of schools, hospitals, universities, charities, youth centers, and mosques. This system of Da’wa engenders hatred in Palestinian society and further radicalizes an already radical population. Charities provide for the families of suicide bombers after they carry out attacks, hospitals treat family members of activists, schools bombard children with praises of martyrs and those who take up arms against occupation, while the mosques offer fiery Khutba (خطبة), reminding religious Muslims that it is their duty to wage Jihad against the infidel. Besides the obvious functions of this Da’wa network, they also serve as cover for members of Hamas’ military wing by providing jobs.

The Government also questioned Dr. Levitt about the Military Wing of Hamas, the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades. Levitt testified that fighters for the Brigades are often recruited through the Da’wa and that terror cells are compartmentalized and that funding for terror operations comes from all over including the United States. While early activities of the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades consisted mainly of shootings and kidnappings, in the mid 1990’s, attacks evolved into tactical bombings and then suicide bombings.

The Government concluded their direct examination of Dr. Levitt on Tuesday, October 24, and the Defense began their cross-examination starting with Mohammed Salah’s lawyer, Michael Deutsch.

« Close It

Czech Report Shows Egyptians Probing Flight Defenses

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

In a September 18 article for the Daily Standard, "Practice Makes Terror," (blogged about here) I argued that the "rash of false alarms" following the August 10 revelation of a foiled transatlantic air terror plot may not have been entirely false. I argued that there may be casings and dry runs occurring -- and that a number of incidents that were casings may not end up being remembered as such.

Now a new article in Norway's Aftenposten lends further credence to the view that casings are indeed occurring:

Czech security police (BIS) have reported an attempt to storm the cockpit of a flight from Oslo to Prague. The BIS annual report for 2005, released on Tuesday, mentions flight OK 447 in September 2005, where three Egyptian citizens tried to gain access to the pilots. According to BIS spokesman Jan Subrt, police terrorism experts believe that the three Egyptians were not trying to hijack the plane but rather testing the security measures on board the plane, which was owned by Czech Airlines (CSA). "The crew on board discovered the three Egyptians trying to open the door into the cockpit. When the stewards intervened they immediately gave up their attempts and gave the excuse that they were looking for a staff member because they wanted to buy chewing gum," Subrt said. BIS managed to identify the trio but could not demonstrate any links to Islamist terrorist organizations. The three were apprehended upon landing and Czech security police escorted them to Egypt after questioning. Subrt said that their suspicions were based on more than that the incident just "concerned three Arabs" but would not divulge details that led BIS to believe that there was a terrorism link to the event.

Hamas Trial in Chicago - Week 1

By Steven Emerson

Last week the government began its case against alleged Hamas operatives, Mohammed Salah and Abdelhaleem al-Ashqar (and Hamas Deputy Political Chief Mousa Abu Marzook who was charged in absentia). The trial is expected three months and former New York Times reporter Judith Miller is scheduled to testify on behalf of the prosecution. A few months before the trial began, al-Ashqar hired William Moffitt, who represented Sami al-Arian, so the prosecution can probably expect a similar defense strategy of, amongst other tactics, twisting material support for a terrorist organization as protected under the First Amendment. IPT Analyst Scott Rosenbaum has been following the case in the Northern District of Illinois and below are the links to his coverage of the trial:

Opening Statement of the Government

Opening Statement of Michael Deutsch, Mohammed Salah’s lawyer

Opening Statement of William Moffitt, Abdelhaleem al-Ashqar’s lawyer

The Islamic Courts Union Readies a Final Push Into Baidoa

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

My most recent article for The Weekly Standard (co-authored with Bill Roggio of The Fourth Rail) details the alarming rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia. On June 5, the ICU won control of Mogadishu, and it has steadily made strategic gains throughout the country since then. The transitional federal government (TFG) is now hunkered down in the south-central Somali city of Baidoa. The situation in Baidoa has been precarious for some time, as the ICU has demonstrated its capacity to take the city. There are now signs that the ICU may be beginning its final push into Baidoa to crush the transitional government.

Members of the ICU have indicated that this final push is coming. Today the number two leader of the ICU, Hassan Turki, announced the group's intention to chase the transitional government from Baidoa. SomaliNet News reports that Turki promised to bring all of Somalia under the ICU's rule, and that he declared war on the semiautonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland, which have been resistant to the ICU's rule. Adnkronos International reports that unnamed members of the ICU leadership told the pan-Arab daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat that an attack on Baidoa is now planned.

Although the presence of Ethiopian troops protecting Baidoa may have previously deterred the ICU's advance, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys (the head of the ICU's shura council) has now declared war on them: "We have been asking the Ethiopians to leave our country for a long time. This is the end of that request. We are now telling them that from now on, their graves will be littered everywhere in Somalia. . . . We will now start fighting. I am calling on all Somalis wherever they are to start jihad against the invaders and those who support them."

My sources in military intelligence also believe that the ICU's final drive toward Baidoa is coming. This is an important situation to follow. If the ICU is set on taking Baidoa, they will in all likelihood not be stopped. There are, however, two critical questions when their final push comes. The first is whether the ICU ends up triggering a war with Ethiopia in the process: there are reportedly around thirty Ethiopian armored vehicles in the vicinity Baidoa, as well as Ethiopian roadblocks designed to protect the city. The second question is whether critical TFG leaders are captured or killed by the ICU, or whether they are able to escape to Ethiopia or another friendly country. It is clearly preferable that TFG leaders escape alive to serve as a thorn in the ICU's side. In fact, the Ethiopian armored vehicles may be stationed around Baidoa not to serve a defensive purpose, but rather to whisk away the TFG leadership when the attack comes.

Knowing the Enemy, Understanding the Enemy

By Douglas Farah

One of the greatest weaknesses five years after 9-11 is the striking inability of the political leadership and body politic to define and reach a consensus on who the Islamist enemy is and what the enemy wants. There is a striking lack of intellectual curiosity, or perhaps fear because of concerns about political correctness, that have blocked a serious discussion of what bin Laden and al Qaeda really think, what their real targets and objectives are and how that group fits into the broader Islamist project of converting the world to an Islamic state ruled by _sharia_ law.

Hence we have the absurd ridiculing in Newsweek magazine of President Bush's use of the word "caliphate" in discussing the Islamist project (and the even more absurd CAIR response that talking about the caliphate is anti-Islamic). We have the inability of senior people whose job it is to study and understand the Islamist project unable to identify the two major branches of Islam, never mind how they differ and what such divisions might mean.

The caliphate, from its historical signficance to the dream of its recreation, is perhaps the best way to understand how the different currents of Islamist thought relate to each other, support each other and form a coherent whole that embraces the Muslim Brotherhood to the historic al Qaeda. My full blog is here.

Explosives found near US Embassy in Venezuela

By Aaron Mannes

Venezuelan daily El Universal reports:

The Baruta Municipality Police Corps Monday found two alleged explosive devices near the US Embassy in Valle Arriba, southeast Caracas.

One of the presumed bombs was found in a box containing leaflets making reference to Lebanese radical Islamic group Hezbollah.

"One person was arrested by the Baruta Police and we are waiting for their report and information from the (political police) Disip," a spokesman of the US Embassy told AFP.

Local TV news network Globovisión reported that one of the devices was in a flowerpot near the Embassy, while the other was outside a school, near the diplomatic premises.

Wilfredo Porras, acting director of Baruta Police, said they arrested a man carrying a "backpack with 100 black powder bases, pliers, adhesive tape, glue and electric leads."

The man declared that "the devices were set to explode in 15 minutes. At first, we thought he was crazy, but we concluded he is not because of the features of both devices and the contents in the backpack," Porras said.

At this point, not much is known - but here are some initial thoughts.

First, this was NOT a Hezbollah operation. If Hezbollah sets out to blow up an Embassy - you'll know it. They hit the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983 and 1984, as well as the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992. Hezbollah coached al-Qaeda in the 1998 double Embassy bombings in Africa. Hezbollah has a long record of successfully hitting hard targets. Based on the information available so far, this does not look like a meticulously planned operation.

But, Venezuela has a large Arab (and particularly Lebanese) population, many with strong ties to the home country. Isla Margarita, a Venezuelan free trade zone, has long been suspected of harboring Hezbollah fundraising cells. (See Hezbollah in Venezuela: A Footnote from my blog.) Chavez's alliance with Iran, as well as his open door to immigrants, have undoubtedly given Hezbollah a chance to expand these networks. So what is likely is that the erstwhile bomber was involved in this extended logistics network (which is built on extended families) and was inspired to act. Also, it is the end of Ramadan, so passions are high. This is the most likely explanation.

This explanation does not exonerate Chavez or Hezbollah. While it is true that this sort of lone wolf terrorist can arise almost anywhere or time - they are more likely to appear when the wind is at their back. Anti-Americanism within Hezbollah is well established. But Hugo's rhetoric, particularly against the backdrop of Venezuela's upcoming elections, is undoubtedly creating a fertile environment for this sort of freelancing.

Alternately, the bombing could have been orchestrated by the regime or its militias to intimidate the Embassy (the U.S. and Venezuela have been playing diplomatic tit for tat for some time now - see U.S. vs. Venezuela: UNDiplomacy). This is not likely - particularly since this attempt embarrasses Venezuela's ally Iran (they just organized a "Large Investment Strategic Fund.")

Another important story from that region, El Universal reports that Columbia will formally submit evidence to the governments of Ecuador and Venezuela that top FARC leaders are in those countries.

More on both of these stories as it comes in.

Cross posted to ProfilesinTerror.

Transatlantic cooperation on terrorism not that bad after all?

By Olivier Guitta

I just wrote an essay for the Journal of International Security Affairs on Euro-US relations on terrorism, Iraq... The full essay can be found here. Here is an excerpt:

French President Jacques Chirac has put it quite bluntly: “I have one principle regarding foreign policy. I look at what the Americans are doing and I do the opposite. Then I am sure to be right.” On the other hand, Edouard Balladur, a close ally of Chirac and former French Prime Minister, sees things very differently: “Europe has no advantages in systematically opposing the U.S. Our fundamental interests are closely linked.”

These two perspectives—one antagonistic and one Atlanticist—encapsulate the tug-of-war now underway in Europe over cooperation with the United States. Unfortunately, for now, Chirac appears to be the rule and Balladur the exception. But the reality is a good deal more complex. While publicly, anti-Americanism may be not only fashionable but politically advantageous, when it comes to quiet cooperation (on intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, and other issues), Europeans dance to a different tune.

Behind the scenes

Germany is a case in point. Back in 2002, the administration of Gerhard Schröder was reelected on a vehemently anti-American and anti-war platform. But new revelations suggest that in reality, Berlin was not nearly as removed from the U.S.-led war effort against Iraq as Schröder liked to claim. “Despite the troubles in the relationship between Berlin and Washington, the political decision was made to continue the close relationship of the intelligence services,” an unidentified source from the BND told the public German television station ARD. This collaboration, moreover, was approved at the highest levels, with Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Schröder’s then chief of staff and current Foreign Minister) and Joschka Fischer, then foreign minister, signing off on continued intelligence contacts. That close relationship apparently involved the stationing of two German intelligence agents in Baghdad throughout the course of the entire Iraq war, even while Schröder and his coalition cabinet were officially maintaining strong opposition to Washington’s actions. The German operatives allegedly helped American forces by identifying “non-targets” such buildings as embassies, schools and hospitals that should not be bombed. But they also went further, delivering assistance in the identification of high-value targets—including the April 2003 bombing in Baghdad’s wealthy Mansur district aimed at Saddam Hussein and several top members of his regime. An additional German agent reportedly was stationed in Qatar in the office of General Tommy Franks, the U.S. commander of Operation Iraqi Freedom. And all three received the Meritorious Service medals from the United States for their assistance.

Update on a very tense situation in Lebanon

By Olivier Guitta

On this 23rd anniversary of the attacks (it happened on Oct 23, 1983) against our Marines and French troops in Beirut which killed respectively 241 and 58, the situation in Lebanon remains very worrisome to say the least.
In the aftermath of the war, here are a few facts to know while assessing a very gloomy future:

· Hezbollah is against Sunni-Shia divide and is fine coordinating actions with Hamas.
Both are unifying forces against Israel. Hezbollah elements have been in Gaza training Hamas
·Recently Hezbollah thanked Hamas for keeping Israel busy for the past six years while Hezbollah preparing for war.
·Hezbollah's goals regarding hostages was and is to negotiate a total package including the Israeli soldier kidnapped by Hamas. Interestingly in the past, Hezbollah worked on releasing not only Lebanese Shia but Palestinian Sunnis as well.

·UNIFIL is a disaster in waiting. IT's been a joke for the past twenty eight years and this one is going to be the same. No clear mandate, no willingness to tame down Hezbollah as seen in the recent episode where Spanish troops stood down at the view of Hezbollah fighters.
·Even French president Chirac is counting on a maximum of 4 to 5 months of calm.
·UNIFIL is already seen by some as an occupation force and a European diplomat was recently quoted as saying that after an attack on Unifil, international forces will be gone in 3 days.
·Soon we are going back to square 1,i.e. pre July situation.
·Indeed Hezbollah is rearming and UN Resolution 1701 is far from being enforced anytime soon.
· Also on the Lebanese political scene, Syria is playing with fire and trying to ignite a civil war by pushing Hezbollah and its allies including Christian General Aoun towards a major confrontation with the Siniora government and the Hariri "March 14" forces.
. Finally, Hezbollah might start at any moment a terror campaign in the West or against Western targets. Incidentally just a few days ago, Iranian President Ahmadinejad threatened very clearly Europe.

THE CALIPH-STROPHIC DEBATE

By Walid Phares

Published by George Mason University's History News Network HNN.

It seems that the US is having a hard time winning the hearts and minds of Arabs and Muslims, but an equally serious problem can be observed in the intellectual circles of America where some have had a difficulty coming to terms with the terminology of the War of Ideas. If the educated elite of the United States is incapable of identifying the ideology and the strategy of the Jihadists five years after 9/11, we not only have a problem with handling the War in Iraq, but also with the future of American national security as a whole.

An article published in Newsweek magazine on October 13, 2006 illustrates this problem. Entitled “Caliwho?” it asks why President Bush has raised the issue of an Islamic Caliphate. Lisa Miller and Matthew Philips, co-authors of the piece, begin by defining the term, “Caliphate” as a “fifty-cent word” posing a question of why a U.S President would use it four times in one speech. At first read, I thought the Newsweek journalists were lamenting the delay with which the chief executive of the nation has finally begun using this term - half a decade after September 11, and fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. After all, has not the American public demanded that the US Administration and Congress take steps toward “informing” the nation about the enemy, its ideology, and its future goals? Since one of the most important objectives of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Salafi Jihadi networks around the world has been the re-establishment of a Caliphate - incorporating in it all Arab and Muslim states – one can only express relief that the term “Caliphate” has finally entered the President’s speeches.

However, as I continued to read further, I realized that the authors of the Newsweek article were putting forth quite a different view. They seemed to be appalled by the fact that the President “dared” to mention the “word” Caliphate and spoke of the Jihadists’ attempt to “extend the Caliphate, establish the Caliphate and spread the Caliphate.” Miller and Philips, writing with the certitude of Middle East Studies expertise, reminded their readers, oddly, that “many people (in the US) live long without using the word Caliphate” suggesting the uselessness of the President’s vocabulary.

Precisely this absence of understanding of the term Caliphate was the problem in the 1990s. During that decade, most instructors in American classrooms unfortunately succeeded at “dis-educating” the nation about the nature of the enemy by simply leaving out the term “Caliphate” of the curricula for Middle East Studies classes. If American students, many of whom would end up being recruited to newsrooms, have never heard about the Caliphate, Salafism, Wahabism or Khomeinism - let alone Jihadism - then the US was inevitably headed for a big trouble.

If in 1941, one would not know what “Reich” meant in the Nazi rhetoric, one would not be blaming those who would be helping others to understand it, but rather those who concealed the meaning from others in the years prior to the rise of Hitler. Since it has turned out that Americans were not properly educated by their Middle East Studies experts prior to 9/11, it is these academic and intellectual elites that should be put on the spot and questioned about their motivation to massage – for decades - Islamic history to make it more palatable to Western audiences. Why are the Newsweek authors blaming US government officials for taking up the task of teaching the nation about the true nature of the enemy when those charged with the task have obviously failed to do so?

Authors Miller and Philips continue further in misleading their readers. They blame the President for using a “pejorative” tone when referring to the “Caliphate” suggesting that the term is quasi-sacred and should be used with near-reverence. The authors treat the term as if it denoted a mere historical period and not an aggressive political project of the Jihadists of the 21st century. The term “Caliphate”, with all its linguistic and doctrinal derivatives in today’s Salafi terminology, is as charged and politicized as the “Third Reich” was to the National-Socialists during WWII. The “Caliphate” epitomizes all that the Jihadists are preparing for, working towards, and killing for. This word IS at the center of the War with Terrorism – it is not an obscure academic word as Miller and Philips would have us believe. The bringing back of the “Caliphate” is the chief reason why Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, Zarqawi, and Adam Gadahn have declared and waged a war against the people of the United States. Given its centrality to the Jihadist activities, the term must be treated seriously.

But Newsweek ’s investigative team is more interested in the “political” implications of such a use. Maybe it could stir some trouble overseas as the alleged Guantanamo-Koran affair did before? Or perhaps it would mobilize another campaign by the traditional (Wahabi funded) elites against educating Americans on matters “they shouldn’t know more about?” Who knows?

The article attempts to “link dots” between the use of the term “Caliphate,” and the so-called abhorred use of the terms “axis of evil,” Islamo-fascism, Islamic radicalism, militant jihadism, or what they coined as the “too jargony but more scholarly term of Islamism.” While they weren’t technically wrong on the latter, the authors implied the President is perhaps wrong or “political” when he used the more focused ones. Miller and Philips interestingly target the “people who prep him,” i.e. his speech writers, as perhaps pushing “complicating” words into the mouth of the commander in chief: in other words his advisors who probably encourage him to draw the attention of the American citizens to what the “Islamists” are up to. So, in sum, the article would suggest calling the enemy “Islamists” (the academic term) but not revealing their objectives, one of which is to establish a Caliphate. Is the Newsweek article calling on US leaders, President or congressional leaders “not” to use the term Caliphate at all, so that readers and the public at large “wouldn’t” learn what the actual Islamists “want” to do? This would be a disservice to the public and in total contradiction with the noble mission of the press.

But the matter would sound even more dramatic to Jihadism experts: For the article says “no one but students of Islamic history have much more than a vague idea of what it means.” Well, if we count on the educational system that “taught” America in the 1990s, you’d end up believing that Jihad is “spiritual yoga,” that Takfir is some Rock’n Roll Band, and that Umma is a Hollywood actress. Sure, if you count on our mostly Wahabi- funded Middle East studies programs you will get your Caliwhos and even your Caliwhats. Neither the US Congress nor the White House, let alone Homeland Security, are paid to teach students; campuses are, and handsomely. Unfortunately they did a bad job in educating their pupils, and now they are putting the blame on the graduated students.

You didn’t have to be an expert on German history or philosophy in 1940 to know what a Reich is. Nor did you have to be a specialist in Roman History and Latin to understand what fascism was. If today’s Joe and Jane Doe aren’t familiar with the term Caliphate it is because “someone” didn’t help them to make the acquaintance and that another someone is still obstructing that knowledge by alleging that this is only for the high cast of academics. While tens of thousands of Jihadists are pledging to the Caliphate before they commit to suicide bombings, beheadings and wrecking havoc in civil societies around the world, some voices (not necessarily the authors of the articles but intellectuals who are offended by popular awareness) are complaining about even “raising the issue.”

Although finding that students in Islamic studies can barely understand the Caliphate, the article yet uses a Merriam-Webster’s “dictionary” to educate readers:

A caliphate, according to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, is the “office or dominion of a caliph”; a caliph is “a successor of Muhammad ... [the] spiritual head of Islam.”

Well, in Islam there is no such a thing as the spiritual head of Islam. One wonders how did Webster's come up with this “spiritual head of” concept other than projecting a Christian-centric concept? Prophet Mohammed, according to the Islamic faith is the last Prophet and the messenger of Allah. He didn’t organize the Caliphate before he died. His followers established this system of succession, which with time, became the head of the Islamic state, not an office for spiritual affairs. Even though the Caliphs were technically the successors to the Prophet at the head of the community, known as Umma, they were heads of Government, leviers of taxes, managers of prosperity, ultimate judges, and more importantly commanders in chief of imperial armies. Caliphs invaded countries and involved themselves in civil wars among Muslims. Dozens of Caliphs were killed in coup d’etats, putsches, battlefields, succession wars, etc. The Caliphate wasn’t just an office to interpret holy texts but it was also a real Governance and power position; the equivalent to the Papacy and Emperor rolled into one. Trivializing the institution of the Islamic Caliphate for 14 centuries just to score points against a sitting President for eight years in "infidel" America is absurd.

Then Miller and Philips go on to lecture on the Caliphate-101:

"After the Prophet Muhammad died in 632 A.D., his father-in-law, Abu Bakr, became the first caliph. (At the heart of the schism between Sunni and Shia Muslims, even today, is the question of succession: who has the right to become Islam’s caliph?) From the time of the Prophet’s death until the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258, caliphs ruled over Muslims and presided over the Muslim expansion throughout the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe. These were the caliphates; some beneficent, some warmongering, in concept not unlike any other empire or dynasty."

So, the lesson from Newsweek article is that indeed the Caliphs were emperors and did wage wars. Some were benign, others harsh, as in any other empire. But that is important for average Americans to know and for Europeans to remember: Caliphs were involved in geopolitics and have declared Jihads, as did Christian emperors for centuries, on divine inspiration. Hence, Caliphs aren’t spared criticism and aren’t shielded from historical analysis and judgment because they were strictly spiritual. Besides, even if they were, Caliphs aren’t deities and the Caliphate is a very earthly thing. Along with all other offices of power in world history, the Caliphates had blood on their hands and no one can dispute that.

But what was missed by the writers was that the US President, and before him President Putin, US Congressional leaders from both parties and Arab clairvoyant leaders such as King Abdallah of Jordan and others, when they mention the Caliphate as a threatening goal, they are not playing historians. They are not talking about Caliphs Omar, Moawiya, Haroun el Rashid or Sleiman the Magnificent. Those are the Caliphs of history, not the commanders of 21st century al Qaeda. Adolph Hitler wasn’t a German emperor from the Middle Ages but he pretended he was their heir. Mussolini wasn’t Julius Cesar but he played his role. Hence when world leaders are warning about the “Caliphate” they aren’t arguing with those who died centuries ago, but resisting the extremists who want to reawaken the dark ages again, but with modern weaponry.

The article imputes rightly to Usama Bin laden the many troubling statements about “his” caliphate:

“Baghdad, the seat of the caliphate, will not fall to you, God willing,” he said, “and we will fight you as long as we carry our guns.” Bin Laden’s rhetoric evoked, as it often does, an earlier, golden era of Islam, one that exists more in his imagination than in the lawless, crumbling city of Baghdad today.”

Precisely, as I explain in my book Future Jihad, the Salafi Jihadists live in the past, borrow from the past but their bloody projects are in the present and loom over the future. When leaders, because of the mishaps of academics, respond to al Qaeda, they are sending a firm message: “This” Caliphate, which is against international law and the enemy of Muslim moderates as well, won’t be allowed to crush the international community and democracies. But our media unfortunately are not interested in a smart and vigorous response to the terrorists, but only in what can be harvested domestically in partisan “debates.” This article is telling us that Bush (or the 1990s’ Clinton for that matter) or any future President shouldn’t utter the word Caliphate, even if it has been absorbed by the modern days Jihadists and used in their mobilization campaign. As if in 1941, American Presidents would have been criticized for the use of “Third Reich” because “many centuries ago, the Reich was perceived as the German nation re-gathered.” Puzzling, isn’t it?

But the academic inquiry turns quickly into the usual political thing. They write: “Backers of the war in Iraq—Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, not to mention hawks like Sen. Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania—jumped on the word and used it in speeches dozens of times.” It is sad to see a debate about a national security, war on terror, war of ideas, history and ideology, rushed into “backers of wars, hawks, jump on word,” litany. For the Caliphate debate isn’t about Republicans and Democrats but about the victory of democracy and the survival of the Republic. It is not a partisan thing but a national defense and world security matter.

And to top it the article consults with the Islamist lobby on the issue and elevate it to the position of ex cathedra on all things Islamic. They write:

Parvez Ahmed, chairman of the Council on American Islamic Relations, says bin Laden’s word choices distort Islam for the world, and he wishes the president would take more care. When Ahmed heard “caliphate” Wednesday morning, he thought of the way Bush used the word “crusade” after September 11. “There’s a fundamental misunderstanding with the president and his advisers on core Islamic issues,” Ahmed said. “He’s getting bad advice, they’re misinformed on Islamic terminology.” Either that, or he’s making a strategic rhetorical choice.

With all due respect to the opinions and analysis of the spokesperson quoted, the question is not who has the real interpretation of the caliphate or Jihad for that matter. CAIR and al Qaeda could debate these matters at will, and one would wish to see this debate happening soon. I mean a real and open debate between the American Islamist-based group on the one hand and Adam Gadahn or Zawahiri on al Jazeera. That would be very informative, but obviously it is technically difficult since Gadahn is indicted and Zawahiri is wanted for justice, both for terror. Nevertheless it would be more academically sound to interview some pro Bin Laden Salafi Jihadi clerics on what the Caliphate they are struggling for IS, and IS slated to become when the time comes, and compare what they are saying with what Western leaders are talking about. Apples shouldn’t be mixed up with Oranges in the War of Ideas.

Tony Blair, the enemy number two of the Jihadi-terrorists after Bush, said a few weeks ago that, yes, we need a war of ideas: a campaign of intellect inside Western democracies, so that the public can be made aware of the realities of the War on Terror. He made a great point. For the Caliphate debate shows more clearly than anything, how “Caliph-strophic” the discourse is among our dominant intellectual elites.

This article was also published by World Defense Review, Family Security Matters and posted on FDD's web site.

Dr. Walid Phares is a Senior Fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a Visiting Fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy and the author of “Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America.” Email: Phares@walidphares.com

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The Shi'ite-Sunni Divide and Our Ignorance

By Douglas Farah

My friend Jeff Stein had a deeply disturbing op-ed piece in the New York Times a few days ago on the inability of senior law enforcement and intelligence officials, along with senior members of Congress-all dealing extensively with the Islamist terrorism issues-to tell Sunnis from Shi'ites.

Many could not say for certain if bin Laden and al Qaeda were Sunni, or whether Iran and Hezbollah were Shi'ite or which group the majority of Iraqis belong to.

He wasn't even asking basic theological differences, rather, just for a basic understanding of who was where on the chess board. This is akin to fighting a war against Christianity and not knowing, several years into the conflict, whether the Pope is Catholic or Protestant.
My full blog is here.

Weekly Standard: A New Terrorist Haven

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

In the new (October 30) issue of The Weekly Standard, Bill Roggio of The Fourth Rail and I have an article on the rise of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The article is reprinted in full below.

A New Terrorist Haven
The frightening advance of Islamists in Somalia.
by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Bill Roggio
10/30/2006, Volume 012, Issue 07

WHEN FIGHTERS from the radical Islamic Courts Union (ICU) seized Mogadishu, capital of Somalia, in early June, the Western world briefly noticed. Analysts and talking heads were concerned that the country could become a terrorist haven. Then the media largely lost interest, though the situation remains dire. The ICU is on the verge of winning an even bigger strategic victory, and its links to international terrorism have become impossible to deny.

After Mogadishu fell, Somalia's beleaguered transitional government holed up in the south-central city of Baidoa and watched as the ICU won a rapid series of strategic gains. It took control of critical port cities--most recently, Kismayo, captured on September 25--that give it access to the Indian Ocean. The ICU's advances have met with little resistance, as typified by the capture of the town of Beletuein on August 9. The governor, escorted by a couple of "technicals"--pickup trucks mounted with machine guns--fled to Ethiopia shortly after fighting broke out between his forces and ICU militiamen.

Now, in late October, the ICU controls most of the country's key strategic points. It can move supplies from south to north, and ICU troops effectively encircle Baidoa. In the past month, the ICU has begun to make overt moves against the transitional federal government. The most dramatic came on September 18, when the presidential convoy faced a multi-pronged suicide car bombing attack just minutes after President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed delivered a speech to the transitional parliament. Six government officials died in what was the first suicide strike in Somalia's history. There were further casualties in an ensuing gun battle, but President Ahmed escaped unscathed.

That attack occurred against the backdrop of ICU-inspired protests in Baidoa. The ICU used local supporters to organize demonstrations against the transitional government, forcing government police to disperse a crowd with gunfire.

The bottom line is that Baidoa is a city under siege, as evidenced by a stream of defections from the transitional government's military to the more powerful ICU. Over 100 government fighters stationed near Baidoa have defected. All that prevents the transitional government's destruction is the presence of some Ethiopian soldiers. Early this month, witnesses saw at least thirty Ethiopian armored vehicles pass through Baidoa en route to military barracks about twenty kilometers east of the city, and these troops have set up roadblocks in an effort to protect the transitional government.

Intelligence sources, however, doubt the Ethiopian forces can prevent Baidoa from falling. Some believe that the main reason the ICU hasn't yet mounted a full assault is a desire to prevent the transitional government from escaping to Ethiopia or another sympathetic country and becoming a permanent thorn in the ICU's side: The radicals would like to see all major figures in the transitional government killed or captured.

The primary reason Westerners should care about these developments is the ICU's increasingly clear support for international terrorism. Longtime al Qaeda ally Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys has been appointed head of the ICU's consultative shura council. The United States named Aweys a specially designated global terrorist in November 2001. He is one of three individuals believed responsible for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania who are currently sheltered by the ICU. Aweys's protégé, Aden Hashi 'Ayro, reportedly received terrorist training in Afghanistan as the United States was preparing to attack the Taliban in 2001.

These men have seized power in a country that contains 17 operational terrorist training camps, as described in a confidential report prepared by the nongovernmental group Partners International Foundation in 2002. The claim in this report has been confirmed by a military intelligence source. Today, hundreds of terrorists from Afghan istan, Chechnya, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Arabian peninsula are said to be flocking to Somalia to train in or staff these camps. According to a military intelligence source, the camps provide training in the use of improvised explosive devices to counter Ethiopian vehicles.

According to press accounts, the ICU has received funding from the Arabian peninsula that allows it to arm its fighters with new weapons. Sheikh Aweys told a group of 600 fighters at the Hilweyne training camp, "This is the beginning, but thousands of other gunmen will be trained. You are the ones who will disarm civilians, restore law and order, and help enforce sharia law."

But the presence of foreign fighters in Somalia suggests that Sheikh Aweys and the ICU have ambitions beyond Somalia. Some ICU leaders, such as Sheikh Yusuf Indohaadde, have denied the presence of foreign fighters in the country in order to distance themselves publicly from al Qaeda. In a late June press conference, Sheikh Indohaadde said, "We want to say in a loud voice that we have no enemies, we have not enmity toward anyone. There are no foreign terrorists here." Within a few weeks of this unequivocal statement, how ever, the Associated Press obtained a copy of an ICU recruiting videotape directed at both Somali and Arab audiences (with Arabic subtitles) that showed Sheikh Indohaadde in the desert alongside fighters from Arab Gulf states.

Another senior ICU leader, Sheikh Hassan "Turki" Abdullah Hersi, openly admitted foreign involvement in Somalia during a speech to supporters after the seizure of Kismayo. "Brothers in Islam, we came from Mogadishu and we have thousands of fighters, some are Somalis and others are from the Muslim world," he said. "If Christian-led America brought its infidels, we now call to our Muslim holy fighters to come join us."

Nor is the ICU's support for international jihad lost on the movement's highest leaders. In an audiotape released in late June, Osama bin Laden stated, "We will continue, God willing, to fight you and your allies everywhere, in Iraq and Afghanistan and in Somalia and Sudan, until we waste all your money and kill your men and you will return to your country in defeat as we defeated you before in Somalia"--a clear nod to the rise of the Islamic courts. In July, bin Laden issued an even stronger statement: "We warn all the countries in the world from accepting a U.S. proposal to send international forces to Somalia. We swear to God that we will fight their soldiers in Somalia and we reserve our right to punish them on their lands and every accessible place at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner."

The rise to power of the ICU is reminiscent of the Taliban's rise in the 1990s. Both radical groups are allied with al Qaeda and other foreign terrorists. And like the Taliban, the ICU is now instituting an extremely strict version of sharia.

In Somalia, as in Afghanistan in the 1990s, the implementation of sharia is facilitated by lawlessness and desperate poverty. The Taliban im posed its harsh rule on what Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid called an "exhausted, war-weary population," many of whom saw the movement "as saviors and peacemakers." Likewise, Somalia, since the toppling of President Muhammad Siad Barre in 1991, has been at the mercy of rival warlord factions known for indiscriminate violence. Rapes and other crimes have been commonplace. It is thus unsurprising that many Somalis view the ICU as a force that can deliver the stability they crave.

In both countries, however, many citizens were unable to accept the radicals' draconian regime. By the time the Taliban was ousted from power in 2001, few Afghans were sad to see them go. Likewise, the influx of tens of thousands of Somali refugees into Kenya shows that not all of the ICU's subjects are happy with their rule.

Where it has taken power, the ICU attempts to regulate virtually every facet of Somali citizens' lives, even barring them from watching soccer matches. ICU forces shot at least two people who demanded to watch a World Cup semifinal this summer. And in mid-September, in the course of raiding a Mogadishu hall where a crowd was watching an English Premier League soccer match, they shot and killed a 13-year-old boy. The ICU has also conducted mass arrests of citizens watching videos, cracked down on live music at weddings, and arrested a karate instructor and his female students because the lessons constituted mixing of the sexes.

Beyond the religious basis for these laws, there is clearly a desire to cement the ICU's control. This can also be seen in the ICU's crackdowns on the media. The Islamic courts have closed several radio stations to stifle dissent. On October 8, they gave the press in Mogadishu 13 rules of conduct that the press freedom advocacy group Reporters sans Frontières describes as a "draconian charter." It prohibits publishing information "contrary to the Muslim religion," information "likely to create conflicts between the population and the Council of Islamic Courts," and the use of "the terms which infidels use to refer to Muslims such as 'terrorists,' 'extremists,' etc." A Reporters sans Frontières press release contends that this charter would result in "a gagged, obedient press, one constrained by threats to sing the praises of the Islamic courts and their vision of the world and Somalia."

The ICU is also moving to disarm the population. In mid-October, the Islamic courts announced the door-to-door collection of weapons owned by Somali citizens and organizations. Only ICU-affiliated Somalis would be allowed to retain their firearms. This move, ostensibly designed to instill order, clearly diminishes citizens' ability to resist the Islamic militia.

Although the situation in Somalia looks grave, the United States has more options for dealing with the ICU than it has in some other areas where terrorist factions have made gains lately, such as the Waziristan region of Pakistan.

Ethiopia's military presence--still relatively light, and meant principally to help the transitional government escape once Baidoa falls--creates an initial opportunity for the United States. Back in the mid-1990s, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia to destroy the predecessor of the ICU, the al Qaeda-backed al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, which was sponsoring Islamic separatist groups in the Ethiopian border province of Ogaden. The Islamic courts are unlikely to be friendlier to Ethiopia than their predecessor. Sharif Ahmed, the head of the ICU's executive council, has openly called for a jihad against Ethiopian soldiers in the country. ICU military commanders have made similar calls.

Nor is Ethiopia the only neighbor concerned about the ICU's rise. On October 5, the ICU moved 15 of its technicals to the village of Liboi, in southern Somalia near the border with Kenya. While an ICU spokes man claimed that this was intended to "check the security in the area," the Kenyans viewed the move as provocative. Concern about the ICU's intentions had already prompted senior Kenyan officials to undergo anti terrorist and counterinsurgency training; when the ICU advanced to Liboi, Kenyan military helicopters responded with a show of force. Kenyan defense minister Njenga Karume later announced that "anybody who might touch Kenya will face the full force of our military."

Since then, Kenya has deployed forces along its border with Somalia. Moreover, the governments of the semiautonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland are hostile to the Islamic courts.

The United States has significant assets at Camp Lemonier in neighboring Djibouti, where the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa is made up of Marines, Special Operations forces, civil affairs teams, and a U.S. and international naval task force. The Combined Joint Task Force's primary missions have been patrolling the East African coast and the straits of the Bab el Mandeb oil choke point, training regional militaries to fight the spread of Islamic terror groups, performing goodwill missions designed to improve the lives of Africans, and undertaking covert intelligence and hunter-killer missions. A Predator drone said to be operating from Djibouti killed Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, al Qaeda's chief operative in Yemen, in November 2002.

All is not lost in Somalia. While the transitional government has no power base to rely on, there is enough concern in the region about the ICU's rise that the United States has potential partners with whom it could fashion an appropriate response if it wanted to. The critical question is whether we can muster the will--or for that matter even the awareness--to address the problem.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior consultant for the Gerard Group International and author of the forthcoming book My Year Inside Radical Islam (Tarcher/Penguin). Bill Roggio is an independent military blogger who served in the Army from 1991 to 1995.

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The Effects of Thailand's Coup on the Southern Insurgency

By Zachary Abuza

One of the justifications for the recent coup in Thailand was Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's mishandling of the southern insurgency, which has claimed some 1,700 lives in the past two-and-a-half years. The generals chafed at the political interference of Thaksin and his deputy Chidchai, their rotation of generals, failed policies and the blatant dismissal of the National Reconciliation Commission's (NRC) findings. People looked to General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, himself a Muslim, to solve the insurgency. With Sonthi in control, there will likely be three steps taken that will improve the current dismal situation, but by no means will it be a panacea.

For the rest of the blog click here.

Malaysia Releases 17 More Members of JI & KMM

By Zachary Abuza

On 18-19 October, Malaysian authorities released 17 members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and an affiliated group the Kumpulan Mujihidin Malaysia (KMM). The 17 had been held under Malaysia’s draconian British-colonial era Internal Security Act (ISA). The ISA allows for detention without charge or trial for up to two years and can be renewed indefinitely. Several of the detainees had been held since mid-2001. According to the Malaysian government, they were released on the orders of Prime Minister (and concurrently Internal Security Minister) Abdullah Ahmad Badawi because "The government was satisfied that all of them are no longer a threat to national security."

The release of four individuals in particular raises several questions; but more importantly, what does the release of 17 people say about Malaysia’s ongoing CT efforts?

The press has focused their attention on one individual, Nik Adli Nik Aziz, the son of the Kelantan state Chief Minister and the spiritual leader of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, better known as PAS. Nik Aziz is a firebrand and vehemently anti-American cleric. His son’s arrest in August 2001 was widely seen as political. The Then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, was ailing in the polls, and went after PAS, which did very well in the 1999 elections, winning 2 of Malaysia’s 13 state governments. As PAS wrote in their paper, "The ISA was used to tarnish the image of PAS and its leaders. It was an attempt to brand PAS as a terror group." The ISA is the bête noir of all opposition parties, as well as human rights organizations, and it has always been used for political purposes. Much of the Malaysian populace was skeptical regarding JI and KMM and refused to believe that Nik Adli’s arrest was anything but political. But Nik Adli was no innocent. He was trained in Afghanistan and had close ties to the current leaders of Thailand’s insurgency. He trained with the GMIP, whose leader Nasori Saeseng was also with him in Afghanistan. He was the master of the family-founded madrassah, SM Arab Darul Anwar, in Kelantan. The school, which the author has visited, is a very hard line school that has graduated a disproportionate number of militants. It was thought to be an important feeder school for JI and the KMM.

There are three other individuals whose release raises some eyebrows:

Zainon Ismail, with Nik Adli, was a veteran of the Afghan Mujihidin and a founder of the KMM. Forty-five members of the KMM, nearly half of its membership, either fought against the Soviets or had trained in al Qaeda camps there in the 1990s. The KMM trained with the GMIP in southern Thailand and kept their stockpile of weapons there. I think we have to see his release in the context of the Thai peace talks that the Malaysian government is negotiating. The GMIP and the BRN-C, the two leading insurgent groups, have not come to the peace table, despite the great fanfare in the media.

Abdul Manaf Kasmuri is one of the most interesting. He was a Malaysian army colonel, educated at Sandhurst, UK where he won three batons of honor on graduation, including best foreign student. In the early1990s, he led Malaysia’s peacekeeping unit in Bosnia where, after witnessing the UN and the West’s inaction, started to secretly support the Bosnian Mujihidin. He was recalled and forced to retire in 1995, but immediately returned to Bosnia, where under the guise of being an aid worker, he continued to support the Mujihidin. He was a frequent traveler to Pakistan, and admired the Taliban. At the time of his arrest he was the human resources manager for an Islamic youth organization based in Kuala Lumpur, and the director of Excelsetia, a JI/AQ front company, registered in the financial black hole of Labuan, Malaysia’s offshore banking center. The other directors were Zulkifli Marzuki, one of Al Qaeda and JI’s most important money men in Southeast Asia, and Yazid Sufaat, who was part of Al Qaeda’s anthrax production team and in whose apartment the USS Cole and 9/11 operations were planned. Yazid Sufaat is still under ISA detention while Marzuki is still at large.

Little is known about Alias Othman, but the circumstances of his arrest are interesting. Many have always wondered why JI or Al Qaeda has never targeted Malaysia, and the government has always downplayed the threat. But Othman was arrested with a cache of weapons, including, chemicals that could have been used to make a poison gas.

The release of 17 individuals raises questions in its own right about Malaysian CT efforts. In general, there is a lack of transparency regarding Malaysia’s internal security and CT operations. Yet Washington has given the Malaysians credit for doing a good job in combating terrorism. The release of so many people does cast some aspersions on Malaysia’s commitment to combating terrorism. The fact that only 80 people were arrested in the country where JI was founded and incubated has always been of concern. Malaysia in many ways is a very permissive environment. While the release was not politically motivated, I think that one must look at such a large release in the context of the ongoing political feud in Malaysia between Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi and his predecessor Mahathir Mohammad and their competition for support amongst the Malay electorate.

The most obvious question is whether Malaysia’ rehabilitation project works. According to my data base, albeit not perfect but which I corroborate using press reports and the reporting of two Malaysian human rights organizations, there have been 72 people related to JI-AQ-KMM who have been detained since mid-2001 under the ISA. Most press reports use the figure “over 80” and the occasional press-report will say “over 100.” 70-80 is a fairly accurate figure.

By my records, of the 72 that I have confirmed were detained under the ISA, 37 have been released, either unconditional releases or with restrictions on their travel, etc. Of the 35 who are still under ISA detention, 12 were part of the Darul Islam cell arrested between March-April 2006; i.e. they have been detained for just over half a year. In sum, with the exception of the DI-12 cell, well over half of the JI-AQ-KMM members have been released.

The earliest releases came in July 2004, thus people had been detained for roughly three years. Most have been released after 4-5 years.

There has been little transparency about the re-education/de-programming process. It obviously involves some theological study and counseling. But a fair bit of evidence is that fear and coercion play a very important role. People are not necessarily convinced of the error of their ways, or are any less militant, but that the state’s coercive powers are an effective deterrent. Moreover, there are still a large number of hard cases, so there are obvious limits to the program. A few of the detainees have appeared in the press, but only in state-controlled media.

Singapore, too has released a large number of their JI suspects. Of the 66 detained under the ISA in conjunction with terrorism, 35 (53%) are still under detention orders. There has been slightly more transparency about Singapore’s re-education program, but still there are many questions that need to be asked.

Without legal proceedings and public testimony, journalists, researchers and analysts are deprived of important information. So much of our knowledge about JI has come from court transcripts and proceedings in Indonesia, where more than 200 people have stood trial. More importantly, the ISA detentions and the subsequent lack of transparency continue to reinforce the public’s perception that the ISA is a political tool, and that the suspects are detained for political reasons, not because they are legitimate security threats to the state and public.

Border Security & Venezuela

By Aaron Mannes

US Representative Michael McCaul (TX - 10), Chairman of the Subcommittee for Investigations of the House Homeland Security Committee just released a major report A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border.

Among other things, the report deals with the history and future risk of terrorists entering the US along with the hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants entering this country along the US-Mexican border annually.

A particularly interesting note was the report's discussion of Venezuela's current policy of freely issuing identity documents. Thousands of cedulas (the Venezuelan equivalent of social security cards) have reportedly been issued to non-Venezuelans - including Cubans, Columbians, Middle Easterners, and Pakistanis. Combined with Hugo's belligerent rhetoric and close relationship with Iran this is extremely worrisome.

This issue has been discussed in intel circles for some time. FARC's foreign minister was living openly in Caracas and had even voted in Venezuela's election.

In fairness, even for Hugo, directly supporting terror attacks against the U.S. may be a bit much (although maybe not). This is more likely crime plus. That is - corruption and criminal activity - permitted by Hugo's regime as a revenue source with the added bonus of causing trouble for the United States.

Regardless it is presents a serious security problem.

The House report has made headlines in Venezuela and the US Ambassador there has called for more stringent controls on Venezuelan identity documents. This also plays into Venezuelan politics. Venezuela is holding elections in December and many Venezuelans are not pleased to see their country slowly slipping into international pariah status.

Muslim Brotherhood Member Barred from United States

By Steven Emerson

Newsweek posted an article on MSNBC how an "influential Islamic scholar" from the United Kingdom was prevented from attending a conference at New York University. The story reported that Kamal Helbawy, founder of the Muslim Association of Britain, was removed from a flight in London right before his American Airlines flight was about to take off for New York. Officials at NYU Law School, which had organized the conference, were aghast. Paul Cruickshank, a fellow at the law school's Center for Law and Security was quoted as saying, “He’s a really respected guy,” Karen Greenberg, Executive Director of the Center, protested the decision to bar Helbawy, "It looks like they are afraid of the words that are going to come out of somebody’s mouth.” Helbawy claimed in the Newsweek story that he has condemned terrorism "thousands of times."

Well, let's go to the videotape. Helbawy appeared at a conference of the Muslim Arab Youth Association in December 1992. I was there. And here are excerpts from the speech he made recorded on videotape:

“Do not take Jews and Christians as allies, for they are allies to each other.”
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“O’Brothers, the Palestinian cause is not a conflict of borders and land only. It is not even a conflict over human ideology and not over peace. Rather, it is an absolute clash of civilizations, between truth and falsehood. Between two conducts – one satanic, headed by Jews and their co-conspirators—and the other is religious, carried by Hamas, and the Islamic movement in particular and the Islamic people in general who are behind it.”
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“Lastly I am going to say something about Imam Hassan al-Banna, peace be upon him, who had been trying to establish 70,000 fighters. And he started with the first battalion with 10,000 fighters and today the Palestinians became strong fighting battalions, let us stand and support this great nation and the future is for Islam and I ask God’s forgiveness for you and for me and the Muslims. We ask God to give victory to our brothers and we ask God to release the leader of the Intifada, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, praise be upon him.”

Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal also spoke at the same conference, immediately after Helbawy. Meshaal told the audience “… the Palestinian nation was ignited with heroic jihadi martyrdom on the Palestinian land. And the start of the blessed Intifada, which was ignited by the blessed man, the handicapped Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, is the one who caused the earth to shake from under the feet of the occupiers. Since then, the Palestinian people have shown examples of sacrifice and courage and heroism. Among the proofs are the revolution of the stones, the Molotov cocktails and the knives.”

By Lorenzo Vidino

The recent rounds of arrests in North America and in Europe highlight the changed face of jihadi terrorism in the West. The profile of the cells dismantled in Toronto and London this past summer confirms a trend that had become apparent after the November 2004 assassination of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam and the 7/7 London bombings: the majority of terrorist activities inside the West come from independent, homegrown networks. Composed mostly of extremely young, second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants in the West (with the notable addition of a growing number of converts), these spontaneous networks have only an ideological affiliation with al-Qaeda, while generally operating with virtually total autonomy. Although it is unlikely that these groups, given their relatively simple structures and often amateurish preparation, could carry out large operations, they are nevertheless dangerous. Their deep knowledge of Western cultures and languages, possession of Western passports and relative lack of overt ties to large terrorist organizations make their detection a difficult task for authorities. Their proven determination to strike their own countries, combined with the relatively easy access to explosive substances and weapons, makes them an immediate threat to the security of Western countries.

A region where this trend is particularly evident is Scandinavia. Denmark, Sweden and Norway have seen a limited presence of "traditional" organized terrorist groups since the beginning of the 1990s, with outfits such as the Algerian GSPC or the Egyptian Gama'a al-Islamiyya using the countries as convenient bases of logistical support for their activities in North Africa and the Middle East. While some of these groups are still operating today, the overwhelming majority of terrorist activities taking place in Scandinavia currently are carried out by homegrown networks.

In a security report released in September, PET, the Danish domestic intelligence agency, warned that the largest threat to Denmark, as in most European countries, comes from small, unsophisticated groups that are "inspired by al-Qaeda's global jihad ideology but can act autonomously and apparently without external control, support or planning" [1]. PET's findings are corroborated by recent arrests in Denmark. On September 6, Danish police arrested nine suspects in the city of Odense, Denmark's third largest. According to authorities, the men had acquired material "to build explosives in connection with the preparation of a terror act.'' Although PET has revealed very few details about the alleged plot, the suspects are believed to be mostly young second-generation Muslim immigrants of various ethnic origins living in Vollsmose, a poor neighborhood of Odense.

By David Schenker

Earlier this week, Israeli Defense Forces intelligence directorate chief BG Yossi Baidatz said that since the September 2005 Israeli withdrawal, Hamas had smuggled in millions of dollars worth of advanced weaponry to Gaza. Baidatz briefed the Israeli cabinet that anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons had entered Gaza, placing IDF helicopters and fixed wing aircraft at risk. Other Israeli sources suggest these weapons include the Russian-made Kornet anti-tank rocket employed so effectively by Hizballah against Israeli armor in August, as well as Soviet-era SAM-7s. Still other reports suggest that Hamas had managed to import over 20 tons of military explosives into Gaza.

No doubt these assessments inspired the current Israeli operation in Gaza, in which Israeli forces have returned to the Philadephia Corridor—the narrow strip of land between Gaza and Egypt—once occupied by the IDF to interdict weapons and personnel smuggling.

For Israel, the challenges posed by an increasingly well equipped Hamas go well beyond armaments. Hamas is also focused on improving the capabilities of its' personnel.

Indeed, two weeks ago, the Hamas PA Minister of the Interior, Said Siyam, traveled to Tehran and Damascus in search of technical assistance for his forces. Siyam’s meetings with Iranian Supreme Leader Khamene'i, President Ahmedinejad, and senior security officials—including reportedly with the Revolutionary Guard officials—were said to have gone quite well. So did Siyam’s meetings with the Syrian Interior Minister. News reports emerging from the trip suggest that Siyam received commitments from Tehran and Damascus to train (and fund) Palestinian (i.e., Hamas) police and intelligence cadres.

These developments are cause for concern for Israel. But they should also be of concern to Washington. Like Hizballah—which has long targeted the US—Hamas too has long espoused a virulently anti-US ideology. A marked improvement of technical capabilities could help Hamas to more effectively target US assets and personnel, should it find it in its interests to do so. Just recall the roadside bomb attack that killed 4 US diplomatic personnel in Gaza three years ago, on October 15, 2003. The investigation remains open, but it’s not difficult to imagine a Hamas role—either independently or via the Popular Resistance Committees—in the attack.

On Ammar Abdulhamid

By David Schenker

Andrew makes some good points in his blog. I know both Farid Ghadry and Ammar Abdulhamid. I think both of them are courageous individuals, who at great personal risk have committed themselves to changing the nature of the dictatorial Ba’athist regime in Syria (if not changing the regime itself).

Recently, Ammar joined the National Salvation Front (NSF), a Syrian opposition group headed by former Ba’athist leader Abdel Halim Khaddam and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader (living in exile in Europe) Sadreddin Bayanouni. Ammar is under no illusions about the nature of the organization, but it is my sense that he joined the group because he viewed it as the most credible group on the ground in Syria. The wisdom of Ammar’s choice can be debated. That said, Ammar does not strike me in the least as a person who is sympathetic to a Ba’athist-Islamist government replacing the current Ba’athist Syrian regime. In fact, I believe him to be a committed secularlist and pro-democracy advocate.

Personally, I can’t imagine that the NSF is the type of opposition group that Washington would want to see replace the Asad regime. It seems likely that the NSF is looking for some contact with Washington. This would only be natural. Whether the Administration would see engagement with the NSF as being in US interests, remains to be seen.

What clearly is in US interests, however, is increased pressure on the Asad regime. Sadly, the internecine fighting among the Syrian opposition—somewhat reminiscent of what happened with the Iraqi opposition prior to the 2003 invasion—will likely only alleviate pressure on the regime.

Reform Party of Syria Should Substantiate "Muslim Brotherhood" Charge Against Activist

By Andrew Cochran

Yesterday, the Reform Party of Syria ("RPS"), one of the many Syrian dissident groups and a good source of information, sent a blast email charging the following: "The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB), in alliance with the ex-vice president of Syria Abdul Halim Khaddam, a staunch Ba'athist, have opened an office in Washington DC. The aim of the office is to infiltrate the US government to influence its apathy towards political Islam. RPS has learned that Ammar Abdul Hamid, a Syrian intellectual who works at Brookings Institute, will be running the office for the National Salvation Front. His duties are to sell political Islam and Ba'athism to reluctant US government officials and to give the Muslim Brotherhood a platform in the Think Tank community of Washington from which they can preach democracy."

Intrigued, I called the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, where Abdulhamid is a nonresident fellow, and asked for a response. They issued a press release last night stating: "Mr. Abdulhamid is not a member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and has never been. He is not opening and will not be opening an office for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and/or the National Salvation Front in Washington DC... Ammar Abdulhamid is a founding liberal member of the NSF, a broad-based, pragmatic coalition of Syrian opposition groups and independent liberal activists... Mr. Abdulhamid is also the director of the Tharwa Project, a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving public information and discussion regarding diversity and human rights issues in the Arab world." A spokeperson for the Center also called me and vociferously denied it (and I mean really vociferously). You can read the press release here.

I conducted some research on Abdulhamid and asked two others (who asked to remain anonymous) who are well known in Washington for their expertise on Syrian dissident groups and the MB. I did the standard Google search on Abdulhamid and found his English-language personal blog site and another personal website, his Arabic-language site, the website of the Tharwa Project, and the website for DarEmar, which Abdulhamid describes as "a publishing house/NGO dedicated to raising the standards of civic awareness in the Arab World." I found nothing on the English-language sites which directly links him to the Syrian MB or leads me to believe he's a MB sympathizer. The Tharwa Project is opening an office in Washington, but I did not find any such announcement about the National Salvation Front (English site here and Arabic site here). The combined information from the two experts is (a) there is no explicit evidence that Abdulhamid is a MB member or sympathizer; (b) the National Salvation Front includes many anti-Assad elements, including MB; (c) the Tharwa Foundation, to the best of knowledge, doesn't have explicit ties to MB (and "Tharwa" means "fortune" in case you're wondering); and (d) it's possible, of course, that Mr. Abdulhamid has periodically entered, accidentally or purposefully, into a tactical relationship with MB types in the course of his work (but that's not apparent from the websites or the RPS press release).

I don't read Arabic and welcome readers' translations of the linked Arabic sites above. In the meantime, my conclusions are: (a) the RPS should either substantiate the charge or recant it; (b) I smell an internecine conflict between Syrian dissident groups which is not beneficial to their cause; and (c) Mr. Abdulhamid appears to be careful about his associations and, hopefully, will remain careful. My thanks to the Saban Center for their rapid response and to my two expert friends for their contributions. I will post updates to this story as needed.

North Korea Sanctions: The Difficulties Are In the Details!

By Victor Comras

Editor's Note: In light of North Korea's status as an official "State Sponsor of Terrorism" since January 20, 1988 and President Bush's warning yesterday that any attempted North Korean transfer of nuclear technology to any party would be interdicted, this post is particularly timely and pertinent to CTB.)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 was meant to send a strong message to North Korea, and indirectly also to Iran, that the international community will not continence continuation of their ballistic missile and nuclear weapons development and testing programs. But, the resolution may have fallen short of its mark. And the devil will be in the details of its implementation and enforcement.

While the language contained in the North Korea sanctions resolution is quite strong and to the point, the measures adopted are considerably weaker than previous sanctions programs imposed by the Security Council. Take, for example, the measures adopted against Iraq or Serbia. Those earlier sanctions programs included across-the-board trade and financial services embargoes, allowing only for specific exemptions based on humanitarian considerations. Air traffic was banned, and all ships to or from Iraq and Serbia were subject to being stopped, searched and detained.

The sanctions adopted in resolution 1718 against North Korea are much more restrained. They impose a partial trade embargo covering only a limited range of heavy military equipment, and high technology items and commodities associated with North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. There is still only a provisional list of the items covered by this embargo. Difficult negotiations undoubtedly are still ahead in coming up with a more definitive list. The resolution also speaks of cutting off the flow of “luxury goods” to North Korea’s leadership, but there is as yet no definition or list of goods associated with this measure. This means implementation and enforcement of this measure is quite unlikely for the time being.

The resolution also envisages financial sanctions against North Korea’s leaders and those entities associated with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. But these measures can only be applied after the Security Council members have decided on the list of individuals and entities to which such measures should be applied. This will be the work of a new “Sanctions Committee” established by the resolution. It may take several weeks, or months, before such a list is agreed and published – and before countries can actually act to implement these new financial controls. Several countries will have to enact new legislation and regulations before such measures can be implemented within their territory. It is difficult to understand how the Sanctions Committee will be able to pick and choose between DPRK entities and leaders when coming up with this list, as every DPRK individual and entity is subject to the same State control and manipulation.

China is clearly in the driver’s seat when it comes to implementing and enforcing the new measures against North Korea. The Chinese can determine what impact, if any, these measures will actually have on North Korea. They remain North Korea’s principal market and principal supplier. The bulk of North Korea’s imports and exports cross their common border. China’s inspection of cargoes, and interdiction of contraband, are essential to making these measures work. But, even if these limited trade sanctions items are interdicted, the economic effect on North Korea will be minimal. China will have to go beyond these limited sanctions, and begin using its considerable economic leverage over North Korea, to force them back to the Six Party talks. Whatever is done in this respect will be completely in line with China's own perception of its national interests.

It is still not at all clear what enforcement measures are envisaged with regard to inspection of air cargoes or cargoes carried by ship. Hopefully, initial inspections will occur at the airports and harbors at which such cargoes are embarked or offloaded. But, there are a number of countries, which are not likely to carry out such a function in a credible manner, (eg Iran). Inspection at sea is another matter. This was a point of contention in the negotiations leading up to the resolution, and the resulting language is quite ambiguous – “all Member States are called upon to take, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK, as necessary;” The United States maintains that this includes the right to inspect such cargoes on the high seas, but others have indicated different views on this point. The previous sanctions programs against Serbia and Iraq specifically authorized such action, which, in both cases was carried out by a so-called Multilateral Interdiction Naval Force (MIF).

I’m not trying to suggest that these new measures will not work. That judgment would be premature at this point. Nor do I have any great suggestions to offer on what we must do to get North Korea to comply fully with the terms of the Security Council Resolution– other than to suggest the obvious: We must encourage all countries, and especially China, to effectively implement these measures. And we must stand ready to strengthen these measures further, including using our experience gained in the Serbia and Iraq cases, when, and if, the opportunity arises.

Terrorist Organizations: Equal Opportunity Reaffirmation

By Michael B. Kraft

The unanimous decision yesterday by a federal appeals court to uphold the State Department’s designation of Kahane Chai, a “militant” Jewish group based in the West Bank, as a terrorist organization is a reminder that the U.S. Government’s efforts against terrorists are aimed not only at violent Muslim groups, despite frequent complaints by some Muslims.

Indeed, it was a 1994 attack on Palestinians in Hebron by a supporter of Kahane Chai, as well as bus bombing attacks the same year by Hamas against Israeli civilians, which helped prompt the U.S. law aimed against fundraising for foreign terrorist organizations.

The three-judge panel of U.S, Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia yesterday supported the State Department’s 2004 redesignation of Kahane Chai as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The group is an offshoot of the Jewish Defense League, which was founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane, who was assassinated by an Arab terrorist in New York in 1990.

Chief Judge Douglas Ginsburg said that then Secretary of State Colin Powell acted reasonably in reaffirming the original designation because of links between Kahane Chai to death threats against Israeli police officers and former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel.

The designations are made under provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. (P. L. 104-132). The law makes it illegal to provide funding or other forms of material support to groups formally designated by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and Secretary of Treasury, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO’s). The initial designation was made in 1997 but under a sunset provision designations have to be renewed every two years or they would expire.

Currently 42 groups are designated following the State Department’s preparation of detailed administrative records that have to be approved by the Justice and Treasury Departments. The list includes includes Middle Eastern groups such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and half a dozen other Palestinian groups, as well as Kahane Chai and its alias Kach, and various terrorist organizations in Asia, Latin America, Africa and Europe.

Two other designated groups --or their U.S supporters -- have appealed the designation as allowed under provisions of the 1996 law. They are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), known as the Tamil Tigers, which recently resumed their offensive against the Sri Lanka Government, and the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), an anti-Iran group that had been supported by Saddam Hussein and conducted attacks on Iranian court facilities and other civilian targets.

These 1996 provisions were a major step in the effort to take the offensive against terrorism funding – a campaign that accelerated after 9/11. Previously U.S counterterrorism laws focused primarily on state sponsors of terrorism. But beginning in the early 1990’s there was a growing awareness in the U.S. Government that an increasing number of terrorist groups were turning to front companies and fund raising among sympathizers instead of depending on such terrorist-supporting countries as Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria for financial support.

Although there were early efforts to criminalize the provision of material support for specific acts of terrorism, the law to curb fund raising for terrorist organizations themselves was precipitated by two series of terrorist attacks in the Middle East.

The first event was the action by Dr. Baruch Goldstein, an American-born immigrant to Israel, who shot and killed 29 Arabs at a mosque in Hebron in February, 1994 before being beaten to death. He was believed to have been affiliated with Kahane Chai or Kach, small groups of right wing Jewish extremists who had been involved in several terrorist acts and raised funds in the U.S. The Hebron massacre prompted the State Department and Justice Department to convene interagency meetings to determine whether (a) existing laws could be used to curb money flows to terrorist groups and/or (b) whether new laws were needed. The second event was a series of deadly bus bombings in Israel later that year by the Palestinian Hamas group, the same organization that won the Palestinian elections earlier this year.

The massive 1994 Crime Bill was then working its way through Congress at the time but the interagency group, on which I served for the State Department, concluded that this bill was not the best vehicle for adding potentially controversial counterterrorism measures. So a decision was made to introduce separate new legislation for the 1995 Congressional session. That bill was enacted after modifications and lengthy hearings more than a year later as the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

At the same time the Clinton administration took a stop-gap measure. It used its authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to issue an executive order in January 1995 freezing the assets of 12 Middle East terrorist groups on the grounds that they threatened the use of force to undermine the Middle East peace process. The “dirty dozen” included 10 Palestinian groups and two Jewish groups, Kahane Chai and Kach (which have since merged).

Thus, the actions by both the right wing Jewish extremists involved with Kahane Chai as well as the terrorist attacks by HAMAS and other Arab groups were key factors in developing the 10-year-old law authorizing the designation of foreign terrorist organizations and banning the knowingly provision of material support to them.

A salient difference, however, is that the Israeli Government declared Kahane Chai a terrorist group (in 1994, three years before the U.S) and the group is condemned by most Israelis and Jews as an extremist fringe element. Meanwhile, Hamas, Hezbollah and other Islamic terrorist groups have widespread support, overt or tacit, of many Palestinians and other Arabs and their leaders for their suicide bombings and other attacks aimed deliberately at civilians.

Cornered Tigers Pounce: Sri Lanka Update

By Aaron Mannes

In its ongoing war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) the Sri Lankan military has suffered a devastating series of reversals in the past week. On October 11 they launched an offensive and lost a large scale battle around Muhamalai in which over 129 soldiers were killed and over 200 injured. (The LTTE also captured weapons and ammunition so it can continue the fight.)

On October 16 the LTTE, deploying its signature tactic, struck a Sri Lankan Navy convoy killing nearly 100 people, mostly sailors, and wounding 200. It was the single deadliest terror attack in Sri Lanka's long, bloody conflict between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. On the 18th, Sri Lankan suicide boat bombers struck a naval base in the southern city of Galle, a major tourist attraction deep in the government's territory. The attack also set off rioting in Galle in which Sinhalese townspeople reportedly attacked Tamils - security services imposed a curfew and claim to have brought the situation under control. The operation is further demonstration of the LTTE's ability to mount sophisticated operations far from its base in Sri Lanka's far north.

At first these reversals appear surprising, as the Sri Lankan military had been scoring successes against the LTTE including capturing territory from the Tigers near the strategic port of Trincomalee in September. However, these successes relied, in great part, on the assistance of Col. Karuna a former high-level Tiger commander who, along with his men, defected to the Sri Lankan government. In Karuna's territory in Sri Lanka's east the military was operating successfully because of intelligence and support from Karuna. But when they entered the LTTE strongholds in the north, they were over-confident and without the same support.

No one should have doubted that, despite reversals at home and abroad, the LTTE retained formidable capabilities. In 2000, before the cease-fire, the LTTE also won several major battlefield victories against the Sri Lankan military. They also fought Indian forces to a standstill during India's ill-fated peace-keeping mission in Sri Lanka from 1987-1990 (in what is referred to as India's Vietnam.)

The fighting occurs against the backdrop of a scheduled resumption of peace talks on October 28. The Sri Lankan government hoped to enter the talks from a position of strength - instead they are entering from a position of tremendous weakness.

Unfortunately, the peace process offers little chance of a long-term resolution. The LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, is a world class terrorist and the Tigers could teach Hamas or the Salafis a thing or two about indoctrinating suicide bombers. He is unlikely to accommodate himself to a role within Sri Lanka's (imperfect) democracy. At the same time, separation is not an option. An independent Tamil state (the LTTE's ultimate goal) will become an irritant to India - possibly encouraging separatism among its Tamil minority - and, because of its strategic location astride the Indian Ocean, a probable haven for transnational crime.

The best that can be hoped for is quiet (which, in the wake of the massive civilian suffering is a worthy goal). Hopefully the respite will be used by the international community to foster comprehensive efforts to reach past the LTTE to the Tamil people, while also pressing the Sri Lankan government to develop more inclusive policies towards its Tamil minority. This, combined with continuing pressure on the LTTE's international fund-raising and arms procurement, might - in time - bring some peace to Sri Lanka.

Several excellent analysis from India's perspective are available from the South Asia Analysis Group.

Cross-posted to The TerrorBlog.

A Week of Bombings in Mindanao: Making Sense of It All (updated 10/17)

By Zachary Abuza

A spate of bombings rocked the southern Philippines over the past six days. The attacks have been clearly pinned on the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operatives and should be seen as both an attempt to distract the attention of the security forces from their ongoing offensive in Jolo and as payback for the arrest of Dulmatin’s – the top JI operative in the Philippines – wife on 3 October. But the attacks have broader implications for the peace process now that the government is implicating the MILF.

1. The Attacks:
Ten people were killed and over 40 were wounded in a string of bombings across Mindanao and Jolo. In all, four bombs went off and three were defused. The first bomb went off in a crowded marketplace in Makilala, North Cotabato, and killed eight. The bomb was a cell phone-detonated 81-mm mortar round. A second bomb, hidden inside a black backpack, was defused in front of the Makilala municipal hall. That was followed by a bomb of a similar design in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. It was also placed in a market and killed two. A bomb twice as large was placed in front of the new shopping mall in Cotabato City, but failed to detonate, an apparent malfunction in its cell phone-detonator. On Sunday, three people were wounded when a bomb went off at a police camp in Jolo. That same day a bomb was defused in a crowded market in Padian, Zamboanga del Sur. That bomb was fairly sophisticated and one press report described it as made of “ammunition from a rocket-propelled grenade, 60-mm. mortar, and 40-mm. and M203 plastic pipe with TNT flakes, one kilo of mixed TNT flakes with ammonium nitrate, blasting caps, and an alarm clock in a backpack.” An M79 grenade went off in the marketplace, but there were no casualties as the police had cleared the area.

According to National Security Advisor Bert Gonzales, "Investigation showed that the old leaders are still the ones overseeing the entire operations of its terrorist cells operating in the south. But these were actually carried out by new recruits." Two days later, the government pressed charges against six members of the MILF, including its chairman Ebrahim el Haj Murad, for helping to carry out the attacks. According to a press report, an un-identified informant for the police said that a mid-level MILF field commander Kule Mamagong organized a team led by Abdulbasit Usman, a JI trained bomber and leader of the Special Operations Group. At this point there is some but not overwhelming evidence of MILF complicity.

2. The Ongoing Offensive:
Clearly the past week’s attacks were to counter the government’s offensive against the ASG in Jolo, which began on 1 August. Dubbed “Oplan Ultimatum,” the offensive was launched after roughly 200 ASG were seen converging in Indanan town together with JI members Umar Patek, Dulmatin, and a Singaporean national, Manobo. The offensive has netted some gains and a handful of ASG members were killed or captured; though fewer than the Armed Forces of the Philippines routinely claim. The AFP has some 5,000 men deployed on the small island of Jolo. In the past week eight AFP were killed and more than 30 wounded in fierce fire-fights.

The ASG are believed to be under the command of Radulan Sahiron. Another top ASG leader, Isnilon Hapilon, is thought to have been wounded. Press reports, citing intelligence sources, state that he withdrew from Jolo and landed in Lantawan town on Basilan where he is being treated.

The most important ain in the offensive was the seizure of a large explosives cache in early September in Pitakul that included almost 6,000 blasting caps and ten sacks of ammonium nitrate. Also recovered were documents and CDs. The ASG/JI bomb-factory provided some evidence of cross-fertilization. Dr. Azahari’s small bag bomb has now been found in the southern Philippines. Several of last week’s bombs were detonated by cellular phones, a JI technique but not one previously employed by the ASG. US military sources quoted in the press argued that the cache of explosives was intended to be used outside of Jolo/Sulu; though without further evidence provided that is conjecture.

However, on 17 October, Philippine security forces seized about 200 kg of ammonium nitrate that was hidden under a shipment of fresh fish aboard a ferry had come from Jolo. One month earlier, police siezed a similar amount of ammonium nitrate also aboard a ferry landing in Zamboanga. The government is bracing for a new wave of attacks.

3. What Have We Learned from Dulmatin’s Wife?
A second reason for the wave of bombings is clearly in revenge for the 3 October capture of Dulmatin’s wife, Istiada Oemar Sovie (aka Amenah Tohe) and two of their children Edar, 6, and Alih, 8. They were arrested in a safehouse in Pitakul town near the recent fighting. Sovie has shed significant light on the triangular relationship between the ASG, JI and Moro Islamic Liberation front (MILF). Operationally she has revealed the following:

• Her husband, Janjalani, and Patek were near Patikul, still the scene of intense fighting.
• There are some seven other JI members in Mindanao that she knows of including four Indonesians in Maguindanao (whom she identified as her brother-in-law Baharin, Zae, Tom and Karim) and a Singaporean national, Manobo, who is in Sulu with her husband.
• Her husband has been instrumental in training ASG operatives in bomb-making.

But her other revelations have been equally important.
• She shed extensive detail on the under-ground network of getting people from Indonesia to Mindanao, including the network of safe-houses in Sabah, Malaysia. While the tri-country maritime border has proven somewhat vulnerable for JI, the Philippine National Security Advisor Bert Gonzales admitted this weekend that the Philippine government does not have near the resources to police the 26,000 small crafts that go between the Philippines and Indonesia annually.
• She reinforced our understanding that JI is thoroughly inter-connected through marriage. Dulmatin’s sister, Atkah, is married to Baharin, while a brother, is also in Mindanao.
• Her revelations about the MILF have been the most damaging. While she confirmed that MILF operatives had received training from her husband, the real shocker is that in 2003 when they arrived in Mindanao from Central Java, they stayed in Camp Darapanan, currently the MILF’s headquarters. The MILF often ascribes ties with JI to lost commanders, but they were literally living besides the MILF Chairman Ebrahim el Haj Murad for a year before moving to nearby Parang. She makes clear that the JI men always received sanctuary in MILF territory.
• She has not made it clear why they left Mindanao for Sulu, but said that they went along with Rushida, whom she believed was ASG chieftain Khadaffy Janjalan’s third wife in early-2005.
• The four Indonesians she mentioned, in addition to other known senior JI operatives at large, Zulkifli bin Hir and Abdulrahman Ayob are still in MILF areas. They are less radioactive” than Dulmatin and Umar Patek and are accorded sanctuary.
• The MNLF in Sulu was not welcoming to the ASG or JI members. While the Muslim community in MNLF territory did not detain them, they made it clear that the radicals were unwelcome.

4. Implications for the Peace Process:
The vehemently anti-MILF governor of North Cotabato, Emmanuel Piñol, immediately blamed the recent attacks/bombings on the MILF. "I’m holding the MILF responsible for this atrocity. The bomb used was a known signature armament of the MILF," Piñol declared over a local radio program. Pinol was behind some leaks that hardline elements of the MILF, under the command of Ustad Ameril Umbra Kato were instrumental in the attacks. In particular he singled out a team of operatives led by Abdul Basit Usman of the MILF’s Special Operations Group who planted the explosive in Tacurong. On Sunday, the police cleared the MILF of culpability though many AFP commanders have publicly opined in Pinol’s favor. On Tuesday, the government reversed course and charged six MILF members with assisting the attacks. In addition to Chairman Murad, those charged include: Commanders Kule Mamagong alias Ustadz Kule; Daud Sarip; Biznar Salahuddin; Atti Lintungan alias Ustadz Atti; Samsudin Demaalo alias Commander Platon Blah; and Ahmad Akmad Batabol Usman alias Abdulbasit or Basit Usman; Zahide Abdul alias Zabiri Abdul or Bedz; and Usman Al Majad.

The bomb signature – command-detonated artillery shells have been used by the MILF before, but there is so much joint training and cross-fertilization that it is hard without any arrests to positively link the MILF. There will be faint MILF “fingerprints” on the attacks, but this was clearly an ASG/JI operation.

The MILF condemned the recent bombings on their website and denied any connections to the attacks. No surprise there; standard operating procedure. The MILF denied that Abdul Basit Usman was on their roster, and stated that he was expelled several years ago for his involvement in terrorism. The MILF spokesman Eid Kabalu warned, "If they pursue this, it may lead to a total breakdown in the peace process." The MILF's lead negotiator Mohagher Iqbal also weighed in saying "This is a serious issue and it will certainly affect the peace talks."

The MILF have also demanded access to Dulmatin’s wife in order to “educate” her and refute her allegations of MILF complicity with JI. It is very evident that members of the MILF are against the peace process (Kato, for one, but also Wahid Tondok and Salamat Samir) and the longer the talks drag on the more they will be vindicated. Many in the MILF support JI, though for most it is a more pragmatic relationship. With the peace process still far from being concluded, they are not going to cut ties with JI or the Abu Sayyaf. For that reason alone, it is imperative to get the MILF and government back to the peace table. The MILF asserts that terrorism would be counter-productive to the peace talks, yet there are both spoilers within the MILF, as well as those who want to pressure a government, which is dragging out the talks.

The two sides are far apart on many issues, and it is absurd to listen to President Arroyo assert that “80 percent” of the talks have been concluded. Much of what has been “agreed to” has been papered over and the two sides have many unresolved issues that divide them. The talks must be resumed. The Philippine peace process continues to have regional implications.

New Polling Data in Indonesia Shows "Significant" Support for Terrorists

By Zachary Abuza

In four years since the devastating bombs that killed 202 people on the Indonesian resort island of Bali, police and security forces in the region, with the support of Australian and American counterparts, have hurt Jemaah Islamiyah’s capabilities. Roughly 400 members have been arrested. Last November, Dr. Azahari bin Husin, the group’s top bomb-maker was killed and police netted some 33 bombs in various states of production, much of JI’s available cache. JI is seeking to rebuild its ranks. Azahari’s cookbooks were written in an easy to understand manner and he had trained his own protégés. Likewise they have been trying to stockpile explosives. Two weeks ago a female courier was caught with 8-9 kilos of mining-grade plastic explosives. JI is down but not out.
What is most troubling is not that JI is still around or able to perpetrate attacks, but that they have an uncomfortable amount of support in society.
In their most recent poll, the very well respected and independent Indonesia Survey Institute polled some 1,092 residents from across Indonesia from late September to early October – the “bombing season” in Indonesia - and found that 17.4 people supported JI’s use of violence to establish an Islamic state. A similar number, 16.1 percent, actively supported the Mujihidin Council of Indonesia (known by its Bahasa acronym MMI). The MMI is the overt-civil society organization of JI’s spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Other top JI members have concurrently held positions within the MMI, which is committed to establishing sharia law in Indonesia. Other top JI leaders, such as Abu Jibril, who was released from prison in October 2004 after a token sentence are also active in the MMI leadership.

Most alarming is that when asked if they supported the actions of Imam Samudra, who is now awaiting a firing squad for his role in the Bali bombing, 9 percent of the respondents said yes. According to the pollsters: "They approved the bombings conducted ... in Bali with the excuse of defending Islam." "Jihad that has been understood partially and practised with violence is justified by around one in 10 Indonesian Muslims.”

These numbers are also discouraging because of some positive improvements in public opinions about violence in 2005. The Pew Center for People and the Press’ polling data also sheds some light on this issue. In their 2005 poll, support for violent jihad had fallen from 27 percent in August to 15 percent, while those who said violence can never be justified grew from 54 percent to 66 percent. These numbers appear to be rising again. But the Pew survey had one fascinating number that few analysts have latched onto: the number of Indonesians who believed their religion is “under attack” grew from 15 percent to over 80 percent. This is the key figure. Dr. Christine Fair and Hussain Haqqani have done the regression analysis of the pew data and found that the single greatest indicator as to why people support suicide terrorism is the degree to which people believe their religion is under attack.

In the past few years, the Indonesia Survey Institute, has tried to assuage concerns that Islamists are gaining a foothold. Previous surveys have put support for Islamists at 15%. Other survey work that is touted by Indonesian-ists suggests that high rates of support for sharia are really qualified and not as strong as they actually appear. Yet the support for Islamists is clearly growing. The Indonesia Survey Institute concluded by saying the percentage of such support "is very significant": ''For support of extreme actions like in the Bali bombings, 9 per cent is not insignificant. It's very significant.”

Indeed it is.

Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorism in Europe

By Jonathan Winer

First, thank you Andrew for inviting me to participate in the CT blog, which I have consulted with interest for many months.

The French situation would seem perfect for an exploration of whether going beyond normal law enforcement operations to counter-insurgency may have applicability to homegrown Islamic extremism in particular locales where respect for existing social norms is being threatened by counter-cultural and counter-political values oriented around an ideology that justifies violence.

Some relevant excerpts from recent Counter-insurgency Doctrine issued by US military analysts. They wrote it with Iraq and Afghanistan in mind, not extremist enclaves in Western Europe. The question is how much of this kind of thinking could apply to domestic, localized threats, who view themselves as part of a "global insurgency" agains the Christian West. From the point of view of an young Islamic extremist living in Parisian suburbs, the term "occupied France" may have a very different meaning from the one we ordinarily give it, meaning something closer to the term "occupied Palestine."

The concepts of counter insurgency outlined in the US Army paper excerpted below would seem, I think, to be applicable to the French situation. It is not clear to me whether the French government is thinking this way about it. -- JMW

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Because insurgents attempt to prevent the military battlespace from becoming decisive and concentrate in the political and psychological, operational design must be different than for conventional combat. Specifically, the U.S. military and other government agencies should develop an effects-based approach designed to fracture, delegitimize, delink, demoralize, and deresource insurgents. To make this work requires an independent strategic assessment organization composed of experienced government officials, military officers, policemen, intelligence officers, strategists, and regional experts to assess a counterinsurgency operation and allow senior leaders to
make adjustments. . .

Mounting global discontent arising from globalization; the failure of economic development to keep pace with expectations; the collapse of traditional political, economic, and social orders; widespread anger and resentment; environmental decay; population pressure; the presence of weak regimes; the growth of transnational organized crime; and the widespread availability of arms are making insurgency common and strategically significant. This significance is likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer. . .

At some point every insurgency must open direct operations against the regime in order to succeed. This can take the form of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, assassination of officials, sabotage, and other types of irregular or asymmetric violence. At the same time, the insurgents must continue to improve their skills, learn their craft, accumulate resources, and mobilize support. They may do this by cultivating external alliances, smuggling, robbery, narcotrafficking, kidnapping, black marketing, money laundering, counterfeiting, merchandise pirating, illegal use of charities, racketeering, and extortion. They may buy arms, obtaining them from ideological allies, or capture them from government forces. Most―but not all― insurgents also seek to augment their legitimacy, mobilize greater public support and, in some cases, expand their international acceptance.

Insurgents have a variety of methods to do this, including propaganda, information warfare designed to popularize the perception that they are seekers of justice forced into violence by the unwillingness of the regime to give them a voice in the political system, actions which demonstrate that they offer a better alternative than the regime, and simple boldness and courage― ”armed propaganda”―designed to demonstrate the incompetence and brutality of the regime. In any case, insurgents inspire resistance and recruitment by defiance, particularly among young males with the volatile combination of boredom, anger, and lack of purpose. Insurgency can provide a sense of adventure, excitement, and meaning that transcends its political objectives. Thus the greater the pool of bored, angry, unoccupied young men in a society, the more fruitful ground for insurgent organizers to work. The job of mobilizing support and acquiring resources is even easier for insurgents in a liberation conflict since they can draw on the inherent dislike people have of domination by “outsiders.” As Khair al-Din Hasib, the “father” of pan-Arab nationalism, stated, “Whenever, wherever there is occupation, there will be resistance.” . . .

Starting an insurgency is easy. A dozen or so dedicated radicals with access to munitions and explosives can do it. Building an effective insurgency, though, is difficult. History suggests that it requires a specific set of conditions. The importance of these is determined, in part, by the effectiveness of the regime. When facing a determined regime with an understanding of counterinsurgency and the resources to undertake it, all of these conditions must be present for any degree of success by the insurgents. When facing a weak, disorganized, corrupt, divided, repressive, or ineffective regime, insurgents can overcome the absence of one or even several of the conditions.

The most basic precondition for insurgency is frustration and the belief that this cannot be ameliorated through the existing political system. This may be widespread among a population or limited to a radical elite which then has to convince the more passive population of the need for violent change. A conspiratorial history and culture are also important. In such societies, insurgents can utilize or take over existing patterns of underground activity, webs of secret societies, or widespread criminal activity. A society already accustomed to conspiratorial activity is a naturally fertile ground for insurgency. . . .

One additional strategic factor merits consideration: some strategic thinkers contend that the United States is now facing the first insurgency of a global scale―created by the interlinkage of multiple national insurgencies―led by a network motivated by radical Islam. The Global War on Terrorism has all of the characteristics of an insurgency: protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, dispersal, the use of complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political mobilization designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor; avoidance by insurgents of battlespaces where they are weak and a focus on those where they can compete, particularly the psychological and the political. The insurgents are fighting a total war with limited resources; the counterinsurgents are self-restrained by ethics and a desire to control costs. This belief suggests that the appropriate American response is to build a grand strategy modeled on counterinsurgency which reflects the differences between national and liberation insurgencies. . . .

Because insurgents attempt to prevent the military battlespace from becoming decisive and concentrate in the political and psychological, operational design must be different than for conventional combat. One useful approach would be to adopt an interagency, effects-based method of counterinsurgency planning focused on the following key activities:

• Fracturing the insurgent movement through military, psychological, and political means, to include direct strikes, dividing one part against another, offering amnesties, draining the pool of alienated, disillusioned, angry young males by providing alternatives, and so forth. Relationships within insurgent movements are not necessarily harmonious. Cabals within the insurgency often vie for leadership or dominance. Identifying these rifts and exploiting them may prove to be a coup for the counterinsurgency strategy;
• Delegitimizing the insurgent movement in the eyes of the local population and any international constituency it might have;
• Demoralizing the insurgent movement by creating and sustaining the perception that long-term trends are adverse and by making the lives of insurgents unpleasant and dangerous through military pressure and psychological operations;
• Delinking the insurgent movement from its internal and external support by understanding and destroying the political, logistics, and financial connections; and,
• Deresourcing the insurgent movement both by curtailing funding streams and causing it to waste existing resources.

------------------------
From Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the 21st Century, Metz and Millen, US Army Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004

Controversy Grows Over Supposed Unity of Iraqi Mujahideen as Al-Qaida Announces Founding of Sunni Islamic State

By Evan Kohlmann

The Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC)--the Al-Qaida umbrella group for extremist mujahideen factions operating in Iraq--has attempted to make history today by announcing the foundation of a Sunni Islamic state out of the remnants of Iraq. In a video statement, an MSC spokesman (whose identity was concealed) accused Kurdish and Shiite militia forces of establishing their own zones of control in the north and south of Iraq in the face of "this farcical state of al-Maliki, which unfortunately some Sunni traitors have joined." As a result, in partnership with several other Iraqi mujahideen factions considered outside the MSC--including Jaish al-Fatihin ("The Conquering Army")--the spokesman declared the establishment of "the Islamic State of Iraq in Baghdad, Al-Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salahuddin, Ninewah, and sections of the Babil and al-Wassat provinces." The spokesman also explained that the leader of the new state would be the "Amir al-Mumineen Shaykh Abu Omar al-Baghdadi" and asked "all the mujahideen, the clerics of Iraq, the tribal chiefs, and the Sunni people to swear an oath of allegiance" to Abu Omar.

However, even as the MSC announces the foundation of their Islamic state, there are already serious questions about the eagerness of other Sunni mujahideen in Iraq to join alongside them. Earlier this week, the media wing of the group Jaish al-Fatihin issued a statement denying that it was involved in any alliance with Al-Qaida or the MSC. In a terse communique, the group admitted it was "surprised" to find that its name had been prominently included in a list of Iraqi insurgent groups who the MSC claimed were backing its new political ventures in Iraq: "Perhaps it happened inadvertently, but we were not made aware of [this], neither directly nor indirectly." The MSC, in turn, has fired off their own lengthy rebuttal today accusing Jaish al-Fatihin's media wing of being ignorant and out-of touch:

"It seems that that Media Wing of the Al-Fatihin Army is not aware that four out of five of the former Al-Fatihin Army brigades have recently sworn allegiance to the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq under the command of brother Abu Abdullah al-Iraqi. It was agreed at the time with the commander of the brigades... to keep the groups under the name of the Al-Fatihin Army."

The MSC offered a lukewarm willingness to mediate their dispute with the Jaish al-Fatihin's representatives, but sternly admonished that "such information and discussions should not be posted in public forums in order to avoid spoiling the morale of Muslims." Or--for the MSC--more importantly, to avoid revealing the lingering hesitation of some Sunni insurgents in Iraq to join on the bandwagon of Al-Qaida in dismantling the final vestiges of the Iraqi nation.

Terrorists, Traitors and Citizenship

By Bill West

As reported extensively in the media over the past two days, including here in the CT Blog, Adam Gadahn was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in southern California for treason and providing material support to al-Qaeda. Gadahn, a 28 year old native-born American citizen, has surfaced as an alleged video mouthpiece and recruiter for al-Qaeda, ranting vindictive threats against his own country and countrymen. Today, an in-depth article by law professor Henry Mark Holzer appeared in FrontPage magazine analyzing the background and validity of the treason charge against Gadahn and Professor Holzer determined the Government is on very solid ground with its indictment.

Gadahn is an accused suspect and, as heinous as the accusations may be and no matter how strong the evidence in the case might seem, in America the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a court of law. Hopefully, Gadahn will soon get his days in a US court.

The charge of treason has been rarely brought in America. As noted in the various press reports, the last such cases were more than fifty years ago, stemming from WW-II. The circumstances of America’s current conflict against radical Islamic terror organizations and their state sponsors are presenting opportunities for Federal prosecutors to potentially pursue such violations. We have, most unfortunately, seen a number of successful Federal terrorism prosecutions involving other violations wherein the defendants have been either naturalized or native-born US citizens. The recruitment of US citizens, especially native-born citizens, by al-Qaeda and affiliated/similar terrorist organizations, is something they aggressively pursue. As noted from the convictions brought to date, the Government has had some success in targeting such operatives with various terrorism-related and other criminal violations.

When such cases are pursued and especially when convictions result against US citizens who are involved in foreign terrorist organizations targeting America, issues invariably arise about the loyalties of those US citizen defendants. Clearly, when such defendants are convicted of terrorism related violations, especially violations such as conspiracy to levy war against the United States as some have been, it can be presumed their loyalties no longer reside with America.

When such defendants are naturalized US citizens and their criminal “bad acts” predate their naturalization, the Government can and usually does pursue revocation of the convicted defendant’s naturalization status. Sometimes, a separate felony naturalization fraud violation under 18 USC 1425 will be incorporated into the larger indictment when the evidence allows. Otherwise, a separate civil de-naturalization proceeding may be initiated under 8 USC 1451.

But what happens if the “bad acts” occurred after the naturalization? The unfortunate answer is the naturalized US citizen, now a convicted terrorist or terror supporter, gets to remain a US citizen. And for the native-born US citizen, that citizenship is sacrosanct. This even though such “citizens” have been convicted of offenses tantamount to being engaged in terrorist warfare, or supporting that activity, against their homeland. Or, does the law really say it must be that way?

Actually, no. At least under certain circumstances. A little known provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1481, that has been on the books for decades but is an even more rarely utilized statute than the treason law (and possibly may never have been used in an adversarial, involuntary case), allows for both naturalized and native-born US citizens to be stripped of their citizenship if they engage in certain activities. Among the most notorious such activities, as defined in subsection (a)(7) of the statute, are: “committing any act of treason against, or attempting by force to overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States, violating or conspiring to violate any of the provisions of section 2383 of title 18, or willfully performing any act in violation of section 2385 of title 18, or violating section 2384 of title 18 by engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, if and when he is convicted thereof by a court martial or by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

Clearly, this statute might provide an additional powerful tool to the Government in its counter-terrorism efforts. As noted previously, a number of naturalized and native-born US citizens have already been convicted in terrorism-related cases wherein the underlying activities supporting the convictions appear to fall within those defined in 8 USC 1481(a)(7). In fact, some of those defendants have even been convicted specifically of conspiracy to levy war against the US.

A full review of the 8 USC 1481 statute is quite revealing. There are other proscribed activities. These essentially relate to becoming a naturalized citizen of a foreign country or taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign country; under certain circumstances serving in the armed forces of a foreign country; or, under certain circumstances serving in any official position of a foreign government or political subdivision thereof. These are not in and of themselves “bad acts” but are proscribed acts under US nationality law. What is clear is those proscribed acts relate to the loyalty of the person performing the acts. The acts are indicative of loyalty to a foreign state and not loyalty to the United States, therefore the US citizen performing the acts is presumed to have abandoned his/her loyalty to the United States.

Of particular interest in this regard is the fact that some cases have been identified wherein terrorist and terror-supporting suspects who are US citizens have been found to hold dual nationalities with other countries. Could some of those suspects have served in foreign militaries while holding US citizenship? Did they take a foreign oath of allegiance? There are even cases wherein dual-national individuals have been publicly identified as holding public office in certain terrorist organization strongholds in a foreign land.

Of course, there is virtually no precedent with this law. Revocation of citizenship has almost always been against naturalized US citizens wherein there was evidence of fraud or misrepresentation with the underlying naturalization process, often linked to the larger criminal activity of the defendant. In the rare case where a native-born person loses their US citizenship, it is done through voluntary renunciation, something for which 8 USC 1481 also provides. Interestingly, 8 USC 1481(b) indicates that any citizenship revocation action would be civil in nature, meaning the rules of evidence and standards of proof would not be as strict as in criminal procedures.

Just because a legal statute and process may have been little (if ever) employed does not mean it has no value. Under the current circumstances of the GWOT, wherein the Government should be pursuing every legitimate lawful tool available to it to bring to bear against terrorist suspects and enemies, why shouldn’t such an avenue not be further explored?

What is the value in stripping a US citizen terrorist of their citizenship? The terrorist then becomes an alien. In the case of a naturalized citizen, they revert back to the nationality they held before naturalization and ultimately subject to potential deportation to their home country. In the case of a native-born US citizen, they would become a stateless alien, unless some other country conferred citizenship upon them or they held dual-nationality. Even with a stateless alien, such a person also, upon serving any criminal sentence, would be subject to deportation proceedings and could be detained during those proceedings and could be detained until a final removal order is obtained. If they are determined to be a national security threat, they could even be detained, indefinitely, after a final removal order is obtained if they could not be physically deported because no country would take them. For those stripped of their citizenship who are already outside the US, they could be barred from entering this country. For serious terrorist threats, therein lies another rationality behind the effort beyond the fact the law allows for it.

While these issues present serious considerations, they would invariably be highly controversial, especially relative to native-born American citizens. It should be remembered, however, that such persons would be citizens who, by their own actions, have demonstrated hatred and the ultimate disloyalty for their country. Do such persons really deserve discretionary shielding from a legitimate law that happens to be waiting for action?

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More Bad News on Darfour

By Douglas Farah

A new report by the UN monitoring group for Sudan paints a grim picture of the deteriorating situation in Sudan, largely at the hands of the government-backed _janjaweed_ and now, Chadian rebels allied with Khartoum. (Link to come)

The situation is inevitably messy in drawing lines among myriad factions all seeking their own agenda. But one element is often overlooked in trying to place the Darfur disaster in a broader context--the long-standing relationship between the Sudanese government and the most radical elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, and, as a direct outgrowth of that, the government's direct sponsorship of Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and multiple other Islamist groups.

These ties have not gone away. The Brotherhood continues to hold regular leadership meetings in Khartoum, under the protection of the government, and has set up a financial structure there as well. It is this structure that helps sustain the regime as well as encourage the slaughter in Darfour.

It is not an accident that bin Laden used one of his rare public appearances, aired April 23 on al Jazeera, to reject the still-born peace accord in Sudan and call for jihad in Darfur. He urged _mujahadeen_ to acquaint themselves with the territory and tribes of the region. My full blog is here.

Chemical Weapon, Kotli and Cricket: Alleged Al Qaeda Ashes Plot May not be Farfetched !

By Animesh Roul

The “London Bombers”, who attacked the public transport system on July 7, 2005 were initially ordered by al Qaeda leadership to assassinate the England and Australia cricket teams using Sarin gas (a Chemical Weapon), during the 2005 Ashes Series. This revelation was made by a man claiming to be a family friend of one of the bombers to the Sunday Times newspaper. This report created a sort of debate over the purported claim made by this friend of bus bomber Hasib Hussain, who was involved in the bombing London's Tavistock Square.

Experts have disputed this claim. According to Rohan Gunaratna, acclaimed terrorism expert and author of Inside Al Qaeda (2002) the London bombers trained in the Malakand camp, not in Kotli in Pakistan as claimed by Mohammad Sidique Khan ( the Edgware Road bomber) and Shehzad Tanweer ( responsible for the Aldgate attack) who allegedly received the orders at a training camp near Kotli in December 2004.

While Gunaratna downplayed the Kotli camp claim as 'misleading', David Wright-Neville of Monash University, Australia said, "there's no evidence that Sarin nerve gas has ever really loomed in the al-Qaeda cells in Europe's thinking.”

Is this revelation contradictory with the information already available? Or, is it going to add more flesh to the investigations?

However, these questions notwithstanding, the fact remain that both Khan and Tanweer visited Pakistan during 2004, as information provided by Pakistani intelligence. In addition, one may ponder that how a so-called family friend of a terrorist can know ‘Kotli, not a famous city in Pakistan’s territory, by its name and existence of training camps there? Has he ever visited Pakistan to know such a place exists where terror training camps are operational? Is there any past evidence of Sarin plot by Al Qaeda cells?

I wish to put some open source information into perspective that Kotli has been a focal point of terror training of Islamic militant closely affiliated to al Qaeda and al Qaeda always has plans to use Sarin nerve agent (Chemical weapons).

Kotli camps came to limelight when there were instances of factional clashes in terror training camps. In early Oct 2000, couple of trainee militants of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and another trainee affiliated to Jamaat-e-Islami were killed during an internecine clash between two factions of the outfit at a training cap in Kotli. In the same month, Jamaat-e-Islami had offered to provide more recruits to terrorist training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). The JI chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed had reportedly announced that the Jamaat would soon strengthen and expand its own training camps near Muzaffarabad and Kotli in PoK.

In Kotli, terror training camps have been operational since long with the collusion of Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence. According to a June 2001 report, about 400 young recruits from various groups (Hizb-ul-Mujahadeen, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Hizb-e-Islami) took arms training under direct supervision of Colonel Musa of the Special Operations intelligence unit of ISI and two other officers, Major Umar and Captain Hussan.

Again, in December 2001, Indian security agencies claimed to have arrested Ayub Ahmad Sarogi alias Ayubi, a resident of Kotli who was affiliated to al Qaeda network, and foiled a Qaeda- Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) plot to exterminate Jammu and Kashmir legislators and to target vital installations by fidayeen (suicide) attack. Ayub has also reportedly disclosed that the al Qaeda had spread its network in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), New Delhi, Mumbai and Uttar Pradesh, besides to a couple of other Indian cities much before the United States declared a war on Taliban and al Qaeda.

I doubted this ‘al Qaeda-in- India’ claim, even after recent July 2006 Mumbai blasts. However, nobody can deny the fact that they (Islamic terror outfits) are all intertwined and have close operational and logistic linkages. Most of avid terror watchers will agree that most of the Pakistan based Islamic outfits mentioned here (or those not listed here) have close ties with al Qaeda and follow the tenets of bin Laden, if not the Prophet’s. It is now a open secret that they are mushrooming in Pakistan ‘s territory.

Regarding Sarin nerve gas threat: Not long ago, British intelligence agency claimed to have cracked a Qaeda codes and foiled a chemical attack (involving sarin) on Parliament. This Sarin plot hatched in 2004 when the agencies have discovered coded e-mails on computers seized from terror suspects in Britain and Pakistan. Much before this the visuals of dogs being gassed at Qaeda training camp, could be a reminder to asses its WMD capability without underestimating it.

It is not hard to believe London terrorists' Kotli camp sojourn and Sarin gas threat against cricket players (cricket plot as Plan B). It may not be far fetched. The disclosure might give new perspective into the 7/7 case and clues to understand the capabilities of al Qaeda that we fail to know all these years.

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Dhiren Barot (a.k.a. Esa al-Hindi) Pleads Guilty to Plotting Numerous Attacks

By Andrew Cochran

In a major legal victory against a key terrorist operative, Dhiren Barot of London, a.k.a. Esa al-Hindi, pleaded guilty today in London on charges of plotting numerous attacks in the U.K. He was one of eight suspects arrested in the United Kingdom in August 2004 and charged under Britain’s Terrorism Act. Barot planned "the Gas Limos Project" to explode three limousines "packed" with gas cylinders and explosives in underground car parks in the UK as part of a wider bombing campaign there, which would include the use of a radioactive bomb. You can also see the London Times story on this case and the BBC story on the case.

Barot was indicted in April 2005 in the U.S., and Justice Department prosecutors will probably seek his extradition for trial here. Specific buildings targeted in the U.S. included the International Monetary Fund and World Bank buildings in Washington, the New York Stock Exchange and Citigroup buildings in New York and the Prudential buildings in Newark.

We reported on the al-Hindi case and its importance from the release of the federal indictment:

Evan Kohlmann, April 12, 2005: "Federal Indictment Unsealed Against Trio Accused of Targeting Citigroup, NYSE for terror attacks" with the U.S. indictment and a link to a one-page summary of al-Hindi's book, The Army of Madinah in Kashmir, on Evan's "Global Terror Alert" site. In his post, Evan discussed Barot's stated intentions, "Barot highlights several desirable "war strategems" in particular, including 'Economical warfare', 'Drug warfare', 'Germ warfare', and 'Chemical warfare.'"

Bill West, April 13, 2005: "Immigration Fraud and Terror? Yet Again." Bill pointed out that "Defendant Barot, by allegedly obtaining a student visa by clear and blatant fraud, and using that visa to enter the U.S. to further his terrorism efforts, is one of the clearest examples yet of abuse of the student visa system by terror suspects since the 9-11 hijackers."

Jeffrey Imm, August 16, 2006: "How The Road To Terror Leads Back To London," in which he references the al-Hindi case, among others, and includes a link to a good Center for Defense Information summary of the case.

Daily Standard: Prison Jihad?

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

On September 19, I testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee about Islamic radicalism in prisons. Today I have an essay entitled "Prison Jihad?" at The Daily Standard based on this testimony. An excerpt:

BEFORE ENTERING THE COUNTERTERRORISM FIELD, I worked for a radical Islamic charity called the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation. In this capacity, I gained some familiarity with the kind of Islamic extremist literature that often finds its way into the U.S. prison system and thus influences inmates' religious education. I was, after all, one of the people responsible for distributing this literature. It's a serious problem for American society and homeland security. But first, some background on Al Haramain.
THE INTERNATIONAL AL HARAMAIN ORGANIZATION was originally formed as a private charity in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1992. It was devoted to fostering Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia's austere brand of Islam. When I worked for the group, it had offices in more than 50 countries and an annual budget of between $40 million and $50 million. Today, however, Al Haramain no longer exists as a stand-alone entity. It was merged into the Saudi National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad.

Al Haramain's terrorist connections begin with the Ashland, Oregon, branch, for which I worked. The Ashland branch has been designated a terrorist sponsor by the Treasury Department. Two directors were indicted for their roles in a money-laundering scheme that involved smuggling roughly $130,000 in traveler's checks out of the country without declaring them. Federal investigators believe that this money funded the Chechen mujahideen.

The U.S. Treasury has designated Al Haramain offices in Kenya and Tanzania as sponsors of terrorism for their role in the 1998 embassy bombings. The designation lists multiple connections between Al Haramain and the bombings, including the offices' involvement in planning the attacks, funding by a wealthy Al Haramain official, and a former Tanzanian Al Haramain director's role in making preparations for the advance party that planned the bombings. The Al Haramain branch office in the Comoros Islands was also designated because it "was used as a staging area and exfiltration route for the perpetrators of the 1998 bombings."

Read the whole essay here.

Gadahn Indicted for Treason (with Indictment) & NYC Airplane Crash Raises Readiness Questions (updated 10/12)

By Andrew Cochran

Two items of news with last update at 5:45 pm ET: Adam Gadahn, a.k.a. "Azzam the American," was indicted for treason in California, the first such indictment in 50 years in the U.S., for giving aid and comfort to Al Qaeda. Gadahn has emerged as a leading spokeman for Al Qaeda.

HERE is the indictment (Acrobat file), thanks to Steven Emerson. There are two counts, one for treason and the other for providing material support and resources to Al Qaeda. Individual statements by Gadahn in Al Qaeda videos form the basis of the treason count: "Fighting and defeating America is our first priority..."

Previous CT Blog posts on Gadahn:

Commentary on “Azzam the American’s” Diatribe
The "Azzam-Zawahiri" tape: a longer reading..
The "Azzam" Threat: A prelude to Future Jihad in America
New Al Qaeda Video Seeks Americans to Convert to Islam
New Video Coming From Ayman al-Zawahiri and American Al Qaeda (updated)
MSNBC: "American greases al-Qaida media machine"
American Al-Qaida Operative Surfaces Again in Bin Laden Video Release

And a small fixed-wing plane crashed into a 50-story condominium building at 524 East 72d Street, near York Avenue, in New York City this afternoon. Early concerns of a terrorist attack were not warranted; N.Y. Yankees pitcher Cory Lidle owned the plane and was killed in the crash.

Sad to say, this was a test of the capability to spot and stop, if possible, a terrorist attack using a small plane in a major urban area. One question will be whether any radar picked this plane up, or whether it flew too small, too low, and/or not in the air long enough to be tracked. None of the 3 NYC-area airports saw the plane on radar, and it took off from an airport in Teterboro, NJ. Recall that small planes flying into Washington airspace caused mass evacuations of the U.S. Capitol area in May 2005 and again in June 2005, but those planes were followed in DC airspace, which isn't blocked by any high-rise buildings. Another question will be whether the pilot was talking with flight controllers and, if so, whether those controllers were able to report the plane's status to any other officials before it crashed. An investigation into the June 2005 event found insufficient communication between FAA traffic controllers and Washington-area officials at DOD and DHS.

UPDATE 10/12: Rep. Anthony Weiner, who represents Brooklyn and Queens, has called on the FAA "to restrict small planes from flying in low airspace around New York City until a complete safety and security assessment of New York City airspace is completed" and "to prohibit helicopters from flying over Manhattan." I'm sure that Congress will take a long look at this issue in the next session. Thanks to James Gordon Meek of the "NY Daily News" for pointing out Rep. Weiner's press release. And DOD has issued a press release with an account of the NORTHCOM mobilization of fighter jets over US cities yesterday.

Lack of Language Proficiency Shows Broader Problems in Fighting Islamists

By Douglas Farah

The Washington Post's stunning revelation that only 33 of the FBI's 12,000 agents have even minimal Arabic-none working on terrorism issues-is a symptom of a much broader problem within much of the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

The Post piece on the catastrophic lack of language ability five years after 9-11 says that we have still not taken this war seriously. There is no widespread effort to understand radical Islam, read the literature, understand what their plan is or what their motivations are.

After five years, one would think every IC and law enforcement person involved in terrorism issues would have read the Muslim Brotherhood literature, al Qaeda literature, "Ghost Wars," "The Looming Towers," "Imperial Hubris," etc. This should not be optional, but required. There are different perspectives presented and one can debate the meanings, the way forward and the tactical and strategic responses, but only if everyone is starting from the same point.

The fundamental flaw is an ongoing inability or unwillingness to identify the enemy as Islamist who want to kill us, and deal with that enemy for what it is-a sophisticated, multi-pronged, coherent group that constantly runs intelligence, counterintelligence and propaganda operations. My full blog is here.

Another Indication of the Continuing Deteoriation in Baghdad

By Andrew Cochran

At his press conference this morning (continuing as I write), the President is addressing the deteoriating security situation in Baghdad on the heels of a terrorist attack on an American arms depot there. Another indication of that the slide downhill there will continue comes from a jihadist website message translated by Laura Mansfield calling for Baghdad residents to prepare for an upcoming "Big Battle of Baghdad." Here's an excerpt of the message thanks to Laura:

With the approach of Baghdad's big liberating battle, the Baghdad of al-Mansur, al-Rashid, and the lawful president, the father of martyrs, Saddam Husayn, announced earlier by the brave Iraqi Army and the heroic resistance groups, we call upon the people of Baghdad and all our people in the provinces to prepare for this blessed battle and follow the next steps to minimize losses as much as possible:
--form national committees in districts, particularly first aid committees with all necessary medical equipment, and plan secretly the battle strategies;

--each family must store food, including dry food, and water as much as possible;

--form smaller committees to support poor families in spreading the spirit of passion, assistance, and cooperation known of Iraqis;

--prevent anyone from taking any kind of revenge on those who are objecting to the Al-Tahrir (liberating) government, God willing; and

--form local resistance committees to support Al-Tahrir Army, preferring officers of the Iraqi Army who could be trusted after background checks and confirming that they are not working for the occupation and agents.

Minneapolis Cab Ordinance Raises Questions About Religious Exemptions

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

A new proposed ordinance in Minneapolis has been garnering considerable media attention. For some time, hundreds of Muslim cabdrivers at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport have been refusing fares that they know are carrying alcohol. These fare refusals happen frequently enough that the airport and drivers have "worked out a proposal that calls for cabdrivers who won't carry alcohol to have a cab light that's a different color. That way, the airport workers who hook up travelers with taxis can steer alcohol-carrying fares to cabs that will take them."

The Minnesota chapter of the Muslim American Society (MAS) was reportedly involved in engineering this proposal. I’ve previously written about MAS's ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, in both The Daily Standard and The Dallas Morning News. But even a broken clock is right twice a day; MAS's involvement does not necessarily mean that the proposal is a bad thing. Moving beyond the groups involved, the proposal itself deserves some consideration. Religious accommodations can be a positive thing; they can also be a negative. This proposal will almost certainly go into effect in Minneapolis, and there will be future calls in the U.S. to accommdate other laws to Islamic religious practice -- and to the religious practice of other faiths. So it's important to tease out some of the underlying issues related to the Minneapolis agreement.

A first aspect worth noting is the trend toward Western institutions accepting the most conservative interpretations of Islam and deciding that "this is what Islam holds." In covering the airport proposal, Minneapolis's Star Tribune dutifully reported, "The Qur'an, Islam's holy book, strictly forbids buying, selling, drinking or carrying alcohol." This is plainly false: in the verses that deal with intoxicants, the Qur'an says nothing about carrying alcohol (2:219, 4:43, 5:90-91). However, a hadith commonly used in khutbas in the Middle East is relevant to the issue at hand: "May Allah curse wine, the one who drinks it, the one who pours it, the one who sells it, the one who buys it, the one who squeezes (the grapes etc.), the one for whom it is squeezed, the one who carries it and the one to whom it is carried." The argument advanced by the Muslim cab drivers seems somewhat novel theologically. This hadith seems to condemn the person who transports wine for the purpose of commerce -- as opposed to transporting someone who is carrying wine for their own consumption. Of course, sometimes one will be very careful in dealing with religious obligations to make sure that these obligations are not violated. But the fact that this point isn't well established in Islam suggests that a quite conservative interpretation of religious obligations is here being touted as mainstream Muslim belief.

Second, the case for religious exemptions is strongest when they don't impose costs on others. When the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that Muslim police officers can keep their beards, that may be an example of a court accepting a conservative interpretation of Islam (albeit one that is far more mainstream than the refusal to transport someone carrying alcohol), but it doesn’t impose external costs on others. In Minneapolis, this may not be a costless ordinance. Three-quarters of cabbies in Minneapolis are Somali Muslims. In the future, if you want to carry a duty-free bag out of the Minneapolis airport, you might face a long wait. Another issue that may lie ahead in terms of external costs is Muslim cab drivers who refuse to carry seeing-eye dogs for the blind, as is occurring in Australia.

Third, there is the question of U.S. law. Religious exemptions are designed to shield believers from laws that unreasonably compromise their freedom of conscience. But in some cases -- as when a claimed religious belief discriminates on the basis of gender, or violates fundamental public policy -- most people would believe that U.S. law should predominate over the claimed exemption. Where should this line be drawn? That is a vital question.

Ultimately, it is important to be cognizant of the kind of precedents we create with exemptions or ordinances that are attached to religion -- whether or not that religion is Islam. The Minneapolis ordinance is a relatively trivial step, but it does pinpoint issues that may be far more important down the road.

UPDATE, OCT. 11, 2006, 10:16 A.M.: When I wrote this entry early on Tuesday, it seemed that the proposal would go into effect. However, the Metropolitan Airports Commission, which regulates airport taxi service, found that the proposal created a major backlash. Commission spokesman Patrick Hogan reported that the Commission received 400 e-mails and phone calls, almost all of which opposed the proposal. Thus, the Commission rejected it, leaving the current policy in place. As USA Today reports, the current policy "says drivers who will not transport alcohol must go to the back of the taxi line."

Putting Together a Coherent International Strategy to Combat Terrorism Financing

By Victor Comras

A report issued October 4th by Canada’s Financial Intelligence Unit, Fintrac, estimated that “the total value of case disclosures of suspected terrorist activity financing and other threats to the security of Canada {during the 2006 reporting period} was approximately $256 million.” It’s rare these days to find terrorism financing related estimates in government reports, or, for that matter in any open literature on terrorism financing. But, extrapolating from the Canadian report, one can only conclude that terrorism financing remains big business. And that is why government agencies and financial institutions around the world are shouldering costs in trying to combat it. A recent article in the Economist, for example, estimated that UK banks alone expend some $500 million per year in order to comply with UK AML/CTF requirements.

So what’s happened to all those glowing reports, just a few years ago, that we were near victory in the war on terrorism financing? In 2002 British Chancellor Gordon Brown claimed that al Qaeda’s financing had been completely disrupted. And then-US-Treasury Secretary O’Neill’s claimed that “al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are suffering financially as a result of our actions.” It seems it’s gotten a lot harder since then to find, prosecute, or put out of business, those funding the new generation of al Qaeda and its copycat cells around the world. And we have never really come to grips with cutting of funding to other terrorist groups such as Hizbollah and Hamas. I think we all now realize that we still have a sharp uphill battle when it comes to significantly curbing terrorism financing. And, I think, we still lack a coherent international strategy to accomplish this goal.

The strategy we use now relies, largely, on two basic approaches. The first involves bilateral intelligence and investigative cooperation to trace funds and find terrorists. The second involves using UN resolutions and international conventions to criminalize terrorism financing and to freeze the funds and other assets of those that materially support the terrorists. These tactics do make some sense. But the way we have implemented them does not. We have settled for half measures, diplomatic compromises and unfulfilled promises. The structure we have built, from FATF to the United Nations, is completely lacking in accountability or consequences, and its effectiveness is now quite doubtful.

The following commentary is drawn from remarks I delivered at the September 11-14, 2006 ICT Conference in Hertzlya, Israel

The bilateral arrangements we now have in place engage only a limited number of countries. These countries maintain close links between their intelligence and enforcement services, and are more or less open to sharing information between themselves. But the group is still quite small, and the gaps in information gathering support and sharing is still quite limited. Even within Europe, there remain serious shortcomings, as indicated recently by EU terrorism cooridinator, Gijs de Vries. Expanding such cooperation remains one of the EU’s highest priorities.

The cooperative intelligence gathering and sharing arrangements we now have in place have, as their principal goal, identifying and closing down terrorist cells located in our respective countries. The agencies involved are looking for suspected terrorism fund transfers, with the emphasis on tracing these funds to the terrorist recipients rather than back to their sources. And in most cases those providing the funds are not to be found within their borders. Even when the financial players are local, prosecutions are doubtful and difficult given the sensitive intelligence sources and methods being used. This is one important reason that we’ve had more success in finding the terrorists than we have had in putting their financiers out of business.

At the same time we have relied heavily on the United Nations to put in place an international legal framework for curtailing and criminalizing terrorism and terrorism financing. Unfortunately, these measures have suffered from inadequate implementation and enforcement, and need to be revamped and strengthened.

UN Security Council Resolution 1267 and subsequent resolutions direct that all countries identify and designate al Qaeda members and associates and that they “Freeze without delay their funds and other financial assets or economic resources.” This is potentially a strong measure, but it comes into play only after an individual or entity has been added to the special designation list maintained by the UN’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. That list is woefully inadequate and out of date. It includes only a very small subset of known al Qaeda agents and entities – including very few of the terrorist groups and cells that emerged after 9/11. Of course, Hizbollah and the various Palestian-related terrorist groups are not included within its purview.

There are now some 122 groups and entities that are identified on the list as associated with Al Qaeda. This means that their assets are to be frozen. But that is no longer happening. In fact, quite a few of these organizations continue in operation, and continue to solicit funds, in many cases openly. Take a look at the list of designated charities. Many of them are still around and still raising money. Some have simply changed their name. We all know about Lashkar e Taiba and its director Hafiz Sayeed, who, when Lashkar was designated simply started up Jamaat-ul-Dawa. It took the US State Department nearly two years to designate Jamaat as an alias of Laskhar. And the UN has still not acted on this. That means that Jamaat can still solicit funds openly today. Designating entities, but not the individuals that run them, is a half measures that we cannot afford. It has allowed such groups to easily regroup to circumvent the UN measures against them.

There are now some 218 persons named on the Al Qaeda list. Most of these are operatives rather than financiers. Many are behind bars or in hiding. Some of them are financiers who got put on the list right at the outset during the first round of asset freezes. Included on the list are such deep pocket donors, such as Youssef Nada, Ahmid Idris Nasreddin, Yasin Al Qaeda and Wael Hamza Julaidan. But these guys quickly discovered just how easy it was to circumvent these UN mandated sanctions. They continue to operate using trusts, shell companies, and beneficial ownership arrangements to insulate themselves from the sanctions.

Let’s turn to the other key UN Security Resolution – 1373 (2001). That resolution goes beyond Al Qaeda and the Taliban and directs that all countries criminalize terrorism and terrorism financing. It requires all countries to freeze the funds and other assets and economic resources of any person or persons who commit, or attempt to commit terrorist acts, or who provide material support for such persons. And these obligations are replicated in numerous international treaties and conventions and specifically in the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Financing. But,there is still little beef in this bun! Implementation of 1373 has been tangled up by two major problems. The first is that the measures only come into play after terrorist acts have been attempted or carried out. There is nothing automatic here. Local judicial or administrative proceedings are required before any of the assets can be frozen or transactions stopped. And this can entail considerable delay – the money just doesn’t wait around to be frozen.

Another serious problem is the lack of consensus on a clear definition of terrorism. The International community has been struggling with this definition for over a decade. Without a common definition countries remain free to interpret their own obligations and define for themselves which groups are terrorists and which are “freedom fighters.” Saudi Arabia uses this distinction, for example, to get away with funding Hamas, while Iran and Syria use it to provide funds and support to Hezbollah. Many other countries also avoid taking steps to freeze funds or take other civil or criminal action against those individuals or groups which they support.

So What Should We Do To Develop a More Coherent and Workable International Strategy to Combat Terrorism Financing? Let me put forth six buzz words that I think are essential for such a strategy (1) clarity, (2) commitment, (3) capacity, (4) cooperation, (5) accountability, and (6) consequences.

Clarity requires a simple and direct definition of terrorism. We certainly all know terrorism when we see it. How can you call a suicide bomber attacking a restaurant or a mall anything else? If the General Assembly can’t agree on that than maybe the Security Council should act. If the Security Council can’t act, than let those countries that can agree on such a common standard or definition adopt one on their own and act accordingly.

Combating terrorism and terrorism financing takes more than passing laws and regulations. It requires a dogged commitment to implement these laws and go after those that support terrorism. That requires political will to act against those who commit or support terrorist acts even if we support their ultimate goals. And commitment, in turn requires capacity. We need to insure that all countries that have the will to combat terrorism and terrorism financing do not lack the resources to do so. This was a goal set by the G-8 several years ago, but relatively little has been done to date to realize it. This is what CTAG and the UN’s CTED are supposed to do. Well they certainly need to get a move on.

It’s also essential that we broaden further the circle of cooperation and information sharing that has been at the vanguard of our efforts to combat terrorism and terrorism financing. This might best be done by establishing new functional arrangements, outside the United Nations, that can better handle sensitive intelligence and investigative information and provide direct support for judicial cooperation.

Accountability is key. This means effective oversight and reporting on what is actually being done by countries to implement the UN resolutions and measures against terrorism. I think we need to establish a team of qualified objective observers, freed from the current diplomatic shackles imposed by the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. They should be appointed for fixed terms and empowered to report directly to the Security Council on the actions that countries are actually taking or not taking to carry out their counter-terrorism responsibilities.

Finally, there must be consequences. Lets start with seeing the al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, or its monitoring tearm begin calling to task countries which are not living up to their international commitments. And if that’s not enough to foster compliance, lets consider ostracizing those countries which egregiously are out of step with their Chapter VII responsibilities.

Consequences also means making sure that strict penalties are imposed on those that engage in, or support terrorist acts. Let’s really put those responsible for financing terrorism out of business. Unfortunately, that’s not what’s happening today.

These are some of the key steps that must be taken if we want to see real progress in combating terrorism financing.

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The Continued Misunderstanding of the Salafi Jihad Threat

By Walid Phares

In an article titled "Al Qaeda finds new partner: Salafist group finds limited success in native Algeria" (The Washington Post, October 5, 2006) by Craig Whitlock, Western sources, including French and American, assert that the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (originally a local Algerian group) has become global by joining with al Qaeda. While the article is very interesting and informative, the analysis of the International Salafi movement by Western sources and expertise shows a continuous misunderstanding of Jihadism and its strategies. For in the essence of the article there is an assertion that the Algerian Salafists were restricted to fight their Government for "local" reasons, but it was U.S. intervention in the region that "compelled" the Combat Salafists to join al Qaeda worldwide. This assertion and other little informed debates taking place in the U.S. these days are committing an analytical sin: Projecting onto the Jihadists an alien thinking, most likely because of the pressures of American politics.

The academic, expert, and journalistic assertions that Jihadists in general and Salafists in particular, are initially local, then become international, is derived from how Western scholarship monitors the Islamists actions but in many cases fail to analyze the motives and thinking process of these Jihadists. The Salafists for example, do not consider their Jihad as solely confined to a particular country, even if their actions are restricted to the boundaries of a particular country. Salafists and other Jihadis are international by essence, by ideology, and by ultimate goal. It is not the foreign policies of Western powers that "open their eyes" on the necessity of initiating action internationally, but it is their analysis of the feasibility of such action, in conformity with their ideology.

"La hudud lil jihad illa qudrat al mujahideen" is in the center of their strategies: "There are no frontiers to Jihad other than the capacity of the Mujahidin." The decision to go global, regional, or to stay local, depends on a calculated process, not on an emotional reaction. In The Washington Post article, one can see the following analytical issues:

The article said Ayman al-Zawahiri, declared that al-Qaeda, had joined forces with an obscure Algerian underground network and would work in tandem with the group to "crush the pillars of the crusader alliance."

First, al Qaeda, as in many other occasions, declares in the open that it has achieved a new step, while in reality the joining of the forces has been done a while ago. One has to be attentive to the statements made by the Salafists years ago in support of Bin Laden. But some of the "formal" declarations are issued more so for Jihadi politics than for reporting news.

Second, the Salafi Combat Group is not an "obscure" group to Algerian and Arabs. It is as well known as Hamas in Gaza or the Janjaweed of Darfur. However yes, these Jihadists were unknown to the American public, for the simple reason that they were not reported appropriately. Actually, leading scholars in the 1990s have argued that the Salafi Jihadists in Algeria were a "force for change."

Three years ago, in the Detroit Terror case, the expert of the defense, Professor Bernard Haykel said that Salafists are peaceful.

This month, an article written by Amy Waldman in The Atlantic Monthly continues the cover up for that ideology; the article charging that defining the Salafists as Jihadists is a "bashing of Islam."

Dangerous conclusion when hundreds of Muslim reformist writers are warning the world about the spread of Salafism as Terror ideology. Hence, the American public wasn't educated enough, for many political reasons, as to what is Salafism, who are the Salafists and what are their strategies. Thus, when a main Jihadi Salafi group is cited in the speech of Zawahiri, it "suddenly" moves from "obscurity" to the light of news.

Ironically, The Washington Post says, "the Algerian partner, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, had fought the Algerian government in a barbaric civil war for almost a decade."

Isn't it strange that such barbarity wasn't a subject of interest in the American or international debate neither before nor significantly after 9/11?

The Salafists in Algeria killed tens of thousands of civilians, including women, children, and the elderly, as well as journalists and rock stars. However, our mainstream media didn't dedicate enough space to report about their horrors and their ideology for years.

The Washington Post article subtly put conclusions in the mouth of Zawahiri when the article stated: "The new alliance had different targets in mind. 'Our brothers will be a thorn in the necks of the American and French crusaders and their allies, and a dagger in the hearts of the French traitors and apostates.' "

The Post explains this statement as "the latest sign of how, with al-Qaeda's help, the Algerian network has rapidly transformed itself from a local group devoted solely to seizing power at home into a global threat with cells and operations far from North Africa."

In reality, after a thorough review of the group's literature, activities, and actions over the past many years, one would rapidly conclude that the Salafists weren't just a "group devoted solely to seizing power at home."

These arch-Jihadists are believers in the restoration of the Caliphate and aimed at establishing a Taliban regime in Algeria, as a prelude for a worldwide campaign for Jihadism. Unfortunately, the way some in academia and media describes the Jihadists as "solely" dedicated to fight local government wrongly inform the audiences. The Salafists, all Salafists, like all Jihadis, are international in essence. Not understanding this part of the equation leads to massive mistakes in analysis. For there is a difference between, on the one hand being "nationalists" and turning "internationalists," and on the other hand being "local internationalists" and when opportunities arise, "moving to the larger sphere of action." The Algerian Salafists have always been "local internationalists," and many among them have fought in overseas wars. All what the Zawahiri declaration is doing is to confirm that the GSPC has become a formal associate in al Qaeda: a license was issued.

The article confirmed the "group known by its French initials GSPC has emerged since as an umbrella for radical Islamic factions in neighboring countries, sponsoring training camps in the Sahara and supplying streams of fighters to wars in Iraq and Chechnya, according to counterterrorism officials and analysts in Europe and North Africa."

The Washington Post added that "in the past year, authorities have broken up cells in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland , including one group that allegedly plotted to shoot down an Israeli airliner in Geneva ."

Recently, statements made by the Group pushed France to classify it as "one of the most serious threats currently facing France." The French Prime Minister believed that the Salafists were a "real and permanent" risk to France, in part because of its military involvement in Lebanon and Afghanistan, as well as its policy of forbidding Muslim girls to wear head scarves in public schools. Which means that the group is not "solely dedicated to changing Government in Algiers.

Another interesting fact revealed by the article is that the GIA, parent organization to the GSPC "subscribed to an Islamic ideology called takfir, a belief that any Muslim who does not embrace strict, medieval codes of conduct is an apostate deserving of death." This is precisely what Western counter-Terrorism agencies haven't yet absorbed fully. And this is the concept for which defense teams in terrorism court cases in the West and in the U.S. are battling hard to cover up. In Jordan and other Arab countries, Takfir "is" terrorism. In America and other democracies, pro-Wahabi lobbies argue that it is a matter of religion only. Salafists action is centered on Takfir, which is a doctrine that renders individuals and communities "infidels."

The article stated that until 2001, the GSPC wasn't trusted by the rest of the international jihad, per Louis Caprioli, former director of international counterterrorism for the DST, the French counterintelligence service: "That's when the GSPC started to become international. It used to be focused solely on Algeria."

Here is another analytical mistake: The GSPC didn't change its ideology to become "international."

In the documents I reviewed from terrorism cases in Rotterdam, Detroit and Idaho as well as an ocean of material online and from other sources, all indicate that the Algerian Salafists have always been "internationalists," they have supplied many battlefields with Jihadists. But the world Jihadi war gradually absorbed their resources internationally. Also, their networks reached the level of continental-sufficiency in Europe and beyond, permitting their actions to grow further. In addition, the local conflict with the Government and society in Algeria reached a dead end, for the moment. In short the Combat Salafis didn't have a change of heart because of Fallujah and thus are heading to Detroit or Los Angeles. They have always been at War with the infidels were ever their leaders asked them to. And true, that they will be increasing their activities against France because of the French involvement in Afghanistan and Lebanon, and the scarf affair as well. But if this tells the observers anything, it is about the essence of the Salafi mission as international.

The amazing ingredient in this whole matter is how analysts actually fall into the propaganda trap of al Qaeda and its allies. Just because Zawahiri declared that the GSPC's "demand for membership" has been now been accepted, arguments for a "sudden change in the Salafists' deployment are sought and expanded. However the pragmatic analyses by Algerian experts are the closer to reality such as "an alliance could bring benefits to both sides. If the Algerians could win al-Qaeda's endorsement, it would erase their network's pariah status in radical Islamic circles, making it easier to raise money and logistical support. In turn, al-Qaeda would gain a local affiliate and an operational foothold in North Africa."

The Post article cites French experts who still emphasize that the Salafist "underground in Europe is no longer fighting solely for a national cause. That has enabled it to recruit large numbers of Tunisians, Moroccans, Syrians and other extremists who do not hold a stake in the Algerian conflict."

Again, Xavier Raufer, a terrorism specialist at the University of Paris and a former French intelligence officer, repeat the analytical mistake: All Jihadists have an ideological stake in every single battlefield for Jihad. But the leadership determines – for whatever reason – which battlefield is to be reinforced. These are decisions made at a strategic level: Should the European cells strike Europe, send fighters to the Sunni triangle or head towards Somalia and Darfur.

We need to begin understanding their logic and not to apply Western logic on them. A reference in the article to a US counter terrorism official captured the reality in pragmatic terms: "The GSPC, they saw the handwriting on the wall," the U.S. counterterrorism official said. "If they just stuck to fighting the Algerian government, all they would be is a minor thorn in their side. So they had to reach out."

But the most important error in analysis is in the final conclusion of the report.

Citing a French expert, Xavier Raufer, the article says "many of the Salafist group's foot soldiers in Europe have never been to Algeria, but are motivated to join the network because of Islamic anger over conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel," Raufer said. "For them, it's an easy time," he said of the recruiters. "When they preach, a lot of people are furious. A lot of Muslims are outraged at what's going on."

While it is true that Salafists born in Europe and never having been to Algeria are motivated to join the network, the reason behind it is deeper than just a so-called "Islamic anger over conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel." These are the reasons invoked by the ideologues, the Salafist propagandists and al Qaeda. The reasons to join are a conviction that they are joining the Jihad, and pleasing Allah. They have been conditioned to see the world as a struggle between infidels and Islam. And it is through this prism that all matters related to international relations are seen and read.

Jihadists who have never been to Palestine, side with Hamas; those who have never seen the jungles of the Philippines, side with Abu Sayyiaf; those who were born in Algeria and were shooting policemen and journalists, decided suddenly to travel to Chechnya to behead Russian soldiers and shoot children in Beslan.

And to bring it back home to the exciting, and often misinformed, debate, we always need to use the Jihadi prism. Yes the Jihadists have been heading to Iraq to fight the American and British infidels, but as a part of a global Jihad against all infidels, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, where ever the opportunity arises and whenever the "emirs" see it fit strategically.

Dr Walid Phares is a visiting fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels and a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C. His most recent book is Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America

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Stratfor: No "Satisfactory Military Solution" to North Korean Test

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Stratfor has issued an important new analysis examining U.S. military options against North Korea. It concludes that "an overt military strike -- even one limited to cruise missiles -- is not in the cards. The consequences of even the most restrained attack could be devastating."

Stratfor points out that North Korea acquired a nuclear capability out of desire for regime preservation. This fact makes any military option perilous because "it is quite conceivable that Kim Jong-Il and his advisors -- or other factions -- might construe even the most limited military strikes against targets directly related to missile development or a nuclear program as an act threatening the regime, and therefore one that necessitates a fierce response." North Korea could retaliate using the 10,000 fortified artillery pieces currently trained on the South Korean capital of Seoul; it also has over 100 No-Dong missiles capable of hitting deep into South Korean territory or else targeting Japan. The artillery alone could be devastating for South Korea. As William C. Triplett II noted in his 2004 book Rogue State, North Korea is capable of firing "between 300,000 and 500,000 artillery shells per hour on the Seoul metropolitan area."

The options for countering this artillery fire, Stratfor notes, are not good. An air campaign aimed at dismantling the artillery would take a long time, and Seoul and the South Korean economy could be severely damaged in the interim. Moving troops into North Korea would be enormously costly: "Fifty years of concerted military fortification would make Hezbollah's preparations in southern Lebanon look like child's play. Moving U.S. and South Korean armor into this defensive belt could break it, but only with substantial casualties and without the certainty of success."

In war game scenarios, the defeat of North Korea requires its army to move into South Korea, where it "would be vulnerable to U.S. and South Korean airstrikes and superior ground maneuver and fire capabilities." But even in that best-case scenario, there are still substantial barriers. The war-gaming has assumed 30 days for the activation and mobilization of U.S. forces for a counterattack, with U.S. and South Korean forces maintaining an elastic defense in the interim. Stratfor notes three problems with this approach:

The first is that the elastic strategy would inevitably lead to the fall of Seoul and, if the 1950 model were a guide, a much deeper withdrawal along the Korean Peninsula. Second, the ability of the U.S. Army to deploy substantial forces to Korea within a 30-day window is highly dubious. Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom both required much longer periods of time. Finally, the U.S. Army is already fighting two major ground wars and is stretched to the breaking point. The rotation schedule is now so tight that units are already spending more time in Iraq than they are home between rotations. The idea that the U.S. Army has a multidivisional force available for deployment in South Korea would require a national mobilization not seen since the last Korean War.

The bottom line is that, in Stratfor's words, there doesn't appear to be "a satisfactory military solution."

Thanks to Nick Grace of Global Crisis Watch for drawing the Stratfor report to my attention.

In Somalia, Islamists' Rapid Gains Leave Room for Changes

By Douglas Farah

The Union of Islamic Courts, the Islamist movement that has taken over much of Somalia, may already be running into difficulty sustaining its rapid gains. Like most Islamist movements such as the Taliban and al Qaeda, little thought appears to have been given to how to govern if and when power is attained. Simply repeating that sharia law provides the answers does not lead to a platform of governance.

At the American Enterprise Institute's discussion of Somalia last week, several important points were made by panalists. One is that the UIC is, like most of Somali structures, based on clans and sub-clans. In the case of the UIC, the dominant clan structures constitutes less than 10 percent of the population.

This relatively small base, coupled with the rapid ascent of the UIC, for which its leaders were completely unprepared, leads some to believe radicalization of the movement will cause a backlash that will make it impossible for the UIC, at least in its most radical incarnation, to succeed in even the short term. My full blog is here.

North Korea/Iran Cooperation Shows Implications of Nuclear Test

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

North Korea conducted an apparently successful nuclear test today at 10:36 a.m. local time. The test has been reported in the North Korean media, and a seismic event at a suspected nuclear test site has been confirmed by Russian equipment in the area and U.S. and South Korean intelligence. This is another example of a major geopolitical situation for which policymakers were unprepared, and to which they don't have a good answer. Further, there are two immediate implications for the global war on terror. First, the Iranian nuclear program may be more advanced than previously believed. Second, past North Korean cooperation with Iran provides even more reason for concern.

Iran likely has at its disposal the same technology and blueprints that North Korea possesses. Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan has admitted to supplying nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya through a black market. His claim has been supported by international investigators, who found that Chinese nuclear designs that were probably supplied to Pakistan in the 1980s were later sold to Libya by Pakistani-led smugglers. Former UN arms inspector David Albright has been quoted as saying, "You have to almost conclude [that the Chinese design] went to Iran and . . . North Korea." Iran thus has blueprints for nuclear weapons technology that has been successful tested by two other countries, Pakistan and North Korea.

If the international community's reaction to the North Korean test is weak, that will further encourage Iran. As former Indian intelligence chief B. Raman stated on this week's installment of the always excellent Global Crisis Watch podcast:

Iran is watching how the international community is going to react to North Korea. . . . So the international community must be prepared for the possibility that North Korea is going to carry out a test and we must tailor our response and we must be ready with a basket of sanctions against North Korea. And the moment that it carries out that test those sanctions must be imposed so the message goes to North Korea as well as Iran. And once we take that first step what are the other options that are available for the international community we can discuss later. But if we defer and if we do not do anything immediately and if we go on discussing more and more with various groups and all, ultimately North Korea, Iran and Pakistan also -- the jihadi elements there -- they are going to get the wrong message, thinking the international community is weak, the international community will not act against them.

Moreover, close cooperation between North Korea and Iran in the past provides additional reason for concern. I previously blogged about a late 2005 Iranian purchase of eighteen disassembled BM-25 missiles from North Korea. Israel's intelligence chief reported that Iran received these missiles in late April of this year. And this is only the tip of the iceberg. Intelligence reports uncovered in mid-2005 "accuse North Korea of secretly helping Iran develop its nuclear program." Reuters reported this August that both countries are cooperating on the development of long-range ballistic missiles. In fact, Iranian delegates were reportedly present when North Korea test-fired seven ballistic missiles in Japan's direction on July 5. North Korean experts are reportedly helping to bolster fortifications at Iranian nuclear facilities "in anticipation of possible preemptive strikes."

This is not a comprehensive account of the two countries' cooperation; even a surface-level examination reveals their ties. When a country successfully tests a nuclear weapon, that changes everything. Here, North Korea's test certainly changes the contours of the global war on terror.

JI's Long-term Growth Strategy

By Zachary Abuza

It's bombing season in Indonesia. This month marks not only the fourth anniversary of the first Bali bombing, it also marks one year since the most recent Bali bombing. And although progress has been made against al-Qa'ida's terrorist affiliates in the region, it would be naive to write off Jemaah Islamiah's capacity to strike again.

For more please click here to read my op-ed in "The Australian" newspaper. An excerpt:

The unwillingness to take on the terrorist infrastructure is regrettable and negligent. JI has a very long-term timetable. By pursuing overt strategies, JI is able to forge closer ties with Islamists who might otherwise eschew their violence. JI is thus no longer seen as a radical fringe, though its agenda has not changed.
There is scant evidence that JI can be weaned off terrorism. Anyone who doubts this should ask themselves whether Hamas has been tempered because it has social welfare organisations and a leading role in politics. The answer is no. It remains a terrorist organisation, precisely because of its vast social networks. No wonder Hamas is a model that JI seeks to emulate.

Al Mansoorian: A Deadly Shadow of Lashkar (LeT) Looms Large over Jammu and Kashmir

By Animesh Roul

A prolonged gun battle ( lasting for 27 hours ) in the business hub of Budshah Chowk, in Srinagar, between suspected Al Mansoorian’s suicide squad members and security personnel, claimed the lives of seven security men, a lone civilian and two militants. The gun battle ended on Oct. 5, afternoon. Approximately 30 people sustained injuries in the suicide attack. Spokesperson of the Al-Mansoorian outfit (also Al Mansooreen) Aamir Mir, claiming the responsibly of the attack, identified the two terrorists killed as Tariq Ahmed Bhat and Mohammad Mushtaq.

The following day Al Mansoorian (AM) strike again and this time by beheading a civilian (decapitation, Al Qaeda style) of Mohammad Shafi Mir for his alleged link with Indian security forces.

Al Mansoorian, termed as a shadow outfit / an offshoot of the proscribed Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) of Pakistan, is quite active in Jammu and Kashmir and has been attacking security forces and Government infrastructures and civilians since 2002, colluding with other Islamic terrorist outfits. The first high profile suicide attack claimed by A-M was carried out on May 14, 2002 in the Kaluchak cantonment area in Jammu. More than 30 people including women and children were killed and 47 others were injured. The slain terrorists were identified later as foreign mercenaries from Pakistan’s Faisalabad and Gujranwala areas. Investigations also showed that food items found from the terrorists were purchased from Zaffarwal in Pakistan and militants had reportedly infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) in the Samba area.

Although LeT has been outlawed in India and Pakistan, it has been perpetrating terrorist strikes in India under different banners that include Al-Mansoorian.

By Olivier Guitta

I just wrote an article for The Weekly Standard on Tariq Ramadan. It explores in depth his bio, background, strategy and tactics to Islamize the West.
The whole article can be found here.
Here's an excerpt:
ON SEPTEMBER 20, the State Department denied a visa to Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan on the grounds that he had contributed around 600 euros to a French charity classified as a terrorist organization since 2003 because of its relationship with the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas. This latest exclusion follows on the revocation of Ramadan's visa to live and work in the United States while teaching at Notre Dame in 2004, a step taken at the express request of the Department of Homeland Security. While the American Civil Liberties Union and the leftist literary group PEN, among others, present Ramadan as a moderate and accuse U.S. authorities of intolerance, the background and views of Tariq Ramadan suggest the government's move was entirely justified.

For starters, Ramadan is the grandson of Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the highly influential Islamist organization born in Egypt in 1928. It was the Brotherhood that invented the now-familiar Islamist modus operandi of covert organization, assassination, and extremist theology. Its goal was to overthrow the Egyptian regime, install a fundamentalist Muslim government, and impose sharia (Islamic law) as the new constitution. Tariq's father, Said Ramadan, was a major figure in this organization, expelled from Egypt by Gamal Abdul Nasser for Islamist activity.

Said Ramadan took refuge first in Saudi Arabia, where he was a founder of the World Islamic League, one of the largest Saudi charities and global missionary groups. He then moved to Geneva, where in 1961 he created the Islamic Center, a combination mosque, think tank, and community center. The philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood influenced a generation of wealthy Muslim kids, including Osama bin Laden. Interestingly, Said Ramadan also had U.S. connections: He had a close relationship with Malcolm X and was personal mentor to Dawud Salahuddin, a black convert to Islam who murdered an Iranian dissident, Ali Akbar Tabatabai, in Bethesda, Maryland, in 1980. After fleeing the United States, Salahuddin spent a few days in Geneva visiting Said Ramadan before taking refuge in Iran. Profiled in the New Yorker in 2002, Salahuddin confirmed that Ramadan remained his adviser and spiritual guide until Ramadan's death in 1995.

Dul Matin's Wife Captured in Philippines

By Kenneth Conboy

Philippine authorities confirmed on Friday that an Indonesian woman detained on the southern island of Jolo was the wife of Jemaah Islamiyah fugitive Dul Matin. Matin is one of JI's few remaining bomb-making experts and was linked to the 2002 Bali bombings. Shortly after those bombings, he fled to Mindanao and has been alternately seeking sanctuary with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf Group. The U.S. Department of Justice has a $10 million reward for Matin; one of his JI colleagues in Mindanao, Umar Patek, also has a price on his head courtesy of the DoJ.

In recent months, Philippine authorities have received evidence that Matin has been frequenting the Jolo vicinity. On at least three occasions, too, the Philippine military has incorrectly claimed to have killed Matin during airstrikes and raids.

The capture of Matin's wife--who was carrying ID under several different names--has raised speculation that Matin and Umar Patek might be near the mountainous town of Patikul. The Philippine government is especially concerned that Matin might be helping the ASG with their bomb-making skills.

Jonathan Winer Joins Us As Contributing Expert

By Andrew Cochran

We are very pleased to add Jonathan Winer, a highly respected veteran of the counterterrorism community, to our roster of Contributing Experts. Currently a partner in the Washington office of Alston & Bird LLP, Mr. Winer counsels companies in anti-money laundering, data security, and electronic payments, including complying with USA Patriot Act, Bank Secrecy Act and Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations and with state regulatory and licensing requirements, as well as with enforcement actions. His clients include domestic and foreign banks, mutual funds, payment system companies, credit card operators, providers of stored value cards, investment managers, insurance companies, and money service businesses. He previously served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Law Enforcement, where he was one of the architects of U.S. international policy in financial services regulation and enforcement, and served for ten years as Chief Counsel and principal legislative assistant to Senator John F. Kerry, handling and drafting legislation conducting a series of Congressional investigations. His full bio is on the Alston & Bird website. Mr. Winer serves as a Member of the Atlantic Council Working Group on Terrorism and on the Steering Committee of the Transnational Threats Initiative of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is a member of the Massachusetts Bar and the District of Columbia Bar.

We welcome Jonathan's insights and analyses.

Testimony: Intercepting Radicalization at the Indoctrination stage

By Walid Phares

The Subcommittee on Homeland Security at the US House of Representatives held a hearing on an important theme: "The Homeland Security implications of radicalization.” I testified under the title: “Intercepting radicalization at the indoctrination stage.”My remarks covered the following themes:

a) Identification of the threat
b) Development of the threat
c) Components of the threat
d) Strategic penetration
e) Threat shields

In the latter, I noted two issues:

1. The little ability of the public to identify threats since the Terror ideology hasn't officially been identified by the Government yet.

2. That Law Enforcement and Homeland Security cannot mobilize on a large scale to identify Jihadism because the latter has inserted itself under the political freedoms of the country. It is "protected" by advocacy groups, legal defense and is funded both domestically and by foreign regimes and organizations. Finally my testimony offered a program for a Resistance to “radicalization”based on six policy suggestions.

Following is the full text of the Testimony

HEARING AT THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

Subcommittee on Intelligence

Information sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment

U.S. Representative Rob Simmons, Chairman

“The Homeland Security implications of radicalization”

Wednesday September 20, 2006 1 PM

Room 2212 Rayburn House Office Building

TESTIMONY BY PROFESSOR WALID PHARES

"INTERCEPTING RADICALIZATION AT THE INDOCTRINATION STAGE”

Senior Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies
Director, Future Terrorism Project

Author, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America

Chairman Simmons and Members of the Committee,

It is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss the theme “The Homeland Security implications of radicalization.” My contribution is titled: “Intercepting radicalization at the indoctrination stage.”

Identification of the Threat

Your concerns about “radicalization” as a threat to U.S. Homeland Security are warranted. For after twenty five years of studying the ideology and the evolution of the doctrines that produced the self-declared Jihadist movement (al haraka al Jihadiya) which has declared, waged and continues to conduct war against the United States and other democracies, I conclude along with a number of colleagues in this field of expertise that the Terrorism America and its allies are facing in the War on Terror, is a direct product of this radical ideology. The 19 men, who massacred 3,000 US and other citizens on September 11, belong to al Qaeda and the latter is a self declared Salafist-Jihadist organization. Every single case of Terrorism uncovered on U.S. territory, since 9/11, was motivated by this ideology. To name a few: The Virginia Paintball gang, the dirty bomb case, the shoe bomber case, al Qaeda's John Walker, Azzam al Amriki AKA Adam Gadahn, the Oregon case, the Virginia multiple cases, the Jihadi charities, etc. This ideology was omnipresent in the cases than ended with court sentences and those which didn't; in the Sheikh Abdel Rahman case of 1993; in the statements made by the Zarqawi networks while assassinating innocent civilians; in all speeches by Usama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri from 1998 till now; and on all Jihadi web sites in all languages: one global common thread is always omnipresent: The Jihadi ideology. And in parallel to al Qaeda’s radical doctrine another ideology of Jihadism follows the teachings of Ayatalollah Khomeini and is embodied by the public speeches of Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmedinijad and Hezbollah. Hence, the ideologies that produces “Radicalization," are the Jihadist ones. They are of two main "trees," the Jihadi Salafist and the Jihadi Khomeinist. These doctrines, taught and disseminated worldwide and in America, are the producers of the "Jihadists" (al Jihadiyun) who have declared war and waged it against the United States both overseas and in the homeland. Jihadism is the ideological common identity of terror groups al Qaeda, Salafi Combat Group of the Maghreb, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Jemaa Islamiya of south Asia, the Taliban of Afghanistan, Laskar Taiba of Pakistan, the Mahakem Islamiya of Somalia, and other Salafi-Wahabi groups internationally, in addition to Hezbollah. Jihadism was the inspiration for the 1990s attacks, 9/11, Madrid, London, Beslan, Mumbai, Riyadh, Casablanca, the Sunni Triangle in Iraq and other violence associated with Terrorism. Hence at this stage of the War on Terror, the ideology behind the threat has been identified and thus should be addressed.

Development of the Threat

Prior to 9/11, the spread of Jihadism was operated by Salafi, Wahabi, Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), Tablighi, Deobandi and Takfiri schools of thought around the world, mostly by the means of religious schools known as Madrassa. Moving into the United States gradually as of the 1970s, and increasingly in the 1990s, Jihadi cadres took the control of existing religious schools funded by foreign support but also formed their own indoctrination networks, often in and around Mosques and other social and cultural centers. In about twenty years of militant activities, the Jihadist ideology produced three generations of radicals, a pool which Terrorists have and continue to recruit from. The perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks are foreign Jihadists. But most of the other arrested Terrorists (or alleged Terrorists) claiming the same ideology and who identify with al Qaeda or its allies, are "American Jihadists," citizens or permanent residents, U.S.-born or naturalized. Hence the most dangerous dimension of the ideology of Jihadism is the fact that it has already recruited and inspired Americans to wage war against their own nation. Therefore Jihadism is a direct threat against Homeland Security

Components of the threat

This threat against national security and against the foundations of civil society and democracy is embodied by a set of ideas and concepts that reject the legitimacy of citizens’ free choice, their natural liberties, pluralism, and the rule of secular law. The Jihadi ideology is not another social or political way of thinking within Democracy, nor is it a political alternative to one particular party or a specific policy in domestic or foreign affairs. Jihadism rejects the American constitution, the bill of rights, the international declaration on human rights, the United Nations and international law. Jihadism aim at destroying democracies and installing a totalitarian regime named Caliphate. And to do so, Jihadism creates the conviction in the minds of its adherents that war against the Government, people and constitution of the United States is the path towards achieving the universal goal. The beginning of the threat starts with the "click" that transforms a citizen into a Jihadist. From there one, the constant objective of the Jihadi recruit is to strike against the national security of the United States. The Terrorist can be a member of al Qaeda if he/she are successful in establishing the contact, as for example with the case of Adam Gadahn and Jose Padilla, or they could operate under an al Qaeda like Jihadism, without having established a link with the mother ship.

Strategic penetration

The strategic penetration operated by the Jihadists before and since 9/11 is based on three models: One are the Jihadists who originates overseas and move to the United States, either legally (visa, lawful immigration, marriage, political asylum) or illegally. In either of these cases the Jihadis ends up operating on the inside of the country, using its laws and facilities. The estimate of Jihadists who have infiltrated the country over the past two decades is certainly in the hundreds, possibly close to a thousand. This "first generation" Jihadists has organized itself to perform two activities: One is to grow its own strength for "future Jihads." Two is to produce the second generation of American-born Jihadists. If you analyze the average age of U.S. born Jihadists, you would conclude that the production of the second "generation" has begun in the late 1980s and mostly since the early 1990s. The formation of this "second generation" can only happen through two methods. First is to indoctrinate then recruit within the Muslim community using a variety of methods and already penetrated institutions. Second, is for them to take the control of the religious conversion of non-Muslims and indoctrinate the converts during the process or after the process: Hence a first generation of radical Salafists-Wahabis has already processed a radicalization and the recruitment of American-born Muslims or converts. The issue is not conversion: This is a free and pluralist society. Certainly there is and would be a problem with the radicalization taking place within a particular community. But the real issue affecting Homeland Security is the systematic penetration of a religious community and the recruitment of Jihadists to perform acts of Terrorism and aggression against national security.

And once the "Pool" of indoctrinated individuals is formed, mostly of younger persons then the Terror organizations can recruit from. However, Jihadists in the West in general and in the U.S. in particular, are of two types once they are formed: Either they join an organization and moves into a cell, or they form their own cell, without connecting with a larger organization or al Qaeda. The most dangerous Jihadists, both on the individual level or as self-formed cells are those who have been able or are in the process of penetrating the defense-security system of the United States. In this realm, the Jihadists can harm the most the national security of the Homeland, and analytical indications project that one of their ultimate goals is to penetrate and weaken U.S. Homeland Security.

Threat shield

There are several shields that "protect" the U.S.-based Jihadists from containment. Among these shields are

a. The little ability of the public to identify them since their ideology wasn't officially been identified by the Government.

b. Without the public, Law Enforcement and Homeland Security cannot mobilize on a large scale to identify and isolate the Jihadists activities. Furthermore, by not identifying the ideology and its strategies, the U.S. Government cannot direct its agencies and resources against the threat.

c. The ideology of Jihadi-Terrorism unfortunately, enjoys the political freedoms of the country. It is "protected" by advocacy groups, legal defense and is funded both domestically and by foreign regimes and organizations.

Resistance to “radicalization”

To establish a national resistance to "radicalization" following are 6 suggestions:

1) Identification of the ideology of Jihadism by Government, media and experts.

2) Mobilization against the ideology of Jihadism by the public and educational institutions

3) Ban of the ideology by the U.S. Congress

4) Mass education of the public about it

5) Working with domestic NGOs, with the general public and specifically with the Muslim communities

6) Working with international INGOs and particularly with liberal, democratic and humanist Muslims

Looking at the future

In summary, Terrorism is threatening Homeland Security and Jihadism is a main root cause of Terrorism. The U.S. capacity of protecting Homeland security and defending national security will depend largely on developing policies and laws that would identify, ban, isolate and shrink Jihadism, with the help of the American public in general and the Muslim and Middle Eastern communities in particular. Such a shift in Homeland security must be based on a comprehensive strategy of containment of the Terror ideology within the framework of civil and democratic rights of society.

In closing, I would like to thank you and the committee members and staff for the opportunity to present this testimony today. I look forward to responding to any question that you might have.

Dr Walid Phares

Senior Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and Director, Future Terrorism Project
Author, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America
September 20, 2006
U.S. Congress

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LTTE Arms Purchasing Ring Busted in Baltimore

By Aaron Mannes

Last week the U.S. Attorney for Baltimore announced that two complaints and an indictment were unsealed charging six people with conspiring to purchase weapons for the LTTE. The lead agency in the operation was Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This is the second major bust of a Tiger arms purchasing network in the U.S. in two months. Like the previous operation these arrests were the culmination of an impressive operation. The arms purchasers were allowed to sample the merchandise at an arms range in Havre de Grace (a small town not far from Baltimore - or, interestingly, Aberdeen Proving Grounds.) Some of the arrests were actually made in Guam.

On the U.S. side, clearly more resources have been devoted to breaking up LTTE arms buying networks. This is an important development if the terrible civil war that has tormented Sri Lanka for over a quarter century is ever to end. The LTTE is an effective terrorist organization that has carried out over 200 suicide bombings and has also held its own in direct fighting with both the Sri Lankan and Indian militaries.

When interviewed about the previous bust, I stated that the LTTE is capable of hitting the U.S. However, they have historically avoided hitting U.S. targets or even American advisors to Sri Lankan forces to avoid American animus.

One of the key items sought by both LTTE arms-purchasing rings were anti-air missiles (SAMs), indicating that Sri Lankan airpower is a major concern for the Tigers. The apparent success of the Sri Lankan military along with the damage done to the LTTE's international network may be reasons why the LTTE has announced that it is willing to return to the negotiating table.

At the same time, the details revealed by the LTTE operatives show that the Tigers retain substantial capabilities in many areas. The arms buyers mentioned pruchasing an additional $15 million worth of equipment after the first sale, provided their interlocutors with false passports, and were planning another transfer at sea in international waters (indicating that Tiger maritime capabilities remain.) Most worrisome, one of the defendants claimed to be a retired Indonesian Marine General. It is not clear whether this is true, but ties to the Indonesian military would be a valuable asset for the LTTE's internation arms purchasing network.

For more background on the LTTE, see my piece in the Daily Standard.

Cross-posted to the TerrorBlog.

U.S.-Turkish Relations on the Brink?

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

For many years, Turkey -- a secular democracy with a predominantly Muslim population -- has been a staunch U.S. ally. Since Turkey has served as a bulwark of stability in the Middle East, it's important that the U.S. recognize the disturbing manner in which Turkish public opinion has been turning against the country's alliance with the United States and ties with the West -- and how recent events may further widen the rift between the U.S. and Turkey.

The change in Turkish public opinion is reflected in the annual survey of public opinion released by the German Marshall Fund in early September. The New York Times noted this survey in a September 10 editorial:

The survey's most striking finding is the degree to which Turks now question their ties to the United States and Europe, and have warmed to Iran, their neighbor to the east. The discontent appears anchored in Turks' overwhelming disapproval of President Bush's handling of international affairs and growing disapproval of European Union leadership. Both are manifest in waning Turkish support for the institutions that have bound Turkey to the West. Though Turkey has been a staunch NATO member since 1952, only 44 percent of Turks in this year's survey agreed that NATO was essential for Turkey's security, versus 52 percent in 2005. Even though Turkey opened official membership talks with the European Union last year -- after strenuous efforts to meet the union's criteria -- only 54 percent of Turks now view membership as a good thing, versus 73 percent in 2004.

Beyond that, both Turkey and the U.S. have recently made moves that damage the countries' bilateral relationship. In late September, the Senate Banking Committee blocked U.S. Export-Import Bank funding for a proposed railway project that would connect Turkey with Azerbaijan through Georgia, bypassing Armenian territory. This measure was backed by the Armenian lobby, which argued that the railway amounted to "an economic embargo against Armenia." For its own part, the Turkish government did itself no favors with respect to its relations with the U.S. when it decided not to freeze the assets of Yasin el-Kadi, who appears on the UN's list of terrorism financiers. Turkish prime minister Recep Erdogan said of El-Kadi: "I believe in him as I believe in myself." One source opined that these actions by the U.S. and Turkey are "a textbook example of the failure of diplomacy and foreign policy: get nothing and pay a dear price for it."

All this is occurring against the backdrop of Turkey's battle against Kurdish separatist terrorism. As I have previously discussed on this blog, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) have both launched a series of attacks that serve to undermine the Turkish economy, with the PKK targeting oil and gas pipelines while the TAK targets the tourist industry. These attacks have further damaged U.S.-Turkish relations, as Turkish popular perception holds that the U.S. isn't doing enough to help Turkey combat Kurdish separatist terror. There are even allegations -- fed by a recent interview with the brother of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan -- that the U.S. has been funding and supporting the PKK.

Turkey is a significant ally in the war on terror for a number of reasons. The direction of Turkish public opinion coupled with recent events provides cause for concern about the state of U.S.-Turkish relations. Ultimately, the New York Times was correct when it editorialized: "The United States must not ever take Turkey for granted."

Kyle Dabruzzi contributed research for this analysis.

GWOT Lockbox

By Bill West

More than five years out from the 9/11 attacks, our nation still grapples with who the enemy really is as much as how to fight that enemy. In this 21st Century war, America and its allies, and those allies vary at any given moment, with all the technology and manpower available to it, apparently still cannot produce an effective "no fly" lookout list. After long and tremendously divisive political debate, our political leadership has decided the best immediate course of action for border security is to erect a 700 mile fence along our southern border. Meanwhile, the computerized database (US VISIT) that is supposed to track temporary foreign visitors entering and departing the US still only tracks their entry, with the departure control half of the system still years away from implementation. The recently declassified "Key Judgements" portion of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) related to the war on global terrorism reads more like the reports we hear from talking head experts on any network or cable news show. Was there really anything we didn't already know in that NIE? Was that the best our multi-billion dollar Intelligence Community can produce? Perhaps that should be the real story behind the NIE.

Ironically, more than 60 years ago during WW-II, the last declared war this country fought, in less time than we have now been in Iraq, America built thousands of ships, airplanes, tanks and other war machines and fielded millions of warriors against multiple well-armed nation-states dedicated to our destruction and we completely defeated those enemies. In the process, this country developed, from scratch, the atom bomb and did so in complete secrecy. That "Greatest Generation" demonstrated it deserved the title.

We now appear to be so self-contained within such a bureaucratic quagmire, at least at the Federal Government level, that virtually nothing innovative and progressive occurs. This is nothing new. The Federal Government has become so huge and intransigent over the decades that anything but reaction, and that generally means lethargic reaction, is completely abnormal. The immediate post-9/11 creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was a rare exception, and given the notable inefficiencies and notable failures that have come out of DHS, a strong argument might be made that mistakes were made in that Department's creation. Even so, the risk-taking and innovation involved behind DHS was a golden moment for both Congress and the Executive Branch. Better to have tried and failed than never have made the attempt...a motto hardly ever heard within the Federal Government and even less seldom experienced. Bureaucrats, especially those of the senior management ilk, are far more inclined to take little or no risk and seek little or no change. It appears little has changed in that regard since 9/11.

That is not necessarily the case at the state and local level and even within the private sector. The New York City Police Department, for instance, has aggressively created and staffed its own counter-terrorism cadre independent of the Feds and has even sent Detectives overseas to work with key allied law enforcement agencies. These efforts have not always been viewed favorably by the Federal authorities, but the NYPD has stood its ground and the results have worked. Other local authorities, especially in the arena of immigration enforcement, have decided enough is enough. Some cities are enacting anti-illegal alien ordinances making it illegal to employ illegal aliens or to rent to illegal aliens, subjecting violators to fines and loss of business licenses. Private groups like the Minuteman Project have demonstrated, far from being the "vigilantes" some have labeled them, that a viable cadre of fixed surveillance observers at key border locations can have a dramatic positive effect on border law enforcement and security, since illegal crossings dropped dramatically where the Minutemen deployed and there were no adverse incidents during those deployments. These are but a few examples of some of the non-Federal "out of the box" concepts linked to improving security for Americans.

It is not a complete loss at the Federal level. The men and women on the front lines of Federal law enforcement and intelligence and security agencies work very hard each day, often under difficult and dangerous conditions, to insure our safety. It's seemingly the lack of imagination and innovation at the policy making and implementation level that stymies genuine forward motion. One of the reasons DHS was created was to "cut through the red tape" and "streamline the bureaucracy" of the various agencies incorporated into the new Department so national security and counter-terrorism efforts would be "cutting edge," modernized and swiftly implemented. Can anyone seriously say that has happened? Even so, occasionally, there is reason to hope.

One such reason is a bill that was introduced in the US Senate by Sen. John Ensign [R-NV]. This is S. 2483, the Law Enforcement Assistance Force Act of 2005. The bill would create a volunteer law enforcement force within the DHS comprised of qualified retired law enforcement officers. This force would be called to active duty in times of natural disaster or national emergency and would serve for up to one year, without pay (but would be paid travel and per diem allowance). Consider the value of such a volunteer force during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, or after a major terror attack, or perhaps deployed along the border in place of a civilian effort like the Minutemen? The costs of such a program within the Federal budget would be minimal. The manpower resources, especially if the initial cadre was tapped from retired Federal law enforcement sources wherein DHS had ready access to OPM files for updated background checks, would provide a nearly immediate pool of trained and experienced officers who are highly motivated for the work (all volunteers). This bill is a solid example of someone at the Federal level trying to break out of that lockbox. Unfortunately, the bill remains locked in committee for now.

The Global War on Terror threatens all Americans. We need innovative and creative ideas and the will to try them if we hope to prevail in this struggle. The generation that won WW-II understood this. We should also.

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Al Qaeda's Growing Threat in North and East Africa

By Douglas Farah

As noted recently by the Washington Post's Craig Whitlock, the formal merger of the Algerian-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is an enormously important development of the jihadist plans for northern and western Africa.

As Zawahiri stated in his address last month announcing the formal alliance of the two groups, the GSPC "will be a thorn in the necks of the American and French crusaders and their allies, and a dagger in the hearts of the French traitors and apostates."

This is even more important when combined with the growing f al Qaeda presence and interest in Darfur, the jihadi rallying point to the east. According to folks who have recently spent time in Darfur, the janjaweed, protected and aided by the Sudanese government, are allowing al Qaeda training camps. Bin Laden and Zawahiri have singled out Darfur as a key area of jihadi expansion, along with Somalia and Yemen to the east. My full blog is here.

Agreed Indo-Pak Joint Anti Terror Mechanism under “Cross Border Terror” Shadow

By Animesh Roul

Recently agreed joint anti terror mechanism between Indian premier Manmohan Singh and Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf on the sideline of Non-Aligned summit at Havana in Sept. 2006, is going to face the first litmus test when New Delhi will present a list of Pakistani nationals suspected to be involved in July 11 Mumbai serial blasts with related evidence.

After two and a half months of investigations India's security agencies claimed to have cracked the case and found Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Lashkar e Toiba’s involvement in Mumbai terror attacks. According to the investigation report, they have perpetrated the act by colluding with local recruits and with cadres of banned Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). ISI has spent Two million Indian rupees for executing 7/11 blasts in Mumbai, claims investigating officers and Azam Cheema, LeT's commander in Pakistan's Bahawalput district, is suspected to be the mastermind behind the conspiracy.

Out of eleven Pakistani nationals directly involved in the Mumbai serial blasts, two are believed to be dead and rests are still at large, may be fled to Pakistan or Nepal.

Delhi police earlier claimed that at least 37 Pakistani nationals funded terror operations in India, including Oct. 29, 2005 Delhi market blasts. Money comes through foreign remittances and Hawala networks (in US Dollars and Saudi Arabian Riyals ) and sent to Delhi blast accused Tariq Ahmed Dar's, a LeT operative, accounts. The chargesheet revealed that the flow of funds from Pakistan was controlled by one Abu Ozefa, a Pakistani and divisional commander of the LeT, who was killed in Kashmir this January.

Indian agencies are probing any possible links of these terror finances with July 11 blasts.

The rejection from Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz on Oct. 2 does not come as surprise when he said ‘it (India) has a history of leveling such allegations.’ However, Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri indicated later that his country will cooperate with India.

It is common knowledge now that Pakistan’s territory has been used by Islamic terror groups to fight in India, Afghanistan and Middle East. This observation no more needs substantial evidence. Most recently, Afghan intelligence service indicated that many would-be suicide bombers detained in Afghanistan claim they have been brainwashed and equipped by Arab, Chechen and Uzbek militants in Pakistan. Neverthless, Pakistan has denied everytime about the existence of terrorist training facilities on its soil.

Presumably, Pakistan under no circumstance would hand over any terror suspects to India. Although it has been promising to take action against them, if evidences are convincing and sufficient, it failed to make even an arrest in the past (the biggest example was Dawood Ibrahim).

India would like to get Azam Cheema along with his cohorts for trial or further investigation. Of course, it all now lies on Pakistan's response to the evidence regarding its involvement in the Mumbai blasts which will prove the sincerity in controlling cross-border terrorism in the subcontinent and commitment to any bilateral (no matter moral or legally binding) instruments.

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The Brotherhood's Early Ties to Violent Islam

By Douglas Farah

A new document by the West Point Combating Terrorism Centerexamines the 1,600 page Islamist treastise by veteran jihadi thinker, propagandist, and historian Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. Published in 2005, the jihadi document lists 25 “paradigmatic jihadi movements,” or
particularly edifying historical cases, where jihadis have both succeeded and failed to rally supporters, defeat their opposition, or establish territorial control.

The CTC document examines four of the jihadi movements that al Suri, who was attempting to write the definitive jihadi cirriculum for the coming generation. What is particularly interesting is that even the more obsucre groups discussed all have ties back to the international Islamic Brotherhood, some to the late 1960s.

The Haraka al-Shabiba in Morocco, though little known and enjoying almost no success during its brief existence in 1969, drew almost all of its inspiration from the writings of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al Banna, the Brotherhood's two most influential thinkers. My full blog is here.

Possible Military Connection to New Indonesia Arrest

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

On Tuesday, an Indonesian woman who had a considerable amount of explosives in her bag was arrested at the Sidoarjo train station in Indonesia's East Java province. This was first reported in The Jakarta Post, which stated that the woman (whose name is Kangiyani) was fifty-five years old and was carrying two kilograms of explosives. The details concerning her age and the amount of explosives were contradicted by later reports in the Indonesian press, but many of the basic details of The Jakarta Post's account have been generally accepted.

My colleague Nick Grace, of Global Crisis Watch, provides further details from the Indonesian-language press. He notes that later press accounts state that Kangiyani's age is forty rather than fifty-five, and that she was carrying 9 kg of explosives rather than 2 kg. But the most interesting aspect of the developing story is the possible link between the explosives and Indonesia's military. Nick writes:

The 40 year old woman was in the process of completing a sale of the materials to an Indonesian named Mahmud, who paid 3 million rupiah (equivalent of US$250 and approximately 3 months salary for the average Indonesian). Both were detained by [elite Indonesian anti-terror unit] Detachment 88. According to DetikNews and Jawa Pos, Kangiyani was selling the TNT on behalf of her husband, "AH," who is a sergeant in the Indonesian Navy. There are conflicting reports over whether "AH" has been captured and is under interrogation. . . . Mahmud claims that he bought the TNT for "fish bombs" so that he could more easily fish. Meanwhile, fear is building in Jakarta over suicide attacks and President Bush's planned 6 hour layover and visit with [Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono] on or around Nov 20.

One obvious aspect to this is the possible terrorism connection -- particularly if Kangiyani had 9 kg of TNT. Each of the three suicide bombers in the October 2005 Bali bombings carried around 10 kg of TNT in their backpacks. Nick Grace notes that Detachment 88 raided a house in central Java in May that netted a cache of TNT, and it's believed that rising jihadist star Noordin Top's branch of Jemaah Islamiyah, Tandzim Qaedatul Jihad, "is desperate to replenish its stockpile."

Second, the military connection noted above is interesting beause there have long been suspicions in Indonesia that Jemaah Islamiyah receives bomb-making materials from corrupt soldiers. Of course, it's too early to draw any conclusions. After all, the fog of war can often make the first information to emerge following a terrorist arrest or attack unreliable: note, as one example, the differing accounts of Kangiyani's age and the amount of explosives she had. Nonetheless, this story is well worth following.

GSPC suffering losses in Mali and Europe

By Olivier Guitta

GSPC, the Algerian terror group which is now officially part of Al Qaeda, has been active in Mali since the summer of 2005. At first, GSPC used Mali as a hiding place to avoid being arrested by Algerian authorities. It has traditionally allied itself to nomadic tribes, including a group called the Democratic Alliance of May 23. But according the daily l'Expression, this group just affirmed that they killed three of the main GSPC leaders based in the Sahara. One of them is none other than the successor of GSPC emir Al Para. The reasons for this "war" between the two groups are still up in the air. It looks like the Alliance has been very isolated politically and internationally lately. And siding with the West against Al Qaeda should bring them more popularity.
Anyway, if this information is confirmed, then GSPC suffered a major blow that will definetely impact its firepower.
Also three members of the Algerian terror group were just arrested in Italy and Switzerland in connection with two 2005 terror attacks in Algeria. The Milan police was again behind the arrests as the ones last year which put another 5 GSPC members behind bars.

These latest events are hopeful signs in our war against Radical Islam.

Animesh Roul Joins Us as a Contributing Expert

By Andrew Cochran

We are pleased to welcome Animesh Roul, co-founder and Executive Director (Research) of the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict in New Delhi, as a Contributing Expert. He is involved with independent think tanks, media houses, and policy organizations in India and abroad and contributes regularly to web portals, newspapers, and scholarly journals. In his earlier stint he worked as a Research Associate at New Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management.

Mr. Roul specialises in Islamic fundamentalism, WMD terrorism, armed conflict and issues relating to arms control and proliferations in South Asia.

His views have appeared in Jerusalem Post and La Clave, among many publications. Mr Roul has written for the "Terrorism Focus" and "Terrorism Monitor" of the Jamestown Foundation ("Trail from Mumbai Blasts Leads to Multiple Terrorist Groups"), ISN Security Watch ("Sri Lanka: blackouts and blockades"), the South Asia Intelligence Review, and "Peace and Conflict Monitor." You can read more details of his biography from the link in the left sidebar.

We look forward to Mr. Roul's contributions to the CT Blog about South Asia, one of the most active areas for Islamic terrorists in the world.

We're Ignoring Simple Measures to Prevent Terrorist Infiltration of Borders & Prisons

By Michael Cutler

It seems that the only thing that is predictable where our nation's supposed "War on Terror" is concerned is that incompetence is the order of the day. A recent ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) press release dealt with a thwarted effort by a translator, who was employed as a contract translator at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan, to secure an immigrant visa as the result of a fraudulent petition. I believe it is important to once again provide you with this press release because it meshes with the story in yesterday's "Washington Times" about a lack of translators who can read mail and other documents of detainees who are suspected of being involved in terrorism. According to the article, this lack of translators also prevents the Bureau of Prison, the agency in charge of these prisons, from monitoring verbal communications as well. This, in my opinion, creates two major critical issues that are not being addressed. First of all, it is important for officials in charge of a jail to be able to know what is going on to help prevent escapes and assaults on prison guards as well as other inmates. Second, this failure to read these letters and monitor phone conversations and other oral communication also impedes efforts to gain critical intelligence that might be culled from a review of all of these various potential sources of information.

We face a ludicrous paradox: While we agonize over how much pressure interrogators should bear against inmates who might possess intelligence that might be critical in preventing future terrorist attacks, our government is missing what might be critical information that would not even involve the interrogation of prisoners, only the ability to read and understand the languages in which they communicate, including Arabic.

Interestingly, I have recommended in testimony before Congress that it is essential to mandate that ICE enforcement personnel successfully complete a Spanish language training program, which was mandated when I attended Border Patrol Academy in 1972, as were all INS enforcement personnel. I further recommended that in addition to Spanish language training (a reasonable requirement since the great majority of illegal aliens are Spanish-speaking), that the ICE academy also provide other language training where strategic languages are concerned. Among those languages would be Arabic, Farsi and Urdu. Thus far, ICE special agents are still receiving absolutely no foreign language training! Apparently Bureau of Prison personnel are similarly hobbled by a lack of language training.

I hate to keep on saying the same things, but we need to remember that we are at war. Three thousand innocent victims of the attacks of September 11, 2001 provide mute testimony to that simple fact. Yet, the "Can-do" attitude that America demonstrated in prosecuting World War II is lacking today. While members of both houses jump up and down, usually only when a television camera is taping them, demanding that we do a better job of screening the containers arriving on vessels to search for Weapons of Mass Destruction, only a comparative few members of the House of Representatives and the United States Senate have been willing to tackle the issue of border security and the lack of integrity of the immigration system. Those who have consistently demanded such improvements are the true leaders of our nation, but they are waging an apparent uphill battle with their colleagues from both sides of the political aisle.

Clearly it is critical to provide language training to employees of BOP and ICE, as well as other agencies whose employees might be able to use foreign language ability to help prevent future terrorist attacks. This is not a new issue. After the attacks of September 11 much was made about the inability of the FBI to translate a mountain of intercepts and other material that might have helped them to prevent the attacks of 9/11. Yet, even this obvious strategy of providing appropriate foreign language is not being pursued. So while the debates about the use of torture to extract intelligence and information from detainees at Guantanamo has made the headlines, other non-controversial methods of securing intelligence have been ignored!

We the people have the absolute right to demand our government does a much better job of addressing these critical issues immediately! No less than the safety and survival of our nation and our citizens hang in the balance.

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UN Terrorist List Essential to Combating Terrorism and Terrorism Financing -- An Answer to A Recent Wall Street Journal Article

By Victor Comras

David Crawford’s article in the Oct. 2nd Wall Street Journal, entitled The Black Hole of a U.N. Blacklist -- Terrorism Suspects Are Stripped of Assets Without Hearings or the Right to Appeal, raises interesting and difficult issues concerning the war on terrorism and civil liberty protections. But, what’s most troubling about the article is its one-sided approach that would take down the single most effective tool, we have today, in our arsenal to deal with terrorism financing.

I have written several blogs on the importance of the UN’s 1267 designation list in the combat against terrorism and terrorism financing. The list is the essential element that obligates all countries to apply the same 1267 sanction’s measures against identified members of al Qaeda and the Taliban and those that have provided them funding and other material support. I have complained that the list is much too short and still covers only a very small number of such al Qaeda and Taliban members and associates. Without such a list, and the UN Chapter VII measures that are associated with it, all countries would, each individually, have to undertake separate judicial and other processes before they could act against such individuals and entities. And each country would be left a free hand to determine if, and toward which individuals, or groups, they would want to act. Those engaged in terrorism and terrorism funding could easily circumvent the asset freezing and other 1267 measures by simply moving their assets elsewhere.

Five years of experience since 9/11 have also shown that it has proven extremely difficult, and in many cases impossible, to use the regular judicial process for dealing with terrorists and particularly those that finance them. Most of the information available related to terrorism financing remains in the domain of sensitive sources and methods intelligence. And even the most solid intelligence information (which, in most terrorism financing cases, is the only information available) is usually not usable in open court. Evidence the Swiss and Italian government failures to bring any successful prosecution against such known terrorism financiers as Youssef Nada and Ahmed Nasreddin, and the counter-challenges being posed by Yasin al-Qadi’s lawyers around the world.

As a member of the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions (1267) committee’s original Monitoring Group, I am quite familiar with the names on the 1267 committee’s consolidated list, and the designation procedures that got them there. I am not aware of any case in which listing was the result of a government “vendetta” against those concerns. In each case credible information was provided to the 1267 committee that designation was fully merited. Nevertheless, I would agree that some method of oversight – some sort of checks and balances – should be devised to insure against misuse.

Mr Crawford cites the case of Saad al Fagih, a Saudi national living in the UK, who was added to the 1267 list in December 2004. Saad Rashed Mohammad al-Faqih was also designated by the U.S. Treasury Department on December 21, 2004, as an al Qaeda associate along with Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee, for providing financial and material support to al Qaida and Usama bin Laden (UBL). According to the Treasury Department “Saad Rashed Mohammad al-Faqih has maintained associations with the al Qaida network since the mid-1990s, including an individual associated with the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.” This involved a pattern of of support and involvement that went well beyond providing Usama bin Ladin with a then very sophisticated and expensive satellite telephone that was directly linked to the 1998 bombing of two US embassies in Africa. His designation was also based on his leadership of the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) which was regularly used to post al Qaida-related statements and images, and which was used as a channel for raising funds for al Qaida and other terrorist organizations.

Mr. Crawford incorrectly alleges that there are no remedies for those mistakenly included on the al Qaeda/Taliban designation list. The UN Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions committee worked out such procedures some time ago. The revised 1267 committee guidelines allow any individual or entity on the list to petition his government to take up his case for his removal. Any government is free to request delisting which is granted if approved by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached the matter may still be referred to the Security Council for resolution The procedures suggest that the matter first be discussed between the government representing the requestor and the government or government’s which sponsored the listing initially.

I do agree with one inference in Mr. Crawford’s article. I believe that serious consideration should be given to establishing a new independent international legal panel (outside the UN Political Structure) charged with receiving and evaluating intelligence and other information to determine if there is, in fact, a sufficient basis to designate an individual or entity. Their initial determination should be made in camera, and provided directly to the Al Qaeda and Taliban Committee which must retain final Chapter VII authority on listing and delisting. The standard used by the panel should be akin to that of “probably cause. ” Once designation occurs, procedures should also be available, through the panel, and under Al Qaeda Committee auspices and guidance, for those designated to demonstrate their bona fides

Letter Offers Insight to al Qaeda, Points to Role of the Brotherhood

By Douglas Farah

Today's Washington Post has a fascinating look into the Salafist jihadi movements. The internal letter from the al Qaeda leadership to Zarqawi from December 2005 was translated and provided by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and is available here.

The most interesting element is the dismay of the "core" al Qaeda leadership (bin Laden, Zawahiri et al) at the Zarqawi tactics of killing other Muslims, especially Sunnis, and the insistence on following a much broader overall political policy, rather than just attacking the enemy militarily.

Written by a senior al Qaeda commander using the name Atiya, the letter clearly shows that Zarqawi (and most likely his successor in Iraq) are subordinate to bin Laden and Zawahiri in the conception of the core al Qaeda leadership. This indicates a structured, hierarchical structure, at least among these groups. The letter orders Zarqawi to do many things, rather than requesting the actions. This is somewhat different than the al Qaeda often protrayed as isolated, dispersed and decentralized.

While clearly the overall jihadi movement is decentralized, self-starting etc., the core group is clearly deeply involved in Iraq and has a clear command and control structure. My full blog is here.

Tariq Ramadan Continues His Deception Despite Evidence

By Andrew Cochran

Yesterday, the "Washington Post" ran a column by Muslim activist Tariq Ramadan, in which he lamented the "fear of ideas" among federal officials that has led to the refusal of a visa for him to visit the U.S. in his column, Ramadan said, "After a lengthy investigation, the State Department cited no evidence of suspicious relationships, no meetings with terrorists, no encouraging or advocacy of terrorism. Instead, the department cited my donation of $940 to two humanitarian organizations (a French group and its Swiss chapter) serving the Palestinian people."

Ramadan asserts he is entitled to a full disclosure of the evidence known to authorities which supported the visa denial. But aliens seeking entry into the U.S. have no rights to that evidence and shouldn't. As former senior immigration agent Bill West wrote here on September 25, "Especially for visa adjudication purposes under US immigration law, contributing money to a charity determined to be a funding funnel for Hamas could constitute support for terrorism no matter how Ramadan and his supporters might try to spin it. And for visa denial purposes, proof need not be anything close to criminal standards nor even court-use standards...it's all administrative action with virtually no due process rights accorded the foreign-based alien...something that still drives those apologists crazy."

We have tracked Ramadan's repeated attempts to enter the U.S. and hide his past; I last wrote on them on August 30, with links to other entries by Doug Farah, Steven Emerson (who wrote of Ramadan's support for attacks against the U.S., Israel, and Russia), Olivier Guitta, Lorenzo Vidino, and Bill West. Then, in his post here on September 29, Doug Farah discussed European intel detailing contacts between Ramadan and numerous terrorists, including Al Qaeda #2 Ayman al-Zawahiri (when he was still running Egyptian Islamic Jihad), Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman (the 1993 WTC bombing), and others. Other terrorism experts have provided more details of Ramadan's statements or publications in support of terrorism. And far from being "humanitarian organizations," as Ramadan claims, the two groups to which he contributed "have appeared in several terrorist investigations since 1995..."

The State Department doesn't have to lay out all the evidence needed to keep him out of the U.S., but there is enough out there already to justify the denial.

Exclusive - The 9/11 Suicide Wills Unmasked: "Eid al-Fitr at Tarnak Farms"

By Evan Kohlmann

In late 2001 or early 2002, the U.S. government was able to recover a video recording from a suspected Al-Qaida facility in Afghanistan. The video, which contains no sound, is divided into two principle sections: first, a speech given by Bin Laden on January 8, 2000 at the Tarnak Farms complex to an elite gathering of top Al-Qaida leaders——including both Saif al-Adel and Fahid Msalam (both indicted in U.S. federal court for their roles in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s reported successor at the head of Al-Qaida’s international terrorist operations, Abu Faraj al-Liby. Also in the audience for Bin Laden’s speech were a number of key 9/11 organizers and hijackers—including Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Mohammed Atta, and Ziad Jarrah. During the second portion of the video, filmed on January 18, 2000, Jarrah and Atta are subsequently recorded reading what appear to be suicide wills. The two men sit side-by-side in a room, presumably also located at the Tarnak Farms complex. The following slides contain still images taken from that video, juxtaposed alongside other known photos of these individuals, for the purpose of identification and comparison.

Future Terrorism: Mutant Jihads

By Walid Phares

Indonesian JI Ties to Somali Gun Runners Arrested in Yemen

By Zachary Abuza

Chicago Hamas Trial: Former Israeli Security Agent Takes the Stand

By Steven Emerson

The first American Crisis in the Middle East

By Aaron Mannes

Source: Zawahiri Likely Alive, Bajur Accords on Hold

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Civil Liability is Crucial in the War on Terrorism: A Response to the Wall Street Journal.

By Victor Comras

More Action on Weapons Trafficker Viktor Bout

By Douglas Farah

More Ceasefire Violations in Mindanao, Pressure Mounts as Deadline in Peace Talks Nears

By Zachary Abuza

Terror Down South: India Battles Terrorist Threats Beyond J & K

By Animesh Roul

Torturer Toto Tells Terrorist Tale of Immigration Woe

By Bill West

Radical Australian Cleric Al-Hilali's Sermon in the Context of a Growing Fringe of Home-Grown Militants

By Zachary Abuza

AMIA Background

By Aaron Mannes

Small Progress in Argentina

By Douglas Farah

Two Terrorism Experts "Get Political" in Op-Eds

By Andrew Cochran

Matthew Levitt, Treasury Official and Former CT Blog Expert, Testifies at Chicago Hamas Trial

By Steven Emerson

Czech Report Shows Egyptians Probing Flight Defenses

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Hamas Trial in Chicago - Week 1

By Steven Emerson

The Islamic Courts Union Readies a Final Push Into Baidoa

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Knowing the Enemy, Understanding the Enemy

By Douglas Farah

Explosives found near US Embassy in Venezuela

By Aaron Mannes

Transatlantic cooperation on terrorism not that bad after all?

By Olivier Guitta

Update on a very tense situation in Lebanon

By Olivier Guitta

THE CALIPH-STROPHIC DEBATE

By Walid Phares

The Shi'ite-Sunni Divide and Our Ignorance

By Douglas Farah

Weekly Standard: A New Terrorist Haven

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

The Effects of Thailand's Coup on the Southern Insurgency

By Zachary Abuza

Malaysia Releases 17 More Members of JI & KMM

By Zachary Abuza

Border Security & Venezuela

By Aaron Mannes

Muslim Brotherhood Member Barred from United States

By Steven Emerson

The Danger of Homegrown Terrorism to Scandinavia

By Lorenzo Vidino

Hamas in the Palestinian Authority Seeks and Receives Assistance from Tehran and Damascus

By David Schenker

On Ammar Abdulhamid

By David Schenker

Reform Party of Syria Should Substantiate "Muslim Brotherhood" Charge Against Activist

By Andrew Cochran

North Korea Sanctions: The Difficulties Are In the Details!

By Victor Comras

Terrorist Organizations: Equal Opportunity Reaffirmation

By Michael B. Kraft

Cornered Tigers Pounce: Sri Lanka Update

By Aaron Mannes

A Week of Bombings in Mindanao: Making Sense of It All (updated 10/17)

By Zachary Abuza

New Polling Data in Indonesia Shows "Significant" Support for Terrorists

By Zachary Abuza

Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorism in Europe

By Jonathan Winer

Controversy Grows Over Supposed Unity of Iraqi Mujahideen as Al-Qaida Announces Founding of Sunni Islamic State

By Evan Kohlmann