Cornered Tigers Pounce: Sri Lanka Update

By Aaron Mannes

In its ongoing war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) the Sri Lankan military has suffered a devastating series of reversals in the past week. On October 11 they launched an offensive and lost a large scale battle around Muhamalai in which over 129 soldiers were killed and over 200 injured. (The LTTE also captured weapons and ammunition so it can continue the fight.)

On October 16 the LTTE, deploying its signature tactic, struck a Sri Lankan Navy convoy killing nearly 100 people, mostly sailors, and wounding 200. It was the single deadliest terror attack in Sri Lanka's long, bloody conflict between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. On the 18th, Sri Lankan suicide boat bombers struck a naval base in the southern city of Galle, a major tourist attraction deep in the government's territory. The attack also set off rioting in Galle in which Sinhalese townspeople reportedly attacked Tamils - security services imposed a curfew and claim to have brought the situation under control. The operation is further demonstration of the LTTE's ability to mount sophisticated operations far from its base in Sri Lanka's far north.

At first these reversals appear surprising, as the Sri Lankan military had been scoring successes against the LTTE including capturing territory from the Tigers near the strategic port of Trincomalee in September. However, these successes relied, in great part, on the assistance of Col. Karuna a former high-level Tiger commander who, along with his men, defected to the Sri Lankan government. In Karuna's territory in Sri Lanka's east the military was operating successfully because of intelligence and support from Karuna. But when they entered the LTTE strongholds in the north, they were over-confident and without the same support.

No one should have doubted that, despite reversals at home and abroad, the LTTE retained formidable capabilities. In 2000, before the cease-fire, the LTTE also won several major battlefield victories against the Sri Lankan military. They also fought Indian forces to a standstill during India's ill-fated peace-keeping mission in Sri Lanka from 1987-1990 (in what is referred to as India's Vietnam.)

The fighting occurs against the backdrop of a scheduled resumption of peace talks on October 28. The Sri Lankan government hoped to enter the talks from a position of strength - instead they are entering from a position of tremendous weakness.

Unfortunately, the peace process offers little chance of a long-term resolution. The LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, is a world class terrorist and the Tigers could teach Hamas or the Salafis a thing or two about indoctrinating suicide bombers. He is unlikely to accommodate himself to a role within Sri Lanka's (imperfect) democracy. At the same time, separation is not an option. An independent Tamil state (the LTTE's ultimate goal) will become an irritant to India - possibly encouraging separatism among its Tamil minority - and, because of its strategic location astride the Indian Ocean, a probable haven for transnational crime.

The best that can be hoped for is quiet (which, in the wake of the massive civilian suffering is a worthy goal). Hopefully the respite will be used by the international community to foster comprehensive efforts to reach past the LTTE to the Tamil people, while also pressing the Sri Lankan government to develop more inclusive policies towards its Tamil minority. This, combined with continuing pressure on the LTTE's international fund-raising and arms procurement, might - in time - bring some peace to Sri Lanka.

Several excellent analysis from India's perspective are available from the South Asia Analysis Group.

Cross-posted to The TerrorBlog.

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