Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorism in Europe

By Jonathan Winer

First, thank you Andrew for inviting me to participate in the CT blog, which I have consulted with interest for many months.

The French situation would seem perfect for an exploration of whether going beyond normal law enforcement operations to counter-insurgency may have applicability to homegrown Islamic extremism in particular locales where respect for existing social norms is being threatened by counter-cultural and counter-political values oriented around an ideology that justifies violence.

Some relevant excerpts from recent Counter-insurgency Doctrine issued by US military analysts. They wrote it with Iraq and Afghanistan in mind, not extremist enclaves in Western Europe. The question is how much of this kind of thinking could apply to domestic, localized threats, who view themselves as part of a "global insurgency" agains the Christian West. From the point of view of an young Islamic extremist living in Parisian suburbs, the term "occupied France" may have a very different meaning from the one we ordinarily give it, meaning something closer to the term "occupied Palestine."

The concepts of counter insurgency outlined in the US Army paper excerpted below would seem, I think, to be applicable to the French situation. It is not clear to me whether the French government is thinking this way about it. -- JMW

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Because insurgents attempt to prevent the military battlespace from becoming decisive and concentrate in the political and psychological, operational design must be different than for conventional combat. Specifically, the U.S. military and other government agencies should develop an effects-based approach designed to fracture, delegitimize, delink, demoralize, and deresource insurgents. To make this work requires an independent strategic assessment organization composed of experienced government officials, military officers, policemen, intelligence officers, strategists, and regional experts to assess a counterinsurgency operation and allow senior leaders to
make adjustments. . .

Mounting global discontent arising from globalization; the failure of economic development to keep pace with expectations; the collapse of traditional political, economic, and social orders; widespread anger and resentment; environmental decay; population pressure; the presence of weak regimes; the growth of transnational organized crime; and the widespread availability of arms are making insurgency common and strategically significant. This significance is likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer. . .

At some point every insurgency must open direct operations against the regime in order to succeed. This can take the form of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, assassination of officials, sabotage, and other types of irregular or asymmetric violence. At the same time, the insurgents must continue to improve their skills, learn their craft, accumulate resources, and mobilize support. They may do this by cultivating external alliances, smuggling, robbery, narcotrafficking, kidnapping, black marketing, money laundering, counterfeiting, merchandise pirating, illegal use of charities, racketeering, and extortion. They may buy arms, obtaining them from ideological allies, or capture them from government forces. Most―but not all― insurgents also seek to augment their legitimacy, mobilize greater public support and, in some cases, expand their international acceptance.

Insurgents have a variety of methods to do this, including propaganda, information warfare designed to popularize the perception that they are seekers of justice forced into violence by the unwillingness of the regime to give them a voice in the political system, actions which demonstrate that they offer a better alternative than the regime, and simple boldness and courage― ”armed propaganda”―designed to demonstrate the incompetence and brutality of the regime. In any case, insurgents inspire resistance and recruitment by defiance, particularly among young males with the volatile combination of boredom, anger, and lack of purpose. Insurgency can provide a sense of adventure, excitement, and meaning that transcends its political objectives. Thus the greater the pool of bored, angry, unoccupied young men in a society, the more fruitful ground for insurgent organizers to work. The job of mobilizing support and acquiring resources is even easier for insurgents in a liberation conflict since they can draw on the inherent dislike people have of domination by “outsiders.” As Khair al-Din Hasib, the “father” of pan-Arab nationalism, stated, “Whenever, wherever there is occupation, there will be resistance.” . . .

Starting an insurgency is easy. A dozen or so dedicated radicals with access to munitions and explosives can do it. Building an effective insurgency, though, is difficult. History suggests that it requires a specific set of conditions. The importance of these is determined, in part, by the effectiveness of the regime. When facing a determined regime with an understanding of counterinsurgency and the resources to undertake it, all of these conditions must be present for any degree of success by the insurgents. When facing a weak, disorganized, corrupt, divided, repressive, or ineffective regime, insurgents can overcome the absence of one or even several of the conditions.

The most basic precondition for insurgency is frustration and the belief that this cannot be ameliorated through the existing political system. This may be widespread among a population or limited to a radical elite which then has to convince the more passive population of the need for violent change. A conspiratorial history and culture are also important. In such societies, insurgents can utilize or take over existing patterns of underground activity, webs of secret societies, or widespread criminal activity. A society already accustomed to conspiratorial activity is a naturally fertile ground for insurgency. . . .

One additional strategic factor merits consideration: some strategic thinkers contend that the United States is now facing the first insurgency of a global scale―created by the interlinkage of multiple national insurgencies―led by a network motivated by radical Islam. The Global War on Terrorism has all of the characteristics of an insurgency: protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, dispersal, the use of complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political mobilization designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor; avoidance by insurgents of battlespaces where they are weak and a focus on those where they can compete, particularly the psychological and the political. The insurgents are fighting a total war with limited resources; the counterinsurgents are self-restrained by ethics and a desire to control costs. This belief suggests that the appropriate American response is to build a grand strategy modeled on counterinsurgency which reflects the differences between national and liberation insurgencies. . . .

Because insurgents attempt to prevent the military battlespace from becoming decisive and concentrate in the political and psychological, operational design must be different than for conventional combat. One useful approach would be to adopt an interagency, effects-based method of counterinsurgency planning focused on the following key activities:

• Fracturing the insurgent movement through military, psychological, and political means, to include direct strikes, dividing one part against another, offering amnesties, draining the pool of alienated, disillusioned, angry young males by providing alternatives, and so forth. Relationships within insurgent movements are not necessarily harmonious. Cabals within the insurgency often vie for leadership or dominance. Identifying these rifts and exploiting them may prove to be a coup for the counterinsurgency strategy;
• Delegitimizing the insurgent movement in the eyes of the local population and any international constituency it might have;
• Demoralizing the insurgent movement by creating and sustaining the perception that long-term trends are adverse and by making the lives of insurgents unpleasant and dangerous through military pressure and psychological operations;
• Delinking the insurgent movement from its internal and external support by understanding and destroying the political, logistics, and financial connections; and,
• Deresourcing the insurgent movement both by curtailing funding streams and causing it to waste existing resources.

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From Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the 21st Century, Metz and Millen, US Army Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004

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