North Korea Sanctions: The Difficulties Are In the Details!

By Victor Comras

Editor's Note: In light of North Korea's status as an official "State Sponsor of Terrorism" since January 20, 1988 and President Bush's warning yesterday that any attempted North Korean transfer of nuclear technology to any party would be interdicted, this post is particularly timely and pertinent to CTB.)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 was meant to send a strong message to North Korea, and indirectly also to Iran, that the international community will not continence continuation of their ballistic missile and nuclear weapons development and testing programs. But, the resolution may have fallen short of its mark. And the devil will be in the details of its implementation and enforcement.

While the language contained in the North Korea sanctions resolution is quite strong and to the point, the measures adopted are considerably weaker than previous sanctions programs imposed by the Security Council. Take, for example, the measures adopted against Iraq or Serbia. Those earlier sanctions programs included across-the-board trade and financial services embargoes, allowing only for specific exemptions based on humanitarian considerations. Air traffic was banned, and all ships to or from Iraq and Serbia were subject to being stopped, searched and detained.

The sanctions adopted in resolution 1718 against North Korea are much more restrained. They impose a partial trade embargo covering only a limited range of heavy military equipment, and high technology items and commodities associated with North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. There is still only a provisional list of the items covered by this embargo. Difficult negotiations undoubtedly are still ahead in coming up with a more definitive list. The resolution also speaks of cutting off the flow of “luxury goods” to North Korea’s leadership, but there is as yet no definition or list of goods associated with this measure. This means implementation and enforcement of this measure is quite unlikely for the time being.

The resolution also envisages financial sanctions against North Korea’s leaders and those entities associated with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. But these measures can only be applied after the Security Council members have decided on the list of individuals and entities to which such measures should be applied. This will be the work of a new “Sanctions Committee” established by the resolution. It may take several weeks, or months, before such a list is agreed and published – and before countries can actually act to implement these new financial controls. Several countries will have to enact new legislation and regulations before such measures can be implemented within their territory. It is difficult to understand how the Sanctions Committee will be able to pick and choose between DPRK entities and leaders when coming up with this list, as every DPRK individual and entity is subject to the same State control and manipulation.

China is clearly in the driver’s seat when it comes to implementing and enforcing the new measures against North Korea. The Chinese can determine what impact, if any, these measures will actually have on North Korea. They remain North Korea’s principal market and principal supplier. The bulk of North Korea’s imports and exports cross their common border. China’s inspection of cargoes, and interdiction of contraband, are essential to making these measures work. But, even if these limited trade sanctions items are interdicted, the economic effect on North Korea will be minimal. China will have to go beyond these limited sanctions, and begin using its considerable economic leverage over North Korea, to force them back to the Six Party talks. Whatever is done in this respect will be completely in line with China's own perception of its national interests.

It is still not at all clear what enforcement measures are envisaged with regard to inspection of air cargoes or cargoes carried by ship. Hopefully, initial inspections will occur at the airports and harbors at which such cargoes are embarked or offloaded. But, there are a number of countries, which are not likely to carry out such a function in a credible manner, (eg Iran). Inspection at sea is another matter. This was a point of contention in the negotiations leading up to the resolution, and the resulting language is quite ambiguous – “all Member States are called upon to take, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK, as necessary;” The United States maintains that this includes the right to inspect such cargoes on the high seas, but others have indicated different views on this point. The previous sanctions programs against Serbia and Iraq specifically authorized such action, which, in both cases was carried out by a so-called Multilateral Interdiction Naval Force (MIF).

I’m not trying to suggest that these new measures will not work. That judgment would be premature at this point. Nor do I have any great suggestions to offer on what we must do to get North Korea to comply fully with the terms of the Security Council Resolution– other than to suggest the obvious: We must encourage all countries, and especially China, to effectively implement these measures. And we must stand ready to strengthen these measures further, including using our experience gained in the Serbia and Iraq cases, when, and if, the opportunity arises.

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