Counterterrorism Blog

A spate of bombings rocked the southern Philippines over the past six days. The attacks have been clearly pinned on the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operatives and should be seen as both an attempt to distract the attention of the security forces from their ongoing offensive in Jolo and as payback for the arrest of Dulmatin’s – the top JI operative in the Philippines – wife on 3 October. But the attacks have broader implications for the peace process now that the government is implicating the MILF.

1. The Attacks:
Ten people were killed and over 40 were wounded in a string of bombings across Mindanao and Jolo. In all, four bombs went off and three were defused. The first bomb went off in a crowded marketplace in Makilala, North Cotabato, and killed eight. The bomb was a cell phone-detonated 81-mm mortar round. A second bomb, hidden inside a black backpack, was defused in front of the Makilala municipal hall. That was followed by a bomb of a similar design in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. It was also placed in a market and killed two. A bomb twice as large was placed in front of the new shopping mall in Cotabato City, but failed to detonate, an apparent malfunction in its cell phone-detonator. On Sunday, three people were wounded when a bomb went off at a police camp in Jolo. That same day a bomb was defused in a crowded market in Padian, Zamboanga del Sur. That bomb was fairly sophisticated and one press report described it as made of “ammunition from a rocket-propelled grenade, 60-mm. mortar, and 40-mm. and M203 plastic pipe with TNT flakes, one kilo of mixed TNT flakes with ammonium nitrate, blasting caps, and an alarm clock in a backpack.” An M79 grenade went off in the marketplace, but there were no casualties as the police had cleared the area.

According to National Security Advisor Bert Gonzales, "Investigation showed that the old leaders are still the ones overseeing the entire operations of its terrorist cells operating in the south. But these were actually carried out by new recruits." Two days later, the government pressed charges against six members of the MILF, including its chairman Ebrahim el Haj Murad, for helping to carry out the attacks. According to a press report, an un-identified informant for the police said that a mid-level MILF field commander Kule Mamagong organized a team led by Abdulbasit Usman, a JI trained bomber and leader of the Special Operations Group. At this point there is some but not overwhelming evidence of MILF complicity.

2. The Ongoing Offensive:
Clearly the past week’s attacks were to counter the government’s offensive against the ASG in Jolo, which began on 1 August. Dubbed “Oplan Ultimatum,” the offensive was launched after roughly 200 ASG were seen converging in Indanan town together with JI members Umar Patek, Dulmatin, and a Singaporean national, Manobo. The offensive has netted some gains and a handful of ASG members were killed or captured; though fewer than the Armed Forces of the Philippines routinely claim. The AFP has some 5,000 men deployed on the small island of Jolo. In the past week eight AFP were killed and more than 30 wounded in fierce fire-fights.

The ASG are believed to be under the command of Radulan Sahiron. Another top ASG leader, Isnilon Hapilon, is thought to have been wounded. Press reports, citing intelligence sources, state that he withdrew from Jolo and landed in Lantawan town on Basilan where he is being treated.

The most important ain in the offensive was the seizure of a large explosives cache in early September in Pitakul that included almost 6,000 blasting caps and ten sacks of ammonium nitrate. Also recovered were documents and CDs. The ASG/JI bomb-factory provided some evidence of cross-fertilization. Dr. Azahari’s small bag bomb has now been found in the southern Philippines. Several of last week’s bombs were detonated by cellular phones, a JI technique but not one previously employed by the ASG. US military sources quoted in the press argued that the cache of explosives was intended to be used outside of Jolo/Sulu; though without further evidence provided that is conjecture.

However, on 17 October, Philippine security forces seized about 200 kg of ammonium nitrate that was hidden under a shipment of fresh fish aboard a ferry had come from Jolo. One month earlier, police siezed a similar amount of ammonium nitrate also aboard a ferry landing in Zamboanga. The government is bracing for a new wave of attacks.

3. What Have We Learned from Dulmatin’s Wife?
A second reason for the wave of bombings is clearly in revenge for the 3 October capture of Dulmatin’s wife, Istiada Oemar Sovie (aka Amenah Tohe) and two of their children Edar, 6, and Alih, 8. They were arrested in a safehouse in Pitakul town near the recent fighting. Sovie has shed significant light on the triangular relationship between the ASG, JI and Moro Islamic Liberation front (MILF). Operationally she has revealed the following:

• Her husband, Janjalani, and Patek were near Patikul, still the scene of intense fighting.
• There are some seven other JI members in Mindanao that she knows of including four Indonesians in Maguindanao (whom she identified as her brother-in-law Baharin, Zae, Tom and Karim) and a Singaporean national, Manobo, who is in Sulu with her husband.
• Her husband has been instrumental in training ASG operatives in bomb-making.

But her other revelations have been equally important.
• She shed extensive detail on the under-ground network of getting people from Indonesia to Mindanao, including the network of safe-houses in Sabah, Malaysia. While the tri-country maritime border has proven somewhat vulnerable for JI, the Philippine National Security Advisor Bert Gonzales admitted this weekend that the Philippine government does not have near the resources to police the 26,000 small crafts that go between the Philippines and Indonesia annually.
• She reinforced our understanding that JI is thoroughly inter-connected through marriage. Dulmatin’s sister, Atkah, is married to Baharin, while a brother, is also in Mindanao.
• Her revelations about the MILF have been the most damaging. While she confirmed that MILF operatives had received training from her husband, the real shocker is that in 2003 when they arrived in Mindanao from Central Java, they stayed in Camp Darapanan, currently the MILF’s headquarters. The MILF often ascribes ties with JI to lost commanders, but they were literally living besides the MILF Chairman Ebrahim el Haj Murad for a year before moving to nearby Parang. She makes clear that the JI men always received sanctuary in MILF territory.
• She has not made it clear why they left Mindanao for Sulu, but said that they went along with Rushida, whom she believed was ASG chieftain Khadaffy Janjalan’s third wife in early-2005.
• The four Indonesians she mentioned, in addition to other known senior JI operatives at large, Zulkifli bin Hir and Abdulrahman Ayob are still in MILF areas. They are less radioactive” than Dulmatin and Umar Patek and are accorded sanctuary.
• The MNLF in Sulu was not welcoming to the ASG or JI members. While the Muslim community in MNLF territory did not detain them, they made it clear that the radicals were unwelcome.

4. Implications for the Peace Process:
The vehemently anti-MILF governor of North Cotabato, Emmanuel Piñol, immediately blamed the recent attacks/bombings on the MILF. "I’m holding the MILF responsible for this atrocity. The bomb used was a known signature armament of the MILF," Piñol declared over a local radio program. Pinol was behind some leaks that hardline elements of the MILF, under the command of Ustad Ameril Umbra Kato were instrumental in the attacks. In particular he singled out a team of operatives led by Abdul Basit Usman of the MILF’s Special Operations Group who planted the explosive in Tacurong. On Sunday, the police cleared the MILF of culpability though many AFP commanders have publicly opined in Pinol’s favor. On Tuesday, the government reversed course and charged six MILF members with assisting the attacks. In addition to Chairman Murad, those charged include: Commanders Kule Mamagong alias Ustadz Kule; Daud Sarip; Biznar Salahuddin; Atti Lintungan alias Ustadz Atti; Samsudin Demaalo alias Commander Platon Blah; and Ahmad Akmad Batabol Usman alias Abdulbasit or Basit Usman; Zahide Abdul alias Zabiri Abdul or Bedz; and Usman Al Majad.

The bomb signature – command-detonated artillery shells have been used by the MILF before, but there is so much joint training and cross-fertilization that it is hard without any arrests to positively link the MILF. There will be faint MILF “fingerprints” on the attacks, but this was clearly an ASG/JI operation.

The MILF condemned the recent bombings on their website and denied any connections to the attacks. No surprise there; standard operating procedure. The MILF denied that Abdul Basit Usman was on their roster, and stated that he was expelled several years ago for his involvement in terrorism. The MILF spokesman Eid Kabalu warned, "If they pursue this, it may lead to a total breakdown in the peace process." The MILF's lead negotiator Mohagher Iqbal also weighed in saying "This is a serious issue and it will certainly affect the peace talks."

The MILF have also demanded access to Dulmatin’s wife in order to “educate” her and refute her allegations of MILF complicity with JI. It is very evident that members of the MILF are against the peace process (Kato, for one, but also Wahid Tondok and Salamat Samir) and the longer the talks drag on the more they will be vindicated. Many in the MILF support JI, though for most it is a more pragmatic relationship. With the peace process still far from being concluded, they are not going to cut ties with JI or the Abu Sayyaf. For that reason alone, it is imperative to get the MILF and government back to the peace table. The MILF asserts that terrorism would be counter-productive to the peace talks, yet there are both spoilers within the MILF, as well as those who want to pressure a government, which is dragging out the talks.

The two sides are far apart on many issues, and it is absurd to listen to President Arroyo assert that “80 percent” of the talks have been concluded. Much of what has been “agreed to” has been papered over and the two sides have many unresolved issues that divide them. The talks must be resumed. The Philippine peace process continues to have regional implications.