If It Worked For Al Capone, It Can Work For Al-Qaeda
By Bill West
A report today in the New York Daily News discussed the findings of a study by New York University's Center of Law and Security related to the Federal Government’s anti-terrorism investigation and prosecution efforts since the 9/11 attacks. That study came to the somewhat mixed, if not contradictory, conclusion the Government’s efforts have thwarted additional attacks but Federal prosecutors have frequently inflated the importance of the cases. Perhaps it is arguable that thwarting additional attacks in and of itself is significant and important enough.
The NYU study appears to take issue with the fact that relatively few defendants in cases identified by the Government as “terrorism related” are actually charged with and even fewer convicted of terrorism-specific crimes. Instead, many more of these defendants are convicted of other, non-terrorism crimes such as fraud or conspiracy. Some are even charged with those “minor” immigration violations and, ho-hum, deported. Such efforts, within the law enforcement community, have generally become known as the “Al Capone” approach, taken from the way that infamous depression-era gangster in Chicago was taken down by the “Untouchable” Feds on tax violations because he was so well insulated on more serious crimes by his well-oiled criminal organization...much the way modern day organized crime, drug traffickers and, yes, terrorist organizations insulate their operatives and leaders.
Modern day law enforcement, from at least the 1970s onward, has addressed organized crime and drug traffickers with the “Al Capone” approach via well established and highly successful multi-agency task force efforts. At the Federal level, these have been the Organized Crime Racketeering Strike Force (OCRSF), the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA). They all involve various Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies working in concert targeting major criminal enterprises, going after the crooks with any viable legal process and charges that develop.
Within the counter-terrorism arena, the FBI as the lead Federal law enforcement agency, wisely adopted the multi-agency approach with their Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) well before the 9/11 attacks. The JTTFs significantly expanded after 9/11. Over the years there has been little criticism (except, perhaps, from defendants and their attorneys) of the “Al Capone” approach taken by the Feds against gangsters and drug dealers. Since 9/11, such aggressive law enforcement efforts in the counter-terrorism arena has curiously drawn substantial criticism from some quarters.
Immigration law enforcement, in the form of the old INS Investigations Division and now ICE, has always been a participant in these multi-agency task forces. Not surprisingly, whether the targets are gangsters, drug traffickers or terrorists and their supporters, very many of them are foreign nationals (aliens) who, amazingly, in some way or another violated one or more (usually more) provisions of the US Immigration and Nationality Act. Therefore, not surprisingly, many such task force targets found themselves arrested and charged with immigration law violations. Sometimes such violations were in conjunction with other crimes. Sometimes those violations were the only viable charges under the circumstances, notwithstanding the intelligence that might exist identifying the suspect as a notable bad player (be he/she a gangster, drug dealer or terrorist operative). This isn’t bad; it’s solid, aggressive and innovated investigative law enforcement and prosecution, and it works.