Sowing Mustard Seeds in Poso and Ambon

By Zachary Abuza

It is hard to get people outside of Indonesia to take notice of small bombs going off in remote islands. They’re not going off in the discos where we dance, the hotels where we sleep and embassies where we work. The death toll is low, and the victims are all Indonesian, whether they be Muslim, Christian or Hindu. Yet it is incumbent upon us to take notice as this is part of the militants’ – including Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – strategy to regroup and they don't want us to notice.

JI is clearly a weakened organization. The 2005 death of top bomb-maker, Dr. Azahari bin Hussin and the capture of his enormous cache of explosives set the group back: for the first time since 2002, there were no major bombings in Indonesia in 2006. The Indonesian police along with regional security services deserve tremendous credit. But we have to think long-term, because that’s how JI and other Islamist militants think. JI’s own documents saw the conflict as a protracted one that would last at least 40 years. JI has now adopted a more overt strategy based on social welfare and dawah, and is focusing on religious purification. The other leg of its regrouping strategy is fomenting sectarian violence, what JI was deeply involved in from 1998-2001.

There has been an alarming up-tick in attacks, including bombings, targeted assassinations, and raids on military/police facilities. Since October 2004, there have been at least 28 successful bombings, resulting in the deaths of 48. Most were small and a handful of larger bombs killed the majority of the victims. Police found, seized or defused 260 IEDs. There have been more than 60 bombings since the Malino peace agreement was signed on 12 March 2001. More than 21 people, including five police, were gunned down, and most infamously, militants beheaded three schoolgirls. Most of the bombs are quite small and three were responsible for almost half the casualties.

Security forces have been trying to cope with the problem. On 22 January 2007, government forces responded to a large number of armed militants was amassing near Poso. The raid set off a gun battle that killed 15 suspected fighters and one officer. In all 17 suspected terrorists were killed in January in clashes with the police. Over 10 people were arrested, yet more than 50 suspected militants were able to escape. Two days ago, two more militants linked to JI were arrested.

Attacks, including the beheadings of three schoolgirls, are meant to undermine confidence in the state. Clearly people are out to undermine the Malino Accords. It is clearly a reprisal of the “uhud project” of 1998-2001 in which JI sought to establish hijrah, a secure base area governed by sharia where they could train and emanate outwards. JI seeks to provoke attacks based on its broadened definition of a defensive jihad.

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