![]() |
| The first multi-expert blog dedicated solely to counterterrorism issues, serving as a gateway to the community for policymakers and serious researchers. Designed to provide realtime information about terrorism cases and policy developments. |
FCI Can Complement CTBy Bill West
Yesterday, the Washington Times reported that Joel Brenner, the chief of the new Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, stated in an interview that America is facing substantial espionage threats from foreign intelligence services, particularly those of China, Cuba, Iran and Russia. Brenner noted that his new organization has a primary mission to revitalize the counterintelligence efforts of the US Government to confront these threats, and to also bring those counterintelligence efforts in line with the Government’s counter-terrorism mission. The article noted counterintelligence efforts by the FBI, CIA and the Defense Department; however, interestingly there was no mention of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies. While counter-terrorism clearly requires the involvement of DHS, there are notable aspects of counterintelligence matters wherein DHS agencies, particularly US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) may be able to play a significant role. It is interesting that the Cuban Intelligence Service (CUIS) is identified as such a notable threat and how the Cubans are now training and involved with their Venezuelan counterparts. Given the evolving close relationship the Venezuelan government has with the Islamist regime in Iran, this may be cause for greater concern, coupled with the existing threat already posed by Iranian intelligence capabilities against the US. Historically, there were solid, demonstrated successes enjoyed against CUIS operatives in south Florida from the mid-1990s onward. These were genuine multi-agency cooperative success stories involving the FBI, then-INS and the Intelligence Community, with the "hands on" charges being Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) violations (cutting edge efforts back then). The numerous subsequent Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) prosecutions all stemmed from those early joint FBI/INS anti-CUIS cases in Miami. Some of those techniques were employed with counter-terrorism cases, to include Imran Mandhai and Adham Hassoun, that fell into place or were improved because of those early efforts against Cuban spies. These concepts remain entirely applicable to current Foreign Counterintelligence matters, be they Chinese, Iranian, Cuban, Russian or whatever. As foreign terrorists and their organizations have repeatedly demonstrated, the routine and flagrant abuse of the US immigration system and laws/regulations to gain entry and to stay in the US is also something that can be viably attacked as their Achilles heel. Hostile foreign intelligence operatives are no different. There must be recognition, however, by appropriate officialdom of the potential for properly applied immigration investigative/enforcement techniques in all this. It is not entirely clear, given resource limitations and diverse mission disbursement, those potentials are being fully recognized at the national level. Perhaps a “look back” at prior successes may be in order?
TrackBackTrackBack URL for this entry: |