Latest Developments in the Hariri Investigation: The 7th Report of the Independent Commission.
By David Schenker
On March 15, the UN released the 7th report of the International Independent Commission investigating the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, 14 subsequent assassinations, and a host of post 2005 terrorist acts in Lebanon. The most recent of the terrorist atrocities under investigation are the assassination former Lebanese minister of industry Pierre Gemayel, and the Ain Alaq bus bombings that killed three and wounded over twenty. The report is quite dense and highly technical, but if you can manage to slog through 20 pages, the report is a fascinating read.
The Commission, now headed by Belgian prosecutor Serge Brammertz, was established pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1644 (March 2005), some two months after the Hariri murder. The initial reports explicitly pointed to a key Syrian role in the assassination. (Interestingly, the first report, published in October 2005 and penned by then lead investigator Detlev Mehlis, was apparently heavily edited by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, denuding the report of references to top Syrian officials implicated in the killing.)
More recently, though, the reports have focused on primarily on process, forensics, and motives. While they have made fewer headlines then their predecessors, these recent reports have been no less damaging to the Syrians. Key findings of the March 15 Report include:
The suicide bomber did not spend his youth in Lebanon. Isotope data indicates that the man had significant exposure to lead pollution in an urban environment outside of Lebanon until he was at least 12.
Ahmad Abu Adass, who issued a video-taped claim of responsibility of the Hariri attack, may have been either coerced or duped into making the video. Relatives who knew him prior to his disappearance stated that “his appearance on the video tape was physically different” than before. Some relatives said he was thinner, raising the possibility that he was under duress prior to making the statement.
Based on forensic findings, it is “highly unlikely” that Abu Adass was the bomber.
The Commission added a new motive to the reasons why Hariri was killed: In the last months of his life, Hariri was focused on the 2005 elections and in particular, the draft electoral law, including the redrawing of constituencies. This newly discovered possible motive should be added to wider context (see paragraph 53 of the report), which generally suggests a leading Syrian role.
Many believe that Syria was trying to reconcile with Hariri when he was assassinated. The Commission has a working hypothesis that the initial decision to kill Hariri was taken before the later attempts at rapprochement, leading to a situation where “two tracks…were running in parallel. On one track, Hariri was engaged in rapprochement initiatives, and on the other, preparations for his assassination were underway.” (See paragraph 63).
As for the investigation into the assassination of member of Parliament and An Nahar editor Gebran Tueni, the Commission believes that a remote detonated IED was responsible for the murder.
The Commission has 104 persons currently working full time staffing the investigation bureaucracy, and has budget for up to 188 staff. The detailed nature of this report and the latest extension of the Commission’s mandate suggest that the investigation is progressing and that it will ultimately reach a successful conclusion. To date, Brammertz and his colleagues have not leaked, so it’s difficult to ascertain exactly where the investigation is leading. Based on the earlier reports, and on the damning discussion of “motives” in this latest report, however, it is clear that Syria remains the leading suspect in the investigation.