Counterterrorism Blog

A number of my colleagues have suggested that I discuss further my concerns with the latest UN Security Council Sanctions Resolution on Iran. Many in the news media are characterizing the new round of UN Security Council Sanctions on Iran as “tough” and “stringent,” and my previous blog seems well out of step with these perceptions. Those assigning such positive attributes to Resolution 1747 are apparently relying, in part, on statements made by various world leaders that the Security Council’s unanimous support for Resolution 1747 demonstrates the international community's commitment to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. I wish that were the case, but I strongly doubt it. The new sanction measures, in my view, represent, at best, a very weak international response to Iran. They demonstrate a continuing strong reluctance on the part of key members of the international community to take any meaningful action to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons. And that may well signal to Iran that there will be only light penalties to pay down the road if they continue to move ahead on uranium enrichment. The suggestion that the Security Council means business and that tighter sanctions may follow must carry little weight with Iran’s leaders at this late stage after so many similar empty warnings over the last 18 months.

I am deeply concerned also with the way the Security Council is now formulating and using sanctions resolutions. They are simply setting the sanctions bar too low - both in terms of its impact and its enforcement - to have any effect. The Security Council should always avoid adopting measures that they already know, in advance, are unlikely to achieve any of the stated objectives. Such action serve only as an “empty gesture” or "excuse" for non-action on the part of the Security Council, and by others who are using the Security Council measures merely as an excuse for not taking any action themselves. This serves only to diminish the credibility of the Security Council and the effectiveness of sanctions as an effective foreign policy tool. The use of new terminology merely "calling" on states to "exercise vigilance and restraint" when it comes to halting the flow of heavy arms and military equipment, including missiles to Iran, or to restricting the travel of key nuclear and military personnel, is particularly ludicrous and disturbing. Why not ban such trade and travel outright? Hopefully, such provisions will not become standard fare when it comes to future sanctions resolutions.

I invite readers to compare the measures in Resolution 1747 to the kinds of sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council in previous times discussed below.

The weakness of the Resolution 1747 (2007) speaks for itself. It adopts 5 specific new measures to pressure Iran to comply with its call to abandon its unregulated uranium enrichment program. These include:

(1) A very limited asset freeze directed at an additional 28 Iranian military entities and military leaders, presumably few, if any of which, still maintain significant bank accounts or assets overseas. Of note, however, is the addition of Iran's Bank Sepah to the list of entities whose assets must now be frozen.

(2) A ban on Iranian sales and exports of arms and military equipment. Iran now sells arms to only a few countries in the Mideast and Africa, including Sudan. Hezbollah, also, is a major recipient of Iranian arms, but that covert supply route is unlikely to be affected by the new resolution. It is also unclear if the resolution applies to current arms purchase contracts.

(3) A non-obligatory suggestion that countries “exercise vigiliance and restraint,” when it comes to providing heavy military arms and equipment to Iran, including “battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems.”

(4) A non-obligatory suggestion that all countries “exercise vigilance and restraint" when it comes to allowing specified Iranian military officers and nuclear scientists and engineers visit their countries; and

(5) A non-obligatory suggestion that all countries and international financial institutions not engage in new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the government of Iran, except if they are to be used for humanitarian or developmental purposes. But there is no suggestion that countries should also refrain from otherwise undertaking normal business transactions or commercial investments with the Iranian government, including investment in Iran’s key energy sector.

Now, who can really expect that any of these measures will deter Iran from its present course of action?

Let’s compare these measures to the severity of previous UN Security Council Sanctions resolutions. The most comprehensive and severe UN sanctions program were directed against Serbia and Iraq.

The Serbia Sanctions were adopted following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, and during the progression of the war in Croatia and Bosnia. They included a complete arms embargo and a comprehensive program of economic sanctions that prohibited all imports from and exports to Serbia and Montenegro (except for exports of food and medical supplies). The measures adopted also banned all financial services and transactions, all scientific and technical cooperation, and all flights to and from Serbia and Montenegro. The assets of all Yugoslav government-owned and -controlled entities were frozen, and the provision of services, both financial and non-financial, for the purposes of business carried on in Yugoslavia were prohibited. All maritime traffic was prohibited from entering Yugoslavia's territorial sea. See UNSC Resolutions 713, 724, 757, 787, 820, and 942.

Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council imposed a series of stringent sanctions measures against Iraq which included a complete arms embargo, a trade embargo on imports to and exports from Iraq except for “supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and in, humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs,” and a comprehensive asset freeze and ban on financial services and financial transactions. A flight ban was also imposed as were bans on all maritime traffic. Following the end of the Gulf War, and in order to obtain full Iraqi compliance with previous UN Security Council resolutions, the Security Council maintained a package of sanctions against Iraq which included, inter alia, a complete arms embargo, an investment ban, a financial services and transactions ban, a ban on sensitive and dual use equipment and technology, and controls on Iraq’s oil exports and importation of civilian goods under the UN Oil for Food program. There was also a flight and maritime traffic ban. See UNSC Resolutions 661, 665, 678, 687, and 706

The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Afghanistan in October 1999, demanding that the Taliban cease its activities in support of international terrorism and turn over Osama Bin Laden to the appropriate authorities. To enforce these demands, the Council froze Taliban bank accounts and assets overseas, and established a flight ban on Ariana Afghan airlines. These sanctions were quickly expanded to require all countries to ban the sale of weapons and military equipment, and certain chemicals to Afghanistan, to close all Taliban offices in their countries and to expel any Taliban officials within their borders. A total travel ban and flight ban were also imposed. Similar measures were also applied to individuals and entities identified as being associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban.

In order to pressure Libya to cooperate with the investigation into the downing of PanAm flight 109 over Lockerbie, and to turn over for trial those responsible, the Security Council imposed a series of sanctions measures including a comprehensive arms embargo, an asset and financial transaction freeze, a ban on the provision of equipment and technology for oil refining and transportation, and on all air flights to and from Libya. All countries were also required to reduce the number of Libyan diplomatic personnel serving in their countries. See UNSC Resolutions 748 and 883.

The Security Council has imposed sanctions against Sudan on several occasions, most recently in 2004 and 2005. These measures are directly principally against non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating North, South and West Darfur. They include a comprehensive arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze on individuals designated by the Committee.

Sanctions against Liberia were adopted in 1997 and continue to include an arms embargo, travel ban and prohibition on the purchase or sale of diamonds originating or coming form Liberia. Similar sanctions were also imposed against specific individuals and entities stemming from Sierra Leone. A ban on round timber coming from Liberia was eventually dropped.

During the recent Congo crisis the Security Council imposed a complete arms embargo on all foreign and Congolese armed groups and militias operating in the territory of North and South Kivu and Ituri provinces. They also imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on all persons identified as acting in violation of the arms embargo, as well as on the political and military leaders of the various armed groups operating in the DRC. They added to this list also those political and military leaders and other individuals who were recruiting or using child-soldiers, and otherwise targeting children in the conflict.

This is only a sampling of the use by the UN Security Council of sanctions measures to deal with local crisis and unacceptable state behavior. There have been numerous other uses of sanctions in the past, including against Rhodesia and South Africa. These measures had a purpose and they had an impact. But the measures so far adopted against Iran stand out singularly as the weakest and most timid response the Security Council has ever made in dealing with such a high profile and potentially egregious disturbance to international peace and security as Iran’s (and North Korea's) determination to develop and possess nuclear weapons.